About

Osama kulfa balls

A box of Pakistani sweets I bought in Kandahar in April 2002, showing how popular Osama Ben Laden was at that time

Zie hier voor Nederlands (okt 2018)

This is the personal webpage of Robert Kluijver (born in Cyprus, 1968). I use it to publish blogs, articles that have appeared in the press (with link) or not, and reviews. In the top menu are links to other sites I have made and publications.

I studied international relations in Amsterdam and Paris (PhD obtained in January 2023). I worked and undertook academic research in Central Asia (1997-2000), Afghanistan (2000-2007), the Middle East (2007-2015) and the Horn of Africa (2015 to now). I worked for the United Nations, the Open Society Institute, NGOs (MSF and INSO), donor organizations and a variety of other organizations (EU, World Bank, research institutes). I currently live in Brussels. I specialize in research and analysis of conflict and post-conflict situations with a focus on artistic and cultural development.

In the field of the arts I produced the first Pavilion of Afghanistan at the Venice Biennale (2005), and curated contemporary art exhibitions in the Netherlands, Paris, Berlin, Kabul, the UAE, Saudi Arabia and India. 

From 2010 to 2016 I taught the courses ‘Contemporary Art and Geopolitics in the Arab World’ and ‘Lessons (not) Learnt in Afghanistan’ at the Paris School of International Affairs (Sciences Po master program). From September 2016 to October 2022 I worked on my PhD ‘The State in Somalia: Between Self-Governance and International Order’. Since my successful defense I am continuing my academic research, publishing and lecturing activities, associated with the Paris-based Center for International Studies (CERI) and am looking for a stable university position.

Simultaneously I work as a consultant for international organizations; recently I have worked in Sudan and Somalia as a consultant on cultural development, assisting donors in supporting the creative sector, without creating imbalances or dependency.

My Area of Operation/Expertise

Recent Posts

Is It Time to Recognize the Taliban Government?

Robert Kluijver. Published in The Conversation (France): December 1, 2024, 4:06 PM CET

Is it justifiable to continue not recognizing the Taliban government, which has been in power for more than three years? This stance does nothing to improve the situation of Afghan women and prevents the international community from fully engaging with other critical issues playing in the country.


Working for the United Nations in Afghanistan

Working for the United Nations in Afghanistan today presents specific challenges. The Taliban government, in power since August 15, 2021, is not recognized. Despite this non-recognition, the UN maintains a political presence in the country, with around 1,000 expatriates working for its agencies, primarily providing humanitarian aid to the population to the tune of several billion dollars per year.

When the Taliban took power, they assured the international community that their members could remain and that foreign civilians would enjoy their protection. Western diplomatic missions all left to avoid recognizing the new regime, but UN agencies stayed on. Their presence was justified by the duty to assist the population.

Afghanistan is indeed beset by multiple crises. The war has ended, but the country has been severely affected by climate change since at least the 1990s. Long droughts alternating with torrential rains, as well as the melting glaciers that feed irrigation canals, have caused a decline in agricultural productivity and rural exodus to cities.

Adding to this is a severe economic contraction: the abrupt departure of the international community caused GDP to fall by 28% in one year. By autumn 2021, another year marked by drought, the UN was forecasting a possible famine. Somewhat reluctantly, the international community continued to fund activities in Afghanistan—on the condition that its funds did not benefit the Taliban.

There was no humanitarian catastrophe that first winter or in the years that followed, even though the dual climate and economic crises persisted, compounded by other disasters, both natural (earthquakes and floods) and political (Pakistan’s decision to expel hundreds of thousands of Afghans). The UN takes credit for averting a grave humanitarian crisis, although other factors, such as peace and solidarity among Afghans, may have contributed more.


Contradictory Positions

UN agency leaders in Afghanistan must coordinate their activities with the new authorities, who had developed a strong grip on society even before returning to power during two decades of “shadow governance.” Their prudent administration of controlled areas, coupled with what many Afghans perceived as a national liberation war against a foreign occupation, had garnered a certain degree of popular legitimacy, which has grown since they assumed power.

After 20 years of war and NATO’s withdrawal, the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan—the Taliban’s official name—is not going anywhere soon. This is clear to everyone in Afghanistan, including those within UN agencies.

However, the UN refers to the new regime as the “de facto authorities.”, stressing that they lack international legitimacy. The previous government, despite its complete collapse, still holds Afghanistan’s seat at the UN and most embassies worldwide. While some key states, notably China, Iran and Russia, have engaged with Kabul’s leaders, the Islamic Emirate lacks representation in international institutions, where the Taliban are still regarded as a terrorist organization.

Pressure on the Taliban to accept values that we see as universal—which they dispute—only radicalizes them further. As the Taliban’s Director of International Trade remarked to me in December 2023, citing their efforts against ISIS-K and the destruction of opium fields:

“You [the international community] wanted us to fight terrorism. We did. You were concerned about opium production harming your youth. We ended it. Yet, you have never publicly acknowledged that the Islamic Emirate solved the problems your [2001–2021 republic] government could not. Now, you constantly criticize us over Afghan women and expect us to listen. But this concerns our society, and you have no say in it.”

Within the UN worldwide, the perception of the Taliban as misogynistic religious barbarians to be categorically rejected is widespread. However, such rhetoric has no impact on the plight of Afghan women and complicates the work of UN staff on the ground. They must publicly reject the Taliban government while enoying their protection and hospitality, and negotiate with them discreetly to achieve concrete outcomes.


Quiet Exchanges Yield Results

In April 2023, the Taliban announced that Afghan women could no longer work for the UN in the country. Yet, no women have been dismissed to date, and new recruits have even been hired, thanks to behind-the-scenes dialogue with Taliban leaders. Public UN criticism of the Taliban’s policies on women risks jeopardizing such negotiations.

International attention on Afghanistan remains narrowly focused on one issue: the condition of Afghan women. A French TV producer warned me that if my pitch on Afghanistan didn’t involve “beards and burqas,” no network would be interested. While the plight of Afghan women, particularly girls barred from secondary and higher education, should not be minimized, other issues also deserve attention.


Climate Change

Afghanistan contributes almost nothing to climate change but suffers heavily from it. If desertification in this country of 40 million people continues, we can expect waves of migration to neighboring and wealthier temperate countries. The Islamic Emirate is concerned about the climate threat and could be an effective partner in climate adaptation—but only if allowed to participate in international forums and access funding, such as those negotiated at COP 29. While the Taliban were invited to COP 29, it was only with observer status.

The FAO, for which I served as a strategic communications advisor, continues to implement programs for environmental preservation, reforestation, and irrigation projects. However, communication efforts must carefully demonstrate that these programs benefit only affected communities, not the government. If a government member attends an inauguration, their photo is avoided in publicity materials.

The UNDP, another agency with a mandate on climate change, has halted all environmental programs to avoid any suspicion of collusion. Even the term “development” is now prohibited in agency communications in Afghanistan, replaced by the language of meeting “basic needs.”


Breaking the Deadlock

Refusing to acknowledge the Taliban government in Afghanistan seems to achieve little beyond giving Western politicians a moral boost as protectors of Afghan women.

While this stance may comfort Afghan exiles hoping to regain power with Western backing, it changes nothing on the ground. Believing the Taliban will collapse under international public pressure after defeating the US and NATO is wishful thinking.

A more transparent relationship with Afghanistan’s new rulers would improve the UN’s chances of having a positive impact on the country, especially in the medium and long term.


Robert Kluijver, Associate Researcher at the Center for International Studies (CERI), Sciences Po/CNRS, and expert on the Horn of Africa.54

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