Humanitarian response to Afghanistan: to make us feel good or to support Afghans?

Wed 15 September UPDATED ON 20 SEPTEMBER

Today I tried to send money by Western Union to a friend in Afghanistan. At their office on Louise square, Brussels, I was told that the Afghan government had banned transfers to the country. The director came to confirm that it had been a decision of the Taliban; the employee shook his head sadly in commiseration with the Afghans. Later I managed to transfer the amount on the company’s online platform. It was just not possible in dollars anymore, only in the local currency. That makes sense, because there are not so many dollars left in Afghanistan, and they are needed to buy things from abroad – such as food. Edit 10 November: my donation arrived in the Afghan bank but my friend had to come every day to stand in line, and each time he was told the money was there but they had no cash to pay him out. After three weeks I recalled the money and then sought out an Afghan money trader in Belgium that could send the money to my friend through the hawala system. Transfer costs are a bit lower than with Western Union and my friend could pick up the money from Kabul’s money market the same day.

The EU High Representative, Josep Borrell, said in a press statement this afternoon that a serious lessons learnt exercise was needed within the EU to reflect on the results of twenty years of statebuilding efforts. He also stated the EU should engage the new Taliban government (underlining it is not the same as recognizing them), overriding some member states who rather not even talk to the Taliban. He congratulated Europe on increasing the humanitarian aid available to Afghans to 200 million Euros. The Taliban government, in turn, yesterday thanked the world for the 1.2 billion USD pledged in Geneva to aid Afghanistan. But no European aid will be delivered through the Afghan government. The Ministries of Education, Health, Rural Development and others will have insufficient funds to confront the looming crisis.

A camp in the outskirts of Kabul for people displaced by the fighting in Southwest Afghanistan, visited in 2013. Photo by the author
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Policy paper: Engaging the Taliban

Robert Kluijver, 25 August /1 September 2021

As the dust settles after the Taliban takeover of the Afghan government, diplomats, donors and aid agencies are already wondering: how will we deal with the new government? I argue here that the West should engage the Taliban for the sake of the Afghan population.

Street view in Kabul’s old city, near Asheqan wa Arefan; 2013 (photo by author)

The EU has stopped its development aid, as have USAID and other major Western donors. This aid provided more than half of the Afghan government’s budget and no Western donor wants to appear to be propping up the Taliban regime. Instead, more humanitarian aid has been promised by the EU (increasing it from 50 to 200 million Euros) which it plans to disburse through the UN, to help fleeing Afghans as well as those staying in the country. Humanitarian assistance is typically disbursed through non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and is therefore seen as not supporting the government. This is highly problematic as I shall argue.

Likely security cooperation between the West and the Taliban

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Reflections on the crumbling of the Afghan state

I first arrived in Afghanistan on March 21, 2000. I was immediately whisked into the office of the Taliban Deputy Minister for Culture, who warmly welcomed my mission to collaborate on the documentation and protection of cultural heritage. In the following seven months I occasionally worked with him and other Taliban authorities, mostly at the provincial and district level, as I surveyed Afghan monuments and archaeological sites and undertook some small-scale protection and restoration works. I lived in Kabul and moved freely, without needing any protection, through the city and the country, except in the Northeastern areas held by the opposition.

Visiting the site of Hadda in Eastern Afghanistan, Sep 2000. Photo credit Molly or Nellika Little

I found the Taliban personable and hospitable as only Afghans can be, but I also noticed they were often uncultivated and inept, and intensely disliked by my Afghan colleagues. I once co-hosted a political gathering of Taliban (for the opening of the National Museum in August 2000) and then noticed that usually calm Taliban contacts suddenly agitated for jihad and national cultural resistance (the museum was closed again after three days): to me an antipathetic group identity and project. Moreover the Taliban were clearly incapable of governing the country – in four years since they had gained power they had not restored any buildings, and only paved 20 km of road – and most Afghans I met ardently longed they would disappear.

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The Taliban and The City

In a recent article, Antonio Giustozzi explains how the Taliban have improved their command & control structure. He describes how, under the military pressure of the US and NATO, and with the support of Pakistan’s ISI, the Taliban leadership has become more in control of the movement; and how this centralization alienates some local Taliban commanders and increasingly the population, who now have to deal with rotating commanders instead of well-known local strongmen (‘the devil you know’). Pakistani influence over the Taliban has always been terrible for the movement’s legitimacy among Afghans. On the other hand this centralization has allowed the Taliban to improve their governance and also their public image, as less brutalities are committed in the name of the movement.

Trevor Paglen: The Fence (Lake Kickapoo, Texas). C-print, 2010. Image of the electronic radar 'fence' around the USA to track traffic through space above the USA.

Trevor Paglen: The Fence (Lake Kickapoo, Texas). C-print, 2010. Image of the electronic radar ‘fence’ around the USA to track traffic through space above the USA.

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