UPDATE: Fortunately the conflict was stopped by intense diplomacy, mostly to the credit of the UN Special Representative Michael Keating, who engaged in several rounds of shuttle diplomacy; President Farmajo also played a positive role, instead of weighing in on the side of Puntland as was long feared/expected. Currently (Feb 2020) the conflict is in its frozen state, as it has been since the late 1990s.
Several weeks after our report the International Crisis Group issued a report on the same subject, with many similar perspectives but more detail and links
June 1, 2018, Hargeisa and Addis Ababa. Over the past weeks more than 75 soldiers have been killed in the conflict opposing Puntland and Somaliland near Tukaraq. This is the heaviest death toll recorded in conflict between the two states over the past twenty years.
Landscape of the Nugaal plain near Faleeryale in the contested area. Pic by R Kluijver
The shelling in the morning of 24 May between the front lines, causing the death of 27 soldiers and the injury of twice as many, followed on a ceasefire agreement signed on 23 May. Each side accuses the other of violating that ceasefire.
In January of this year Somaliland took the town of Tukaraq and several others in the vicinity. These were in the area controlled by Puntland; Tukaraq was its customs and security checkpoint. Puntland’s parliament declared war and both sides sent troops to the front line in Eastern Sool province, but until May there were no casualties, despite occasional shelling between the stationary troops.
The two states have contested sovereignty of this area since Puntland was established, in 1998, as a Harti state within Somalia. The Dhulbahante and Warsangeli that live in Eastern Sanaag, Sool and Buuhoodle belong to the Harti confederation so Puntland assumed control over these areas. On the other hand, Somaliland was established in 1991 as an independent state within its pre-unification, British borders, and according to the map these areas belong to Somaliland. Until now fighting between both states was largely symbolic and geared toward winning the political loyalty of the inhabitants; bloodshed has been rare.
Besides being much more violent, the current clashes are worrisome for the following reasons:
1. The soldiers on both sides belong to national armies, not clan militias. Past conflict occurred between neighbouring clans or sub-clans whose alliances with either Puntland or Somaliland were not steadfast and did not lead to significant support from these governments. By themselves, local clans have insufficient resources for protracted warfare. They also avoid fatalities, which lead to either revenge killings or onerous blood-money compensation. This moderating factor is now absent. It is now the army of Puntland fighting against that of Somaliland.
2. Since the election of Somaliland’s President Bihi last November, tensions were sparked between Hargeisa and Mogadishu by Somaliland’s deal with the UAE to establish a military base in Berbera. There is no perspective for dialogue as there is fundamental disagreement between both parties over the status (independence) of Somaliland. Although Mogadishu has had no control over Somaliland since 1991, the federal government still acts as if Somaliland were one of its federal states. The authorities in Hargeisa have alleged that the federal government provides covert military support to Puntland, but there is no evidence of that; if the conflict worsens, however, it is likely that the federal government will stand by its ally against what it sees as a renegade local government.
3. This conflict is also embedded in the current Gulf conflict. The UAE supports Somaliland, and Qatar the federal government. Turkey sides with Qatar and federal Somalia and has an important military role already in the Somali federal army. These regional powers, including Saudi Arabia, could be drawn into a low-intensity conflict in Eastern Sool, adding fuel to the fire. Ethiopia alone has good relations with both Somaliland and Puntland and has an interest in peace between the two states, that it both supports, but its new government is focusing on other, internal issues.
The row that President Farmajo started over the UAE-Somaliland deal may have strengthened Somaliland’s case for independence. The UAE has stated unequivocally that it recognizes the sovereignty of Somaliland, a considerable victory in its bid for international recognition. The growing strategic interest of the UAE in Somaliland – while it has interrupted its security assistance to Mogadishu – may give President Bihi confidence. The UAE’s budding military presence, about which most Somalilanders feel ambiguous, has received a PR boost with the participation of UAE military aircraft in search and rescue operations in Western Somaliland after the cyclone that hit the coast on 20-21 May. Moreover, Bihi is a military man whose participation in the Somaliland resistance brought him fame, and he may well feel inclined to start his presidency with a military victory. The declared plan is to secure the Eastern border of Somaliland, which is now within Puntland-controlled areas. If Somaliland believes it can secure a quick military victory at an acceptable cost, it may initiate an offensive soon.
Puntland’s President Gaas, facing elections scheduled for January 2019, similarly seems to prefer a military solution to the simmering dispute over the control of Eastern Sool and Sanaag. Besides the popularity boost it may give him, he needs the votes of the 17 Dhulbahante and 8 Warsangeli members of the 66-strong Puntland Parliament who will elect the President after the elections. At the start of his presidency in 2014 Gaas promised Puntland would retrieve these areas. In both Eastern Sool and Eastern Sanaag, Puntland has witnessed the advance of Somaliland’s influence, and it sees this as an aggression that must be responded to.
The Dhulbahante, whose inner turmoil has usually triggered previous conflicts between Puntland and Somaliland, now seem to have a secondary role. Traditionally they are inclined towards Puntland because of their belonging to the Darood/Harti confederation; moreover, they have a considerable presence in the federal and Puntland’s government. On the other hand, the Dhulbahante autonomy movement Khatumo and Somaliland reached an agreement in 2017, providing the Dhulbahante with more leverage in Hargeisa, where they also now occupy senior government positions.
The current conflict is reinforcing divisions among the Dhulbahante factions. The pro-Puntland faction is led by the current Vice-President of Puntland Abdihakim Abdullahi Omar ‘Amey’, a Dhulbahante from Buuhoodle. The pro-Somaliland faction is led by Khatumo President Ali Khalif Galaydh. There are many other factions, each with their own leaders, often divided along sub-clan lines. A war might consolidate the power of Amey and Galaydh, and thus benefit them politically. In any case, as this is no longer their conflict, Dhulbahante leaders are not in a position to stop it.
The federal government in Mogadishu has appealed to both sides to resolve the conflict by dialogue and is calling for troops to be deployed between the two sides. On Friday 25 May President Farmajo suggested the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) keep the peace, but AMISOM and its donors are unlikely to respond to this request. Also, for the reasons described above, Somaliland does not see the federal government as a neutral arbiter and would not welcome AMISOM.
There is now a clear danger that the conflict in Eastern Sool will spread to other areas contested by both states, namely Buuhoodle (on the Ethiopian border) and Eastern Sanaag.
It is clear to local observers that neither Somalilanders nor Puntlanders have an appetite for war, but political movements have not emerged to reflect this position. In the absence of a civil society voice, political leaders on both sides have resorted to clan discourses, pitting ‘Isaaqness’ against ‘Daroodness’ each as victim of the other, to mobilize their population. The VP of Puntland recently appealed to the Dhulbahante diaspora to support Puntland, claiming that other non-Puntland Darood clan fighters from the Marehan and Ogaden had joined the struggle against the Isaaq (the government in Garowe however denies this). This is a dangerous development, reminiscent of the situation in the early 1990s when such clan discourse precipitated most of Somalia into civil war. If somewhere far from the frontlines an Isaaq will be killed by a Darood, or vice-versa, that will be a sure sign the conflict has spilled over.
To avoid this happening, and given that political leaders may find it convenient to resort to war and can thus not be counted upon to avoid it, citizens from both Somaliland and Puntland will have to protest against the impending war and call for a peaceful resolution of the conflict. The federal government and regional powers (Qatar, UAE, Turkey, Ethiopia and others) should refrain from providing any military resources to either side until a political solution is reached. The UN should ensure its arms embargo is complied with. Meanwhile, awareness should be spread about the potential threat to long-term reconciliation in the Somali region if this conflict is allowed to degenerate into war. That is why we have written this brief overview; we hope you can act upon it.
May 31, 2018
Khaalid Hassan and Robert Kluijver. Khaalid is an expert on local governance and economic development based in Hargeisa; Robert, based in Ethiopia, is writing a PhD after two years working as analyst of Somali affairs.