Is It Time to Recognize the Taliban Government?

Robert Kluijver. Published in The Conversation (France): December 1, 2024, 4:06 PM CET

Is it justifiable to continue not recognizing the Taliban government, which has been in power for more than three years? This stance does nothing to improve the situation of Afghan women and prevents the international community from fully engaging with other critical issues playing in the country.


Working for the United Nations in Afghanistan

Working for the United Nations in Afghanistan today presents specific challenges. The Taliban government, in power since August 15, 2021, is not recognized. Despite this non-recognition, the UN maintains a political presence in the country, with around 1,000 expatriates working for its agencies, primarily providing humanitarian aid to the population to the tune of several billion dollars per year.

When the Taliban took power, they assured the international community that their members could remain and that foreign civilians would enjoy their protection. Western diplomatic missions all left to avoid recognizing the new regime, but UN agencies stayed on. Their presence was justified by the duty to assist the population.

Afghanistan is indeed beset by multiple crises. The war has ended, but the country has been severely affected by climate change since at least the 1990s. Long droughts alternating with torrential rains, as well as the melting glaciers that feed irrigation canals, have caused a decline in agricultural productivity and rural exodus to cities.

Adding to this is a severe economic contraction: the abrupt departure of the international community caused GDP to fall by 28% in one year. By autumn 2021, another year marked by drought, the UN was forecasting a possible famine. Somewhat reluctantly, the international community continued to fund activities in Afghanistan—on the condition that its funds did not benefit the Taliban.

There was no humanitarian catastrophe that first winter or in the years that followed, even though the dual climate and economic crises persisted, compounded by other disasters, both natural (earthquakes and floods) and political (Pakistan’s decision to expel hundreds of thousands of Afghans). The UN takes credit for averting a grave humanitarian crisis, although other factors, such as peace and solidarity among Afghans, may have contributed more.


Contradictory Positions

UN agency leaders in Afghanistan must coordinate their activities with the new authorities, who had developed a strong grip on society even before returning to power during two decades of “shadow governance.” Their prudent administration of controlled areas, coupled with what many Afghans perceived as a national liberation war against a foreign occupation, had garnered a certain degree of popular legitimacy, which has grown since they assumed power.

After 20 years of war and NATO’s withdrawal, the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan—the Taliban’s official name—is not going anywhere soon. This is clear to everyone in Afghanistan, including those within UN agencies.

However, the UN refers to the new regime as the “de facto authorities.”, stressing that they lack international legitimacy. The previous government, despite its complete collapse, still holds Afghanistan’s seat at the UN and most embassies worldwide. While some key states, notably China, Iran and Russia, have engaged with Kabul’s leaders, the Islamic Emirate lacks representation in international institutions, where the Taliban are still regarded as a terrorist organization.

Pressure on the Taliban to accept values that we see as universal—which they dispute—only radicalizes them further. As the Taliban’s Director of International Trade remarked to me in December 2023, citing their efforts against ISIS-K and the destruction of opium fields:

“You [the international community] wanted us to fight terrorism. We did. You were concerned about opium production harming your youth. We ended it. Yet, you have never publicly acknowledged that the Islamic Emirate solved the problems your [2001–2021 republic] government could not. Now, you constantly criticize us over Afghan women and expect us to listen. But this concerns our society, and you have no say in it.”

Within the UN worldwide, the perception of the Taliban as misogynistic religious barbarians to be categorically rejected is widespread. However, such rhetoric has no impact on the plight of Afghan women and complicates the work of UN staff on the ground. They must publicly reject the Taliban government while enoying their protection and hospitality, and negotiate with them discreetly to achieve concrete outcomes.


Quiet Exchanges Yield Results

In April 2023, the Taliban announced that Afghan women could no longer work for the UN in the country. Yet, no women have been dismissed to date, and new recruits have even been hired, thanks to behind-the-scenes dialogue with Taliban leaders. Public UN criticism of the Taliban’s policies on women risks jeopardizing such negotiations.

International attention on Afghanistan remains narrowly focused on one issue: the condition of Afghan women. A French TV producer warned me that if my pitch on Afghanistan didn’t involve “beards and burqas,” no network would be interested. While the plight of Afghan women, particularly girls barred from secondary and higher education, should not be minimized, other issues also deserve attention.


Climate Change

Afghanistan contributes almost nothing to climate change but suffers heavily from it. If desertification in this country of 40 million people continues, we can expect waves of migration to neighboring and wealthier temperate countries. The Islamic Emirate is concerned about the climate threat and could be an effective partner in climate adaptation—but only if allowed to participate in international forums and access funding, such as those negotiated at COP 29. While the Taliban were invited to COP 29, it was only with observer status.

The FAO, for which I served as a strategic communications advisor, continues to implement programs for environmental preservation, reforestation, and irrigation projects. However, communication efforts must carefully demonstrate that these programs benefit only affected communities, not the government. If a government member attends an inauguration, their photo is avoided in publicity materials.

The UNDP, another agency with a mandate on climate change, has halted all environmental programs to avoid any suspicion of collusion. Even the term “development” is now prohibited in agency communications in Afghanistan, replaced by the language of meeting “basic needs.”


Breaking the Deadlock

Refusing to acknowledge the Taliban government in Afghanistan seems to achieve little beyond giving Western politicians a moral boost as protectors of Afghan women.

While this stance may comfort Afghan exiles hoping to regain power with Western backing, it changes nothing on the ground. Believing the Taliban will collapse under international public pressure after defeating the US and NATO is wishful thinking.

A more transparent relationship with Afghanistan’s new rulers would improve the UN’s chances of having a positive impact on the country, especially in the medium and long term.


Robert Kluijver, Associate Researcher at the Center for International Studies (CERI), Sciences Po/CNRS, and expert on the Horn of Africa.54

Self-Governance plan of Sudan’s resistance committees

Sudan’s resistance committees are still active – by necessity, because they are the only networks supporting the people of Sudan, taking care of public services while the state has failed nearly completely. We should support these democratic popular forces in whatever way possible.

In January 2022 the resistance committees of Khartoum state (the urban agglomeration of Khartoum, which holds between a third and half of Sudan’s population) published a Charter for the Establishment of People’s Authority. This charter is an open source document, and it leaves most specifics of the transitional governance structures open to be decided in a democratic way. But some of its principles reveal what self-governance coordinated by resistance committees may look like:

Continue reading

Al Shabaab governance

This article, based on recent fieldwork by Somali researchers and the insights they have kindly provided me with, and on interviews I conducted in Mogadishu and Beled Weyne in 2020, examines how Al Shabaab exerts its rule over the southern and central regions of Somalia. The movement depends on local support, as it receives practically no international support, and thus needs to gain legitimacy through its governance. The opposite is true of the federal government of Somalia, which receives most of its funding from abroad. The insurgents outgovern the federal government of Somalia in practically all aspects. They also govern the population in Mogadishu and other areas supposedly under government control.

To explain Al Shabaab’s staying power despite the international community’s continuous efforts to militarily defeat it, the insurgency is examined as an expression of what once was a successful social movement, as a nationalist resistance movement, and through the lens of rebel governance. Its political project, to supercede fractious Somali clan identities by imposing an Islamist state, is shared by many Somalis, even if they dislike Al Shabaab’s religious fervour and would prefer to live in an open society accepted by the rest of the world.

What seems practically sure is that when international support for the dysfunctional Somali state wanes, the group will sweep to power as swiftly as the Taliban did in Afghanistan.

Following is first the summary of the article, then a link to the full text (24 pages + 3 pages bibliography

Abstract: Viewing the Somali Islamic insurgency movement Al Shabaab as a terrorist or criminal organization strips it of the very possibility of legitimacy. Foreign experts commonly assume that it rules through fear, violence, propaganda and the manipulation of the population’s needs. Recent studies however show that Al Shabaab’s rule is largely tolerated and that the movement, through tight and predictable governance and a nationalist discourse, has garnered some popular legitimacy. This article places these findings within a critical ‘rebel governance’ discourse that examines the movement not from a counter-insurgency perspective but through the lens of evolving socio-cultural relations between the population and the insurgents. How does Al Shabaab respond to the demands of the population while accomplishing its social transformation project: replacing fractious clan identities with a nationalist Islamic one? Considering that the main long-term problem facing the Somali people is climate change, while in the short term peace is the most urgent issue, I argue that the international intervention in Somalia should take into account existing local governance arrangements, including Al Shabaab rule, instead of trying to replace them with liberal democracy.

Map from 2021 showing the extent of Al Shabaab influence over south & central Somalia (about 50% of the total territory of Somalia + Somaliland).

Download the full article here.

Interview in NRC over staatsopbouw in de Hoorn van Afrika

Interview

‘De liberale democratie die het Westen altijd als panacee voorschrijft, werkt simpelweg vaak niet’

https://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2023/05/29/er-zijn-meerdere-vormen-van-bestuur-als-alternatief-van-een-centrale-overheid-a4165826

Robert Kluijver | Expert internationale betrekkingen

In de Hoorn van Afrika verkruimelen staatsstructuren. Het Westen moet steun geven aan plaatselijke zelfhulpinitiatieven van burgers, zegt Robert Kluijver.

De Hoorn van Afrika staat in brand en staatsapparaten verkruimelen. In Somalië ging de centrale staat al ten onder in 1991, in Ethiopië nemen sinds 2020 regio’s het op tegen de centrale autoriteit. En in Soedan raakten de machthebbers vorige maand onderling slaags. Maar de bevolking zit niet bij de pakken neer en werkt aan alternatieve vormen van bestuur. De vraag is hoe om te gaan met dit proces van eroderende staatsstructuren. Misschien is het misplaatst om een sterke centrale regering te willen vestigen en moet juist steun worden gegeven aan plaatselijke zelfhulpinitiatieven van burgers, zoals de verzetsgroepen in Soedan en de lokale vredesinitiatieven in Somalië. Dat betoogt Robert Kluijver, die westerse pogingen bestudeert om liberale democratieën te vestigen in landen die cultureel vaak enorm verschillen.

Wat is er over van de staat in Soedan?

Continue reading

Sudan – The Solution is Real Democracy

Note: this article has appeared in African Arguments (Sudan: Revolutionary Reflections amid a Raging War) on May 5, 2023. A French version, more didactic and less politically engaged but otherwise substantially the same, appeared in the French edition of The Conversation (Soudan: la Transition Démocratique en Péril) on May 3, 2023.

The current fighting between military factions in Sudan must be seen against the backdrop of the Sudanese revolution that started in December 2018.

Continue reading

The Sudanese Revolution

Perspectives from Khartoum, March-April 2022

I have come to Khartoum for a cultural mapping. The European Union has decided to expand its support of the Sudanese cultural sector. The EU, wired to support the state of Sudan, has no partner to work with since the military coup of Oct 25, five months ago: it does not recognize the military government. After several months of efforts to help reconstitute a civilian government, the EU delegation in Sudan has decided to increase its assistance program towards the support of civil society. One of the components of civil society is the cultural sector, supported over the past years through EUNIC. I am glad that sometimes the European Union does use its money wisely. My goal is to help them invest strategically into the cultural sector, in a way that builds it up instead of making it dependent on external funding.

As a result I’m in an intense round of consultations with all kinds of actors in this sector. Artists, directors of private organizations, commercial or non-benefit, institutions, researchers… everybody is speaking about the political and economic crisis, and are thinking about what the cultural sector can do to contribute to an outcome. In the following I will present some of their views on the double failure of the state and the economy, and how they are reacting to this crisis now. But first an explanation about the current situation in Sudan.

El Mek Nimr avenue, Khartoum. Photo by author
Continue reading

Le Somaliland, la démocratie africaine aux 30 ans d’isolement

For the full article (in French) see The Conversation here. I also gave a 20-minute interview in French on the Belgian Radio programme ‘Au Bout du Jour’ by Eddy Caekelberghs on 28 Feb 2022 (link here)

Il y a trente ans, tandis que la Somalie sombrait dans la guerre civile, la partie nord-ouest du pays a fait sécession. Elle s’est déclarée indépendante sous le nom de Somaliland. Depuis, ce pays a construit un État, un ordre démocratique, sa propre monnaie et une économie. Il a surtout connu la paix, à la différence de la Somalie voisine.

Le Somaliland, grand comme la moitié de la France, est peuplé de trois à quatre millions de personnes. Il commande une position stratégique sur les rives sud du Golfe d’Aden, une des zones majeures du transit maritime mondial.

Depuis trente ans, ce pays cherche la reconnaissance diplomatique, en tant que bon voisin et en respectant les règles internationales. Pourtant, il n’est pas reconnu. Pourquoi ?

Le marché du bétail à Aynabo. Robert Kluijver, Fourni par l’auteur
Continue reading

Policy paper: Engaging the Taliban

Robert Kluijver, 25 August /1 September 2021

As the dust settles after the Taliban takeover of the Afghan government, diplomats, donors and aid agencies are already wondering: how will we deal with the new government? I argue here that the West should engage the Taliban for the sake of the Afghan population.

Street view in Kabul’s old city, near Asheqan wa Arefan; 2013 (photo by author)

The EU has stopped its development aid, as have USAID and other major Western donors. This aid provided more than half of the Afghan government’s budget and no Western donor wants to appear to be propping up the Taliban regime. Instead, more humanitarian aid has been promised by the EU (increasing it from 50 to 200 million Euros) which it plans to disburse through the UN, to help fleeing Afghans as well as those staying in the country. Humanitarian assistance is typically disbursed through non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and is therefore seen as not supporting the government. This is highly problematic as I shall argue.

Likely security cooperation between the West and the Taliban

Continue reading

Reflections on the crumbling of the Afghan state

I first arrived in Afghanistan on March 21, 2000. I was immediately whisked into the office of the Taliban Deputy Minister for Culture, who warmly welcomed my mission to collaborate on the documentation and protection of cultural heritage. In the following seven months I occasionally worked with him and other Taliban authorities, mostly at the provincial and district level, as I surveyed Afghan monuments and archaeological sites and undertook some small-scale protection and restoration works. I lived in Kabul and moved freely, without needing any protection, through the city and the country, except in the Northeastern areas held by the opposition.

Visiting the site of Hadda in Eastern Afghanistan, Sep 2000. Photo credit Molly or Nellika Little

I found the Taliban personable and hospitable as only Afghans can be, but I also noticed they were often uncultivated and inept, and intensely disliked by my Afghan colleagues. I once co-hosted a political gathering of Taliban (for the opening of the National Museum in August 2000) and then noticed that usually calm Taliban contacts suddenly agitated for jihad and national cultural resistance (the museum was closed again after three days): to me an antipathetic group identity and project. Moreover the Taliban were clearly incapable of governing the country – in four years since they had gained power they had not restored any buildings, and only paved 20 km of road – and most Afghans I met ardently longed they would disappear.

Continue reading

Somaliland elections – backgrounder

The parliamentary and local council elections in Somaliland on May 31 went well; they were peaceful and they delivered a surprising result, because the opposition parties won.

The ruling party, Kulmiye, came second nationwide in the parliamentary polls, preceded with just one seat by Waddani. UCID, a party which had been doing quite poorly in recent elections, made a surprising comeback.

Continue reading