Is It Time to Recognize the Taliban Government?

Robert Kluijver. Published in The Conversation (France): December 1, 2024, 4:06 PM CET

Is it justifiable to continue not recognizing the Taliban government, which has been in power for more than three years? This stance does nothing to improve the situation of Afghan women and prevents the international community from fully engaging with other critical issues playing in the country.


Working for the United Nations in Afghanistan

Working for the United Nations in Afghanistan today presents specific challenges. The Taliban government, in power since August 15, 2021, is not recognized. Despite this non-recognition, the UN maintains a political presence in the country, with around 1,000 expatriates working for its agencies, primarily providing humanitarian aid to the population to the tune of several billion dollars per year.

When the Taliban took power, they assured the international community that their members could remain and that foreign civilians would enjoy their protection. Western diplomatic missions all left to avoid recognizing the new regime, but UN agencies stayed on. Their presence was justified by the duty to assist the population.

Afghanistan is indeed beset by multiple crises. The war has ended, but the country has been severely affected by climate change since at least the 1990s. Long droughts alternating with torrential rains, as well as the melting glaciers that feed irrigation canals, have caused a decline in agricultural productivity and rural exodus to cities.

Adding to this is a severe economic contraction: the abrupt departure of the international community caused GDP to fall by 28% in one year. By autumn 2021, another year marked by drought, the UN was forecasting a possible famine. Somewhat reluctantly, the international community continued to fund activities in Afghanistan—on the condition that its funds did not benefit the Taliban.

There was no humanitarian catastrophe that first winter or in the years that followed, even though the dual climate and economic crises persisted, compounded by other disasters, both natural (earthquakes and floods) and political (Pakistan’s decision to expel hundreds of thousands of Afghans). The UN takes credit for averting a grave humanitarian crisis, although other factors, such as peace and solidarity among Afghans, may have contributed more.


Contradictory Positions

UN agency leaders in Afghanistan must coordinate their activities with the new authorities, who had developed a strong grip on society even before returning to power during two decades of “shadow governance.” Their prudent administration of controlled areas, coupled with what many Afghans perceived as a national liberation war against a foreign occupation, had garnered a certain degree of popular legitimacy, which has grown since they assumed power.

After 20 years of war and NATO’s withdrawal, the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan—the Taliban’s official name—is not going anywhere soon. This is clear to everyone in Afghanistan, including those within UN agencies.

However, the UN refers to the new regime as the “de facto authorities.”, stressing that they lack international legitimacy. The previous government, despite its complete collapse, still holds Afghanistan’s seat at the UN and most embassies worldwide. While some key states, notably China, Iran and Russia, have engaged with Kabul’s leaders, the Islamic Emirate lacks representation in international institutions, where the Taliban are still regarded as a terrorist organization.

Pressure on the Taliban to accept values that we see as universal—which they dispute—only radicalizes them further. As the Taliban’s Director of International Trade remarked to me in December 2023, citing their efforts against ISIS-K and the destruction of opium fields:

“You [the international community] wanted us to fight terrorism. We did. You were concerned about opium production harming your youth. We ended it. Yet, you have never publicly acknowledged that the Islamic Emirate solved the problems your [2001–2021 republic] government could not. Now, you constantly criticize us over Afghan women and expect us to listen. But this concerns our society, and you have no say in it.”

Within the UN worldwide, the perception of the Taliban as misogynistic religious barbarians to be categorically rejected is widespread. However, such rhetoric has no impact on the plight of Afghan women and complicates the work of UN staff on the ground. They must publicly reject the Taliban government while enoying their protection and hospitality, and negotiate with them discreetly to achieve concrete outcomes.


Quiet Exchanges Yield Results

In April 2023, the Taliban announced that Afghan women could no longer work for the UN in the country. Yet, no women have been dismissed to date, and new recruits have even been hired, thanks to behind-the-scenes dialogue with Taliban leaders. Public UN criticism of the Taliban’s policies on women risks jeopardizing such negotiations.

International attention on Afghanistan remains narrowly focused on one issue: the condition of Afghan women. A French TV producer warned me that if my pitch on Afghanistan didn’t involve “beards and burqas,” no network would be interested. While the plight of Afghan women, particularly girls barred from secondary and higher education, should not be minimized, other issues also deserve attention.


Climate Change

Afghanistan contributes almost nothing to climate change but suffers heavily from it. If desertification in this country of 40 million people continues, we can expect waves of migration to neighboring and wealthier temperate countries. The Islamic Emirate is concerned about the climate threat and could be an effective partner in climate adaptation—but only if allowed to participate in international forums and access funding, such as those negotiated at COP 29. While the Taliban were invited to COP 29, it was only with observer status.

The FAO, for which I served as a strategic communications advisor, continues to implement programs for environmental preservation, reforestation, and irrigation projects. However, communication efforts must carefully demonstrate that these programs benefit only affected communities, not the government. If a government member attends an inauguration, their photo is avoided in publicity materials.

The UNDP, another agency with a mandate on climate change, has halted all environmental programs to avoid any suspicion of collusion. Even the term “development” is now prohibited in agency communications in Afghanistan, replaced by the language of meeting “basic needs.”


Breaking the Deadlock

Refusing to acknowledge the Taliban government in Afghanistan seems to achieve little beyond giving Western politicians a moral boost as protectors of Afghan women.

While this stance may comfort Afghan exiles hoping to regain power with Western backing, it changes nothing on the ground. Believing the Taliban will collapse under international public pressure after defeating the US and NATO is wishful thinking.

A more transparent relationship with Afghanistan’s new rulers would improve the UN’s chances of having a positive impact on the country, especially in the medium and long term.


Robert Kluijver, Associate Researcher at the Center for International Studies (CERI), Sciences Po/CNRS, and expert on the Horn of Africa.54

Self-Governance plan of Sudan’s resistance committees

Sudan’s resistance committees are still active – by necessity, because they are the only networks supporting the people of Sudan, taking care of public services while the state has failed nearly completely. We should support these democratic popular forces in whatever way possible.

In January 2022 the resistance committees of Khartoum state (the urban agglomeration of Khartoum, which holds between a third and half of Sudan’s population) published a Charter for the Establishment of People’s Authority. This charter is an open source document, and it leaves most specifics of the transitional governance structures open to be decided in a democratic way. But some of its principles reveal what self-governance coordinated by resistance committees may look like:

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La Somalie: État défaillant ou État aubaine?

This is my 1.5 page contribution to “Un Monde en Crises“, an analytical digest of the world today written by researchers of the Centre de Recherches Internationales. It argues that the Somali state is not a failure for Somali elites, who distribute international funding to their clan constituencies. Since all clans are represented in the current make-up of the Federal State, this maintains some stability in the country.

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Neoliberal academic publishing

revised on 28/06 01.00 am

I participated in a workshop on academic publishing in peer-reviewed journals, given by the editors of a journal based in Central Europe. This journal has become part of the Palgrave-Springer conglomerate.

While nearly all journal editors, all reviewers and authors work for free, and authors that want to publish ‘open access’ with one of those journals need to pay a fee of typically 1500-3000 USD (so their article does not appear behind a paywall), the journals themselves make whopping profit margins of 40% on average by selling subscriptions and individual articles for very high prices.

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Al Shabaab governance

This article, based on recent fieldwork by Somali researchers and the insights they have kindly provided me with, and on interviews I conducted in Mogadishu and Beled Weyne in 2020, examines how Al Shabaab exerts its rule over the southern and central regions of Somalia. The movement depends on local support, as it receives practically no international support, and thus needs to gain legitimacy through its governance. The opposite is true of the federal government of Somalia, which receives most of its funding from abroad. The insurgents outgovern the federal government of Somalia in practically all aspects. They also govern the population in Mogadishu and other areas supposedly under government control.

To explain Al Shabaab’s staying power despite the international community’s continuous efforts to militarily defeat it, the insurgency is examined as an expression of what once was a successful social movement, as a nationalist resistance movement, and through the lens of rebel governance. Its political project, to supercede fractious Somali clan identities by imposing an Islamist state, is shared by many Somalis, even if they dislike Al Shabaab’s religious fervour and would prefer to live in an open society accepted by the rest of the world.

What seems practically sure is that when international support for the dysfunctional Somali state wanes, the group will sweep to power as swiftly as the Taliban did in Afghanistan.

Following is first the summary of the article, then a link to the full text (24 pages + 3 pages bibliography

Abstract: Viewing the Somali Islamic insurgency movement Al Shabaab as a terrorist or criminal organization strips it of the very possibility of legitimacy. Foreign experts commonly assume that it rules through fear, violence, propaganda and the manipulation of the population’s needs. Recent studies however show that Al Shabaab’s rule is largely tolerated and that the movement, through tight and predictable governance and a nationalist discourse, has garnered some popular legitimacy. This article places these findings within a critical ‘rebel governance’ discourse that examines the movement not from a counter-insurgency perspective but through the lens of evolving socio-cultural relations between the population and the insurgents. How does Al Shabaab respond to the demands of the population while accomplishing its social transformation project: replacing fractious clan identities with a nationalist Islamic one? Considering that the main long-term problem facing the Somali people is climate change, while in the short term peace is the most urgent issue, I argue that the international intervention in Somalia should take into account existing local governance arrangements, including Al Shabaab rule, instead of trying to replace them with liberal democracy.

Map from 2021 showing the extent of Al Shabaab influence over south & central Somalia (about 50% of the total territory of Somalia + Somaliland).

Download the full article here.

Interview in NRC over staatsopbouw in de Hoorn van Afrika

Interview

‘De liberale democratie die het Westen altijd als panacee voorschrijft, werkt simpelweg vaak niet’

https://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2023/05/29/er-zijn-meerdere-vormen-van-bestuur-als-alternatief-van-een-centrale-overheid-a4165826

Robert Kluijver | Expert internationale betrekkingen

In de Hoorn van Afrika verkruimelen staatsstructuren. Het Westen moet steun geven aan plaatselijke zelfhulpinitiatieven van burgers, zegt Robert Kluijver.

De Hoorn van Afrika staat in brand en staatsapparaten verkruimelen. In Somalië ging de centrale staat al ten onder in 1991, in Ethiopië nemen sinds 2020 regio’s het op tegen de centrale autoriteit. En in Soedan raakten de machthebbers vorige maand onderling slaags. Maar de bevolking zit niet bij de pakken neer en werkt aan alternatieve vormen van bestuur. De vraag is hoe om te gaan met dit proces van eroderende staatsstructuren. Misschien is het misplaatst om een sterke centrale regering te willen vestigen en moet juist steun worden gegeven aan plaatselijke zelfhulpinitiatieven van burgers, zoals de verzetsgroepen in Soedan en de lokale vredesinitiatieven in Somalië. Dat betoogt Robert Kluijver, die westerse pogingen bestudeert om liberale democratieën te vestigen in landen die cultureel vaak enorm verschillen.

Wat is er over van de staat in Soedan?

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From Limonov to Surkov: trying to understand Russian politics

Two books I read recently, ‘Limonov’ by Emmanuel Carrère and ‘Le Mage du Kremlin’ by Guiliano da Empoli, ignited my old passion for Russia.

In 1997 I spent a few days in Moscow on my way to Tajikistan, where I learnt to speak Russian. I took the train from Bishkek to Moscow on the way back, managing to blend in sufficiently to cross into Russia without a visa, and spent a week or so in Moscow figuring out how I would travel onward. After that experience I did a Masters in Post-Soviet Studies (in a programme set up by Hélène Carrère d’Encausse, the mother of Emmanuel) and returned a few times to Central Asia, Russia and Ukraine for research or simply travelling, before life pushed me southwards to Afghanistan and the Middle East.

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Sudan – The Solution is Real Democracy

Note: this article has appeared in African Arguments (Sudan: Revolutionary Reflections amid a Raging War) on May 5, 2023. A French version, more didactic and less politically engaged but otherwise substantially the same, appeared in the French edition of The Conversation (Soudan: la Transition Démocratique en Péril) on May 3, 2023.

The current fighting between military factions in Sudan must be seen against the backdrop of the Sudanese revolution that started in December 2018.

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Rêverie Politique

This was my submission to an ‘Ideas Festival’ organized by the Full Circle in Brussels from 2-4 December 2022

The human species is like an organism in which each individual is a node connected in dynamic ways to other individual nodes. Like the cells in a body, together we form a super-organism: humanity.

We may wonder whether Agent Smith in the Matrix was right when he characterizes humanity as a cancer exhausting and ultimately destroying its natural environment.

Still and text from the Matrix, 1999
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Zelensky asks the students of Sciences Po tough questions

On 11 May, the Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky spoke for one hour, through video connection, to the students of Sciences Po; students from other universities were also present. It appears to be the first time Zelensky addresses foreign students since the war began.

Screenshot of Zelensky speaking to students of Sciences Po. Banner image above: excerpt of work by the Ukrainian-born Israeli artist Zoya Cherkassky (Courtesy WithDraw the War: Art Fundraiser for Ukraine)

Noting that he had been briefed that at the end of his speech, five students would be allowed to ask a question, he said he found that a bit unfair towards other students, and that he preferred a dialogue. In his 15 minutes introductory speech, Zelensky asked a few pointed questions to the political science students:

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