

Foundation for Culture and Civil Society
Yearly Report 2005

To the Open Society Institute



Atan-e Melli (National Pashto Dance) performance in the FCCS courtyard, June 2005

By Robert Kluijver
FCCS Ex-Executive Director

Introduction

This report is made on behest of the Open Society Institute, who in 2005, as in 2004, generously provided core funding to the Foundation for Culture and Civil Society.

Although the 100,000 USD OSI grant to the FCCS was spent on specific budget items, the undesignated nature of the grant justifies a general report about FCCS activities in 2005. OSI funds generally went to supporting staff salaries, expansion of and improvements on the FCCS premises, and providing extra funding for projects supported by other donors, for example for the recording of those activities for the FCCS archives.

The total amount of OSI grants made to Afghanistan in 2005 as part of Institute's Central Eurasia Program is approximately 1,000,000 USD. Some of the larger grants were made directly to Afghanistan-related projects of organizations based in the USA, others were made directly to Afghan civil society organizations, and the rest were re-granted through the FCCS to smaller organizations in Afghanistan that required financial and technical assistance of the FCCS to implement their activities. A summary of these three types of grants made in 2004 and 2005 is included at the end of this report. In this report there is no information about these grants (reports have been provided separately), with the exception of the OSI grant to the Open Media Fund for Afghanistan, a grant-making program administered by the FCCS and mainly supported by OSI.

Furthermore some of the FCCS activities were supported by OSI network programs, such as the Nauroz Music Festival (supported by the "East-East Partnership Program") and the Kabul Book Fair (supported by the Next Page Foundation and the Information Program). These have been reported on previously, but for the sake of completeness they have also been included here.

This report is structured in the following way:

1. Summary of FCCS progress and activities in 2005
2. Details on management & administration issues and activities, sector by sector
3. Future of the FCCS: management report made by the Executive Director shortly before submitting his resignation to the FCCS Board of Directors
4. Additional information on OSI grants and relations between OSI and FCCS

But first, I would like to acknowledge two groups of people, who have made the FCCS a success: the staff of the organization, especially the medium level staff who while performing essential functions are rarely given gratitude, and the donors:

Main Donors and Supporters of the FCCS

The following organizations are listed in approximate order of the importance of their support to the FCCS,. Most of the support has been financial, but some of it has also been of invaluable technical nature.

- The European Commission
- The Open Society Institute
- The World Bank
- The Asia Foundation (with USAID funding)
- The Embassy of the Netherlands
- Swiss Development and Cooperation
- Prince Claus Fund (Netherlands)
- CIDA/Canada Fund
- The US Embassy
- UN Habitat
- DED (Deutscher Entwicklungsdienst)
- Department For International Development
- The Embassy of Finland
- The Embassy of Norway
- UNAMA (AETF)
- UNDP
- UNODC
- International Organization for Migrations (IOM)
- The Embassy of France
- The Embassy of Italy

We would also like to thank individual donors to the FCCS, such as

- the Theatre du Soleil, who shipped about 6 tons of theatre equipment collected from various theatres and performance companies in France
- Norwegian Theatre groups from Bergen, who collected 4,000 Euros that was sent to support Afghan music and theatre development
- Frau Erika Kessler from Switzerland, who donated many books, music scores and some art materials
- Roya Ghiasy and Sisley Xhofa, two contemporary artists of Afghan and Albanian origin who brought valuable contemporary art books to our resource center
- Homira Nassery, who collected some art materials for the FCCS

And finally, we cannot go without mentioning the exceptional people in whose minds the Foundation for Culture and Civil Society was dreamed up: Scott Guggenheim (World Bank), Julian Wilson (European Commission) and Clare Lockhart (advisor to Dr. Ashraf Ghani, first Minister of Finance of Afghanistan).

Summary

2005 was a good year for the Foundation for Culture and Civil Society. It was a year of rapid expansion (of program activities, staff, and public outreach) with, notably, increasing international linkages in the cultural domain. The FCCS established itself, without a doubt, as the most important institution for art development in Afghanistan. But in the domain of civil society, too, the FCCS greatly increased its activities, notably around the parliamentary elections, providing essential tools to the population that would allow them to make a more informed choice when voting. Finally, the FCCS embarked on a large and complicated program to become a grants-making Foundation: the *Beydari Melli* (National Awakening) Program. This included opening offices in six provinces outside Kabul. Meanwhile, in areas of financial management, administration and governance the Executive Director attempted to make – not always with success – the necessary adjustments to provide a solid basis for its expansion. In the latter task the technical assistance of Open Society Institute played an important role.

Highlights of FCCS activities in 2005

January	Inauguration of the new FCCS concert hall and compound across the road from the main FCCS premises with a concert reported in the NYT
March	Organization of the 2 nd Nauroz Music Festival in Mazar-e Sharif
April-Sept	National mobile theatre campaign to raise awareness about the first general parliamentary elections of Afghanistan
April	Participation in the civil society delegation to the Afghanistan Development Forum
June	Inauguration of the (first ever) Afghanistan Pavilion in the Venice Art Biennale
June	Launch of the Pilot Phase of the Beydari Melli small grants program
June-July	Theatre workshop by the Theatre du Soleil
August	Production of “Romeo and Juliet” by Aftab theatre, support to the production of “Loves’ Labors Lost” and participation in the Kabul Summer Theatre Festival
July-Sept	Compiling information to make portraits of the almost 3,000 candidates to the National Assembly of Afghanistan, designing, printing and distribution throughout the country of 180,000 catalogues before the elections
September	Participation in the domestic elections observation effort of FEFA in 4 provinces
September	Organization of a national book fair with publishers/booksellers from Afghanistan and Iran and book-related activities
October	Participation of the FCCS in the Dushanbe Theatre Festival with the Theatre Aftab’s “Romeo and Juliet”
November	Launch of the “Beydari Melli” small grants program in 7 regions in Afghanistan and inauguration of the new regional offices set up during the past months
Nov-Dec	Intensive theatre workshop by theatre professionals from Tajikistan

Besides, the FCCS continued its regular activities. In the Cultural Center, 20 concerts, 6 theatre shows, 7 poetry readings and 7 exhibitions took place. To support the development of film culture, an Afghan moviemakers’ club was set up with lectures and film analysis every two weeks, and each Monday art movies from around the world were shown, starting in June. Every month, on average three civil society roundtables were produced, and broadcast on radio, and, increasingly, on Afghan TV channels. The Open Media Fund for Afghanistan found new grantees among regional print media after extensive surveys of the press in the regions, and helped them and existing ones on their way to self-sufficiency. Meanwhile the first phase was finished of the Oral History project involving Kabul University students doing in-depth interviews in several provinces of Afghanistan. Finally, data from more than 1,000 local

civil society groups throughout the country was collected and analyzed comprehensively in order to produce a “baseline civil society report”.

The FCCS staff grew from 31 to 74 during 2005 in order to implement the new programs and staff the regional offices. To consolidate the basis for this rapid expansion, governance reforms were made: in order to make the Board more effective the number of members was reduced from 12 to 7; progress was made on the writing of new statutes and the Board members decided to play a more active role in the organization. The executive structure organogram of the FCCS was adapted, with the creation of new units: Field Coordination, Grants Management and an IT Unit. FCCS staff was trained in the use of proprietary grants management software provided by OSI and new rules and regulations were adopted in the fields of human resources, procurement and logistics. A Finance Admin director was recruited to oversee this department, replacing the less experienced finance officer.

While the FCCS was generally successful in implementing donor-funded programs and organizing public cultural and social events, the governance and administration reforms partially failed to deliver the expected results. The Board never finalized or registered the new statutes and, despite their declared intentions, did not become more actively involved (in a constructive way) in governing the FCCS. The election of the FCCS Chairman to the Parliament in September 2005 and his subsequent refusal to relinquish his chairmanship created tensions within the Board, and between the Chairman and the Executive Director, who objected to his attempts to use the considerable resources of the FCCS for his political purposes. The Board never proceeded to organize the elections for a new Board, such as was stipulated in the FCCS statutes thus creating a situation where the Board was *de jure* illegitimate. As to the Finance and Admin reforms, they were mostly useful and successfully implemented, but they created an Afghan-style bureaucracy that disempowered much of the staff. Regretably (and despite intense attempts by the Executive Director) financial management, transparency and accountability were not improved, leading to a situation where the Executive Director requested the Board to terminate the Admin Finance Director. Instead, the Board asked the Executive Director to leave, which happened in March 2006.

1: The Board of Directors, FCCS Statutes and Governance

At the inception of the FCCS in April 2003, the Board of Directors consisted of 12 members:

<u>Mir Ahmad Joyenda</u>	Chairman / Deputy Director of AREU (Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit)
Timor Hakimyar	Secretary / President of the Artists Union of Afghanistan
Ms. Hangama Anwari	Treasurer / Human Rights Commissioner and Director of the WCLRF (Women and Children Legal Research Foundation)
Nader Nadery	Human Rights Commissioner
<u>Farid Hamidi</u>	Human Rights Commissioner
<u>Dr. Hussein Ramos</u>	Program Director in National Democratic Institute (NDI)
<u>Mrs. Nafisa Kabuli</u>	Judge in the Women and Children Department, Kabul Provincial Court
<u>Mrs. Safia Siddiqi</u>	Advisor to the Ministries of Women's Affairs and Rural Rehabilitation and Development, and poet
<u>Omara Khan Massudi</u>	Director of the National Museums of Afghanistan
Dr. Yaqub Wahidi	Senior researcher of the Linguistics Department, Academy of Sciences
<u>Dr. Alam Ishaqzai</u>	Director of the Social Sciences Department, Academy of Sciences
Prof. Zarif Azhar	Lecturer at the Faculty of Law and Political Sciences, Kabul University

In late 2004, the need was felt to reform the FCCS Board of Directors to make it a more efficient organ that could participate more fully in FCCS affairs. This was discussed during a visit of the FCCS Chairman and the FCCS Secretary to New York, with senior governance experts of OSI. These discussions led to a reform of the Board, and of the FCCS statutes.

In June 2006 some of the Board members voluntarily resigned, either because they were also employed as staff by FCCS (Mr. Hakimyar and Prof. Azhar), or because they work for institutions that are over-represented in the FCCS Board (Mr. Nadery and Ms. Anwari from the Human Rights Commission). Dr. Wahidi resigned because of his senior age; regretfully, he later deceased. The current Board members are those whose names are underlined above.

Two of the current Board members were elected to the National Parliament: the Chairman, Mir Ahmad Joyenda (Kabul), and Mrs. Safia Siddiqi (Nangarhar).

The new statutes were discussed at length by the FCCS Board members during the fall of 2005. The Board members increased the share of their managerial responsibilities, notably those of the Chairman, but they never completed the revision of the statutes, nor did they register the new statutes with the Ministry of Justice, to the relief of the senior staff of the FCCS who feared that micromanagement of their programs by absentee board members would result in paralysis. It is nevertheless worthwhile to point out some of the proposed changes:

- The FCCS, which as a social organization used to be based on membership, would now become governed more closely by its Board.
- The statutes specify in detail the electoral mandates of the Board members, who must be elected every two years, with no more than 2 consecutive mandates per Board member. Elections are by secret ballot, with the participation of the Senior Advisory Council (4 members), founding members who are not part of the Board (6 members), the Board of Directors itself (7 members), the Executive Committee (8 members) and Regional Office Managers (8 members). Each

participant can suggest candidates for the Board. The next elections were scheduled to take place in early 2006.

Besides the Board of Directors, the FCCS has the following governance organs:

1. The Senior Advisory Council consists of retired Board members who express their willingness to stay involved in FCCS affairs. Its main function consists in monitoring the Board and intervening if there are problems internal to the Board.
2. The Executive Committee consists of the FCCS heads of units, and it manages the daily operations of the FCCS, ensuring tight coordination between the units and the program activities. It is headed by the Executive Director of the FCCS
3. The Expert Committees are meant to oversee program activities and grant-making activities in their area of reference. In 2005 only the Open Media Fund for Afghanistan had a standing Expert Committee, while the other units had temporary Expert Committees to revise grant proposals made under the Beydari Melli Program.
4. Provincial Boards. These were elected in 2004 and have in some cases been quite active (Baghlan, Khost, Kapisa). Given the difficulty for the FCCS to provide funds to them, whatever work they do is voluntary. Their function is to provide feed-back on organizations that apply for grants, monitor the activities of provincial grantees, and support FCCS in nationwide projects or for information-gathering purposes.

2: FCCS Management and Administration

From the outset, the FCCS was managed in a collegial, friendly fashion. This system was appropriate for a small social organization, but with the growth over the years it became necessary to closer regulate the FCCS administration and improve the management. In 2005 the following changes were made:

a) General Management. A lot of progress was made in improving the FCCS management structure. Whereas the Executive Director previously had to micro-manage everything, the recruitment of two senior managers (one for the Grants Unit, and a Admin-Finance Director), and the promotion of the Culture Unit Director Mr. Timor Hakimyar to Deputy Director allowed a more fluid and efficient management.

b) Financial Management. For most of the year the FCCS was searching a competent Afghan finance admin director. As these are in high demand and in short supply, it was difficult to find such a person, even with the decent salary offered by the FCCS. The first high-level recruit did not pass the probationary period, but during the fall, a more experienced Afghan Admin-Finance Director joined the FCCS team. He put in place new financial procedures, checks and balances, but could not improve the general financial management or even make correct financial reports to donors.

c) Financial Management Software. The Open Society Institute (OSI) provided comprehensive grants management software (GMS) that is used by most of its national foundations. Three training courses in using the software were organized between November 2004 and November 2005 for FCCS staff. These were hosted by OSI Bulgaria. The software allows exact grant tracking, from registration of candidate organizations to the final installment. It is used not only for financial management of grants, but also for tracking of decision-making, automatic maintenance of a database, communications with grantees through templates, etc. Moreover, it can be used for the complete financial management of the FCCS. This system is supervised by a technical team in Bulgaria through the Internet. From the beginning of 2006 all FCCS accountancy and financial management will be done through this system, which provides a high degree of transparency for donors.

d) Administration. With the growth of staff the FCCS needed to improve its human resources management. Each staff member now has a file which is monitored by the Admin/HR manager. A comprehensive set of administrative policies, adapted from those of the AREU, was adopted during the year. Inventory, procurement, transportation and staff policies are now subject to closer supervision. Finally, UN Habitat has kindly provided training to FCCS staff in such matters as logistics, transport policies, security and human resources management.

e) Information and Communications Technology. Here again, the year 2005 saw a qualitative jump. Partially because of the adoption of the GMS system (see above, b) and partially because of internal needs, the IT section was overhauled. The FCCS server system now includes a proxy server with firewall, a GMS server, and a back-up server, while the main server has an Active Directory system allowing to control individual users (chatting, downloads, internet site visits) and reserve bandwidths for the essential internet users. Moreover, the premises of the FCCS now have a wireless system, allowing the reduction of the number of cables in this historic building. The internet speed has been doubled to 512 kbps because of the number of users. Also, a fixed telephone line and fax have finally been installed, cutting calling costs. Within the office the communications program “Skype” is used to reduce mobile phone costs, while cheap VHS communications (“walkie-talkies”) allow the support staff to stay in touch with each other.

f) Field Offices. At the beginning of 2005 a Field Coordinator was recruited in the Civil Society Section. He set up regional offices in Herat, Kandahar, Mazar and Jalalabad, and expanded the existing FCCS offices in Baghlan and Khost. The regional offices were mostly active from May onwards, and participated in several outreach programs of the FCCS, notably the FEFA domestic elections monitoring and the creation of the Wolesi Jirga candidates catalogues. They also continued the survey and registration of local civil society groups. But above all they prepared for the launch of the Beydari Melli small grants program, which took place in all regions in November 2005. They received several orientation and training courses, in civil society, administration and management, which brought them together at the FCCS to strengthen the ties between headquarters and regional offices. Since then Field Coordination has become a Unit in itself, which works for all FCCS programs. The Field Coordinator spends roughly half of his time traveling in the provinces.

2.1 FCCS Budget, 2005

FCCS Budget 2005

#	Item	Unit cost	qty	Period	total (US\$)
1	Staff salaries		46		312,040
1.1	Chairman of the Foundation	500	1	12	6,000
1.1.1	Executive Director	3,000	1	12	36,000
1.2	Admin/Finance director	1,800	1	10	18,000
1.2.1	IT assistant / webmaster	600	1	12	7,200
1.2.2	Receptionist / Secretarial assistant	300	1	12	3,600
1.2.3	Admin, Logistics and Transport assistant	500	1	12	6,000
1.2.3.1	Drivers (4)	220	4	11	9,680
1.2.4	Errand boy / messenger	150	1	12	1,800
1.2.5	Office Intendent	400	1	12	4,800
1.2.5.1	Office Gardener	200	1	12	2,400
1.2.5.2	Cook/cleaner (3)	150	3	12	5,400
1.2.5.3	Kitchen Assistant	180	1	12	2,160
1.2.5.3	Cafeteria Assistant	220	1	12	2,640
1.2.5.4	Guards	150	5	12	9,000
1.2.5.5	Police guards	150	4	12	7,200
1.2.6.1	Chief Accountant	750	1	12	9,000
1.2.6.2	Finance assistant	500	1	12	6,000
1.3	1st E.C Project director	3,500	1	6	21,000
1.3.1	International advisor/project design EC SGP	7,500	1	1	7,500
1.3.2	Program officers/trainers EC SGP	800	2	8	12,800
1.3.3	Finance assistant EC SGP	550	1	10	5,500
1.3.4	MIS assistant EC SGP	550	1	10	5,500
1.3.5	Media/Reporting officer EC SGP	700	1	8	5,600
1.3.7	Training and Monitoring Officer	750	1	8	6,000
1.4	Research Assistant and University liaison	900	1	12	10,800
1.4.1	OMFA and publications director	750	1	12	9,000
1.4.2	Board Liaison officer	400	1	10	4,000
1.4.3	Translator EC SGP	350	2	10	7,000
1.5	Civil Society Coordinator	1,000	1	12	12,000
1.5.1	Provincial liaison officer	600	1	12	7,200
1.5.2	Civil Society Assistant	300	1	9	2,700
1.5.3	Debates and Public Information Officer	800	1	12	9,600
1.6	Director Cultural Center	1,200	1	12	14,400
1.6.1	Sales, Marketing and PR specialist	1,000	1	11	11,000
1.6.2	Assistant of the Cultural Director	400	1	12	4,800
1.6.3	Cultural Center helper	180	1	12	2,160

1.6.4	Video and Audio unit Editor	500	1	10	5,000
1.8	Specialist Fees	200	1	12	2,400
1.9	Bonuses and Rewards	200	46	1	9,200
2	Staff Support costs				40,225
2.1.1	Honoraria Board members (not Chairman)	100	6	9	5,400
2.1.2	Board members reimbursements	25	6	12	1,800
2.1.3	Meetings and an annual retreat	2,000	1	1	2,000
2.2	Senior Advisory Board expenses	150	1	3	450
2.3	Expert Committee/jury expenses	250	2	6	3,000
2.4	Training for staff	50	50	1	2,500
2.5.1	Staff lunches	25	46	11	12,650
2.5.2	Staff and visitors refreshments (tea & sweets)	150	1	12	1,800
2.6	Staff insurance	50	46	1	2,300
2.7.1	Per diem staff traveling abroad (GMS training)	25	11	7	1,925
2.7.2	Per diem staff traveling national (activities)	10	12	30	3,600
2.7.3	Per diem regional staff attending workshops	10	30	4	1,200
2.7.4	Per diem civil society surveyors workshops	10	80	2	1,600
3	Offices Furniture and Equipment				53,020
	Furniture				11,900
3.1.1	Essential office furniture per new staff member	500	10	1	5,000
3.1.2	Furniture, furnishings and fittings renewal	100	12	1	1,200
3.1.3	Expanded conference room furniture	800	1	1	800
3.1.4	Furniture for guards, cooks and others living in	50	8	1	400
3.1.5	Kitchen furniture, equipment, crockery, utensils	1,500	1	1	1,500
3.1.6	Sanitary facilities for staff	500	6	1	3,000
	Electronic and Office Equipment				29,120
3.2.1	Laptops	1,500	4	1	6,000
3.2.2	Desktops	800	8	1	6,400
3.2.3	Laser Printers	300	4	1	1,200
3.2.4	Good A3 color printer	1,000	1	1	1,000
3.2.5	Universal Power Savers	200	4	1	800
3.2.6	Stabilizers	40	8	1	320
3.3	IT and networking equipment	2,000	1	1	2,000
3.4.2	Software acquisition	800	2	1	1,600
3.5.1	Photocopier (heavy duty)	5,000	1	1	5,000
3.5.2	Fax, safe, TV, VCR & other equipment	2,000	1	1	2,000
3.6.2	Mobile phones	150	12	1	1,800
3.6.3	Installation telephone landline	500	1	1	500
3.7	Digital cameras	250	2	1	500
	Generator and Tools				12,000

5.5	Silent 32 kW generator	11,000	1	1	11,000
5.6.1	Maintenance tools	600	1	1	600
5.6.2	Equipment for guards	100	4	1	400
4	Upgrading the Foundation premises				20,000
4.1	New offices: rehabilitation of premises	5,000	1	1	5,000
4.2	Cultural Center building and equipment	5,000	1	1	5,000
4.4	Library furniture	2,000	1	1	2,000
4.6	Gardens: maintenance and improvement	1,500	1	1	1,500
4.7	New water systems: toilets, well, tanks, piping etc.	2,500	1	1	2,500
	Upgrading electrical systems	1,500	1	1	1,500
4.7.1	Improvements in street outside	2,500	1	1	2,500
5	Operation Expenses				104,380
	Rent and Utilities				70,800
5.1.1	Rent of the main building (not shared)	2,250	1	12	27,000
5.1.2	Rent of the Cultural Center	250	1	12	3,000
5.1.4	Rent of the Guesthouse/activities center	1,000	1	12	12,000
	Small jobs Office maintenance	100	1	12	1,200
5.3.1	Electricity bills	500	1	12	6,000
5.3.2	Water and Gardening bills	50	1	12	600
5.3.3	Generator fuel	1,200	1	12	14,400
5.3.4	Gas cylinders (cooking and guards)	200	1	12	2,400
5.3.5	Fuel for the Diesel heaters	500	1	6	3,000
5.3.6	Waste disposal and road maintenance	100	1	12	1,200
	Stationery and Communications				33,580
3.8.1	Stationery supplies (cartridges, paper, CDRoms...)	500	1	12	6,000
3.8.2	Toner for photocopier	100	1	12	1,200
3.9.1	Mobile phone recharges intensive use	75	4	12	3,600
3.9.1	Mobile phone recharges medium use	50	16	12	9,600
3.9.1	Mobile phone recharges occasional use	10	9	12	1,080
3.9.3	Internet connection (128 kbps)	675	1	12	8,100
3.9.4	Postage, packing, DHL and other transportation	100	1	12	1,200
3.9.5	Subscriptions, dictionaries and other publications	100	1	12	1,200
3.9.6	Landline phone	200	1	8	1,600
6	Travel costs				37,400
6.1	OSI grant-related national travel	200	6	1	1,200
6.2	Grants Management Strategies training Tajikistan	2,500	2	1	5,000
6.3	GMS software training in Bulgaria	5,000	3	1	15,000
6.4	Regional and national travel budget for staff	150	6	12	10,800

6.5	Renting vehicles for visitors	50	10	6	3,000
6.6	Taxi rent in Kabul for all work purposes	200	1	12	2,400


7	Vehicles				35,000
	Acquisitions				21,000
7.1	Toyota "Super Custom" 4WD minivan '96 model	9,000	1	1	9,000
7.1	Toyota "Town Ace" 4WD minivan '96 model	6,000	1	1	6,000
7.1	Toyota "Corolla" '95 model	6,000	1	1	6,000
	Recurrent costs				14,000
7.2	Fuel	200	4	10	8,000
7.3	Vehicle maintenance	150	4	10	6,000
8	Project Activities				147,600
	Civil Society activities				25,600
8.2.1	Civil Society Baseline Survey Workshop	1,000	2	1	2,000
8.2.2	Civil Society Baseline Survey Field costs	200	1	34	6,800
8.2.3	Civil Society Research activities (external experts)	1,000	2	1	2,000
8.2.4	Setting up Regional Offices and Provincial Boards	500	4	3	6,000
8.2.5	Field Coordination expenses	200	1	12	2,400
8.2.6	Meetings: refreshment, supplies, fees, publicity...	100	2	12	2,400
8.2.7	Special projects	1,000	1	4	4,000
	Research Activities and Publications				10,400
8.4.1	Book publications	2,000	1	4	8,000
8.4.2	Support to academic conferences	200	1	6	1,200
8.4.3	Support to research projects	100	1	12	1,200
	Debates and Public Discussions				6,800
8.5.1	Organization costs	200	1	12	2,400
8.5.2	Recording, broadcasting and publication	200	1	12	2,400
8.5.3	Special events (large-scale debates, etc.)	500	4	1	2,000
	EC training activities				15,400
8.5.1	Training of Trainers	4	1	500	2,000
8.5.2	Training Materials	20	4	100	8,000
8.5.3	Monitoring and support of regional trainers	6	12	75	5,400
	Regional Offices support				68,400
8.6.1.1	Office manager	350	6	8	16,800
8.6.1.2	Office assistant	250	6	8	12,000
8.6.2	Staff support: lunch, refreshments etc	50	6	8	2,400
8.6.3.1	Furniture and office equipment	2,400	4	1	9,600
8.6.5.1	Rent	150	6	8	7,200
8.6.6	Regional travel budget	100	6	8	4,800
8.6.3.9	Communications	75	6	8	3,600

8.6.5.3	Utilities (electricity, fuel, water, gas)	25	6	8	1,200
8.6.3.8	Stationery	50	6	8	2,400
8.6.8	Regional office activities	100	6	8	4,800
	Regional office training workshops	150	6	4	3,600
	Dissemination and PR				21,000
8.7.1	Printing of posters, leaflets and other printed	6,000	1	1	6,000
8.7.5	TV spots, broadcasting	3,000	1	1	3,000
8.7.6	Public artwork (banners etc.)	3,000	1	1	3,000
8.7.7	Advertisements, inserts etc. in print media	3,000	1	1	3,000
8.7.2	Recording, editing and broadcasting by radio	1,000	1	1	1,000
8.7.3	Camera recordings incl traveling	1,500	1	1	1,500
8.7.4	Video editing and VCD/DVD production	1,000	1	1	1,000
8.7.8	Website development and maintenance	2,500	1	1	2,500
	Subtotal of all the above				749,665
9	Audit and banking charges				11,245
9.2	Banking charges 1%				11,245
	Total Funds required by FCCS, year 2				760,910

Guaranteed from EC for first year					473,311
OSI - remaining funds requested					127,957
OSI – OMFA					12,974
Admin/core and project costs to be paid by other donors					72,366
Project admin costs, based on 10% over last year's grants	\$ 446,773.50	10%	44,677	44,677	
Total revenue generated minus return on investment					26,000

Revenue Generation: Rent of office space	\$ 4,000.00	1	7	28,000
and memberships	\$ 600.00	1	1	600
and cafeteria	\$ 300.00	1	6	1,800
and ticket sales	100.00	1	12	1,200
and guesthouse revenue	300.00	1	10	3,000
and exhibition sales	\$ 300.00	1	3	900
and cultural services provided	\$ 300.00	1	10	3,000
Total				38,500

2.2 FCCS Organogram



2.3 Staff list

Code	Name	Position	Contract Type	Seniority by Mar 21, 2006
0	Mir Ahmad Joyenda	Chairman	Temp	3
0	Robert Kluyver	Executive Director	Perm	3
1	Del Aga Shekib	Finance/Admin Manager	Perm	1
1.1.1	Obaidullah	Finance Officer	Perm	3
1.1.2	Mir Assadullah	Finance Assistant	Perm	1
1.1.3	Ustad Azhar	Finance Controller	Temp	1
1.2.1	Zahir Shah Haidari	Admin Officer	Perm	3
1.2.2	Mir Masjedi Homayoun	Logistic Assistant	Perm	3
1.2.3	Yar Mohammed	Office Messenger	Perm	1
1.2.4	Abdul Hai	Technical Assistant	Perm	1
1.2.5	Ghulamuddin	Stage Assistant	Perm	3
1.2.6		Receptionist	Perm	0
1.2.7.1	Mohammed Qasim	Driver	Perm	3
1.2.7.2	Waheed	Driver	Perm	2
1.2.7.3	Basser Ahmad	Driver	Perm	2
1.2.7.4	Raheem	Driver	Perm	1
1.2.7.5	Sharif	Driver	Perm	1
1.2.8.1	Nik Mohd	Office Guard	Perm	3
1.2.8.2	Ghulam Mohd Karju	Office Guard	Perm	2
1.2.8.3	Qurban Ali	Office Guard	Perm	2
1.2.8.4	Nasim	Office Guard	Perm	2
1.2.8.5	Rahmatullah	Office Guard	Perm	2
1.2.8.6	Rafatullah	Office Guard	Perm	1
1.3.1	Qayyum	Office Superintendent	Perm	3
1.3.2	ShahinShan	Cook	Perm	2
1.3.3	Amruddin	Superintendent assistant	Perm	1
1.3.4	Anisa Jan	Cleaner	Perm	2
1.3.5	Reza Gul	Cleaner	Perm	3
1.3.6	Reza Gul 2	Cleaner	Perm	1
1.3.7	Raheena	Cleaner	Perm	1
2	Zahoor Shah Zewary	Field Coordinator	Perm	1
2.1.1		Baghlan Off. Manager	Temp	2
2.1.2		Baghlan Off. Assistant	Temp	2
2.1.3		Baghlan Guards	Temp	1
2.2.1		Khost Off. Manager	Temp	2
2.2.2		Khost Off. Assistant	Temp	1
2.2.3		Khost Off. Guards	Temp	1
2.3.1		Jalalabad Off. Manager	Temp	1
2.3.2		Jalalabad Off. Assistant	Temp	1
2.3.3		Jalalabad Off. Guards	Temp	1
2.4.1		Mazar Off. Manager	Temp	1
2.4.2		Mazar Off. Assistant	Temp	1
2.4.3		Mazar Off. Guards	Temp	1

2.5.1		Herat Office Manager	Temp	1
2.5.2		Herat Office Assistant	Temp	1
2.5.3		Herat Office Guards	Temp	1
2.6.1		Kandahar Off Manager	Temp	1
2.6.2		Kandahar Off Assistant	Temp	1
2.6.3		Kandahar Off. Guards	Temp	1
2.7.1		Maimana Off. Manager	Temp	1
2.7.2		Maimana Off. Assistant	Temp	1
2.7.3		<i>Maimana Off. Guards</i>	Temp	0
2.8.1		<i>Ghazni Office Manager</i>	Temp	0
2.8.2		<i>Ghazni Office Assistant</i>	Temp	0
2.8.3		<i>Ghazni Office Guards</i>	Temp	0
2.9	Mr. Khamush	Kapisa Office Manager	Temp	0
3		<i>Public Information Officer</i>	Perm	0
4	Behroz Mohaqheqh	IT Officer	Perm	3
4.1	Musa	IT Assistant	Perm	1
4.2		<i>Graphic Artist</i>	Perm	0
4.3	Qair Rashidi	Audio/Video Editor	Perm	2
5	Abdul Hadi Pardis	Grants Management Unit Director	Perm	1
5.1	Noor Ahmad Fahim	Research & Publications Program Officer	Temp	2
5.2	Ahmad Saleem	Civil Society Program Officer	Temp	1
5.3	Dr. Homayoun	Culture Program Officer	Temp	1
5.4	Mortaza Rahimi	Training and Monitoring Officer	Temp	1
5.5	Shukrullah	MIS Officer	Temp	1
5.6	Ruqia Kohistani	Registrar	Temp	2
5.7		<i>Reporting and Monitoring Officer</i>	Temp	0
5.8	Waheed Khalili	Kabul Regional BMP Officer	Temp	1
6	Dr. Omar Sharifi	Research and Publications Unit Director	Perm	3
6.1	Abdul Jabar Sapand	OMFA Manager	Temp	2
6.2	Fawad Ahmad	Translator 1	Perm	1
6.3		<i>Translator 2</i>	Perm	0
7	Timor Shah Hakimyar	Culture Unit Director and Deputy Executive Director	Perm	3
7.1	Shah Mard	Culture Unit Deputy	Perm	2
7.2	Emmanuelle	Cultural Center Outreach Officer	Temp	1
7.3	Mostafa	Cultural Center Assistant	Perm	2
7.4	Najib Atta	DED cultural center program assistant	Temp	1
8	Dr. Mohd Sayed Niazi	Civil Society Unit Director	Perm	2
8.1		<i>Civil Society Assistant</i>	Perm	0
8.5.1	Mohd Farshid	Civil Rights Program Manager	Temp	1
8.5.2		<i>Civil Rights Program Assistant</i>	Temp	0
8.6.1	Lorenzo	IWA Program Manager	Temp	1
8.6.2	Yama Torabi	IWA Research Manager	Temp	1
8.6.3	Hamid Razaq	IWA Research Assistant	Temp	1

3. Establishment of the first two Provincial Offices of the Foundation for Culture and Civil Society

Background and Concept

On 22 January 2004 UNAMA and the Foundation for Culture and Civil Society (FCCS) signed a contract (AETF 4009) whereby UNAMA pledged to fund the establishment of provincial offices for the Foundation for Culture and Civil Society (with a later amended budget, totaling 29,788 USD).

We will not recall here the full scope of the project; briefly, the purpose was to establish pilot offices in 2 provinces with an active civil society but a low level of donor activity (Baghlan and Khost). The office would provide support to local civil society groups, and help develop local culture, functioning as a node for the FCCS.

Services provided to local civil society would include representation, registration, assistance in acquiring or improving organizational status (registering as a social organization) and internal mechanisms (template bylaws and rules & regulations), training/assistance in proposal writing, access to computers, financial services - a bank account - monitoring and evaluation on behalf of the FCCS or donors, and training/assistance in reporting. The office would also occasionally organize or host cultural events, and thus become a meeting place for provincial civil society and cultural groups.

One of the attractive aspects of this program was that the provincial offices could rapidly become self-sustaining, by being both lean structures (the recurrent budget for staff, utilities, rent, transport and communication was less than 1000\$ per month) and by charging for their services, through project administration costs. Other sources of revenue would be, for example, by participating in national programs for the FCCS or other organizations.

The rationale for this was that instead of each local group acquiring capacity (difficult to find locally) in all these areas, it would be more economical to centralize these services. Instead of charging 7-14% project administration costs twice, these costs would be shared by the Provincial Office and the final grantee, proportional to real capacity. Of course, as local groups grow, they will acquire office- and donor-related capacity anyhow, and become fully independent. The Provincial Offices would thus function as an incubator for local groups

Linkage with the EC-funded small grants program

The difficulty with this concept is that it only would make sense to the local civil society and cultural communities if there is back-up: i.e. funds for local projects, or intensive capacity-building in acquiring new skills and self-help strategies.

Therefore this project was scheduled to coincide with a European Commission grant to the FCCS of 2.5 million Euros, to be disbursed in small grants for civil society and culture projects throughout the country.

In January 2004, at the time the grant agreement was signed, the EC grant seemed to be imminent. In communications at that time, EC staff assured the project could be signed by end February or March. By that time negotiations for the grant had already been going on for 8 months, since April 2003.

The response to our project proposal took the EC about five months, however; in May/June it turned out that there was a legal hurdle, and that an international contracting partner had to be found. After approaching

several organizations, UN Habitat was finally agreed on as the partner. The project had to be rewritten, more time passed, and it was only in December 2004 that finally the EC contract was signed.

From December 2004 to May 2005 the program, to be called “Beydari Melli Program” (National Awakening Program) was being established with the help of UN Habitat and the Open Society Institute. By 1 June we had most of our other regional offices (Jalalabad, Mazar, and Herat, with the exception of Kandahar) up and running, and from this date the Baghlan and Khost offices came under the EC program, since the funding from UNAMA (AETF) was finished. In this sense there was luckily a smooth transition from one funding source to another.

Development of the Project

In the meanwhile, however, both of our offices came to life (see below, activities) and started organizing events involving local civil society, identifying proposals, translating them and editing them on the computer, sending them to local donors and to the FCCS headquarters. Some of these projects were accepted by donors, such as UNDP, OSI, and the FCCS itself.

In Pul-e Khumri, notably, the office soon became a focal point for civil society and cultural activities, thanks to the dynamism and previous connections of our office staff. Several big cultural events were organized there, such as a 3-day long gathering of poets and storytellers from Baghlan and neighboring provinces, and civil society meetings. Quite a lot of work was done, notably on the environment, on awareness-raising in the districts about cultural heritage and the history of the districts, and on the media (support to the local TV station, the independent radio station, and press).

In Khost, too, the office started similar activities, although it only really took off in early 2005 due to the problems we had encountered, as mentioned above (lack of expected EC-funding for submitted projects, and also, lack of adequate office space, as the rents in Khost are higher than in other provincial capitals)

Now both offices are fully operational, and through the Beydari Melli Program, are starting to really fulfill their functions as local Civil Society Support Agencies, including access to funds, ample training facilities, and as a meeting place for local civil society groups.

Establishment of the Office in Baghlan

In April 2004 the FCCS Civil Society Coordinator was hired, and given the urgent task of first organizing the opening the Provincial Offices in Baghlan and Khost. He traveled to Pul-i Khumri where he identified and then met with all civil society groups, and organized a founding assembly of all groups. This took place on Saturday 17 April 2004. The Chairman of the FCCS, the Executive Director (the author), the Culture Unit Director, the Research Assistant and the Civil Society program manager traveled to Pul-i Khumri to participate in the founding assembly. Representatives of 45 civil society groups participated in the meeting, where the purpose of the office was explained, and then elected (through secret ballot) a 5-member provincial committee.

Baghlan provincial board members

- 1) Mr. Abdul Ahad Berenmehr, chairman. Also editor of “Talaya” socio-cultural and news publication, and respected local writer, intellectual and journalist. UN voter registration team leader
- 2) Mrs. Nafisa Jahed, secretary. Also head of the provincial Department for Women’s Affairs, University teacher and involved in several other women’s organizations
- 3) Mr. Sayed Kazem Fazel, board member. Also provincial representative for the Afghan Civil Society Forum, an initiative by SwissPeace, and the local head of CCA (a well-known NGO)
- 4) Ms. Neda Kaihani, board member. Active young lady, directs a computer and English-language training center. UN Civic Educator
- 5) Prof. Shah Zaman Zamani, board member. Professor in the local University, department of Law and Political Sciences

The Board members were briefed about their responsibilities after the meeting by the senior Foundation staff. Terms of Reference for Board members, and the budget (for the sake of transparency) were handed over to them. They were entrusted with the task of choosing an English speaking, computer literate office manager and finding premises to rent for the modest budget of 300\$.

The Board members were also introduced to the governor and other civilian authorities, and their existence was publicized by the FCCS.

By the beginning of May, the Civil Society Coordinator and the Executive Director made a trip to Pul-e Khumri to bring the budgeted-for office equipment and check on how the Board members were progressing. Several young men proposed by the Board were interviewed for the position of office manager and one, Jawed Paya, passed the tests (computer, English and interview). Several premises were looked at, and finally one building, sharing a big courtyard with a private house, was chosen to become the domicile of the FCCS in Pul-e Khumri.

In mid-May Jawed Paya came to Kabul. He was given terms of reference, financial training, several issues were discussed, and he was given an advance on his budget for expenses. The office was opened shortly thereafter.

Thereafter the Baghlan office started its activities. A full report (in Dari) of their activities has been added in annex.

In May 2005 the Baghlan office moved to new premises, with more space, in the center of Pul-e Khumri.

Establishment of the Office in Khost

Towards 20 April the Civil Society Coordinator went to Khost, and spent several days establishing a list of local civil society organizations. It was found that Khost has a vibrant civil society, with many young people involved in socio-cultural or learning associations. A meeting was organized and almost all invited organizations turned up. From FCCS headquarters the Director of the Cultural Center and the Board assistant came to observe the proceedings. The objectives of opening a provincial civil society coordination office were explained and the nature of local civil society and its role in the reconstruction of Afghanistan were discussed.

Khost Provincial Board Members

- 1) Mrs. Sahera Sharif, chairwoman. Head of the provincial Department of Women's Affairs, only female professor in Khost University, member of the national Academy of Sciences. Head of UN Electoral Unit local women's team.
- 2) Mr. Zahir Shah Angar, secretary. Editor of Mazal Magazine (an OMFA publication) and director of the independent "Voice of Peace" FM radio (of the Internews network)
- 3) Mr. Wazir Badshah Dariz, member. Manager of a Literacy Program
- 4) Mr. Ahmad Shah, member, runs a "Quick English Learning Center"
- 5) Mr. Hakim Halim, member, director of a computer learning center.

Note on the election process in Baghlan and Khost: The FCCS followed the JEMB guidelines for elections: a single non-transferable vote system with one vote per present organization, and a secret ballot. The candidates presented themselves in a first round, and then each voter cast 3 votes. This favored the election of minority candidates.

Note on the results of the elections: in each province we were happy to see a mix of women, media, cultural, social and educational issues reflected in the elected boards. This proved not only the validity of our democratic approach (rather than appointing a Board, all local organizations elected one) but also the maturity of civil society in these areas.

The elected Board was briefed and introduced to the local authorities, and Civil Society/ NGO/ media organizations.

Towards the beginning of June 2004 the Executive Director of the FCCS traveled to Khost to investigate complaints by some youth groups that felt they had been left out of the electoral process. I met the governor of Khost and Sahera Sharif, the elected Chairwoman first. Then I met the contesting groups in the Aina office of Khost, which they use as their headquarters. Most of the young men had fledgling media organizations (a bulletin, a magazine project, a website) and complained that only one of them, the Aina director, had represented the whole group, that thus only got one vote. They demanded that the elections for the Board be held again.

I congratulated them on being such motivated members of civil society, and for their interest in our provincial office, and explained once again the coordinating (and not implementing) role the office would have. Not knowing who these young people exactly represent I left it to our Chairperson to decide whether to hold elections again or not and she decided that the existing Board was good enough, and that the dissatisfied youth represented a relatively minor part of local civil society.

By this time we had learnt that the EC grant was not going to be signed in the coming months, and we thus asked our board members in Khost to put a hold on the establishment of the office. However, according to the contract with UNAMA, an office was rented, equipped and prepared for activities, and an office manager was recruited (Mr. Hakim Halim)

Conclusion

The original concept of this project - to make local civil society support centers that could soon become autonomous by providing financial services and related support to local groups - was validated, as they truly started fulfilling these functions. It is true that they did not generate enough income to become self-sustaining in the one year period we had foreseen. It seems to be more difficult than we had thought for local

organizations to raise funds for civil society or cultural projects. But this was offset by the fact that these offices now will be funded through the EC-funded “Beydari Melli Program”. Since much more training will be organized through the regional office staff than we could initially afford, we believe that over the coming 1.5 years they *will* become autonomous. This could then be a model replicated elsewhere throughout Afghanistan.

4: The Beydari Melli Small Grants Program



FCCS Regional Offices

Kabul

Talang Watt 869, in front of police headquarters, Jug-e Shiri road
Tel: 070 040 737
E-mail: fccs_kabul@yahoo.com

Kandahar

Near Nazoo Ana school, Shahr-e Nao, 5th district
tel: 070 316 745
fccs_kandahar@yahoo.com

Herat

Beside Rahmatullah Pharmacy, Mukhaberat street
tel: 040 228 412
fccs_herat@yahoo.com

Mazar-i Sharif

Room 3, 3rd floor, Jowzjan Market, in front of Ghulam Sakhi Cinema
tel: 079 110 550
fccs_mazar@yahoo.com

Jalalabad

First house from left, first Qasaba, Torikham bus station
tel: 079 698 474
fccs_jalalabad@yahoo.com

Khost

Behind the Police Headquarters, west of the football ground
tel: 079 422 722
fccs_khost@yahoo.com

Baghlan

Naswar Kobi street, Islam Qala, Pul-e Khumri
tel: 075 591 029
fccs_baghlan@yahoo.com

FCCS local offices:

Maimana (079 344 041), Kapisa (079 696 669)


For general information, contact by e-mail:
ecg@afghanfccs.org



Beydari Melli

Beydari Melli

small grants program for the development
of Afghan culture and civil society



4.1 Beydari Melli yearly progress report, 2005

Project Title: Civil Society Empowerment Program / Beydari Melli

Date of Report: December 2005

Period of Reporting: 12 months (3 December 2004 to 3 December 2005)

Project Ref. No: EC Ref: ASIE/2004/89353
(UN-HABITAT Ref. No. : XB/AFG/04/X04)

Completed by: Abdul Hadi Pardis Beydari Melli Project Director

Amount €: EC: 2,300,000
OSI: 125,000
TOTAL: 2,425,000

1. Snapshot

- a. Start Date of Contract: 03 December 2004
b. End Date of Contract: 03 December 2006
c. % of project lifetime elapsed: 50%

Call for proposal	No of Called proposals	No of Received Proposals	No of selected proposals	Projects status	
				ongoing	Completed
1 st Call for proposal	17	75	17		17
2 nd Call for proposal	120	71	Not yet	Not yet	

2. Objectives

The objective of this program is to empower civil society in Afghanistan, with a particular focus on the regions, while building the capacity of the FCCS to take on this function.

3. Major Achievements of first instalment

- **Staff recruitment**
- Headquarters team:
 - ✓ Project Director (2 successive ones and one reassigned the new one recruited)
Project Advisor
 - ✓ Financial Director (was terminated, new recruited)
 - ✓ Grants Manager
 - ✓ Chief Technical Assistant
 - ✓ Field Coordinator
 - ✓ MIS assistant
 - ✓ Translator
 - ✓ Admin/Finance assistant
 - ✓ Training supervisor
 - ✓ 3 Program Officers
 - ✓ Civil Society Analyst (recruited for preparing Baseline Survey Report)
 - ✓ UN-HABITAT appointed *new point person*

Still to be recruited: Monitoring and Reporting Officer, Public Information Officer, M&E officer for UN- Habitat (one position in headquarter), Regional M&E officers for UN-Habitat (8 positions: Herat, Farah, Kandahar, Mazar, Bamyan, Parwan, Kapisa, Panjsheer, Jalalabad and Kabul- Kabul and Jalalabad are still not clear-)

Regional Office Staff

- ✓ 7 Regional Office Managers (including one for Kabul)
- ✓ 6 Regional Office Assistants
- ✓ Support staff (guard/cleaner)

Providing new staff with equipments, and have them start work according to their terms of references.

● **Trainings/Capacity building**

According to the contract both FCCS and UN/Habitat agreed that UN/Habitat will train FCCS staff capacity building which is not completed yet but, some important trainings launched. The FCCS staff trained in follow subjects:

- ✓ HR Management
- ✓ Transportation
- ✓ Logistics and Procurement:
- ✓ Security
- ✓ Finance
- ✓ General Filing System for FCC
- ✓ GMS Training (Grant Management Process)
- ✓ Orientation on BMP.

Also after requirement of Training officer for BMP the following training launched with assistance of UN/Habitat technical adviser for Grantees and BMP program officers:

- ✓ Training of Applicants for first Call for Proposal on project design and proposal writing.
- ✓ Training of surveyors for base line survey.
- ✓ Preparation of General Training Manual
- ✓ Review of launched trainings by UN/Habitat for FCCS staff and Grantees
- ✓ Preparation of training materials for Proposals preparation to Grantees.
- ✓ Preparation of training materials about Civil Society
- ✓ Monitoring and Evaluations (for BMP program officers)
- ✓ Preparation of required period reports (Narrative and Financial) against each Milestone stated in Annex A of the grant agreement.
- ✓ *GMS Monitoring & Evaluation Training for:* FCCS Program Officers.
- ✓ 17 grantees received *Training on Milestone Achievement Reports*
- ✓ *FCCS Capacity Development by UN-HABITAT Security Officer* to FCCS
- ✓ *Completion of BMP Training Manual in English:*
- ✓ *Regional Officer Capacity Development:* Regional Office Staff received training in CSEP proposal writing.
- ✓ *Training on Reporting:* Representatives of 17 Grantee organizations received training on reporting.
- ✓ *Training Materials Development:* The translation of the Training Manual “Envisioning Afghan Civil Society” has been completed; the development of the first of two Beydari Melli Management Training Manuals has been initiated. Also, training materials about the grant distribution process in the provinces have been developed.
- ✓ *Materials Development.* The development of the first of two Regional Officer Training Manuals has been completed.
- ✓ *Proposal Writing Training Workshops* were conducted in all regions. A total of approximately 440 CSO representatives (15% of them women) were trained. Approximately 60% of the

trainees were youth (i.e. younger than 25 years). Workshops lasted 1-2 days. 15 workshops were held.

- ✓ *Regional Officer Capacity Development:* Training Officer and CSEP Technical Advisor travelled to regions to inspect office operations, and conduct on-the-job training where needed.

- **International Trainings and Study Trips**

- ✓ In-depth GMS Training - Sofia Bulgaria (twice):

This training established and organized by OSI (Open Society Institute). The main purpose of this mission was to get in-dept training on GMS; how to use GMS, uploading of GMS related templates and installation of GMS based on the local requirements.

- ✓ Study trip -Tajikistan

Study trip to Tajikistan completed where a delegation of senior-level UN Habitat and FCCS staff familiarized themselves with the technical and social aspects of the OSI Foundation's grant-making activities.

- ◆ *GMS Conference in Turkey:* MrGMS Grant Manager attended a 7-day GMS conference sponsored by OSI in Turkey. Purpose of this conference was to share experiences using GMS, to identify software clichés, and to discuss means to further enhance the effectiveness of the software.
- ◆ *GMS:* 4 staff (3 from FCCS, 1 from UN-HABITAT) participated in GMS Training in Sofia, Bulgaria, which dealt with the financial module components of GMS.

- **Introduction of BMP:**

- ✓ The BMP was introduced to UN-Habitat's Programs representatives during the annual Program Meeting of UN-Habitat, took place in Panjsher, for propose of finding the better way of integration with other UN-Habitat's programs.
- ✓ Introduction of BMP to regional manager Fokoka UN-Habitat office.
- ✓ Introduction of BMP to Counter part.

- **Operational manual**

Operational Manual completed and translated to Dari and Pashto languages with flowcharts, and project cycle description which includes the following:

- ✓ Introduction
- ✓ Roles
- ✓ Eligibility
- ✓ Call for Proposals
- ✓ Project Cycle Management
- ✓ Capacity Building
- ✓ Financial Management
- ✓ Monitoring
- ✓ Communicating Program Activities
- ✓ Attachments(The Operational Manual is also attached with 4 Annexes)

Also a brief of operational manual prepared with the title of **Beydari Melli Info for Applicants.**

Operational Manual and Beydari Melli Info for Applicants translated to Dari and Pashto Languages for helping those Civil Society Organization that don't have complete familiarity with English language

- **Baseline Survey:**

A baseline survey of civil society organizations was launched in December 2004, whereby 16 provincial surveyors were trained and then supported to collect information on local civil society organizations with a three page questionnaire. This data was then entered into a comprehensive

database. This process has since been taken over by the regional offices, and is still ongoing. Almost 900 organizations from about 20 Afghan provinces have so far been entered into our database. The questionnaire was reviewed, but for consistency's sake the original one is still being used.

In June 2005 a sociologist was recruited to analyse the data and prepare a baseline report on civil society organizations in Afghanistan, which is currently in the final review process.

- ◆ *Baseline Survey: Data Analysis and preparation of final baseline report continuing.* A CSO directory has been printed, which contains all data except Kabul (survey analysis still ongoing).
- ◆ *CSO Directory into Dari:* With the surveys conducted in Kabul and the remaining regions, the number of Civil Society Organizations surveyed and entered into the Data Base is now at 1500. 500 more remain to be entered into the directory. However, surveys will continue and the data will be updated throughout the project. The CSO Directory translated to Dari language.
- ◆ *Civil Society Provincial Analysis Report:* The report has been completed, and is with the Director of FCCS for final editing.

- **First call for proposal (Pilot Phase):**

The First call for proposal lunched on follow proposes:

- ✓ Drugs and Society - Research paper on the social effects of drugs on society
- ✓ Kabul Streets Community Works – Community project to clean neighbourhood streets
- ✓ Short Story Writing Workshop for Girls – Workshop for school-age girls culminating with reading and publication of selected stories
- ✓ Short Film on Situation of Higher Education in Afghanistan – 10-15 minute film on any aspect of higher education
- ✓ Media and Public Participation in Parliamentary Elections – Raising public awareness about the elections through publication
- ✓ Encouraging Women's Participation in the Upcoming Elections – Creative methods of encouraging women's independent candidacy

On first call for proposal a total of 70 proposals received which were reviewed by Project Selection Committees and from the mentioned proposals 17 were approved. The grants were awarded after a lengthy process of reform of the selected proposals in consultancy with the prospective grantees, and thereafter the grants were awarded. All projects are currently being implemented with close monitoring by the Program Officers.

- ✓ Reviewed pilot call for proposals lesson learned, analyzed and starting bringing changes base on lesson learned in methodologies.
- ✓ *Project Completion:* The number of grantees having completed their projects went up to 17.

Second Call for Proposal:

- ✓ *Second Call for Proposal:* In consultation with EC representative, projects eligible for the second round of proposals have been selected, and a 'Second Call for Proposal' document has been prepared.
- ✓ *Preparation of 2nd Call for Proposals Strategy:* The FCCS / UN-HABITAT began with the drafting of a 2nd Call for Proposals Strategy, keeping in mind a request made by Elisabeth Roussier [EC] to facilitate a more visible participation of Afghanistan's communities of artists.
- ✓ *Second Call for Proposal:* Seven 'call for proposal' information gatherings have been held (with the presence of the Beydari Melli Project Director as well as FCCS Head of Units and Program Officers), in the following regional offices: Kabul, Balkh, Baghlan, Herat, Kandahar, Jalalabad, Khost. The interest for the call for proposal gatherings was especially strong in the regions, where an average of 200 CSO representatives per region attended. 120 project grant opportunities have been announced, covering the following subjects:

- Instrument Making Workshop Support (5)
 - Documenting Endangered Natural Heritage (7)
 - Short Movies Production (15)
 - Documenting Afghanistan's Handicrafts (7)
 - Musical Learning Courses (4)
 - Introducing the Provincial Council to the People (7)
 - Discovery of Talents: Publication of Unpublished Manuscripts (21)
 - Discovery of Talents: Young graphic artists (35)
 - Youth's visions, and critiques on current socio-political issues (3)
 - Organizing youth gatherings through musical concerts (2)
 - Student social/cultural activities (5)
 - "Who is Who in the Local Government?" (7)
 - "Short Story Writing for Girls" (as per request of Jalalabad CSO representatives) (2)
- **Establishment of regional offices:**

Six Regional offices have been established in, Herat, Kandahar, Jalalabad, Balkh, Khost, and Baghlan provinces. Contracts were made as well as rent agreements, and all necessary equipment was purchased. The first step of training was launched for provincial staff but before the second call for proposals, which will be implemented in all provinces, the provincial staff must get more training.

- **Monitoring & Evaluation:**

Monitoring & Evaluation of first call for proposal projects followed twice a week by the related program officer. The result of monitoring is entered into the Grants Management System (GMS) but also archived as hard files.

Project Monitoring & Evaluation: Beidarie Millie staff continued to carry out bi-weekly project site visits wherever project implementation was underway (15 in Kabul, 1 Kapisa, 1 Herat). Meetings with grantees on specific project management issues have been held.

FCCS Financial Report: FCCS submitted its first Financial Report to UN-HABITAT.

Output Binder: FCCS/UN-HABITAT prepared output binder of BMP project achievements.

Customization of Reporting Templates: Customization of BMP reporting templates was initiated.

Creation of new Monitoring & Evaluation Formats: UN-HABITAT initiated, through the GMS Grants Manager and the BMP Technical Advisor discussions for the development of a data base which will table data of implemented projects according to geographic regions, gender, programmatic areas, etc.

Documents and templates development:

GMS: GMS Software modifications introduced in Turkey in September were uploaded. UN-HABITAT grant manager provided backstopping support for FCCS finance staff.

4.2 Afghan Civil Society Baseline Report

Foundation for Culture and Civil Society

Afghan Civil Society Baseline Report



Lorenzo Delesgues and Robert Kluyver

Kabul, Afghanistan, October 2005

Acknowledgments

We are indebted to the FCCS provincial offices for their hard work, which has made this survey possible. We would like to thank the Beydari Melli program staff, and in particular Shukrullah Ameer, Management of Information Systems Specialist, for his application and determination in building the database and extracting the results. Doctor Niazi, the FCCS Civil Society Coordinator, was fundamental for our analysis; not only for his deep knowledge of afghan political and social intricacies, but also because he actually recruited, convened and trained the surveyors, and later supervised the progress of the surveyors. Farid Bahman, UN Habitat's Technical Advisor on the Beydari Melli Program, provided valuable assistance in the creation of the questionnaire, as did Dawn Stallard, who launched this whole survey process. From the outset, Mir Ahmad Joyenda, Chairman of FCCS, played a very important role in the orientation of this analysis. We also express our thankfulness to Anna Paterson for being the most efficient and talented editor during the whole report writing process. Finally, we would like to thank the donors of this program, the European Commission and the Open Society Institute.

Project History

On 01 December 2004 the European Commission delegation in Kabul signed a 2.3 million Euro contract with UN-Habitat for the implementation of a 2-year nation-wide small grants program, the "Civil Society Empowerment Program". The Foundation for Culture and Civil Society (FCCS), which had been involved in developing this project in collaboration with the EC since April 2003, signed an agreement with UN Habitat in January 2005, to implement this program, which we named "*Beydari Melli*" (National Awakening)

The stated objectives of this EC grant are to:

- Support the development of culture and civil society throughout Afghanistan
- Build the capacity of the FCCS as a national civil society institution that may work towards this goal over the years

It was agreed that as a first step a baseline survey would be made of civil society in Afghanistan, which would allow us to better orient the program, as well as measure progress by comparing initial data to the data we will collect at the end of the program, in December 2006.

A textbox later in these pages will explain more about the Beydari Melli Small Grants Program.

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Chapter 1

An Introduction to Civil Society in Afghanistan

“Civil Society” has become a much-used word in Afghanistan, although it is notoriously undefined. It is used by donors, foreign analysts, the Afghan Government, Afghan politicians, local organizations and the public at large, and it is likely that each user has its own definition for it. However since “Civil Society” is not yet a clear notion in Afghanistan some members of the Afghan Government and of the international community involved in reconstructing this country have ignored Afghan civil society altogether. The United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan (UNAMA) and many of the main international donors didn’t make any provision for civil society input into the national reconstruction and reconciliation process, and this pattern has been followed until today by the post-Taliban Afghan governments¹. The European Commission, and some of the European donor nations, did express an interest in civil society development from the outset of the creation of the new Afghanistan, but did not result in any significant civil society empowerment program until 2005.

For many westerners the term civil society designs a sector of citizens’ groups which place themselves between the family, the government and the market, with a specific common purpose that will affect at least part of public life. This is however not the meaning given to civil society in Afghanistan.

In Afghanistan the term used for Civil Society is *Jame’a Madani*, which etymologically means “urban society”² although “*madani*” can also be derived from “*madaniat*”, civilization. In the first case civil society would be opposed to rural society, in the sense that it is based on a social contract, or the Rule of Law, i.e. the code of conduct that people who are not bound to each other by ties of kinship or clan must adopt to live together in a more complex social setting. In the second case, and this appears to be the more common interpretation among ordinary Afghans, it refers to “civilized” groups of people who are not directly linked to the power structures: urban intellectuals, poets, writers, and other people who strive for social progress and the common good. A shared characteristic to the different interpretations of the concept is thus that it refers to groups who are not linked to the official power structures, but there is not much more that these interpretations share.

But there are also increasing numbers of Afghans, close to foreign organizations, who have adopted a more Western interpretation of the concept, which includes traditional organizations - such as tribal or village councils, councils of religious scholars (*ulema*) - and all NGOs. The main conflict between the Western and the common Afghan interpretation of “civil society” lies in the inclusion of these two groups.

The traditional councils, however useful they may be to the implementation of reconstruction and development projects, are generally seen as regressive forces in society, especially the religious ones. For example, they are not elected, and only rarely include women or youth. Since 2001 international NGOs and donors have become increasingly interested in using these councils for the implementation of their programs, enthusiastically calling them “civil society”. These councils do not restrict themselves any longer to local issues, becoming increasingly connected to global issues dictated by International agendas.

¹ A civil society conference was organized parallel to the Bonn Conference in December 2001 by Swisspeace with funding from the Open Society Institute, but although this conference was successful in establishing the Afghan Civil Society Forum (ACSF) it appears quite obvious that there was no input from this meeting into the state-building exercise for Afghanistan.

² From the Arabic *Jame’a* = group, community, society and *Medina* = city. The term used throughout the Arabic-speaking world has the same etymological root

As to NGOs, they generally have a poor reputation in Afghan society. To understand this, one must look at how NGOs were created in Afghanistan.

The popular perception of Afghan NGOs

From a donor perspective, the large Afghan NGOs have many qualities: national outreach, experienced staff, sufficient management and financial administration, reporting skills, and a past history with donors. Moreover, donors generally assume local NGOs to be naturally part of civil society. But the perspective of the large majority of Afghans is quite different.

Until the early 1980s there were practically no NGOs in Afghanistan. Most of them were created during the jihad as service deliverers for the areas of Afghanistan controlled by the mujihadeen. In fact, in the early years of the resistance against the Afghan communist government, Western donors would give funds directly to the mujihadeen in Peshawar and Quetta, for a variety of purposes: to buy arms, supplies, and to administer basic services in the territories these groups occupied. But since these funds were totally unaccounted for, Western donors encouraged these mujihadeen groups to professionalize this service delivery, typically by encouraging a few engineers and doctors affiliated to these groups to set up an NGO, which could organize the provision of humanitarian assistance and account for it.

Western NGOs also received part of this anti-Afghan government funding, especially for the services they provided in the refugee camps in Pakistan, but also, increasingly, for the humanitarian assistance they provided in the mujihadeen-occupied territories. However, throughout the late 1980s and 1990s, donors encouraged Western NGOs to subcontract this work to Afghan NGOs, to “indigenize” the support. In fact, many of the big Afghan NGOs today are “spin-offs” of Western NGOs: a Western NGO would take some of its program staff and help them create an NGO, truly incubated in the Western NGO, and would thereafter give privileged support to this Afghan NGO. During the Taliban years, this allowed Western donors and NGOs to have minimal Western staff presence in Afghanistan, while keeping alive a non-governmental infrastructure of professional Afghans³. Mistakenly, the Western donors also imagined they were fostering a professional class that could take over ruling functions from the Taliban. During the war against the Taliban and the months thereafter, as the Interim Afghan government was being formed, many Western donors, supported by big Western NGOs, advocated for a government that would include many of these NGO leaders, especially in the sectors of reconstruction and social services. This was however thwarted by the new political class that emerged at the Bonn conference, and only a few of these NGO directors were given high functions⁴.

Now the problems with this class of NGOs in the eyes of the Afghan population are multiple:

- They are seen as politically biased towards the religious, mujihadeen groups. For example, many of the Afghan and Western NGOs, and even UN agencies, were staffed by anti-communist Hezb-e Islami supporters, who generally had a higher level of education than other mujihadeen - but they were also more fundamentalist. Even today, one will find more long beards and skullcaps among these NGO workers than among the urban population. Many of these older, and thus more capable, Afghan NGOs are almost only staffed by males who are 40+. By contrast, “civil society” groups (such as defined by Afghans) often come from the more progressive social groups, who thrived in the communist period.
- The uncontrolled recruitment policies of these NGOs led to them being controlled by kinship groups, and thus, as they expanded throughout the country, they would put relatives in charge of their local offices.

³ The Taliban were upset about this “state within the state” structure and tried, very much as the present government, to encourage donors to give the funds directly to their government; and failing that, they put increasing pressure on the NGOs to reveal their assets, salary levels and information about their projects and funding, in order to control them better (and very likely to increase their cut) - as is happening now. Ultimately, Taliban officials took to creating their own NGOs to compete with the other NGOs, which was not a very successful move either.

⁴ Today the most prominent government official with a mostly NGO background is Haneef Atmar, Minister of Rural Rehabilitation and Development

In many areas these NGOs thus have very little contact with the population, which becomes obvious when they are requested to do significant outreach among the population, for example doing civic education, surveys, focus groups etc. The local population accordingly sees them as extraneous organizations. In many cases, since the populations among the Afghan-Pakistani border which could migrate freely to and from Afghanistan during the jihad are Pashtun, these NGOs were originally staffed by Pashtuns (many from the East, close to Peshawar, the main basis of the jihad).

- The significant funds these NGOs had, and still have, access to allows them to support lifestyles much above that of the local population: comfortable offices, new 4wd cars, good salaries and sophisticated communication means (HF and VHF radios), while the population assumes, quite naturally, that these resources should have gone to the more vulnerable groups and infrastructure projects.
- Many of the NGOs did not function as professionally as they purported to (this is partially due to the recruitment policies) and the infrastructural or humanitarian services they provided were not good enough, and thus criticized by the population. A typical case is in road-building. Many of these NGOs would “repair” a road without the sufficient know-how and equipment, and in the next spring floods this road would be washed away, allowing the NGO to get new funds from donors to repair it again, thus giving themselves permanent work. On the humanitarian delivery side (food, medicines, shelter etc.) the NGOs would give the priority to their own kinship or tribal groups, and the staff could take important “cuts”.
- The close symbiotic relationship these NGOs have to Western organizations, and the distance they maintained with successive Afghan governments, has made these Afghan NGOs a new social elite, unaccountable to both the population and the government. That’s why, both during the Taliban times and today, the government and the population quite naturally bond together to reduce the power of these NGOs.

This being said, we must nuance this general image of Afghan NGOs in two ways. First, some of the big Afghan NGOs did try to establish better links with the local population through open recruitment policies (but this is rare) and by closely involving the beneficiary communities through focus groups and other means of providing input (this is more common). Second, the term NGO in Dari (*sozman-e khair-e dawlati*) has the same meaning as in English, and some true civil society organizations registered as NGOs, and still call themselves as such. Therefore, one cannot ascribe the problems noted above to all Afghan NGOs.

But still, and obviously so, the general image of Afghan NGOs among the Afghan population is largely negative. This is an intractable problem for umbrella organizations such as ACBAR (Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief) who are trying to “clean up” the image of Afghan NGOs while many of their core members are precisely these big Afghan NGOs that were fostered during the anti-government “jihad”.

Therefore many of the civil society organizations that have sprung up over the past years avoid calling themselves NGOs, and in many cases honestly attempt to avoid the mistakes made by the older NGOs, including for example people from different ethnic groups, youth and women among their core members. Most of these organizations call themselves “social organizations” (*sozman-e ijtimai*).

Social Organizations and the new regulatory framework

The term “social organization” also has some negative connotations, although not as many as “NGO”. This is due to the fact that the rise of social organizations occurred during the communist period. These were mostly government-controlled professional organizations and trade unions, whose heads were appointed by the communist government, usually with “advice” from the Soviet advisors. Among those still extant today are the Union of Afghan Workers (a kind of Union of Unions), the Farmers Union, the Artists Union, and some others. Although since 1992 many of these “social organizations” have become dysfunctional, some of them

were kept alive, although unfunded, by post-communist governments. Even today, a “Higher Council of Social Organizations” still regroups these organizations, generally un-reformed carcasses of the former institutions.

However a new Law on Social Organizations was passed at the end of 2002 (published in the Official Gazette of January 2003). The organizations that want to qualify as social organizations must adopt statutes which regulate their activities, precise their objectives, and which determine mechanisms for membership, governance, and financial issues such as liquidation. At least 10 founding members must sign the statutes, which are the basis for registration. Although the law is quite modern and encourages democratic and transparent governance, and membership, it also has some loopholes. For example, there is no provision that benefits of the social organizations may not be distributed to the members of the organization, an essential provision to avoid social organizations becoming commercial entities for the benefit of the founders. It is also far from certain whether the Department at the Ministry of Justice that regulates social organizations has effective monitoring capacity. In addition, the same department also registers and regulates political parties, creating a dangerous amalgam between social organizations and political parties⁵.

However this law, especially in contrast to the new NGO law, has created a clear distinction between social organizations and NGOs. The new NGO law has several stipulations that presume a functioning financial administration - NGOs have to submit budgets, project reports, yearly reports etc. - which is not required of social organizations, while the NGO law has less governance-related stipulations (about membership etc.)

Several hundred organizations have registered as social organizations since early 2003, while the number of NGOs is hardly increasing, as the registration process, formerly with the Ministry of Planning, and now with the Ministry of Economics, has long been frozen, and is further marred by uncertainties in the application of the new NGO law, which has draconian reporting requirements to the Government. As the Government is seen as largely corrupt, in addition to being “anti-NGO”, and there is practically no legal recourse when a government official presses an NGO for a bribe, a disclosure of assets and salary levels may easily lead to extortion by officials.

However, as will become clear in this survey, most of the organizations based in the provinces are unclear about the registration process and the differences between the types of registration. For example, in Nangarhar province, of 103 organizations surveyed, 59 call themselves social organizations, while only 3 of the 103 subsequently say that they have registered with the Ministry of Justice; while in Khost, 29 of 96 organizations surveyed call themselves NGOs, but only 15 have registered with the Ministry of Planning/Economics. The contrary may also occur: in Baghlan, only 6 organizations call themselves NGOs out of 98 surveyed, but 14 say that they have registered with the Ministry of Planning/Economics. These may be extremes, but similar discrepancies occur all throughout the country.

To complicate this, other types of registration are also current. A local cultural association may only register with the provincial Department of Information and Culture, which provides no clear legal status. Many organizations also register with a provincial Department of Planning or Economics, which is not registered or even recognized as valid by the central Ministry⁶. In fact, many organizations are not registered at all (in Ghazni and Khost more than 50% of organizations are not registered in any way), or don’t know whether their registration with a local Department of a Line Ministry, or even an NGO or international donor agency, has any legal validity.

This is of concern not only for formal reasons (an organization without registration can in principle not open a bank account, and legal responsibilities for eventual donations received are not clear) but also for purposes of civil society development. As long as civil society organizations are not bound by their own statutes to commit

⁵ For example, a government decree banning political parties from receiving “foreign contributions” that was issued in the spring of 2005 also automatically applied to social organizations. This decree, after strong protest from social organizations, was not applied to them.

⁶ As reported in “Afghanistan Civil Society Assessment”, prepared by Counterpart International, April 2005

themselves to transparent procedures of governance and administration, they will not be solid blocks to build Afghan civil society with, and it will be difficult for the public to trust them or even see them as truly striving for the common good.

The Civil Society concept used in this Survey

The Foundation for Culture and Civil Society in its daily work uses a more Afghan definition of civil society, including intellectuals, artists, youth and professional organizations, and generally the progressive - or more exactly “civilizing” - forces in Afghan society, but not the unreformed traditional community and religious structures, nor the big Afghan NGOs who are primarily concerned with delivery of services that would normally be the responsibility of the State.

Given the proliferation over the last years of organizations - however they may call themselves - that are primarily created to attract donor money⁷ our primary focus was on those local organizations that have shown a capacity to work voluntarily, and that may continue to exist without donor money. For example, throughout the country less than 20% of the organizations indicated receiving any funds from an international source while local donations, membership fees, course fees and/or the community each are mentioned as funding sources by more than 20% of the surveyed organizations. In some provinces (Jowzjan, Sar-e Pul) only about half of the organizations reported receiving funding from any kind of source.

By no means, given the confusion in terminology and registration processes noted above, did we cut out NGOs from our survey. Indeed, the kind of state-services they provide (roads, wells, education, health etc.) are deemed as prime necessities by many communities, so they are natural activities for local organizations to engage in. But we stipulated that the head offices of the organization must be located in the province surveyed.

The survey focuses on three groups of activities: cultural, social and service-delivery. The strong focus on culture, which otherwise may be unwarranted in such a survey of civil society, is due to the fact that the small grants program (*Beydari Melli*, or “National Awakening”) focuses as much on cultural development as it does on civil society. This is in keeping with the role Afghans ascribe to their civil society: as a “civilizing force”.

We performed the survey in 15 provinces (see map 1): one in the West (Herat), one in the Southwest (Kandahar), three in the South-Southeast (Khost, Paktia and Ghazni), three in the East (Nangarhar, Nuristan and Laghman), the four provinces of the Northeast (Badakhshan, Takhar, Kunduz, Baghlan), and three in the North (Balkh, Jowzjan and Sar-e Pul). We deliberately avoided Kabul as our primary purpose was to make a portrait of civil society in the provinces. We tried to include Bamiyan and the Central Highlands, but given the harsh winter season, we had to cancel that. In each province our surveyor contacted as many civil society organizations as possible; this ranged from a low 4 in Nuristan to a high of 119 in Ghazni, with an average of 58 CSOs per province.

[insert map 1]

In fact the survey is ongoing, and we will soon issue an analysis of civil society in Kabul, as a separate appendix to this document. In all other provinces too, for the purpose of the *Beydari Melli* small grants program that this survey is part of, registration of existing and new civil society organizations is an ongoing process.

⁷ as other donors in Afghanistan do, we receive many proposals of small organizations that read more like shopping lists than like projects: long lists of office furniture, communication means, carpets, vehicles and salaries with a very brief and general statement of the purposes of the organization

It is our intention to perform a similar survey of civil society in 2007, at the end of this program, in which we will be able to measure progress, if any, in the sector of civil society development. We expect to include more provinces, if not all of them, in our future survey.

Parallel to this, a Civil Society Directory, with essential information about more than 1,000 organizations registered up to date, will be available to those interested.

A Short Description of the Beydari Melli Program

The Beydari Melli Program is a nationwide small grants program funded by the European Commission through UN-HABITAT and is implemented by the Foundation for Culture and Civil Society (FCCS), which has received additional technical and financial support for this purpose from the Open Society Institute (Soros Network of Foundations). The overall goal of the program is to contribute to the development of civil society and culture in Afghanistan, leading to an increase in social, artistic and cultural activity throughout Afghanistan.

Grants are available for a range of activities including special events, ongoing activities and individual support. Grants will be solicited through calls for proposals. Projects that do not answer a specific call for proposals are not accepted.

Since the Beydari Melli Program targets small, local civil society organizations and individuals, training and on-the-job support is provided by program staff in improving the structure of the candidate organization, designing and implementing projects, financial management and monitoring and evaluation.

The calls for proposals will occur about every three months, in November 2005, February, May, and August 2006. The program shall be run from FCCS offices in Kandahar, Herat, Mazar-e Sharif, Pul-e Khumri, Jalalabad, Khost and Kabul, and from sub-offices in Maimana, Ghazni and Kapisa. The subjects and conditions of the calls for proposals will be announced through launch events and the media. This is a competition-based award. The best proposals and organizations will be selected for awards.

Grants made under this program will never exceed USD 12,000. Each call for proposals will specify a maximum grant size, usually between 1,000 and 6,000 USD. The total amount of grants to be disbursed is 1,490,000 USD, which we plan to share among more than 400 grantees.

Subjects of calls for proposals made up to date include

- Culture: short documentary and fiction movies, music classes and short-story writing for girls, contemporary art, unpublished manuscripts, traditional instrument-making & organizing cultural events at universities and in public spaces
- Civil Society: Women and elections, youth debate clubs, provincial administration surveys
- Media: Elections awareness, covering the activities of the elected provincial councils
- Research and Surveys: natural heritage, traditional handicrafts and master craftsmen, drugs and society

The FCCS commits not only to give maximum guidance to grantees in the implementation of their projects when requested, but also to make the grant results available to the public through publications (print and multimedia, movies...) broadcasting through radio and TV, traveling exhibitions, and in the FCCS resource center in its Kabul headquarters.

Chapter 2

Methodological Notes about this Survey

Survey intentions and objectives

The main objectives of this baseline survey are to

- Understand the factors influencing the development of Civil Society organizations
- Identify the main sectors of activity of CSOs
- Evaluate the governance, financial and human resources profile of these organizations
- Outline the factors which make civil society organizations more or less dependent
- Build an analysis of the Civil Society sector based on reliable data
- Define the training needs of the organizations
- Design the strategy of FCCS in regard to Civil Society and its sectors of activity
- Provide clear and exploitable data for organizations working in the sector of civil society development

Since “Civil Society” is not yet a clear notion in Afghanistan, there is a strong need for concrete data, which should help us build a clearer picture of this phenomenon. To this end, we designed a survey integrating a wide range of data to outline the main characteristics of Afghan Civil Society organizations. In this first stage of analysis, we intended to define the shape of Civil Society. It is only after this first step, that a deeper analysis of the core mechanisms of Afghan Civil Society will be possible.

Our experience highlighted that it will be difficult to gather accurate data on certain sensitive subjects. The funding expectations of some organizations may influence several of their responses. The financial aspects of their activities are particularly sensitive to these calculations. Knowing that we will not be able to gather accurate information on all the subjects, we chose to conduct a deeper survey including those sensitive matters only in a second phase. For this first baseline report our objective was to draw a relevant sketch of the Afghan Civil Society in order to build up our strategy for the next phases of the survey but also to disseminate a first set of accurate data for the use of organizations working in the Civil Society sector.

Context of the survey

Our study is based on a survey conducted in 15 Afghan provinces involving more than 860 organizations. It is the largest survey to date on Civil Society organizations in Afghanistan. A survey in the city of Kabul is now underway and will be analyzed separately. The provinces were chosen in order to cover the majority of Afghanistan’s regions. The survey was compiled between the end of 2004 and the beginning of 2005. Then three months were necessary to create the database and to carry out proper verification on data.

Data management

The data was gathered separately in every province. After a training period, each surveyor was deployed in one province. This reduces the potential for mistakes to a provincial level. Once the data was collected, it was entered and double checked in the database software.

The interviews were led by the surveyors in the offices of the interviewees in order to assess the office environment and get a better feel for the scope and role of the organizations. The surveyors filled in the survey forms themselves, and were asked to make a private narrative assessment of each organization.

The survey’s main weaknesses emanate from the questions them self. Sometimes the query did not provide us with clear-cut information; i.e.: when we asked, “where do you work: urban, rural, both”, the both result is

hardly exploitable. We do not know to what extent the activity of the organization answering both is rural or urban. This problem is recurrent. In the training section; we don't know which training is not required. The only way to express non required training activities is to tick "less important". To eliminate this imprecision, we will combine the results of "more important" with the result of "less important", in order to determine the training necessities.

A quality analysis of the database was conducted in order to identify in which provinces and on which questions the greatest number of errors were occurring. It was also aimed at reassessing our surveyor training needs and questionnaire for the next stage of the survey. To accomplish this database evaluation, we first selected all the questions that had incomplete or illogical answers. By this means we were able to detect and isolate the weak or unreliable results of our survey. The financial and the training answers appeared particularly unreliable. In the financial section, answering to budget questions was optional; it consequently broke the homogeneity of the survey. Many organizations didn't want to give any answer to avoid State or tax control over their activities. That fear may have falsified some of the answer regarding the annual budget amount. Having no tool to evaluate the budget distortion extend, we relied on the global coherence between the number of ongoing projects and the existence of donors.

In some provinces, Balkh, Paktia, Jowzjan and Sar-e-Pul, the quality of the survey was not as high as in other provinces. To resolve these local mistakes, we asked the surveyors to revise their incomplete forms. The analysis is based on the last completed version of the forms.

The findings of the database evaluation quality are shown in the chart 46.

[insert map 2]

The geographical coverage of our survey is difficult to gauge precisely. In fact the surveyors were working in a specific province but we don't know how deeply they searched for organizations. We can not evaluate to what extent the rural areas were surveyed. In our analysis, we will consider that the surveyors mainly made their enquiries in urban areas known to them. Knowing this intricacy, the surveyors were asked to go to every district of the province in order to have a better coverage of rural areas. However, we also know that most Civil Society organizations not specifically geared toward the prevision of local rural services - of which there are few - locate their offices in the urban centers. Civil Society is altogether more an urban phenomenon.

Many interviewers had difficulty identifying the organization's office. Not all of them have a board outside their office, and their staff is usually not present all day in the office. That is particularly true in the rural areas.

Figure 2 shows the real coverage of the survey in terms of answers, i.e. organizations that give as their address a location in a district outside of the provincial capital. Some provinces like Balkh or Herat have been surveyed only in their capital cities.

Data extremes management

In our survey, we identified three types of data extremes: Time related (new or old organizations), Human resources related (micro organizations, large professional associations), Financial related (micro projects, massive international projects),

For each of these three types, we have tried to evaluate their impact on our study. In most of the cases, a specific study of the data extremes brought us some very useful trends. It helped us to acquire more appropriate figures, reducing our error level. In order to define the components of average organizations, we had to filter the extremes. The averages bases are calculated using the Gauss distribution.

These extremes can be very helpful to create ideal types of organizations necessary for the next phase of our survey. These ideal types will then be studied in depth and will serve as models to cover all the varieties of

Civil Society organizations. This method will help us to focus on the more significant organizations and will allow us to raise awareness on very specific issues.

To keep the contextual coherence of extremes, the relevant data extremes are analyzed separately in each section.

Below an example shows the Human resources extreme, it illustrates the necessity of data extremes extraction. Those two graphics have completely different outcomes for the same question: In this case, it is interesting to see that the proportion of female staff changes completely from the first to the second set of bars.

[insert graph 1]

In our survey, the first organizations were created in 1931. But the majority of them appeared after the fall of the Taliban regime. The newly established organizations are considered in most of our queries. In some specific cases only we have excluded them. For example the organizations created in 2005, didn't have the time to finalize their projects. In consequence, when we will analyze the implementation quality, these organizations will be filtered from our database to avoid any falsification of our results.

On the financial part, we have tried to show a complete picture of the financial disparities. We have then extracted different averages useful for our study. For the financial data, a part of the extreme extraction helps us to build up tendencies. This way of analysis is the more accurate due to the particular sensitivity of the financial questions. By this mean, we avoid major mistakes. A major attention will be given to the financial sector in the next phase of the survey.

Graphic design

The data extraction has been made following a series of questions interrelations (referred to in the annexes p.56).

The scope of graphic is to have a synthetic view on phenomenon impossible only viewing the data tables. The graphics are the basis of our analysis. We built them to cover as many significant interrelated questions from the database. We have then commented and classified them in order to show the more interesting findings of the survey.

[insert graph 2]

Chapter 3

General Analysis of Civil Society Organizations

We will now start an extensive analysis of civil society organizations based on the data we collected. The first questions concern the organizations in themselves: when they were created and which institutional form they have, how they are governed, aspects of financial management, human resources and administration.

Period in which civil society organizations were created

The graph below shows the year of establishment of the surveyed organizations. The appearance of large numbers of civil society organizations is a recent phenomenon, as more than 60% of them were established in the past 4 years, since the fall of the Taliban. This obviously reflects the improved freedom of association and expression, as well as the readiness to participate in the reconstruction effort. It is interesting to note regional differences: in the North, in the provinces of Balkh, Jowzjan, Sar-e Pul and Badakhshan, the organizations are generally older. This is also true in the provinces of Laghman and Kandahar. This can be explained by the more liberal society that exists in the North. By contrast, in the provinces of Khost and Paktia, almost 80% of the organizations have been created since 2001, showing that this is a much younger phenomenon in these strongly conservative areas. This agrees with personal observations. In the North, many of the leaders and staff of civil society organizations are men and women in their 40s, while in Khost and Paktia, most of the organizations have been formed and are led by young men in their 20s.

[insert graph 3]

One however notes that there has been a steady increase in the number of organizations created per 5 year period over the last decades: from 19 organizations established in the 40 years precedent to the revolution, and then (per five year period) 12, 23, 72, 108 and 608. This exponential rise in organizations created is of course partially due to perspective. The organizations that we surveyed today did not include, of course, the many organizations created in past years that have disappeared since, but they do include those that may disappear tomorrow. However it also points out that the “NGO mentality” of local groups who hope to appropriate a part of the donor funds available may be a stronger factor for their creation than the existence of more freedom. Witness for example the more than 100 civil society groups that formed organizations during the Taliban years.

As to the type of organizations created (see graph), those established before 1960 were mostly professional associations and local workers unions (connected to the State apparatus in Soviet style). The surprising burst in organization creation in the decade of the 1930s is due to (xxxxxx) In the first communist years, no civil society organizations at all were formed, while during Dr. Najibullah’s rule there were some timid attempts. The 1990s were the period of NGOs, and one sees that half the organizations created in those years call themselves Non Governmental Organizations. Since 2001, however, we see an explosion in “social organizations” and “associations” (the latter term doesn’t have a precise legal meaning, but more a social one: groups of volunteers coming together for a common purpose, often recreational). Over the last years, their number has increased tenfold, while that of the NGOs has grown less, about threefold. As we will see later, the social organizations are much less focused on project implementation than the NGOs, so this sudden appearance of organizations doesn’t necessarily translate in a dramatic increase of activities and projects.

A note of caution must be introduced here: during the survey, we requested the organizations themselves to identify themselves as “NGO”, “Social Organization”, “Association/Union” (a free category basically meaning neither NGO nor Social Organization) or “Umbrella Organization” meaning an organization regrouping several

other organizations. However clear these concepts may have been to us and our surveyors, it is doubtful that the surveyed organizations themselves clearly understood the differences between these groups. We calculated how many of the organizations calling themselves “NGO” had registered with the Ministry of Planning/Economics as NGO, and how many of the organizations calling themselves “Social Organizations” had registered as such with the Ministry of Justice - and came up with less than 50% average nationwide, with the Northern provinces scoring better on this “coherence indicator” and with the lowest scores in most rural provinces (Laghman, Paktia, Jowzjan and Ghazni) where the understanding of legal subtleties may be less - and, surprisingly, Herat. The provinces where more organizations defined themselves as NGO are the more urban provinces (Kandahar, Balkh, Nangarhar and Khost) and the Northern provinces of Kunduz and Takhar; while in those provinces where less international funding is available, in the rural provinces of Sar-e Pul, Jowzjan, Paktia, Laghman and Ghazni, less than 10% of the organizations call themselves “NGO”.

When one compares this data with the place of registration given

[insert graph 4]

When we analyze the area of activities of the civil society organizations (see graph below) another interesting trend comes to light over the last few years. We see that a disproportionate number of organizations claiming to work in mostly rural areas were created in 2003. This was obviously the effect of the launching of the National Solidarity Program by the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development. Incidentally, it also shows that to some degree the village councils set up to decide on the affectation of the block grants were included in this survey by our provincial surveyors.

[insert graph 5]

Budget:

The survey does not inform us concerning the periodic evolution and amount of organization’s budget at all, provided that, it allowed us to have data for the year 2004. Most of the figures related to funding are sensitive thus; their accuracy is not very high. Given that, basing our analysis on the financial tendencies, will greatly reduced the risk of mistake.

Sensitivity of the financial aspects is due to the interest of certain organization to appear poorer in order to attract more funds. To avoid this uncertainty on our figures, we will not consider the budget gap as a quantity in absolute valor but as a structural difference between organizations. During the survey’s budget evaluation, organizations had the choice to declare it in Afghani or in USD. The result is very interesting. At large, organizations with lower access to International donors gave us their budget in Afghani while the other declared it in USD. The average amount and distribution of budgets differs a lot weather it is in Afghani or in USD. This phenomenon is recurrent in all sectors of activity. It appears that the gaps can be amplified in specific cases.

The budget distribution is homogenous (following the Gauss curb), for the sum declared in Afghani. Whereas budgets are received in USD do not follow a homogeneous distribution. In the latest, we detect three points of budget accumulation: I around 1000 \$ for small budgets, II around 15000 \$ for medium budgets and III around 200000 \$ for high budgets. This could reflect a tendency from the international donors to define budget categories. While fund perceived in Afghani are just the result of a random accumulation.

In rural or urban activities, average budgets in Afghanis indicate the budget minimum to be able to run a project. In rural areas, this limit is around 200\$ while in urban areas, it jumps to 1000\$. Budgets in USD outweigh this values more than 10 times (the average of the smaller budgets is between 20000\$ and 50 000\$

in rural areas). The statement only reveal financial extremes. For both local based initiatives and international uphold programs. The low budget level signifies that other coping strategies are enacting in these organizations. Funds in nature or not accountable are caught by these entities to live on. Considering these coping strategies, the budget gap between organizations receiving their budget in USD and the one receiving it in Afghani is in reality inferior. The definition of a financial scale for projects can be an interesting tool for donors' grants distribution.

The important financial gap created by international funds has an impact on the desire of the Afghan Government to control the international money flow. The main argument of the Government being that the international money coming to Afghanistan, not only should belong to the Government, but also that it is the only structure that can objectively distribute and coordinate the international assistance by canalizing it through the State structures.

Certain provinces like Ghazni, Paktya and Badakhshan are able to reach a high level of money generation using local income mechanisms. While other provinces like Balkh, Kandahar and Kunduz, are less efficient in the use of local financial opportunities and rely more on the international community.

Type of organization and financial attraction force

Budgets tend to be distributed in function of the type of organization. NGO and Umbrella are the main organization able to attract the high fringe budgets where as associations and unions, only access to more limited budgets. A quasi inexistence of NGO on the lower range of budgets is shown in the chart bellow. The Social organizations and Association/Unions follow a very similar behavior pattern.

A local *shura* who wants to become eligible for a grant from international donors has to be registered and automatically becomes a NGO or a social organization. These bureaucratic demarches have to be included in an organization's wider development strategy. The budget analysis shows a lack of strategy from the local Afghan organizations. The lack of maturity in this organizational segment may be a part of the phenomenon explanation. Only a few Association and Social organization have access to the higher budget fringes. These organizations are older and more mature on financial aspects.

Since the budget distribution does not depend so on the basic function of the organization but on its institutional structure; the risk is high to see a diminution of the Social and Associations in the coming year due to their lack of financial attraction.

Human Resources:

In this section we will first proceed to an evaluation of the human resources distribution. The extremes of the distribution will then be studied separately. Human resource analysis gives us some interesting results related to gender issues.

The country distribution of human resources points out that a majority of organizations have between 3 and 30 paid staff (II). We observe a proportional relation between paid and volunteer staff. The smaller organizations tend to have more volunteer. Organizations with a staff number comprise between 6 and 20 persons have the highest number of paid staff.

At a gender level, if we consider the three above categories (I, II, III), it appears that female employment rarely goes beyond 35% of the paid staff. This limit is reached by the middle and big organizations (I, II) while in smaller organization (I) the female employment is very low and does not exceed 10% of the paid staff.

A broad number of the Organizations with more than 100 staffs are professional or student and youth organizations. This group is also composed of very large NGO founded in the 1990's. Those organizations were not surveyed because they are associated with the International NGO and are not falling in our Civil Society criteria. The larger Afghan NGO (Ibn Sina, AREA (Agency for Rehabilitation and Energy Conservation in Afghanistan), CHA (Coordination of Human Assistance)) are powerful implementing partners for the international community. They work mainly with Oxfam, NSP programs, REACH (Rural Expansion of Afghanistan's Community-Base Healthcare) and EuropAid. Their annual budgets are very high, more than 1 million \$ per year⁸.

The larger organizations, at large associations, are very opaque on their budgets.

Female staff are spread in northern areas (Kunduz, Takhar and Baghlan), in Ghazni and in urban areas (Heart, Kandahar and Mazar). Takhar, Sar-e-pul and Paktya concentrate the highest number of very large organizations.

Medium size organizations analysis (II)

A majority of organizations surveyed have between 3-30 staffs. Medium size organizations are mostly present in Ghazni, Balkh, Baghlan and Nangrhar province.

There are important disparities between the regions. In Laghman, Khost Paktya and Badakhshan, the level of female staff is very low. In Kandahar, Herat, Balkh and Ghazni, the proportion of female staff reaches country's maximum heights. Whereas in Southern and Eastern regions, it is far lower than Northern provinces.

As a direct consequence of fund distribution for reconstruction, the International donors are indirectly the major employer in most of medium and large Civil Society organizations. Organizations receiving their funds mainly employ male staff and give a lesser importance to volunteer staff. By opposition to the community base organizations who structure their human resources much more around volunteer staffs. Paid employees are concentrated in urban areas. The very high proportion of volunteer staff in urban areas indicates that community based organizations mostly developed in urban environments. The highest proportions of female staff are present in organizations receiving their budgets from communities (see the [chart 33](#)).

The use of volunteer staff by community base organizations gives the impression to be one of the coping phenomenons applied by organizations having the lowest budgets.

Medium size organizations (I) have a project implementation quality close to the national average⁹. Provided that, not only it indicates that is the ideal size for an organization to gain high efficiency but certainly also to attract enough funds for projects implementation.

Whereas, very small organizations have low level of completed projects not only because they are less institutionalized but also for their lower attraction to donors' funds.

In the average size organizations, Education and Cultural events activities are very dynamic sectors. At the opposite all the cultural production (Fine art, Music and film/Theater) are under developed. A clear connection exists between the Woman Right and Handicraft activities and woman work.

⁸ On this matter see the Counterpart International Afghan Civil Society Assessment, July 2005

⁹ See [chart.... \(emplementation quality en fct des type d'org\)](#)

Micro size organizations analysis (I)

This section turns out to be an extreme of our distribution. Micro organizations count for about 10% of all the surveyed entities. The level of feminization of these organizations is weak. It shows that real obstacles exist for woman initiatives. These micro organizations are mainly present in Balkh, Ghazni, Kandahar, Khost and Baghlan. They have quasi inexistent female staff, with the exception of Baghlan province where there is a very low proportion of female staff and Herat where a single micro organization is established, directed by a woman.

Paktya is the only province where micro organizations have the same proportion of male and female staff but once again this figures reflects the presence of only two entities.

The micro organizations activities are underdeveloped for infrastructure, income generation and agriculture sectors. Some very rare woman micro organizations working on Human Rights issues exist. Education, Sport and Environment activities are highly active fields for micro organizations.

The very specific sector covered by this type of organizations remains marginal and is rarely able to attract funds beside community or donation. Still, the sector constitutes the premise of Civil Society tangible actions.

Housing

The housing situation indicates two main trends: the level of incompressible expenses and organizations' degree of isolation. Renting seems to be the most common housing situation in Afghanistan. On one hand, it creates a large amount of fix costs; on the other hand, it gives organizations a high degree of flexibility. In certain cases, the housing survey has become a sensitive issue. Actually, the rent can be a way to justify abusive expenses.

After the fall of Taliban's regime and the humanitarian explosion, the cost of rent has exploded in all the country and particularly in urban areas, creating further financial obstacles for the renters. In parallel, the inflation allows higher sum of money to be illegally spent.

From the chart below, we observe that resort to renting is weaker in most of the remote areas (Badakhshan, Laghman, Nangarhar, Sar-e-pul, Nuristan).

Certain sectors of activity need to have a major independence. The housing situation of organization acting in Human Rights illustrates this phenomenon. They have the country's highest proportion of organizations' own offices (more than 25%). This inclination to independence is confirmed by the low level of Government involvement in their housing situation. It is also interesting to note that the level of house donation for Human Rights activities is particularly low.

In the other sectors the housing situation has a homogenize distribution. The lack of an office is a constraint for smaller organizations.

The financial capacity of Civil Society organizations seems to be linked with the proportion of renting. Wealthier provinces have a higher rent levels (Kandahar, Herat, Balkh, Baghlan). Thus there are exceptions in Paktya and Kunduz.

Level of institutionalization

Level of institutionalization, is intend as the quantity of rational factors action structuring organization's activity. To understand the degree of institutionalization of an organization, we can combine their budgeting capacity and the presence of a board of director as revelators. On one hand we appraise the organization's rationality with the exterior environment; on the other hand we measure its intern rationality by the restraints on nepotism.

The base of fund rising is to be able to create a budget and to present it to the donors. When there is no budgeting capacity, it means that the organization is very distant, less familiar to international procedures and may be considered less institutionalized. The [chart¹⁰ 42](#) shows the budgeting capacity. In Balkh, Baghlan, Kunduz and Badakhshan, the level of institutionalization is high in compare to Nangarhar, Takhar, Jawzjan and Ghazni.

The second and complementary aspect of the level of institutionalization of an organization is the presence of a board of director. More than 60% of the surveyed organizations do not have a board. The NGO law in preparation requires it in order for the organization to be recognized by the State. Without the State recognition, it becomes very hard for the organization to attract funds from donors. Coupled with the board presence, the precedent result is confirmed for Balkh, Kunduz and Badakhshan provinces. The organizations of Paktya province did not respond properly on their budget capacity although, a large proportion of these organizations have a board of director.

The northern organizations seem to have higher institutionalization level, while the organizations in southern provinces seems to be based more on a customary and nepotistic system of management.

Activity analysis

The survey was conducted on a wide range of sector. To structure our analysis, we have classified all activities under three relevant sections: Civil Society, Culture and Service provision. Each of these groups has then been divided in sub categories to be analyzed individually.

This section aims at providing quantitative data, in order to appreciate the particularities of every activity implemented by the Afghan Civil Society organizations. In order to compeer the sectors, we built our analysis around six common topics: Geographic coverage, Budget level, Human Resources, Type of organization, Sources of budget, and Housing. In the precedent section these topics were examined with different inputs.

This figure represents the whole country Civil Society organization activities. The analysis will not distinguish organizations working in Urban and Rural areas, it will cover the sector of activity as a whole. If we focus on organizations' working area, certain activities appear to be more urban i.e.: Civic action and Culture and other more rural i.e.: Service provision activities.

The Training considered as a complement of other activities was not included in our analysis. Later on, it will be studied in detail to understand the work sustainability of the Civil Society organizations.

Year average budgets

	Civil society		Culture		Service provision	
	Civic Action	Public-Media	Cultural activities	Preservation	I	II
USD	\$13,368	\$5,803	\$7,325	\$13,890	\$18,826	\$10,944

¹⁰ Some organizations did not respond to the budgeting questions, it appears that they are mainly funded by the Government (see the [chart 43](#)). There opacity can be explained by the prudence of bureaucrats or by the unwillingness to show obscure budgets.

The following map evidences that the major amount of money is clearly directed to regions with larger cities (Mazar, Herat and Kandahar). This assessment can not be completely demonstrated due to a lack of information on too many other provinces.

The priorities of the reconstruction process, reflected by the Civil Society organization activities appear clearly comparing the four following graphs:

Budgets distribution clearly indicates a priority given to the Service provision sector and to some specific activities like Civic action and Handicrafts. This has major impact on both financial and institutional structures of Civil Society organizations.

A distinction has been made between NGO, Social Organizations and Associations/Unions. These categories very flexible are not very well delimited. The Social Organization is a recent legal category depending mainly from the Ministry of Justice. The law requires them to have at list 10 members to exist. These organizations are less experimented then the older NGO¹¹.

On one hand, the level of Umbrella and NGO working in an activity reflects the involvement of foreign funds in this activity, as it is clearly shown by the comparison of **the chart** with the **chart**. On the other hand, the level of Social organization and Associations reflects both local and or community interest for an activity.

Organization's mandate

Civil Society organizations' main mandate is related to Social and Service provision matters. The core function of the majority of Civil Society organizations (more than 70%) is to compensate the lack of specific services. These activities (in particular the service provision) are now widely covered by NGO, financed by the International community. If not all, a large part of these services should fall into the State's prerogatives¹². Due to the State's weaknesses, Civil Society organizations cope with this situation. If the State strengthens, then the numbers of such Civil Society activities will diminish. Other wise a concurrence way appear between the State and the Civil Society. In this context, certain Civil Society organizations may become a brake to the State's development and empowerment. This element must be taken into account during the Civil Society strengthening process engaged by the International community.

Eastern region concentrates the major number of organizations working with specific people. While Northern regions organizations have less specialized activities. The work with specific people is directed to Woman groups both in the Northern provinces and in Ghazni, while in Southern and Eastern regions, youth are mainly targeted.

The map enlightens a tendency of frontier provinces to shelter many organizations working with refugees. These remains of the war and its displaced populations are still perceptible in Civil Society organizations' activities.

Civil Society

The Civil Society category is one of the three major subdivision used in our study. It represents activities with an intended impact on social environment through the promotion of ethical values. This sector is considered, to be a powerful sustain to both democratic and open society initiatives process.

¹¹ ACBAR listed more than 2000 local NGO working in Afghanistan in 2005. Only a part of them has been surveyed because they are mostly private companies no relevant for our analysis.

¹² We consider a State that has been structured around the notion of public services. Historically, such a State never existed in Afghanistan. But, since 2002, with the introduction of deep reforms to the State apparatus, it is in part this type of State that is being build up.

Its characteristics will be studied in two parts: The Civic Action which represents the core ethical initiatives and the Publication and Media who constitutes their diffusion tool.

In these activities, budgets are mainly used for educative matters. Their outputs are mainly intellectual. Budgets for Woman Rights and Civic Education are almost equivalents. They are in the upper part of the budget division¹³. These two activities condense the higher budget for a purely intellectual activity. The Environment activities budget is higher due to its outputs, not only intellectual and therefore need major investments on equipment. In term of budget, these activities come out as a priority for the International community.

The Publication and Media has a budget proportional to the more intellectual activities of Civil Society organizations. This aspect points up the complementarities of this sector with all the intellectual related activities.

The Civic Action and the Publication and Media sectors have similar human resources characteristics. The average number of paid staff in the sector is 8-10 persons. They have a similar distribution for gender issues, except organizations working on Woman Rights issues has higher proportions of female paid staff.

These activities are heavily relying on volunteer staff, more than 80% of their declared employees. The Publication and Media activities outweigh this tendency with up to 90% of volunteer staff. The phenomenon can be seen as a coping strategy developed by organizations with lower budgets. Albeit a clear relation can not be established between average budgets and the levels of paid staff.

Civic Action

The Civic Action stands out as the meeting point of Civil Society actions. This sector conveys the ethical influxes that form the bases of other sectors actions. Therefore, we will study its implantation and we will analyze its links.

Civic Action activities are very spread in urban areas. The sector must not be disconnected from other side activities. Not only Environment could be linked to Agriculture and Infrastructure activities, but also Civic Education and Woman Rights could be related to Education and Handicrafts activities, both used to implement their projects. Civic Education and Woman Rights sectors are closely linked and spread in all the provinces but Nangarhar, where Woman Rights are underdeveloped in compare to Human Rights.

Herat, Kandahar, Jawzjan and Sar-e-Pul provinces have a low to very low Civic Action activity taking into account their population, by opposition to Baghlan and Ghazni.

Ghazni's Woman Rights sector is the country's most active. On one hand, political figures like Sima Samar, Maoist leftist organizations, are very engaged in the promotion of Human Rights in Ghazni's province. On the other hand, the province is a point of ethnic tensions particularly with the Hazara communities. These two particularities could explain the level of militancy observed in the following map.

Comparing activity's intensity and budget's, it appears that Herat, and Kandahar have mainly international sustain for Civic Action activities whereas, Khost, Ghazni and Paktya province, developed spread and certainly locally well implanted Civic Action with reduce funds. In Khost this Civic activity is mainly oriented toward environmental issues.

Civic Action's sources of fund are heterogeneous. Self funding (Community, donation, memberships and course fees) are apparently very developed, reflecting the sector's high degree of autonomy, in particular Woman Right and Civic education. Two categories of Civic action organizations emerge from the analysis: the

¹³ See [chart...overall budget](#)

local organizations with low budgets and a greater financial autonomy and the organization funded by international donors, mostly NGO.

The need of autonomy from a part of the Human Rights-Civic related sector is reflected in the housing situation. The proportion of organization having their own house is high but also the resort to renting is low and reflects the limited financial capacity of smaller organizations working in the activity.

The type of organization working in Human Rights is very homogeneous, no real differences appears between Woman Rights and on Civil Legal Human Rights awareness organizations. The proportion of Social organizations and Associations (60%) shows that the sector seems to be invested by local initiatives at large.

Publication and Media

After a period of mass Media absence, during the Taliban, the Publication and Media sector has redeveloped itself mostly in urban areas. This homogenously developed activity is present in almost all provinces with the exception of Nuristan and Sar-e-Pul where it is still under developed. Baghlan, Balkh and Khost province, have the most active Publication and Media sector.

Our database does not allow us to determine on which type of Media (Radio, Press or Television) the organizations are working. Comparing the level of organization working in the sector with the level of radio in each household, we observe that Southern provinces tend to use radio to a higher degree than Northern provinces. The Northern region may use different means of information (Televisions and Newspapers). We also notice that the level of organization working with Media does not correspond to the potential audience.

From that we posit that Media is rarely an activity in itself but a mean intended to reinforce other activities done by the organization. This point seems to be confirmed by the financial study.

Compare to other sectors, Publication and Media budgets are averaging. Budget represented in the map, is not an average budget of organization working purely on Media activities. Over 860 organizations surveyed, only 5 are working exclusively on Publication and Media.

Organization and Association are the main actors in this sector¹⁴ postponing that very local initiative are emerging; about 70 % of organizations working on Publication and Media have been created after 2001. Media and Publication is being used as a mean to promote other activities. The level of media implementation in a region is the sign of important community base movements. Media initiatives are supported by organizations like Havaz, Sayara, Internews and Impacs, whose role is to consolidate the recent media development in Afghanistan.

Culture

The Culture category includes all the activities linked to cultural knowledge, transmission, and conservation. This sector is fundamental in the reconstruction of an Afghan national identity. The war damaged heavily this sector which will be by definition very long to recompose.

Our analysis, we will cover two aspects: the Cultural activities and the Preservation. The first one represents cultural and artistic creations and their diffusion to date while the second one concentrates on the perpetuation of artisans and artistic heritage.

Organizations dedicate to Culture have low budgets in compare to other Civil Society sectors. This may be the principal reason for them to turn to volunteer staff. This low budget is also justified by the level of expenses

¹⁴ See [chart ...](#)

of the Cultural activities. A majority of the organizations working in the sector are associations built around a group of artists. They have a very low level of expenses related to construction materials or furniture.

Handicraft activity is an exception: the average budget is very high, as a consequence of its connection to the Civic action sector.

Surprisingly, the Cultural preservation organizations have a very low budget in comparison to their supposed level of expenses in equipment since they are meant, among other activities, to rebuild monuments.

Cultural activities

We grouped under this category all the activities that have to do with art and artistic representation (Film/Theatre, Cultural events, Music, Fine art). The Cultural event activity usually goes along proportionally with the other. It is the reason why we used it as an indicator of cultural activities in the following map.

Baghlan, Ghazni, Khost and Balkh provinces have the major number of organizations working in the Cultural field. Surprisingly, in Nangarhar, organizations working in cultural events are high but Fine art, Music and Film/Theatre is not part of their activities, it appears that Nangarhar's Cultural activities are mostly dedicated to poetry. From that result we realize that there are few organizations covering the cultural event as a whole. Organizations working on this field are very specialized in order to address a local need.

Another surprising result is the weak role of Herat in the sector, particularly for Music and Film/Theatre. The survey confirms the different reports pointing out the lack of expression freedom in Herat province.

Provinces of Paktya and Ghazni have developed a large number of low budget organizations working in Cultural activities. These organizations emerged certainly according to a local request. By opposite, Herat province has a low number of high budget organizations.

Most of the organizations working in Cultural activities enjoy a high financial autonomy. At large, these organizations are auto-financed by their activities. In average, they depend on foreign or non-local donating entities to less than 15% of their funds. The case of Cultural event organization mitigates the above assertion, their dependence, still very low, on non-local funds reaches more than 20%. This is certainly due to the risk involved in such an activity. Only a minority of organizations are sustained by international funds. Their financial capacity is therefore amplified.

Cultural activities are mainly done by Social or Association/Unions organizations. The NGO and Umbrella are quite absent from this sector. It reveals a very active demand for Cultural activities from the Afghan population. For the moment, this demand is mainly covered by local specialized organizations with low budgets.

Preservation activities

The classification was made in order to group organizations covering various aspects of Afghan's cultural heritage preservation. Provided that, these activities are not always linked together in order to create a homogeneous sector. Handicraft activities can be easily associated to gender issues and Cultural preservation can be a complement of Fine arts or Infrastructure activities.

An irregular geographical distribution of the Preservation activities emerges from this map. Surprisingly, Herat has a low activity in the sector. Kandahar's activity on Handicraft relates to the Women empowerment. Ghazni, Baghlan and Nangarhar appear highly active on Preservation activities. In some cases, (Nangarhar, Baghlan, Balkh, Khost and Laghman), the Cultural preservation activities are associated with Civic activities (Environment).

The funds distributed for the Preservation sector are broadly absorbed by Handicraft activities done in urban areas (Herat, Mazar-Balkh and Kandahar) whereas the other regions have a lower quantity of funds. Given that, local initiatives are higher particularly in Sar-e-Pul, Ghazni and Paktya.

The Handicraft sector is heavily funded by the international community. High budgets are dedicated to this activity by UN and by some NGO, up to 40% of the average organization funds¹⁵, for large national projects. It is used as complementary activity in areas like Human Rights, DDR and refugees reintegration.

The Cultural preservation receives little funds, even compared with other cultural sectors. This activity seems not yet to be on the agenda of international donors thus, when the political situation will be normalized, investments on tourism will certainly boost this sector.

The type of organization working in the handicraft sector reflects a very high international presence. Organizations working on Handicraft appear to be rather artificial and reflect a financial structure that is not aimed to become sustainable (high level of international funds, low proportion of local financial input, high level of running cost indicated by the extent of renting, and low degree of paid staff which indicates a low level of financial profitability¹⁶). The sustainability of this activity is there by relying on international level of finance by opposite to the Cultural preservation, which relies mostly on local initiatives.

Service provision

The State services can in some cases be coupled by Civil Society organization actions. We divide these services in two categories: the category I represents the tangible/structural services of the State while the category II represents the more intangible/social services provided by the State.

Budget averages are very elevated for the I tangible/structural activities while the II category concentrates a lower amount of funds. Organizational structures of the two categories diverse widely. The I category is structured around NGO type organizations, which have been created recently due both partially to lack of services from the State and to recent financial opportunities. The II category is mostly composed of local associations which respond to very specific needs not only relying on crisis situations.

The importance of the structural/tangible activities in term of employment comes up from the Human resources analysis. Organizations working in this field are the main employer among the Afghan Civil Society organizations.

The I category organizations are differentiated from the rest of Civil Society Organization. They tend to behave more like private companies. Their level of efficiency is high and their human resources do not essentially rely on volunteers¹⁷.

I activities

The activities involved in the I category should be by definition widely spread among the country. Their main goal is to compensate the lack of State activity. In reality they are present mostly in the regions where State's services are less efficient.

The budget analysis of the I category of service provision, suggests that the most funded areas not only won't correspond to a weak State's presence, but follows the pattern of urban accessible areas (Kandahar, Herat, Mazar, Baghlan and Takhar), where the State tends to be stronger. To abound in this way, Sar-e-pul or Ghazni, remote from the State, control shelter the organizations with lower budgets for these activities. It shows

¹⁵ See the gap on UN and NGO funding in the [chart ...](#)

¹⁶ See the [chart...](#), [chart...](#), and [chart...](#)

¹⁷ See [Chart...](#)(comparaison ONG efficacite and [Chart HR \(general\)](#)...

that these activities are in direct concurrence with the State and are not implemented in areas where they would be really needed.

Khost province is an exception explainable through political reasons. The province is highly unstable and the presence of service provision organizations is highly necessary to stabilize it. This phenomenon seems to be similar in Nangarhar and Paktya but the lack of budget data in these two provinces impedes to corroborate our observation.

The funds provenience indicates that the organizations working on Infrastructure and Agriculture and to a lesser degree on Health are very dependent from international sponsorship. We also observe that an important proportion of the organizations working in Agriculture and Infrastructure (85%) activities, rent their office, appealing high administrative costs.

The international organizations, like UN, give the major amount of their funds to organizations working in Health, Agriculture and Infrastructure related activities.¹⁸

II activities

The social aspect of service provision by Civil Society is represented by the category II. These activities do not only compensate the lack of efficiency from the State, they also offer a range of basic activities that can be, further on, recovered by the State. These activities are: Education, Sport activities and Income generation.

Education activities are very developed in all provinces. They have been declared by more than 60% of the surveyed organizations. It is easily associable with Sport activities.

The Civil Society sector has a role particularly active to cope with the State lack of efficiency on Education matters. On one hand, whenever a close cooperation between the Organizations and the Ministries exist, it can be seen as a pillar for public services. On the other hand, it is concurrent to the State's actions and in some cases, can contribute to increase its lack of legitimacy.

The provinces of Baghlan, Nangarhar and Ghazni are very active in educational field, by opposite to the provinces of Herat., Kunduz and Sar-i-pul.

The implication for education activities by the international community is not very elevated if compared to other sectors. This is reflected in projects' physiognomy: small with little associated cost to become effective.

Organizations working on the II category of service provision are mainly Associations/Unions or Social organizations, reflecting a very local and community based activity.

The sources of funding of the sector are leaning around three poles: memberships, courses fees and community, which gives to these organizations a high degree of autonomy. About 20% of these organizations also receive money from NGO, giving them a higher financial capacity.

Income generation activities are the more private sector oriented activities. This could explain the high level of employment in this field. It is clearly sustained by the International community through either private sector development initiatives or alternative livelihood activities. In the latest case, the more isolated areas are targeted, the high level of this activity in Sar-e-pul, Badakhshan and Jawzjan provinces attest it. In Kandahar, this activity is more oriented toward woman's issues as an accompaniment activity for woman empowerment and self sustainability.

¹⁸ See [chart...](#) (general fund provenience)

Efficiency analysis

In this section, we turn to the essential data necessary to orient the process of organization's institutionalization now intended by the International Community. To complete our vision of the Civil Society organizations in Afghanistan, we will study the process related to the quality of their work and to the sustainability of their actions. These aspects are fundamental for donors to decide on the amount and type of help to be brought for the growth and improvement of Civil Society organizations. Our analysis will be divided in three major sections: the first will assess organization's work quality, after which we will evaluate their financial transparency and accountability. Finally our attention will focus on the sustainability of their actions.

Implementation quality:

The database helps us identifying the distribution and the type of organizations with the highest project implementation quality. In order to estimate it, we based our query on the number of organizations who had completed projects. All the organizations founded in 2004 and 2005 were excluded from the query. Those young organizations may have had too short time to complete any project.

In the **chart...** are localized the places with the major number of implemented projects. A clear connection appears between the presence of NGO and Umbrella and the number of realized projects (refer to the charts below). Even though, in the provinces of Ghazni, Paktya, Nangarhar, Herat and Laghman, Associations and Social organizations are highly effective¹⁹. Projects implemented by these structures are related to local or community interests. The phenomenon illustrates the development of effective autonomous structure active in very specific areas.

In the **chart 28**, the provinces of Laghman and Paktya have been filtered, because their outcome is not plausible with the rest of the country. A part of the results given to the surveyor by these organizations might be wrong due to their very low self evaluation capacity. **The chart 42** indicates that some organizations in those provinces are quite opaque on their activities.

In Laghman none of the organization declared a budget for their last year of activity. In Paktya we could evaluate to 50% the number of realized projects. But it remains an approximation, so we have decided not to consider these two provinces at this stage of our analysis.

Provinces like Kunduz, Balkh and Herat have a good quality implementation, above 60%. In Herat, social organizations seem to be very efficient. For the provinces of Kunduz and Balkh the result can be explained by the high presence of NGO (see the **chart** below).

¹⁹ This result as to be put in perspective with the **chart...**, showing the national effectiveness of the different types of organization.

In order to acquire a relative view of our precedent finding, we evaluated the work quality in function of the type of organization. To do so, we have compared the number of existing organization and the one who had completed projects. It emerges that almost 80% of the NGO have completed projects for as less as 30 % of the Social organizations and Association. The result lessens the massive presence of Social Organization and Associations in the Afghan Civil Society. This type of organization seems to be very well connected at local level with communities. They are spread in all the country and, up to a certain level, have developed financial mechanism to remain independent. But the precedent chart illustrates the weakness of these organizations. From the database we cannot find the reason of this weakness. It could be interesting to do this analysis in depth during the next survey phase.

This map resume the level of working efficiency in the country, as we have seen, a large part of the outcome depends on the type of organization present in the province. In our precedent sections, we have seen that the region of Herat as a low level of organization active at a local level but their efficiency is high in compare to Baghlan who shelters a majority of local or community based organizations.

Transparency and accountability

In the survey, there are no specific questions that are related to transparency or accountability evaluation. However, it is possible using question related to the organization's financial situation to appraise these aspects. In order to have a more accurate view of these issues and to filter the results, we have added a criterion based on the organization's work quality²⁰.

Paradoxically, the map shows more transparency in a region like Ghazni were the majority of organizations are not NGO. Where as in Herat or Balkh, where we observed a massive presence of this type of organization, transparency is weaker. The results shown by the map in the region of Paktya are not accurate due to the lack of financial data from the province's organizations. Clear links can not be established between the implementation quality and the level of financial transparency.

The problem of the NGO law:

The increasing level of international help going through NGO compelled the Government to find a way to gain control on this money flow. The Government tries mainly to have access to NGO's finances through procedures of transparency control. The Government has a critical view of the reconstruction process particularly directed toward the Civil Society Organizations, with a very low self criticism of Governmental procedures.

The latest draft of the NGO law was done in March 2005. It is supported by President Karzai. In addition, consultations with UNAMA, USAID, European Commission and German state representatives were conducted.

The goal of this law is to provide clearer step marks for registrations procedures and a legal protection for the Civil Society Organizations. It would also allow the State to tax these Organizations. The tax issue is critical for the small and weak organizations that may in reality use illegal ways to avoid taxation. When implemented, the NGO law may have a very deep perverse effect on Civil Society Organizations but also on the integrity of Government's tax mechanisms.

Autonomy and sustainability

This section will successively approach three illustrative characteristics of organizations' autonomy: the evaluation of cross-provincial relations between organizations, their level of financial autonomy and finally their relation to the State.

²⁰ See the precedent section.

Provincial isolation:

The aim of this section is to understand how the organizations are linked to other provinces. It is fundamental to understand, at an organizational scale, which provinces have better links with their neighbors. It can be a determinant factor in order to select a place from which a developed activity will easily spread to the surrounding provinces. To build this graphic we calculated the average number of links that an organization have with other provinces; i.e.: if we randomly choose one organization in Sar-e-pul, it will have 1.2 links with other provinces.

Laghman, Nuristan and Badakhshan provinces are very isolated. Organizations working in those provinces have very self centered activities. This isolation has one main common source: road inaccessibility for Laghman, Nuristan and Badakhshan. In Laghman we observed a communication gap: very few organizations have a telephone line (the question A3 phone was left empty)²¹. Surprisingly, the province of Herat has a relatively low level of connectivity with other provinces.

On the other end, the provinces of Kandahar, Kunduz, Balkh, Nangarhar and Takhar are very well connected with their neighbors. Many reasons can explain the phenomenon. The first could be related to the scarce accessibility of their neighbor's provinces. This reason can easily be applied for the province of Kandahar. Since it is surrounded by very instable areas, it could explain the use of Kandahar as a base to access instable areas. For Balkh and Takhar, the reason could lay on the high level of NGO working there (see the [figure...](#)), the size and the complexity of their projects implies dynamic cross provincial associations for these organizations. These provinces are ideal to establish regional headquarter because of their good connectivity.

Financial autonomy

In order to analyze an organization level of financial dependence, we have first established its sources of fund. If the organization receives its funds from local sources: memberships, course fees, community (green colors on the charts), then the organization has a high financial autonomy. On the other end, if it receives its funds from international donors (in blue colors on the charts), the organization is very dependent on the degree of international help given to the country. In a development perspective, that financial dimension is determinant to find out where dependences on international donors are emerging.

From the above chart, provinces of Laghman, Ghazni and Khost appear highly autonomic in regard to their financial sources. Whereas other provinces have developed a heavy dependence on international funds, in particular: Balkh, Nangarhar and Badakhshan. In consequence, some Afghan Civil Society organizations are all ready particularly vulnerable to the variations of international assistance.

Alone the financial provenience of funds is not enough to estimate an organization level of financial independence. Also the diversity of the donors must be considered. We consider that an organization developed a risky dependence if it receives the majority of its funds from one single source (more than 50%). The chart below shows that half of the surveyed organizations suffer from a lack of budget diversity. These organizations are mainly dependent on local funds (courses fees, donation and community). Up to a certain point, this is a positive dependence. To help them keeping their autonomy, but also to avoid a situation of dependence toward one financial source, these organizations should compose their budgets on more diversified local sources of funds.

²¹ [See p.55](#)

Sustainability and relation to the State

Training and Sustainability

Category	Activity	Over all training distribution in %		Organization imparting training	
Civil society	Civic Action	Environment	5.7%	28.8%	50.0%
		Woman right	8.4%		50.0%
		Civic Education	8.9%		44.0%
	Public. -Media	Publication and Media	5.8%	5.8%	46.2%
Culture	Cultural activities	Cultural events	12.4%	35.2%	46.8%
		Fine Art	5.2%		54.0%
		Music	3.1%		53.5%
		Theatre	3.4%		53.2%
	Preservation	Handicraft	5.5%	11.2%	51.4%
		Cultural preservation	5.7%	50.0%	
Service provision	I	Agriculture	3.4%	36.0%	43.4%
		Health	5.6%		48.8%
	II	Infrastructure	3.5%	42.7%	38.5%
		Other + Sport	6.5%		43.6%
		Income generation	2.8%		32.8%
		Education	14.3%	49.2%	

The training activities done by an organization are associated to other core activities. They intend to spread the knowledge and the capacity to act on specific fields. The training distribution shows which sector of activity has the potential to spread and to become sustainable.

In the perspective of a sustainability analysis, 50% of organization, in average, gives training. Certain sectors like Service provision's Infrastructure, Agriculture and Income generation do not intend do become sustainable activities through training. While sectors like Cultural events, Civic Education Woman Rights and Education rely on training as a part of their strategy to broaden their action.

The training is an important aspect for the Civil Society to expend their activities in relation with the afghan population. The risk is high to have an over developed Civil Society disconnected from the people. The Civil Society projects must not be pursued only to strengthen Civil Society organization themselves.

The State control over Civil Society organizations defines the last section of our analysis on organizations' autonomy. The Civil Society can be a relevant balance to State's power. It is also important for the State to be able to interact with these entities. The level of registration or recognition of the Afghan Civil Society organization by the State is not very high, 65% of the surveyed organizations are registered beside the State.

But their geographical distribution differs a lot. Provinces like Khost or Ghazni have a very low level of registration. It may be due to their organizations' structure. We have seen that in these provinces, the level of financial autonomy is very high. To attract funds, these organizations do not necessary need to show their

registration whereas, in Northern provinces, more dependent on international aid, the registration is required to have access to the funds. In consequence, the registration level is higher than in the rest of the country.

Beside the level of registration, certain distortion appears in organizations' registration places. The absence of clear rules regarding the status of Civil Society organizations and the registration process may result on the observed heterogenic distribution of the registration places.

Our survey paid a greater attention to the organizations registered in Ministries. Others places of registration also exist and they will be included in the second phase of our survey. The registration at a local level, in municipalities, is possible but limited to very specific geographical areas (Jawazjan, Sar-e-Pul and Ghazni).

Without clear rules from the Government, the act of registration can be considered as a pragmatic action. The ministries individually produce lists of NGO with who they have a priority in making their partnerships. We don't have clear reports to understand which elements are considered, by State authorities, to build up these lists. For the medium and large Civil Society organizations, the situation should be regularized as soon as the NGO law will be adopted.

Expressed training needs:

The survey gives us some information about Civil Society organizations' training need. The type of organization and their working area were considered for the analysis. All organizations give a priority to the Fundraising and surprisingly to Governance trainings.

The report writing is generally considered as a less important or to some extent not required training. Financial account is considered as less important by most organizations with the exception of organizations working in rural areas.

Findings and Recommendations

An analysis of all the graphs extracted from the survey's data was conducted. These visual elements are the base of the following findings and recommendations. The survey gave us reliable figures that confirm certain tendencies observed in the field. The most important issues that need to be addressed when working on Civil Society are:

- In most sectors, there is a high level of local initiative, particularly with Cultural activities and the Education sector. Civil Society organizations provide the services that are lacking from the State, and indicate a significant grass-roots commitment to influence the Afghan reconstruction process.
- Since the last three years, Afghanistan has witnessed an explosion of civil society organizations, many of them being created only for the implementation of one project. Thus, the number of such organizations may diminish over time.
- We noted that organizations not in contact with international donors have very low budget levels. But this did not automatically lead to a low level of performance.
- The most effective organizations developed coping strategies to implement their activities with very low budgets. In parallel we noted a relative immaturity of Civil Society institutional structures, which were unable to attract and funnel the large available flow of money.
- The high pressure of international donors for the grants distribution faces Afghan organizations with limited capacity and efficiency. As a result, very few Afghan organizations get the opportunity to work with international donors, increasing the risk of a monopoly by a small number of groups. It

appears that there is a very low distribution level of international funds to local Afghan organizations. This has serious implications for the sustainability of humanitarian projects.

- Due to the amount of international funds, we observe the emergence of areas in which Civil Society organizations are becoming dependent on foreign help.
- To avoid these financial concentrations, there is a necessity to implement a clearer coordination between donors and the Civil Society organizations.
- We observed a very low level of female staff working in micro organizations. But in larger organizations female staff tends to occupy central positions in the organizations.
- The budgets of the less remote organizations suffer from very high fixed expenses, particularly for the office rental.

Main implication for the FCCS:

- FCCS should continue to actively help the development of small local Civil Society structures. These local organizations must learn very basic tools to become more solid financially and gain the respect of international organizations.
- The survey also helps us to extract qualitative information useful in identifying and comparing the most efficient organizations. The FCCS should use these results in order to have a more fair and effective grant distribution process.
- The complexity and multiplicity of rules and regulations concerning the Civil Society sector has to be rationalized and made more coherent. The FCCS could edit a basic guide to help Civil Society organizations with the most common administrative obstacles and procedures in order for them to become more visible and more protected legally.

Review of findings:

The survey gave us reliable figures that confirm certain tendencies of the Afghan Civil Society. The most important issues that need to be considered when working on Civil Society are:

- In most of the sectors, there is a high level of local initiative, particularly on the cultural activities and education sector. The Civil Society organization provides the services that are lacking from the States. It indicates a high commitment from the population to influence the country reconstruction.
- Since the last three years, we assist to an explosion of the number of organizations, many of them being created only for the implementation of one project. This process might be followed by the bankrupt or the disappearing of a large number of organizations in the years to come.
- We noticed that organizations not in contact with international donors have very low budget levels. But it does not automatically induce a low level of performance.
- The most effective organizations developed coping strategies to implement their activities with very low budgets. In parallel we notice a relative immaturity of the Civil Society institutional structures, unable to canalize efficiently the large available flow of money.
- The high pressure of international donors for the grants distribution faces up organizations with low efficiency. It results that only few organizations get the opportunity to work with international donors, creating sectors of humanitarian monopoly. It appears that there is a very low level of redistribution of international funds to local Afghan organizations.

- Due to the amount of international funds, we observe the emergence of provinces where Civil Society organizations are becoming dependent on foreign help.
- To avoid these financial concentrations, there is a necessity to implement a clearer coordination between the Government and the Civil Society Organizations.
- We observed a very low level of woman staff working in micro organizations. But in average the woman staff tends to occupy central positions in the organizations.
- The budgets of the less remote organizations suffer of very high fix expenses, particularly for the office renting.

Main implication for the FCCS:

- FCCS should pursue its action to help the development of small local Civil Society structures. These local organizations must learn very basic tool to become more solid financially and gain the respect of international organizations.
- The survey helps us also to extract qualitative parameters useful to identify and compare the most efficient organizations. The FCCS should use these results in order to have a more fair and effective grant distribution process.
- To complexity and heterogeneity of regulation concerning the Civil Society sector must be rationalized and popularized. The FCCS could edit a basic guide to help Civil Society organizations with the most commons administrative obstacles and procedures in order for them to become more visible and more protected legally.

Recommendation for the next phases of the survey on Civil Society:

In order to advance our knowledge on Afghan Civil Society, the baseline report helped us to define the following priorities to be implemented in the next survey phase:

- In all fields of the questionnaire, more precise numerical figures should be gathered
- The next phase of the survey must try to encompass new elements on the relative legitimacy of new organizations (CDC, Villages Organizations) and traditional bodies like *shuras* and their relationships.
- We should further our understanding of the coping strategies of smaller budget organizations and see if these strategies can be applied on other structures
- Assess the role of the coordinating bodies like ACBAR, ANCB for the NGO but also of informal links between different Civil Society organizations
- Consider beneficiaries and donor perception of the organizations in order to build more accurate evaluations

Provinces	Badakhshan	Baghlan	Balkh	Ghazni	Herat	Jowzjan	Kandahar	Khost	Kunduz	Laghman	Nangarhar	Nuristan	Paktia	Sar-e Pul	Takhar	TOTAL
Number of org. surveyed	31	98	57	119	41	91	32	96	19	22	103	4	40	52	59	864
Established after 2001	19	61	29	77	29	38	14	75	14	12	66	4	31	27	41	62.15%
Urban	6	33	25	29	21	63	14	43	4	8	16	0	26	32	21	39.47%
Rural	0	3	19	19	2	18	0	11	0	1	31	2	0	2	4	12.96%
Both	25	62	13	71	18	10	18	42	15	13	56	2	14	18	34	47.57%
General objectives (multiple answers allowed)																
Advocacy	16	11	3	9	13	41	2	2	2	2	2	1	5	2	3	13.19%
Capacity Building	6	61	11	28	10	20	10	44	1	6	11	1	0	0	1	24.31%
Service Delivery	21	9	15	35	14	4	9	20	6	15	40	0	12	33	24	29.75%
Culture/Social	22	17	25	93	28	26	30	34	13	20	65	1	22	14	30	50.93%
Information / Advice	7	2	3	38	11	2	4	1	1	8	48	2	4	2	2	15.63%
Activities (multiple answers allowed)																
Fine Art	5	51	21	21	17	4	3	4	2	6	8	0	9	5	15	19.79%
Film/Theater	5	31	16	15	6	5	2	3	2	2	8	0	6	3	10	13.19%
Music	10	28	9	11	5	5	1	11	1	1	6	0	4	2	8	11.81%
Cultural Events	18	78	47	66	24	11	13	42	15	17	68	1	27	10	34	54.51%
Cultural Preservation	9	43	22	30	6	3	2	16	3	13	39	0	7	10	1	23.61%
Handicrafts	4	26	26	17	12	3	11	17	9	2	35	0	11	17	14	23.61%
Environment	12	49	24	8	8	2	6	3	3	15	37	1	5	7	12	22.22%
Publication/Media	9	49	22	16	16	4	9	26	7	15	20	0	17	1	11	25.69%
Education	19	87	41	84	33	27	26	45	15	19	55	1	28	7	33	60.19%
Training	20	86	45	78	30	38	8	46	14	11	57	1	28	28	41	61.46%
Human Rights	11	70	40	42	14	6	7	22	11	12	78	3	21	6	19	41.90%
Women Rights	15	65	34	38	19	2	6	15	12	14	48	1	13	4	13	34.61%
Avg activities/org	4.4	6.8	6.1	3.6	4.6	1.2	2.9	2.6	4.9	5.8	4.5	2.0	4.4	1.9	3.6	4.0
Type of organization (self-defined)																
NGO	6	6	26	8	7	7	11	29	11	1	38	1	0	2	20	20.02%
Social Org	18	16	17	73	25	40	19	65	6	5	59	3	2	8	24	43.98%
Association/Union	7	56	14	37	6	44	1	2	2	16	6	0	36	42	14	32.75%
Umbrella	0	20	0	1	3	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	1	3.24%
Institution of registration (multiple answers allowed but rare)																
MRRD	0	0	1	2	1	0	7	0	0	0	26	0	0	0	0	4.28%
Justice	11	16	8	3	5	12	4	4	1	1	3	0	1	2	5	8.80%



Culture	1	4	6	14	8	5	5	9	1	17	21	1	7	3	6	12.50%
Planning/Economics	1	14	30	6	11	7	9	15	11	0	42	1	0	2	19	19.44%
Municipality	0	0	1	2	2	27	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	16	1	5.90%
Other	9	28	11	10	15	32	15	15	4	4	32	0	22	22	15	27.08%
Registration %	70%	63%	100%	31%	102%	91%	128%	44%	89%	100%	121%	50.00%	75.00%	86.54%	77.97%	
Discrepancy NGOs	600%	42%	86%	133%	63%	100%	122%	193%	100%	200%	110%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	105.26%	
Discrepancy SO's	163%	100%	212%	2433%	500%	333%	475%	1625%	600%	500%	1966%	300.00%	200.00%	400.00%	480.00%	
Funding sources (multiple answers allowed)																
UN agencies	2	11	14	2	11	6	7	6	1	0	14	0	0	6	3	9.61%
NGOs	12	9	20	1	8	0	11	13	7	1	45	2	3	3	13	17.13%
Government	4	7	1	1	4	0	2	6	0	0	3	0	2	4	13	5.44%
Community	7	14	3	56	8	3	17	13	2	5	43	2	7	3	0	21.18%
Course Fee	2	64	7	61	23	15	13	41	7	7	12	1	2	5	27	33.22%
Donation (local)	6	19	4	69	6	3	17	13	4	17	31	1	4	1	4	23.03%
Membership fees	16	32	8	32	14	16	13	71	1	2	13	0	19	8	11	29.63%
Donors/Org	1.58	1.59	1.00	1.87	1.80	0.47	2.50	1.70	1.16	1.45	1.56	1.50	0.93	0.58	1.20	
Staffing																
Avg Paid Staff Male	3	3	6	5	14	2	17	7	11	2	5	0.25	16	8	14	7.55
Avg Paid Staff Female	1	1	2	2	5	0.4	6	0.4	10	0.5	1	0	1	0.4	4	2.31
Average paid staff	4	4	8	7	19	2.4	23	7.4	21	2.5	6	0.25	17	8.4	18	9.86
Paid staff in province	124	392	456	833	779	218.4	736	710.4	399	55	618	1	680	436.8	1062	8519.04
Housing situation																
Rented	8	74	48	79	35	61	28	68	16	8	57	1	33	19	47	67.36%
Private House	4	17	1	5	0	10	0	8	0	10	41	3	2	25	3	14.93%
Acquired by Org.	2	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	4	1.16%
Government owned	4	5	1	1	2	17	4	12	0	3	2	0	0	7	3	7.06%
Donated	5	2	6	30	3	3	0	8	3	1	3	0	3	1	2	8.10%
No answer	8	0	0	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1.39%
Training needs (multiple answers allowed)																
Governance	5	79	55	85	26	51	29	69	9	7	90	3	17	45	11	67.25%
Proposal Writing	10	77	52	72	17	71	12	39	10	7	67	2	8	47	40	61.46%
Financial	6	74	57	40	29	41	13	57	5	2	80	3	13	50	5	54.98%
Monitoring	2	76	57	17	18	40	11	15	1	3	64	2	12	47	12	43.63%
Fundraising	25	82	52	95	27	75	13	68	13	3	77	3	32	51	42	76.16%
Report Writing	3	78	54	37	20	40	22	48	3	2	89	4	10	47	1	53.01%



Kabul CSOs Survey Status

# of org Surveyed	Area(City & Districts)	Status	Remarks
530	Kabul(center)	Almost complete	More than 70% CSOs in Kabul have been surveyed. (Since the majority of organizations exist in Kabul (center), the remaining 9 districts will not take so long.)
	Paghman	Completed	
	Shakardara	Completed	
	Guldara	Completed	
	Bagrami	Completed	

Surveyed Organizations status at CSEP Databases

Total Received	Initial Checked	Entered into Databases (Dari, English)	Re-quality Checked	Found incomplete	Resurvey of incomplete Forms	Remarks
530	450	400	350	10	0	Since it was Suggested to have the data in both languages, we are processing them in Dari & English. The incomplete questionnaires will be resurveyed at the end of survey.



4.3 BEYDARI MELLI PROGRAM LIST OF ALL CALLS FOR PROPOSALS

1ST ROUND (PILOT PHASE)

Title	Media and Public Participation in Parliamentary Elections
Field	Media
General Objective	Strengthen free media and encourage transparency in political processes
Location	Nationwide
Maximum Budget	USD 3500
Duration	3 months
Number of Grants Awarded	3
Description and Conditions	<p>The project aims to use media to raise awareness among Afghans about the upcoming parliamentary elections, their role and responsibilities as voting citizens and the significance of their participation in shaping the future of the country.</p> <p>Who may apply:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Any legally registered publication, including print and electronic media 2. Organization must demonstrate at least 1 year experience in media and publication <p>Projects must adhere to the following conditions:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Explain the structure, significance and role of the Parliament 2. Include biographies of the candidates 3. Explain the role and responsibilities of the candidates 4. Include interviews with independent candidates 5. Include perspectives from ordinary citizens

Title	Drugs and Society
Location	Nationwide
General Objective	Deepen understanding of current social issues
Maximum Budget	USD 4000
Duration	3 months
Number of Grants Awarded	1
Description and Conditions	<p>The objective of this project is to develop an understanding of the effects of drugs on Afghan society, particularly its social and cultural implications. The project entails comprehensive research on the social and health issues associated with drugs (such as HIV) and how these issues impact Afghan society and culture.</p>

	<p>Who can apply:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Independent research institutions as well as individual researchers 2. Applicants should demonstrate at least 1 year background in research <p>Conditions:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 6. Research should be based on a variety of sources but must include field research 7. Research should not be less than 25 pages or more than 75 pages 8. Research results must be published by the author and these costs included in the budget
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Title	Short Film on Situation of Higher Education in Afghanistan
Field	Civil Society / Culture
General Objective	Promote creativity and activism among youth
Location	Nationwide
Maximum Budget	USD 1,000
Duration	2 month
Number of Grants Awarded	3
Description and Conditions	<p>The competition is open to youth to produce a short film on the situation of higher education in Afghanistan. Films can be on any aspect of higher education, such as the entrance examinations, new universities, the condition of dormitories, or any other theme relevant to current university students.</p> <p>Conditions:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) Applicants must be 25 years of age or younger 2) The final edited film must be 10-15 minutes in length 3) Proposals must include a plan for screening the film in a public setting 4) Funds should be used for production and screening costs 5) Proposals will be judged on creativity, originality, and potential to promote public discourse on higher education 6) Preference will be given to projects that include provincial universities

Title	Short Story Writing Workshop for Girls
Field	Culture
General Objective	Encourage creativity among Afghan youth
Location	Kabul
Maximum Budget	USD 3,500
Duration	3 months
Number of Grants Awarded	1
Description and Conditions	Any legally registered cultural organization is invited to submit a proposal on planning and implementing 3-month-long short story writing workshops for school

	<p>girls.</p> <p>Conditions:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1- The workshops are meant to serve as introductory courses for young girls on how to write short stories. 2- The organization must organize 3 workshops in 3 different locations in Kabul 3- Each workshop must consist of 15-20 students. The procedure for selection of the students must be clearly documented. 4- Each workshop should be led by a qualified creative writing teacher or an individual with demonstrated experience in the field of writing. Organizations are required to submit biographies of their chosen candidates. 5- The workshops must conclude with a public reading of selected short stories produced in the workshop 6- Selected works produced in the workshops must be published and these costs included in the budget
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Title	Kabul Streets Community Works
Field	Civil Society
General Objective	Encourage culture of volunteerism and mobilize neighborhood communities to improve their surroundings
Location	All districts of Kabul
Maximum Budget	USD 3,000
Duration	2 months
Number of Grants Awarded	5
Description and Conditions	<p>A community organization involving the inhabitants of one neighborhood may submit a project for maximum USD 3,000 to improve their street or neighborhood. The project must improve the vicinity in any of the following ways:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Access for walkers and non-motorized vehicle traffic 2. Environment 3. Sanitation 4. Beauty <p>Conditions</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a) All houses on that street or in the neighborhood must benefit from the works to be undertaken, not only the people submitting the proposal b) In the proposal the geographical limits of the project must be clearly stated. c) Several quotations of the works to be undertaken, made by different craftsmen or companies, must be provided, together with a justification of why one of the quotations is preferred over the others d) The project will be judged among other things on its sustainability over several years. The applying organization must indicate how the neighbors

	<p>plan to maintain the works undertaken over the coming years</p> <p>e) If a formal organization does not exist, at least 10 people from different families in that neighborhood may form a “street committee”. The FCCS will provide a template charter and support the registration effort of the street committee as a social organization.</p> <p>f) No salaries may be paid out to the residents living in the street, except if they undertake the works themselves, and then only at market levels.</p>
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Title	Encouraging Women’s Participation in the Upcoming Elections
Field	Civil Society
General Objective	Promote women’s participation in the public sphere
Location	Kabul
Maximum Budget	USD 5,000
Duration	3 months
Number of Grants Awarded	5
Description and Conditions	<p>Any registered Afghan organization is invited to submit a proposal for a maximum of USD 5,000 to plan and implement a 3-month-long program that encourages women’s participation in the Parliamentary Elections.</p> <p>Conditions:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Programs should include providing information on the election law, Afghan Constitution, the structure of Parliament, election procedure, roles and responsibilities of elected officials and other relevant topics. 2. Programs should encourage women to pursue independent candidacies in the upcoming elections. 3. Organizations are encouraged to create a network among various women’s organizations. 4. Priority will be given to women-based organizations, organizations that have established and positive relations with women in the area, organizations that have a demonstrated experience in providing civic education for women. 5. Innovative approaches are encouraged.

BEYDARI MELLI PROGRAM
LIST OF ALL CALLS FOR PROPOSALS

2ND ROUND NOV 05

Title	Instrument Making Workshop Support
Field, code & step	2.2.2.2 (Support to Musical revival) step 2
General Objective	To improve the production levels of musical instrument workshops To transfer the skills of the best instrument-makers to apprentices Business development in the traditional handicrafts sector
Location	7 provinces
Maximum Budget	USD 4,500
Duration	6 months
# of Grants Awarded	5
Installments	3: Initial: 2,000; Second: 1,000; Third: 1,000; Last USD 500
Target	Ustads (Master Musical Instrument Makers) and NGOs vocational training
Public Information strategy	All master musical instrument makers must be informed of this program
Deadline for Submission	
Description and Conditions	The applicant must provide references from experts to prove his skill-level (in case of NGO applying, submit CV of master-trainer) The applicant must provide a detailed list, with cost estimations, of the raw materials, tools and workshop improvements he plans to make, and a list of the apprentices he plans to train. Conditions Regular conditions apply The grantee will offer one of the instruments made in the workshop to the FCCS, for public display. .
Opt: Typical budget:	Tools and raw materials: 1500\$ Improvement of premises: 500\$ 5 Apprentices x 6 months x 50\$: 1500\$ Master x 6 months: 600\$ Miscellaneous: 400\$ Total: USD 4,500
Suggested Exp Com	



**BEYDARI MELLI PROGRAM
CALL FOR PROPOSALS**

Title	Documenting Endangered Natural Heritage
Field, code & step	2.1.2.3.2 Environment/Grassroots monitoring; step 1
General Objective	To identify groups interested in working on environmental issues To encourage them to start activities To create a database of endangered natural heritage in Afghanistan
Location	7 Regions (mostly organizations in provinces with regional office)
Maximum Budget	2,000 USD
Duration	2 months
# of Grants Awarded	7
Installments	1 st : USD 800, 2 nd : 1,000 and 3 rd : 200
Target	Culture and civil society groups, and individuals and non governmental media organizations
Deadline for Submission	
Description and Conditions	<p>This call for proposals focuses on the natural heritage (wilderness sites, gardens, animals, plants) that is in danger of disappearing.</p> <p>Each applicant to the grant must provide a list of the endangered natural heritage sites and/or plants and animals that they wish to cover in their research.</p> <p>The application must include information on how they plan to document natural heritage (photo-camera, video-camera, drawings...) and submit examples of previous images taken. It must also include how the final report will be made and submitted (on CD-Rom, print-out, written by hand...)</p> <p>The application must also include a form with the information the applicant will take about the sites, plants or animals listed.</p> <p>A CV of the lead researcher specifying how this person is qualified to undertake this research must be submitted with the application.</p> <p>Conditions Regular conditions apply The submitting organization must allow the FCCS to use the results of the survey, for non-commercial purposes only.</p>



**BEYDARI MELLI PROGRAM
CALL FOR PROPOSALS**

Title	Short movie production
Field, code & step	Culture 2.2.3.1, step 1
General Objective	Promote creativity and activism among youth
Location	7 regions
Maximum Budget	USD 1000 (plus USD 200 for Advisor) = USD 1200
Duration	2.5 months
# of Grants Awarded	15
Installments	2, initial 800\$, last 400\$
Target	Youth movies maker groups, Film production companies, Cultural organizations
Deadline for Submission	
Description and Conditions	<p>The applicants must provide the outline of the film to FCCS/BMP office and after approval of FCCS/BMP they may continue the project.</p> <p>Applicants must have all necessary skills to provide a movie and FCCS/BMP will be in contact with applicants till the Applicants deliver the completed and original CD of the film.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 7) The final edited film must be 15-20 minutes in length 8) Proposals must include a plan for screening the film in a public setting 9) Funds should be used for production and screening costs 10) Proposals will be judged on creativity, originality, and capacity to address youth in community. 11) Applicants must submit previously made movies as proof of their skills. <p>Conditions</p> <p>To receive a grant the submitting organization must select an expert advisor from a list given by the FCCS Cultural Unit, or suggest an expert advisor themselves, who will supervise the production and train the submitting organization.</p> <p>The submitting organization must allow the FCCS to use the movies made for projection and dissemination, for non-commercial purposes only.</p>

**BEYDARI MELLI PROGRAM
CALL FOR PROPOSALS**

Title	Documenting Afghanistan's Handicrafts
Field	Appreciation of Afghan cultural heritage (2.2.2.1 step 3)
General Objective	Researching afghan handicrafts in all provinces of Afghanistan
Location	All regions of Afghanistan
Maximum Budget	From USD 3,000 to USD 5000 (According to the size of the region)
Duration	3 months
# of Grants Awarded	7 (one per region)
Installments	3 (initial 50%, intermediary 30% final 20 %)
Target	Local organizations (CSOs, NGOs) with at least minimal capacity interested in cultural heritage and business development
Deadline for Submission	
Description and Conditions	<p>All local organizations can apply. They must submit a plan to cover all the handicrafts traditions in the region, or as many as possible. In their project proposal they must submit:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - a list of all the known handicrafts in their region, and the location of each of them, that they will survey - a methodology of the survey, including a form that they will fill in for each "ustad" of handicrafts - a CV of the principal researcher - the digital camera they plan to buy (model and price) <p>They will have to submit the results of their work (findings, all the filled-out forms, and all the pictures) on a CD and hard copy to the regional office 3 months after receiving the grant.</p> <p>Conditions Regular conditions apply The submitting organization must allow the FCCS to use the results of the survey, for non-commercial purposes only.</p>



**BEYDARI MELLI PROGRAM
CALL FOR PROPOSALS**

Title	Music learning courses for girls
Field, code & step	Culture 2.2.3.1, step 1
General Objective	Create and Promote musical education among girls
Location	Kabul , Herat , Mazar
Maximum Budget	USD 9000
Duration	6 months
# of Grants Awarded	4
Installments	3, initial 4000\$, second 3000\$ and last 2000\$
Target	Musical groups, musical companies, Individual music Masters, cultural organizations
Deadline for Submission	
Description and Conditions	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The applicants must specify who will be the teacher and submit their C.V. 2. Among which propose they will choose girls and must specify the location. 3. Number of the participants should be specify <p>Conditions Regular conditions apply The submitting organization must allow the FCCS to use the results of the survey, for non-commercial purposes only.</p>

**BEYDARI MELLI PROGRAM
CALL FOR PROPOSALS**

Title	Introducing the Provincial Council to the people
Field	Media and Society (2.1.5.3) step 4
General Objective	To increase the proximity between a Provincial Council and the population of a given province
Location	All Afghanistan (34 provinces)
Maximum Budget	USD 6000
Duration	6 months
# of Grants Awarded	7 (one per region)
Installments	3 (initial 2,000, intermediary 3,500, final 500)
Target	Well-established and non-governmental media (print and broadcast)
PI strategy	Through OMFA, Taneen, CIJ and other journalists' associations
Deadline for Submission	
Description and Conditions	<p>The media organization candidate for this grant must have a well-proven capacity to reach a large number of people and work professionally, and above all, impartially.</p> <p>Beydari Melli will subsidize USD 1,000 per month for any media organization that has a good plan to improve the ties between the provincial council in their province, and the population.</p> <p>The candidate media organization will present a schedule with details about the program they will print/broadcast, including:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - an explanation of the functions of the provincial councils - an introduction of the members of the provincial councils - regular reporting on the activities of the provincial councils - a way to publish/broadcast reactions of the population to the provincial councils <p>Conditions</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Regular conditions apply. - The grantee must keep full record of their programs/printed materials and submit a full set of them to the FCCS regional office

**BEYDARI MELLI PROGRAM
CALL FOR PROPOSALS**

Title	Discovery of talent - unpublished manuscripts
Field	Culture - program 2.2.2.3 (reviving poetry and literature) step 1
General Objective	Discover unpublished literary talents throughout Afghanistan
Location	All regions
Maximum Budget	USD 500
Duration	2 months
Number of Grants Awarded	21 (3 per region)
Installments	(initial 300 \$ - second 200\$)
Target	Individual artists
Deadline for Submission	
Description and Conditions	<p>Any individual writer or poet that has an unpublished manuscript of minimum 12 pages that he/she would like to publish may submit this manuscript, together with a CV and a proof of identity, to the FCCS regional office. He/she will have an interview with the regional officer who will determine how motivated this individual is to continue developing his/her writing skills.</p> <p>If accepted, the writer/poet will receive a grant of USD 500 to help him/her work on the next publication, which must be at least 20 pages long, and ready in 2 months.</p> <p>Conditions</p> <p>The writer or poet must sign a declaration authorizing the FCCS to publish, either through local media or in book-form, both manuscripts submitted, up to an extent of 1000 copies (book-form) or 10,000 copies (if published in local media). If more copies will be published, the FCCS will engage in a discussion with the writer to determine eventual royalties.</p> <p>If any candidate brings either a previously published manuscript, or a manuscript written by another person, this person will be blacklisted by FCCS and will not be able to participate in any future call for proposals. If a grant has already been awarded, it will be recalled.</p>

**BEYDARI MELLI PROGRAM
CALL FOR PROPOSALS**

Title	Discovery of talent - young graphic artists
Field	Culture - program 2.2.3.5 (encouraging new artistic talents) step 1
General Objective	Discover new artistic talents throughout Afghanistan
Location	All regions
Maximum Budget	From -USD 200 -to USD 1000.
Duration	2 months
# of Grants Awarded	21 (3 per region)
Installments	2 (initial 800, final 200 USD)
Target	Individual artists
Deadline for Submission	
Description and Conditions	<p>This call for proposal is open for all graphic artists (painting, photography, video, calligraphy, miniatures, sculpture and mixed techniques) under 30 years old. They must make a plan of how they want to portray current life in Afghanistan, and the changes in society. The proposal they submit must include some preliminary work on this subject, and an exact plan of which other artworks they plan to produce. They must also bring previously made artwork to show their capacity. The minimum works of art to be produced are:</p> <p>Painting, calligraphy, miniatures, sculpture: 3 or more Photography: 15 printed photographs A3 format Video: at least 12 minutes of edited video Mixed technique: open to discussion</p> <p>Preference will be given to women candidates</p> <p>The works of art must be ready within 2 months of receiving the grant</p> <p>The FCCS will organize a traveling exhibition in all regional centers of the best works of art.</p> <p>Conditions</p> <p>The artist must sign a declaration authorizing the FCCS to exhibit the works of art produced with this grant, for at least 9 months, before returning them to the artists.</p> <p>The grant may not be used to pay for an existing work of art.</p> <p>Any candidate to a grant which is either not telling the truth about his/her age, does not produce a new work of art, or presents the work of other artists alleging that they are his/her own works of art, will be black-listed by the FCCS and will not be able to participate in any future calls for proposals.</p>

**BEYDARI MELLI PROGRAM
CALL FOR PROPOSALS**

Title	Youth's vision and critics on current sociopolitical issues.
Field	(2.1.6 Civil Society) Step 1
General Objective	Encourage youth to get involved in socio-politic debates. Awareness raising about youth intellectual positions. Help the Government finding innovative solution to these emergent social preoccupations. Get youth involved into Government actions. Raise youth's critical vision on controvert topics.
Location	At least 7 provinces and could be extended to more
Maximum Budget	Total: 6000\$
Duration	6 months
Number of Grants Awarded	3: Kabul regional provinces (Ghazni, Daikonday, Wordak)
Installments	
Target	Independent civil society institutions
Deadline for Submission	
Description and Conditions	By youth we understand person younger than 30 years-old The grantee should present the CV of the debate moderator which must show a precedent experience in this matter. The grantee must provide the space for library and debate. The grantee should present a list of 20 members including female. The grantee will be in charge for the establishment and the monitoring of a reference library which contents will be: social sciences, history-geography, politics, psychology, technology, economy, philosophy, general information. The grantee must debate with a well prepared audience composed of male and female. When the level of the debate will be sufficient, the debate must be recorded and broadcast by the local TV and by radio. The debate participants should be different for each debate. The debate topics must be about sociopolitical issues and be related to local realities. The debate should be an open space for intellectual exchanges in order to detect talents.

600\$ for each debate X 9= 5400 \$ Furniture: 600\$ (Library, books, generator, table etc)



**BEYDARI MELLI PROGRAM
CALL FOR PROPOSALS**

Title	Organizing youth gatherings through musical concerts
Field, code & step	Culture 2.2.3.1, step 1
General Objective	Improve the gathering culture of people through musical shows and cultural activities
Location	Kabul
Maximum Budget	USD 5000
Duration	3 months- 12 Concerts
# of Grants Awarded	2
Installments	3, initial 2000\$, second 1500\$ and last 1500\$
Target	(Eastern & western) organization that promote music , musical companies, cultural organizations except student groups (separate CFP)
Public Information strategy	All (Eastern & western) Afghan local music companies and music groups should be inform
Deadline for Submission	
Description and Conditions	<p>The applicants must be registered in one of Afghanistan government ministries or must be warranty by one known organization. Applicants are should provide all facilities like:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Planning • Location • Official permission for gathering • Informing police or other security centers for provide security during the gathering and musical show • Electricity • Transportation for procurement <p>Conditions Regular conditions apply The submitting organizations must allow the FCCS to use the results of the survey, for non-commercial purposes only.</p>
Opt: Typical budget:	<p>12 programs: Artist fee, Sound system, Electricity= 3000\$ Stationary , publications, Announcement= 500\$ Staff salary(organizer and assistant)= 1200\$ Communications= 100\$ Transportations= 200\$</p>
Suggested Exp Com	

**BEYDARI MELLI PROGRAM
CALL FOR PROPOSALS**

Title	Students Socio-cultural Activities
Field	Culture 2.2.3.5 (encouraging cultural participation by new groups) step 1
General Objective	To allow student groups to start organizing activities which entertain and mobilize other students to participate in culture and civil society events
Location	All universities in Afghanistan, with focus on Kabul University
Maximum Budget	USD 5,000
Duration	6 months
# of Grants Awarded	5
Installments	1 st : 30%, 2 nd : 30%, 3 rd : 30% and 4 th : 10%
Target	Student's associations
Deadline for Submission	
Description and Conditions	<p>All student associations registered with their university can apply. Female students associations and dormitory-based organizations are encouraged. They must submit a plan on how to organize regular cultural events, once per week on average during a period of appr. 3-4 months, and how to make sure a wide range of students will participate. The first months will be used for preparations.</p> <p>The proposal needs to outline</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - what kind of equipment will be bought, and who will own it. - cost per event (including payment to artists, minimal refreshments, rental of sound/light/camera equipment, recordings, dissemination of results etc.) - strategy and cost for announcement of events - cost for printing invitation materials - strategy for reporting about number and type of people attending the events. <p>Salaries may not be included, as students will have to volunteer.</p> <p>Regional BMP staff must be invited to all the events. Copies of recordings or printed results of the activities must be given to the BMP regional office.</p> <p>Conditions Regular conditions apply The submitting organization must allow the FCCS to use the results of the recordings, for non-commercial purposes only.</p>

**BEYDARI MELLI PROGRAM
CALL FOR PROPOSALS**

Title	Who's who in the local governments
Field	Civil Society 2.1.2.2.1 (research on appointments) step 1
General Objective	Provide a complete bibliography of the local government members Identify the political links at a provincial level and at a National level Identify the political and social trajectory of local government's members Evaluate its education background Find their main interests in order to relate them with CSO working in these fields
Location	At least 7 provinces and will be extended to more provinces with FCCS P.O
Maximum Budget	According to provincial status (Number): 1. USD 5000 2. USD 3000 3. USD 2000
Duration	2 month
Number of Grants Awarded	7
Target	Local CSOs
Installments	3 steps: initial: 30%: intermediary: 60%: final: 10%
Description and Conditions	The applicant must be an independent Civil Society organization. It must provide us with the CV of two or more researchers who will interview each Local government member in order to answer a questionnaire that will be provided to them by the FCCS. A list of position and an appropriate number of interviewees must be specified by the applicant. The answers must be signed by the interviewee. Independent source for each candidate must be found by the researchers in order to confirm member's assessments (to be kept in a database). The grantee must provide an edited softcopy of its findings and print 1000 copies of the Provincial's local government Who's Who after approval by FCCS.

BEYDARI MELLI PROGRAM
LIST OF ALL CALLS FOR PROPOSALS

3RD ROUND

Title	Establishing Arts Training Centers	
Field	Contemporary Culture Development 2.2.3.5	
General Objective	Develop contemporary art understanding and production among afghans	
Location	All regions	
Maximum Budget	USD 12,000	
Duration	6 months	
Target population	Registered cultural organizations	
Public Information Strategy	Through arts faculties and schools, regional office contacts, FCCS database of organizations	
Number of Grants Awarded	8	
Installments	Initial: 6,000 USD; 2 nd : 2,500 USD; 3 rd : 2,500 USD; last: 1,000 USD	
Deadline for Submission		
Description and Conditions	<p>The applicant must</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. specify where (in which building) the arts courses will be held 2. indicate which modern or traditional arts will be taught 3. submit the CVs of the teachers 4. provide a list of the equipment and arts materials that will be procured 5. give a curriculum of the classes (time, duration, subject matter) 6. indicate how many students will attend, and what is the target population (for example young men, housewives, street children, professionals...) 7. Organize a public exhibition at the end of the project of the materials made in the art classes <p>Conditions Regular BMP conditions apply. No stipends shall be paid to students/apprentices, and transport costs shall not be allowed</p>	
Typical Budget	Rent of building 250 USD per month Teachers salaries 4 people 6 months 150 USD per month Director salary 200 USD per month Support staff salaries 2 people 6 months 60 USD per month Communications, stationery, utilities, fuel = operation costs Equipment (generator, cameras, tools etc.) Furniture for 20 people and one office Arts materials consumables Food costs 7 people 6 months Exhibition costs Total	1,500 USD 3,600 USD 1,200 USD 720 USD 600 USD 2,300 USD 600 USD 600 USD 600 USD 280 USD 12,000 USD

**BEYDARI MELLI PROGRAM
CALL FOR PROPOSALS**

Title	Afghan Customs: understanding corruption and integrity
Field	IWA / Research 2.1.2.1.1
General Objective	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Produce quantitative data and analysis on corruption practices, perceptions and attitudes within the Afghan Customs ▪ Broaden the knowledge about trends and patterns of corruption and integrity between the private sector and the Afghan customs ▪ Develop Afghan capacities in research ▪ Quantitative survey on 500 persons and 4 provinces (25 customs civil servants and 100 traders or customs user per province) ▪ 8 Focus Group discussions to be used for the qualitative analysis
Location	All Afghanistan
Maximum Budget	9000 \$
Duration	3 months
Target population	Research Institutions and individual researchers
Public Information Strategy	Targeted by IWA on research institutions
Number of Grants Awarded	One
Installments	50% at the beginning, 40% when all the raw data has been collected and 10 % at the end of the project
Deadline for Submission	March 2006
Description and Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ The candidate research organization or lead researcher must submit a research plan to FCCS/IWA including CVs of the lead researchers, provinces which will be covered, judicial organs which will be surveyed, and a description of the objective and methodology of the research ▪ The work will be done under the supervision of Integrity Watch Afghanistan which will assist the research institute to design the questionnaire and to further define the research methodology and the subjects to be surveyed ▪ The survey must be made in at least 4 important border points of Afghanistan. ▪ The raw data of the survey and of the Focus Groups will be made available for IWA for its own research and publication purposes ▪ The candidate organization must analyze the data in written form, conduct focus groups to test its conclusions and submit the analysis and focus group results to FCCS/IWA at the end of the project ▪ The candidate organization must justify of at least two years of experience in research ▪ It must have a precedent experience on nation wide surveys

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ It must have a proven network of surveyors
<p>Typical Budget</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ <u>Survey</u>: 5 questionnaires/day /surveyor = 100days can be done in 20 days by 5 persons with a salary of 400\$ + 500 \$ transportation cost + 500 \$ food= 3000\$ ▪ <u>Consultant/ management</u>: (questionnaire writing, monitoring of the surveyors, Data Cleaning, Analytic report writing)= 1000\$ x 2 months ▪ <u>Database</u>: database construction 10 days, Data entry: 20 days, data cleaning 2 days= 750 \$ ▪ Focus Groups discussions, 2 per province (defining themes, leading the interviews and transcription of the discussion) = 2000\$ ▪ <u>Printing cost</u>: 0.5\$ x 500 copies= 250\$ ▪ <u>Misc costs</u>: 10%= 600\$

**BEYDARI MELLI PROGRAM
CALL FOR PROPOSALS**

Title	Afghan Justice: understanding perception of corruption and integrity
Field	IWA / Research 2.1.4.3
General Objective	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Produce quantitative data and analysis on perceived corruption practices, and attitudes regarding the Afghan Justice System. ▪ Broaden the knowledge about the evolution of perceptions, attitudes and expectations of the Afghan population. ▪ Develop Afghan capacities in research ▪ Quantitative survey on 1000 persons, in 10 provinces (representative sample of 100 persons per province)
Location	All Afghanistan
Maximum Budget	10,000 \$
Duration	3 months
Target population	Research Institutes and Researchers
Public Information Strategy	Targeted by IWA on research centers and Universities
Number of Grants Awarded	One
Installments	50% at the beginning, 40 % upon delivery of the raw survey data, and 10% upon the completion of the project
Deadline for Submission	March 2006
Description and Conditions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ The candidate research organization or lead researcher must submit a research plan to FCCS/IWA including CVs of the lead researchers, provinces which will be covered, judicial organs which will be surveyed, and a description of the objective and methodology of the research ▪ work will be done under the supervision of Integrity Watch Afghanistan which will assist the research institute to design the questionnaire and to further define the research methodology and the subjects to be surveyed ▪ The survey must be made in at least 10 provinces of Afghanistan, in different regions. ▪ The raw data of the survey and of the Focus Groups will be made available to IWA for its own research and publication purposes ▪ The candidate organization must analyze the data in written form, conduct focus groups to test its conclusions and submit the analysis and focus group results to FCCS/IWA at the end of the project ▪ The grantee must justify of at least two years of experience in research ▪ It must have a precedent experience on nation wide surveys ▪ It must have a proven network of surveyors

Typical Budget	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ <u>Survey:</u> 5 questionnaires/day /surveyor = 200days can be done in 20 days by 10 persons with a salary of 400\$ + 900 \$ transportation cost + 900 \$ food= 5800\$ ▪ <u>Consultant/ management:</u> (questionnaire writing, monitoring of the surveyors, Data Cleaning, Analytic report writing)= 1000\$ x 2 months ▪ <u>Database:</u> database construction 10 days, Data entry: 40 days, data cleaning 2 days= 1000 \$ ▪ <u>Printing cost:</u> 0.5\$ x 500 copies= 250\$ ▪ <u>Admin costs:</u> 10%= 900\$
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**BEYDARI MELLI PROGRAM
CALL FOR PROPOSALS**

Title	Awareness-raising in the field of Truth-seeking and Transitional Justice	
Field	Civil Society 2.1.4.2	
General Objective	Promote general knowledge among the citizenry on the Transitional Justice Action Plan and the truth-seeking process thereof	
Location	All regions	
Maximum Budget	10000 USD	
Duration	3 Months	
# of grants Awarded	6	
Installments	3 (50% initial, 40% after completing 10 meetings, 10% after final report)	
Suitable Candidates	Civil society and Human Rights organizations	
Public Information Strategy	Through regional FCCS offices and the HRC regional offices / UNAMA	
Deadline for Submission	15 March	
Description and Conditions	<p>The candidate organization must</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. distribute at least 5,000 copies of the Transitional Justice Action Plan, which can be obtained from the Human Rights Commission. 2. distribute copies of reports by the Afghanistan Justice Project, Human Rights Watch and other relevant information on transitional justice, to enrich the meetings and the focus group discussions 3. provide a list of 50 awareness-raising meetings in the field of truth-seeking it plans to organize in at least 20 different localities (in one or more provinces) indicating which target groups it plans to invite to these meetings, and a standard agenda for the meeting. 4. give a list of at least 10 day-long focus group discussions it plans to organize after the awareness-raising campaign to discuss how local civil society can help implement the Transitional Justice Action Plan, especially the truth-seeking part. 5. specify any innovative manner to introduce the truth-seeking part of the Transitional Justice Action Plan in the meetings. Original ideas will be appreciated but they must be practical 6. invite representatives of the AIHRC and of the FCCS to each meeting <p>Conditions:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Attendance sheets for all meetings and focus groups, as well as the full notes of the focus group discussions (including audio recordings) must be submitted to the FCCS at the conclusion of the project 2. The FCCS and the AIHRC have the rights to use the results of the focus group discussions organized by the implementing organizations 	
Typical Budget	Program Coordinator 3 months	1,200 USD
	Program Assistant 3 months	600 USD
	Audio recording device including microphone	300 USD

	Audio recording consumables and stationery	200 USD
	Transport costs	1,800 USD
	Communication costs	200 USD
	Food and accommodation costs for traveling team	1,200 USD
	Cost per awareness raising meeting x 50	2,500 USD
	Cost per focus group discussion x 10	1,000 USD
	Miscellaneous (photocopies, presentation materials etc.)	1,000 USD
	Total	10,000 USD

Key Action 3. Truth-seeking and documentation

Objective Through truth-seeking and documentation, evaluate the facts of the conflicts and injustices happened in the past, establish accountability and put an end to the continued state of impunity through acknowledging the oppression and expressing the belief in justice²², while supporting reconciliation and recognising that there are ‘multiple truths.’

Activities

- a) Initiate a consultative process seeking views on truth-seeking mechanisms from civil society, academia, community leaders, religious leaders etc. to formulate recommendations for a truth-seeking mechanism in Afghanistan, giving special consideration to the participation of women in the consultation and how to deal with gender-based violence and other crimes against women
- b) In support of this process a conference on truth-seeking in other countries and the lessons learnt will be organised. (The conference shall also address reconciliation - see below, key-action 4).
- c) Draft legislation on the recommended truth-seeking mechanism to be presented to the National Assembly.
- d) Funding, establishment and staff training of the recommended truth-seeking structure.
- e) Increase and accelerate efforts to document past human rights abuses during the conflict in Afghanistan, including on gender-based violence, to complement and enrich the existing work.
- f) Identify a location for the establishment of a documentation centre on the conflict in Afghanistan, bringing together existing collections and books, and regulate legal framework.

²² The concept of a truth commission was found to be virtually unknown in the context of Afghanistan, nevertheless, the overall support for truth-seeking was high: 95% of the respondents in the AIHRC national consultation considered it important to establish the truth of war-time violations. Source: “A Call for Justice” www.aihrc.org.af



**BEYDARI MELLI PROGRAM
CALL FOR PROPOSALS**

Title	Course of web log writing for print media and established authors	
Field	Research and Publication 2.1.5.3	
General Objective	Usage of the latest technology for expressing and publishing opinions and local news	
Location	All regions	
Number of grants	one per region (8)	
Maximum Budget	5,000 USD	
Duration	2 Months	
Installments	2 (initial 80%, final 20%)	
Suitable candidates	Web log writers and media organizations	
Public Information Strategy	Through FCCS website and Afghan mailing list, on afghan news websites and web-forums	
Deadline for Submission	15 March	
Description and Conditions	<p>The candidate must</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. give the http address of its own web-log or web-site to prove its experience and capability 2. provide a CV of the web-log trainer 3. get an expression of interest in the web-log writing course from at least 5 existing print-media and established Afghan authors, and indicate why it will be interesting for the public to have access to these different opinions and sources of local news 4. indicate how it plans to establish domain names and open websites, as well as give an example of the technical and graphic design of such a website for web-logs (preferably by e-mail link to ecg@afghanfccs.org) and how it will make these web-logs easy to find on the web 5. Provide a list of the IT equipment and internet access it plans to procure 6. Provide the training curriculum it plans to use, with a time-line <p>These web-logs will become accessible through a link on the FCCS website</p>	
Typical Budget	<p>Web-log writing trainer 2 months</p> <p>Establishing a domain name and web-site(s) for 2 years</p> <p>Rental of place for course</p> <p>Communications, Transport, Stationery, Utilities</p> <p>Food and refreshments</p> <p>Stipend for participants (average 10 x 30 days x 50 Afs)</p> <p>Computer and IT equipment</p> <p>Internet access</p> <p>Miscellaneous</p> <p>Total</p>	<p>800 USD</p> <p>200 USD</p> <p>500 USD</p> <p>300 USD</p> <p>100 USD</p> <p>300 USD</p> <p>2,000 USD</p> <p>400 USD</p> <p>400 USD</p> <p>5,000 USD</p>

**BEYDARI MELLI PROGRAM
CALL FOR PROPOSALS**

Title	Citizen’s Rights Awareness Raising Program	
Field	Civil Society and Media 2.1.4.2	
General Objective	Increasing people’s knowledge about their rights as Afghan citizens, and their capacity to demand fair and equal treatment from Afghan judiciary organs	
Location	All regions	
Maximum Budget	10,000 USD	
Duration	6 Months	
# of grants Awarded	One per region (8)	
Installments	3 (first: 50%; after progress report 40%; upon completion of project 10%)	
Suitable candidates	Civil Society organizations and registered and active media organizations	
Public Information Strategy	Through the regular channels (FCCS regional offices) and the FCCS database of Human Rights and Civil Society organizations	
Description and Conditions	<p>The aim of this project is to increase the knowledge of citizens about their rights and empowering them vis-à-vis the judiciary organs of the State.</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The applicant must provide CVs of the program director and (if planned) legal assistants, and a list of past activities in civil rights awareness 2. Two types of activities are possible: civil society organizations can conduct workshops or awareness-raising campaigns and provide legal advice to citizens as well as interact with the judiciary organs; and media-organizations can conduct campaigns informing citizens of their rights and allowing them to speak openly through the media 3. The applicant must specify exactly how it plans to implement its plan, including information about which rights will be addressed, which social groups will be targeted, in which localities it plans to operate, and how it will measure the impact of the program 4. Research of the local judiciary organs, and awareness-raising and training of its members can also be part of the project 5. The applicant must have a complete set of the latest Afghan laws related to its campaign, and distribute the relevant legal texts to the target groups 6. The applicant must make at least 10 complete case studies of citizens whose rights have been violated, how they have tried to address this through the judiciary organs and the results. 7. A complete working report including the awareness-raising materials made by the grantee, case studies, attendance sheets of workshops and meetings, and publications reflecting their campaign must be provided to the FCCS at the end of the project. 	
Typical Budget	Program Director 6 months	1,800 USD
	Program Assistants or Journalists	2,400 USD
	Office running costs for legal advice or media organization	2,400 USD
	Workshop/Training/Meeting or broadcasting/printing costs	2,000 USD
	Public awareness-raising material or distribution costs	500 USD
	Complete set of relevant Afghan laws and other books	200 USD

	Practical support to citizens fighting for their rights	500 USD
	Miscellaneous	200 USD
	Total	10,000 USD

**BEYDARI MELLI PROGRAM
CALL FOR PROPOSALS**

Title	Public Gardens and Playgrounds Creation
Field	Environment and Improving of living conditions 2.1.2.3
General Objective	To improve the living conditions of a community and spread environmental awareness
Location	All regions (8)
Maximum Budget	USD 10,000
Duration	6 months
Suitable Candidates	Community organizations and CDCs
Public Information Strategy	Through the NSP and the regular FCCS channels
Number of Grants Awarded	One per region (8)
Installments	3 (70% initially, 20% after the garden is inaugurated, 10% at end of project)
Deadline for Submission	
Description and Conditions	<p>The applicant must</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Submit a CV of the person responsible for creating the garden 2. Submit a complete and budgeted professional plan of the gardens/park it plans to create, including a list of all the trees, flowers and shrubs that will be planted in this or the next season, the public facilities, landscaping, fertile earth, gardening tools and consumables, etc. 3. Provide a list of the equipment (for example benches, playground and sporting facilities) it plans to procure with the estimated costs 4. Indicate who will be responsible for the treasury (on a volunteer basis) and how many funds they will leave in it for the next planting season 5. Receive a document from all the relevant municipal authorities indicating they contribute the land, have seen the whole plan, agree with it and will support it 6. Collect at least 100 signatures of people in the community supporting the project, on a document where they promise they will be responsible for maintaining the gardens in the future, and that they agree with the treasurer's designation and the plans. Preference will be given to proposals where the community commits in writing to supporting the plan with their voluntary work. 7. Submit a plan for protecting and maintaining (irrigating) the public gardens for at least one year, including a gardener and guards from among the community 8. Indicate how it plans to share all the accounts from the project with the

	community (the signatories) and the municipal authorities 9. A board must be set up at the entrance thanking the FCCS and the donors																						
Typical Budget	<table border="0"> <tr> <td>Park Engineer (2 months)/Project Coordinator</td> <td>600 \$</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Specialized labor (gilkar, felezkar etc.) 3 people x 1 month</td> <td>600 \$</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Muzdurkari 6 people x 2 months</td> <td>600 \$</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Gardener (12 months)</td> <td>600 \$</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Guard (12 months)</td> <td>600 \$</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Protecting wall or fence</td> <td>2,000 \$</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Good soil for flowerbeds, landscaping</td> <td>1,000 \$</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Benches, playground and sporting facilities</td> <td>2,000 \$</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Cost of the Plants (trees, shrubs, flowers)</td> <td>1,500 \$</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Miscellaneous</td> <td>500 \$</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Total</td> <td>10,000 \$</td> </tr> </table>	Park Engineer (2 months)/Project Coordinator	600 \$	Specialized labor (gilkar, felezkar etc.) 3 people x 1 month	600 \$	Muzdurkari 6 people x 2 months	600 \$	Gardener (12 months)	600 \$	Guard (12 months)	600 \$	Protecting wall or fence	2,000 \$	Good soil for flowerbeds, landscaping	1,000 \$	Benches, playground and sporting facilities	2,000 \$	Cost of the Plants (trees, shrubs, flowers)	1,500 \$	Miscellaneous	500 \$	Total	10,000 \$
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**BEYDARI MELLI PROGRAM
CALL FOR PROPOSALS**

Title	Anthologies of contemporary poets and authors
Field	Research and Publication
General Objective	Introduction of the contemporary poets and authors of Afghanistan
Location	All regions
Number of grants	One per region (8)
Maximum Budget	6000 USD
Duration	3 Months
Installments	2
Suitable candidates	Publishers, research and cultural organizations and individuals.
Public Information Strategy	Through regular FCCS channels plus universities (literature faculties), writers unions etc.
Deadline for Submission	
Description and Conditions	<p>The applicant must:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Explain what the theme of the anthology will be (for example, writers from a certain region, poems about the war, collection of satire...) 2. Prepare a list of the Dari, Pashto or Turkic poets and authors who will be included in the anthology, and the title of their works. The subsequent information is also needed: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a. Brief introduction of the poet or author. b. A short sample of the poem or story. c. A bibliography of published works of each poet or author. d. A written declaration that the poet or author agrees to be included in this anthology 3. Include costs for paying the authors (optional), writing all the texts on computer, editing them, preparing a professional layout, checking the proofs and publishing the anthology on good quality paper, in at least 1,000 volumes. 4. Submit a CV of the Chief Editor, in charge of the project

	<p>Conditions:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The Chief Editor of the anthology may not contribute to the anthology, except by writing an introduction 2. The successful grantee must provide the proofs on a CDROM to the FCCS before publication, make the changes requested and await approval by the FCCS before printing. 3. The FCCS must receive 100 copies of the anthology for its own use 4. The other 900 or more copies may not be sold, but should be distributed among the authors, public libraries, media organizations, schools and other interested institutions. 																				
Typical Budget	<table style="width: 100%; border-collapse: collapse;"> <tr> <td style="width: 80%;">Chief Editor 3 months</td> <td style="text-align: right;">1,200 \$</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Computer data-operator (2 x 2 months)</td> <td style="text-align: right;">1,000 \$</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Computer lay-out specialist 1 job</td> <td style="text-align: right;">200 \$</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Payments to authors</td> <td style="text-align: right;">1,000 \$</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Proof-reading process with printer</td> <td style="text-align: right;">400 \$</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Printing good quality 1,000 issues</td> <td style="text-align: right;">1,500 \$</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Stationery (paper and ink for printer)</td> <td style="text-align: right;">200 \$</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Office operation costs (phone, rent, transport etc.)</td> <td style="text-align: right;">300 \$</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Distribution costs</td> <td style="text-align: right;">200 \$</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Total</td> <td style="text-align: right;">6,000 \$</td> </tr> </table>	Chief Editor 3 months	1,200 \$	Computer data-operator (2 x 2 months)	1,000 \$	Computer lay-out specialist 1 job	200 \$	Payments to authors	1,000 \$	Proof-reading process with printer	400 \$	Printing good quality 1,000 issues	1,500 \$	Stationery (paper and ink for printer)	200 \$	Office operation costs (phone, rent, transport etc.)	300 \$	Distribution costs	200 \$	Total	6,000 \$
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**BEYDARI MELLI PROGRAM
CALL FOR PROPOSALS**

Title	Production of fiction and documentary films (90 minutes) on contemporary Afghan society
Field	Culture
General Objective	Allow experienced film-makers to produce new movies which do not need to be commercial while encouraging them to reflect on Afghan society
Location	All Afghanistan
Maximum Budget	10,000 USD (feature film) or 5,000 USD (documentary film)
Duration	5 months
# of grants Awarded	5
Installments	3(60%, 30% and 10%)
Suitable candidates	Film production companies

Description and Conditions	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The applicant must submit CVs for the screenwriter, director, the cameraman and the principal actors, with information about all previous movies made 2. The film should be digitally recorded on a professional video camera, with professional sound, using professional actors. 3. The film scenario should treat current social and cultural problems and applicants must try to reflect contemporary Afghan identities and how they have changed 4. With the proposal the applicant must submit a synopsis of the movie, information about the actors, the shooting locations, and technical data about the camera, sound and the editing systems 5. There should be no, or very little violence in the movie 6. The budget may not cover the cost for buying a professional camera, but sound and editing equipment as well as accessories (costumes, make-up, etc.) may be included up to 2,500 USD 7. The FCCS will be allowed to show the movie in Afghanistan and abroad, without making any edits in the final result 8. The FCCS and the donors must be acknowledged in the film's titles <p>Conditions for Grantees:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Once an applicant has been notified that the project has been approved, he/she must make a full script and submit this to the FCCS within one month 2. The grantee must invite the FCCS members to the shooting 3. Once the first draft of the movie has been edited, the grantee must submit this to the FCCS for advice. The advice will be given by an Expert Committee of Afghanistan's most experienced film-makers 4. The grantee must make a "making of" movie which in edited format should be at least 15 min. long, and submit this to the FCCS with the final draft of the movie. 																														
Typical Budget	<table style="width: 100%; border-collapse: collapse;"> <tr> <td>Screen-writer 1 month (not doc)</td> <td style="text-align: right;">500 \$</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Director 2 months</td> <td style="text-align: right;">1,000 \$</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Cameraman 2 months</td> <td style="text-align: right;">800 \$</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Sound & Light assistant 2 months</td> <td style="text-align: right;">500 \$</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Professional editor with studio rent for 1 month</td> <td style="text-align: right;">1,000 \$</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Main actors 4 x 1 month (not doc)</td> <td style="text-align: right;">1,600 \$</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Secondary Actors 6 x 1 month (not doc)</td> <td style="text-align: right;">1,500 \$</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Extras 10 x 1 month (not doc)</td> <td style="text-align: right;">1,000 \$</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Equipment</td> <td style="text-align: right;">1,500 \$</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Consumables (DVCassettes, batteries)</td> <td style="text-align: right;">200 \$</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Accessories, costumes, make-up (not doc)</td> <td style="text-align: right;">200 \$</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Transport costs 2 months (800\$ for doc)</td> <td style="text-align: right;">500 \$</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Communication costs 4 months</td> <td style="text-align: right;">200 \$</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Food costs during shooting only 1 month (not doc)</td> <td style="text-align: right;">500 \$</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Total</td> <td style="text-align: right;">10,000 \$</td> </tr> </table>	Screen-writer 1 month (not doc)	500 \$	Director 2 months	1,000 \$	Cameraman 2 months	800 \$	Sound & Light assistant 2 months	500 \$	Professional editor with studio rent for 1 month	1,000 \$	Main actors 4 x 1 month (not doc)	1,600 \$	Secondary Actors 6 x 1 month (not doc)	1,500 \$	Extras 10 x 1 month (not doc)	1,000 \$	Equipment	1,500 \$	Consumables (DVCassettes, batteries)	200 \$	Accessories, costumes, make-up (not doc)	200 \$	Transport costs 2 months (800\$ for doc)	500 \$	Communication costs 4 months	200 \$	Food costs during shooting only 1 month (not doc)	500 \$	Total	10,000 \$
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**BEYDARI MELLI PROGRAM
CALL FOR PROPOSALS**

Title	Research related to urban issues
Field	Research and Publication
General Objective	To encourage professionals to research urban problems, propose improvements and publish their research
Location	All Afghanistan
Number of grants	5
Maximum Budget	Depending on qualification of researcher: between 2,000 \$ (graduate from appropriate faculty) to 10,000 USD (PhD or very experienced)
Duration	6 Months
Installments	3 (40% initially, 40% upon presentation of first research results and 20% upon approval of final draft for printing)
Suitable candidates	Professional Architects, Urbanists, Social Scientists, and Public Works Engineers
Public Information Strategy	Research Institutes, organizations working on urban reconstruction, E-mailing lists reaching professionals and FCCS regular channels
Deadline for Submission	
Description and Conditions	<p>Three categories of research will be covered by this grant</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) Socio-cultural problems and opportunities resulting from Afghanistan’s booming urbanization 2) Urban reconstruction issues, including cultural heritage preservation, building techniques, town lay-out and administration 3) Public works issues such as traffic, drainage, green areas, public health etc. <p>The applicant must</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. submit a CV with a list of previous studies and published works of the main researcher (the researcher can be currently employed and make the study in his free time, but must adapt his own salary accordingly) 2. provide a detailed description of the research theme and the limits of the study, the methodology that will be used and the expected output 3. indicate who the other members of the research team will be 4. in case of social scientists, submit a planned questionnaire and proof of ability to use statistician’s software such as SPSS 5. in case of architects, urbanists and engineers, submit drawings or plans made on the research subject as proof of capacity (copies not allowed) <p>Conditions:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The grantee must submit a progress report when the first results of the survey have been made, in order to receive the 2nd installment 2. The grantee must submit a draft of at least 80 pages of the research results, including graphs, tables, drawings and maps, to the FCCS, who will have it revised by an Expert Committee. The recommendations of the Expert Committee must be taken into account by the grantee when

	<p>preparing the final draft for publication. The Expert Committee members will be paid for their edits, between 100 and 1,000 \$ according to the amount of work, from the last installment.</p> <p>3. At least 500 copies on good paper and with color where necessary must be printed by the grantee; of these, 100 must be given to the FCCS and the others distributed to universities, organizations and government offices working in the relevant field. No copies may be sold.</p> <p>4. The grantee must acknowledge the FCCS and the donors in the publication, on the cover and in the introduction.</p>																		
Typical Budget	<table> <tr> <td>Lead researcher x 4 months</td> <td>4,000 USD</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Research assistants, 2 x 4 months</td> <td>1,600 USD</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Transport costs 250 Afs per day x 50 days + trips outside city</td> <td>500 USD</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Communication costs</td> <td>300 USD</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Equipment costs</td> <td>1,000 USD</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Publishing costs, good quality 2\$ per copy + proofs</td> <td>1,500 USD</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Miscellaneous</td> <td>100 USD</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Payment to expert editors</td> <td>1,000 USD</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Total</td> <td>10,000 USD</td> </tr> </table>	Lead researcher x 4 months	4,000 USD	Research assistants, 2 x 4 months	1,600 USD	Transport costs 250 Afs per day x 50 days + trips outside city	500 USD	Communication costs	300 USD	Equipment costs	1,000 USD	Publishing costs, good quality 2\$ per copy + proofs	1,500 USD	Miscellaneous	100 USD	Payment to expert editors	1,000 USD	Total	10,000 USD
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**BEYDARI MELLI PROGRAM
CALL FOR PROPOSALS**

Title	Sports Club for women
Field	Civil Society / Sports
General Objective	Improving women's health and providing a dynamic space for interaction among women
Location	All regions
Maximum Budget	10,000 USD
Duration	6 Months
# of grants Awarded	8 (one per region)
Installments	3: 60% initially, 30% after the official inauguration of the sports club, and 10% after the approval of the final report
Suitable candidates	Women's organizations and sports clubs
Public Information Strategy	Through FCCS regional offices, database of sports and women's clubs, and MoWA including local departments of Women's Affairs
Deadline	
Description and Conditions	<p>The applicant must</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. submit a CV of the Project (sports school) director proving that she/he has enough professional knowledge 2. be registered with women's affairs ministry or the National Olympic committee 3. collect the signatures of at least 50 women (and if useful, of their closest male relative) that indicate their interest to participate in the sport club 4. submit a draft Rules and Regulations of the sport club. An example can be provided by the FCCS regional officers. The applicant may charge a membership fee, but must provide information about the fees collected in its accounts to the FCCS. 5. prove by an official document it has the right to use a space for the women's sport club 6. submit a budgeted list of sport club equipment it plans to procure. The equipment must conform to accepted standards in Afghanistan 7. Explain what kind of training will be given to the women, and if the training is given by another person than the project director, include CVs of these trainers 8. There must be drinkable water provision in or near the sports club, and a hammam, toilets and septic tank may be included in the project 9. Indicate which other activities for women can be organized in the sports club facilities 10. Give a plan for sustainability once the project is finished: how will the operation costs of the Sports Club be financed? <p>Conditions:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The grantees must place a board at the entrance of the sport club, and on documents of the sport club, indicating the donors of the project

	<p>2. The grantee must submit a final report with all activities and trainings performed in the sport clubs, and a financial report including revenue, which must be kept by the club for its operation after the grant ends</p> <p>3. Transport, communication and food costs and stipends for participants are not allowed in the budget.</p>																						
Typical Budget	<table> <tr> <td>Project Director 6 months</td> <td>1,800</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Assistant (4 months)</td> <td>600</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Trainers (2 x 2 hours per week x 5\$ x 4 months)</td> <td>300</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Guards (x 2) x 4 months</td> <td>400</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Fixing the sport club rooms</td> <td>600</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Sports equipment and furniture</td> <td>2,000</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Fresh water provision (digging well), showers and toilets</td> <td>2,000</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Rent of the space</td> <td>1,200</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Operation costs: water, electricity 4 months</td> <td>400</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Extra activities</td> <td>700</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Total</td> <td>10,000</td> </tr> </table>	Project Director 6 months	1,800	Assistant (4 months)	600	Trainers (2 x 2 hours per week x 5\$ x 4 months)	300	Guards (x 2) x 4 months	400	Fixing the sport club rooms	600	Sports equipment and furniture	2,000	Fresh water provision (digging well), showers and toilets	2,000	Rent of the space	1,200	Operation costs: water, electricity 4 months	400	Extra activities	700	Total	10,000
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**BEYDARI MELLI PROGRAM
CALL FOR PROPOSALS**

Title	Children's art workshops	
Field	Culture	
General Objective	Encouraging children to develop their creative and artistic talents	
Location	All regions of Afganistán	
Maximum Budget	6000 USD	
Number of grants	one per region (8)	
Duration	4 Months	
Installments	2	
Suitable candidates	Teachers organizations, private kindergartens and orphanages, cultural societies, artist groups	
Public Information Strategy	Through FCCS network of art and children's organizations, through regular FCCS channels	
Deadline		
Description and Conditions	<p>The applicant must</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. indicate which arts it plans to teach, for example drawing, theatre, music, painting, handicrafts...) 2. provide CVs of the arts trainers 3. indicate the target group of children whose creative talents will be developed 4. organize an exhibition of the results of the workshop at the end of the program and invite the FCCS regional manager to it 5. provide a budgeted list of the equipment it plans to procure 6. provide a full schedule of the training, day by day 7. Collect the signatures of at least 50 parents willing to have their children participate in the workshop <p>Conditions:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The children must be under 12 years old 2. The donors must be duly mentioned and credited for this program 3. The grantee must submit the best artworks made in the workshop for an exhibition by FCCS (these and all other artworks produced in the workshop will later be returned to the children and their parents) 4. Transport, communication and food costs and stipends for participants are not allowed in the budget 	
Typical Budget	Project Director x 4 months Art teachers 4 x 4 months part-time Rent of space x 4 months Furniture Arts materials Operation costs x 4 months Inauguration of the Exhibition Total Budget	1,200 \$ 1,600 \$ 800 \$ 1,000 \$ 800 \$ 400 \$ 200 \$ 6,000 \$

**BEYDARI MELLI PROGRAM
CALL FOR PROPOSALS**

Title	Establishing Women’s Social and Legal Support Centers (Women’s Support Centers)
Field	Civil Society, Gender, Rule of Law
General Objective	To establish centers which will provide support to women seeking support to solve their domestic problems, and avoid violent outcomes, while encouraging women to fight for their civil rights
Location	All provinces
Maximum Budget	USD 8,000
Duration	6 months
Target population	Women’s Organizations, Human Rights and Legal Defense organizations
Public Information Strategy	Through FCCS channels, Women’s radios (IMPACS) and MoWA, including provincial departments
Number of Grants	One per region (8)
Installments	3: 50% initially, 40% after first two months of operation (full progress and activities report required) and 10% after approval of final reports
Deadline for Submission	
Description and Conditions	<p>The applicant must:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provide the CVs of the center’s workers, typically one female jurist - preferably an experienced lawyer - and one social worker/paralegal assistant. Qualification and experience are important in judging the proposal • Give the exact address of where the support center will be established, preferably a place without rent. Alternatively, a mobile unit can be established that regularly visits communities or women’s centers • Explain how the center will work: how many women are expected to use it every week, how different cases will be treated in the center or referred to other organizations. This will be part of the work plan • Indicate how the Women’s Support Center will be linked to other institutions working in the field of defending women’s rights, including official judicial organs, Department of Women’s Affairs, women’s media, NGOs, hospitals, etc. • Specify how the existence of this center will be publicized so all women in the community know about it: for example by distributing leaflets, door-to-door campaigning or using women’s media (radios, print etc.) • Explain how the Center could become self-sufficient, or where it plans to request more grants, at the termination of the grant period. <p>Conditions</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • After receiving the first installment, the grantee has one month to set up the office, and should invite the FCCS regional office manager to the inauguration • If after 2 months operation the work performed is not satisfactory, the FCCS may decide to discontinue the grant and retrieve all furniture and equipment bought

Typical Budget	Project Director/Office Manager x 6 months	2,400 \$
	Legal Assistant/Social Worker x 5 months	1,250 \$
	Male Guards x 5 months	500 \$
	Office operation costs (telephone, taxis, stationery, bills)	900 \$
	Office rent allocation	600 \$
	Furniture	600 \$
	Computer, printer and stabilizer	700 \$
	Tea, refreshments and food costs (2\$ per day x 5 months)	300 \$
	Public Information costs (leaflets, radio broadcasts etc.)	400 \$
	Special events (workshops, round tables etc. x 50\$)	350 \$
	8,000 \$	

**BEYDARI MELLI PROGRAM
CALL FOR PROPOSALS**

Title	Establishing local environmental protection committees	
Field	Civil Society, Environment, 2.1.3	
General Objective	Encourage volunteerism in the field of environmental protection, and thus strengthen communities	
Location	All provinces of Afghanistan	
Maximum Budget	USD	
Duration	6 months	
Target population	Civil Society organizations, youth groups, CDCs	
Public Information Strategy	Through regular FCCS channels	
Number of Grants	Max. one per province	
Installments	2:Initial 80%, upon approval of final reports 20%	
Deadline for Submission		
Description and Conditions	<p>The applicant must:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Explain which environmental issues the local protection committee wants to focus on, and what it plans to do on these issues to solve them 2. Describe the structure of the local environmental protection committee, how often it will convene, which are the member organizations, whether it will have a secretariat, a treasury, if it charges membership fees or how it will try to raise funds, where it is based, etc. 3. Give a work plan for the coming 6 months, what it plans to do to improve the environment on the issues given 4. Receive the signatures under the points 1-3 of the heads of 5 to 10 local civil society groups, tribal groups or local authorities who want to participate in setting up this local environmental protection committee and will support its activities with volunteer work of their members <p>Conditions</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The applicant cannot request funds for running costs such as telephone communications, rent of office or of motor vehicle, or any salaries. All this must be contributed voluntarily by the community/participating organizations. The budget must be used for special events and environmental projects 2. When the grantee receives the first installment it must first establish the local committee, with membership, statutes and procedures, and then register it as a social organization. The Regional Office of FCCS can host the meetings. 	
Typical Budget	Cost of organizing meetings 50\$ each x 8 Registration process including trip to Kabul Environmental activities according to work plan (no salaries)	400 \$ 100 \$ 1,500 \$
	Total	2,000 \$

**BEYDARI MELLI PROGRAM
CALL FOR PROPOSALS**

Title	Recording and Publishing Great Local Musicians	
Field	Culture/Music	
General Objective	To preserve the musical heritage of Afghanistan and make it more widely available to the media and the public	
Location	All regions	
Maximum Budget	USD 2,500	
Duration	3 months	
Target population	Registered cultural organizations and individual musicologists	
Public Information Strategy	Through the radio (Radio Kelid and Taneen network) and by contacting all organizations that have recording studios	
Number of Grants Awarded	16 (2 per region)	
Installments	2	
Description and Conditions	<p>The applicant must:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - provide a CV of the person in charge of the project, and explain why this person will be the most suitable to record the music - describe which musicians will be recorded, or in case the musician has died or is not capable of performing anymore, which musicians' recordings will be digitally re-mastered and compiled. A brief history of the musicians and the music they play must be provided, explaining why it is important to preserve this music. - give details about the recording studio which will be used, and a CV of the person who will be in charge of the recording/digital re-mastering. - give exact technical details of which recording equipment will be used, including microphones, recorders, digital audio editing software, and reproduction. <p>Conditions</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The applicant must publish at least 1,000 good quality audio CDs of the music, including a CD box with a cover and information written on the CD. The design for the cover must be submitted to the FCCS and approved (sent back) before the covers are printed, in order to put the correct information about the donors. - The applicant must give 200 of these CDS <i>plus the master recording</i> to the FCCS. 300 CDs must also be given to the musicians who made the recordings. 	
Typical Budget	Salary for the program director Payment for the musicians Rent of recording studio including professional Communications, transport and operational costs Production of 1,000 CDs and covers Total	900 300 500 300 500 2,500

**BEYDARI MELLI PROGRAM
CALL FOR PROPOSALS**

Title	Discovery of talent -graphic artists
Field	Culture - program 2.2.3.5 (encouraging new artistic talents) step 1
General Objective	Discover new artistic talents throughout Afghanistan
Location	All regions
Maximum Budget	From -USD 200 -to USD 1000.
Duration	2 months
# of Grants Awarded	21 (3 per region)
Public Information Strategy	A special effort must be made to reach the artists through artists associations, all cultural organizations and faculties of Fine Arts
Installments	2
Target Population	Individual artists
Deadline	
Description and Conditions	<p>This call for proposal is open for all graphic artists (painting, photography, video, calligraphy, miniatures, cartoons, sculpture and mixed techniques). They must make a plan of how they want to portray current life in Afghanistan, and the changes in society. The proposal they submit must include some preliminary work on this subject, and an exact plan of which other artworks they plan to produce. They must also bring previously made artwork to show their capacity. The minimum works of art to be produced are:</p> <p>Painting, calligraphy, miniatures, sculpture: 3 or more Drawings, cartoons: 5 or more Photography: 15 printed photographs A3 format Video: at least 12 minutes of edited video Mixed technique: open to discussion</p> <p>Preference will be given to women candidates</p> <p>The works of art must be ready within 2 months of receiving the grant</p> <p>The FCCS will organize a traveling exhibition in all regional centers of the best works of art.</p> <p>Conditions</p> <p>The artist must sign a declaration authorizing the FCCS to exhibit the works of art produced with this grant, for at least 9 months, before returning them to the artists.</p> <p>The grant may not be used to pay for an existing work of art.</p> <p>Any candidate to a grant which is either not telling the truth about his/her age, does not produce a new work of art, or presents the work of other artists alleging that they are his/her own works of art, will be black-listed by the FCCS and will not be able to participate in any future calls for proposals.</p> <p>The artist must prepare a professional presentation of his work (frames, DVDs with cover or other)</p>

5.1 Civil Society Organizations Statement for ADF

I am speaking today on behalf of a variety of civil society organizations many of whom are members of the civil society networks, who have co-drafted this statement. These include the Afghan Civil Society Forum, the High Council of Social Organizations, and the Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief.

What is civil society and why are representatives of civil society organizations here today? Some people may think that civil society is a foreign concept, but this is not true. Civil society really means ordinary people and the many ways in which they endeavour to organize and protect themselves during wars and periods of political repression as well as during post-conflict reconstruction and times of peace. Individuals, families, and communities can all participate in civil society. Its diversity reflects human needs and the cultural, religious, economic, and political practices we formulate to address those needs.

In Afghanistan, sufi movements and *khanqahs*; religious institutions such as mosques, *madrassas*, *takiakhana*; water management committees; cultural circles; artistic and professional associations; and non-profit, non-governmental assistance organizations all form examples of civil society structures and organizations. Many of these structures are ancient ones that continue to form the building blocks of developing civil society today.

Civil society is also of fundamental importance to a functioning democratic process and safeguards our human rights which include the right to associate and the right to participate, the right to freedom of thought and expression as well as the freedom to practice ones' religious beliefs. . While elections ceased under the various communist, mujahideen and Taliban rulers, democratic traditions in Afghanistan did not. The Afghan people braved considerable intimidation to elect a President democratically. Afghan hopes for a parliament established through the holding of free and fair elections, are also very high. People want a government that serves their needs and is capable of evolving and changing as peoples' needs change.

We know that the survival of Afghanistan's people and civil society through years of war, instability, and drought is due as much to the strength of our social fabric, our family and community networks and systems, as to the international system, whose help we also appreciate. Our extended families supported each other, *shuras* continued to function, shopkeepers gave credit, and we formed assistance organizations. Afghan people now have the opportunity to promote civil society within the context of the democratic changes and reforms that are intended to provide the foundation for the establishment of peace and stability in the future.

Over the last three years, individual and institutional civil society representatives have played an active and important role via their extensive networks in the development of the Bonn Agreement, in the establishment of the Interim Administration, in both the Emergency and Constitutional Loya Jirgas, in the drafting of the Constitution, and in supporting the Presidential election process by the provision of civic education programmes throughout the country. Non-profit, non-governmental development assistance organizations have promoted and participated in the development of NGO legislation that will regulate the sector, human rights organizations are expanding in number and in the scope of their work, and social organizations ranging from writers groups to farmers unions are forming and talking to each other about shared issues.

Why are we here today? We are here at this meeting because Afghan civil society has the right and the responsibility to contribute to a policy debate which will determine future directions for Afghanistan. Building and maintaining a government is not merely a technical exercise, it needs to include the people of Afghanistan. The success of development and peace in Afghanistan also depends on the ability of the Afghan government to reach out to and include the Afghan people. To this end, it is essential that the government and its international supporters should actively consult with a wide range of civil society organizations from the outset of policy discussions. And the government should do everything it can to support the growth of a vibrant civil society that can facilitate the partnership between people and the government.

We are here today to uphold our responsibility to promote civil society and to state our commitment to the establishment of the rule of law, accountable and transparent government and the good governance that the Afghan people want and deserve. The diversity of civil society means we do not have a common stand on all issues. We do, however, hold shared concerns on a number of issues and we would like to raise these with you now.

➤ **Parliamentary elections**

Parliamentary elections are the means of creating a legislative body, which with the executive and the judiciary, will complete the components of a functioning democratic government. It is vital that these elections are free, fair, and conducted in a genuinely democratic manner. Recent research indicates that Afghan people fear that the electoral process may be manipulated by the powerful and that as a result, lawlessness, the rule of the gun, lack of public accountability, and corruption will be the real winners. To prevent this outcome, the government must implement Articles 85 and 86 of the Constitution which calls for the establishment of a procedure for vetting Parliamentary candidates. *“The purpose behind Articles 85 and 86 is to ensure that those who are elected to public office are individuals of the highest ethical and moral standards. The aim of the Constitution is to ensure that criminals and individuals who have engaged in war crimes and human rights violations should not become part of the nation’s law making institutions.”* (AIHRC, A Call For Justice) To meet the Constitutional imperative, the vetting mechanism must be backed up with sufficient capacity to implement it.

We call on the government and its international supporters to commit the necessary resources for the establishment of an effective vetting mechanism.

Voter education is also critical to the success of the electoral process and civil society organizations can continue to play a key role here, as they did during the presidential election and constitution-making processes. Voter education for the Presidential elections was conducted in a very rushed and limited timeframe and was comparatively poorly funded. Given that Parliamentary elections are far more complex and need more time to be understood:

We call on the government and the international community to deploy adequate resources to start voter education immediately.

➤ **Security—Military/policing and human**

We recognize that there are two main dimensions to security: physical security and human security. The need for physical security provided by the police and the military has been the main focus of international efforts so far. People need to be protected from violence, theft, and other abuses, people continue to feel insecure especially in this regard. We urge continued investment in the reform and training of an ethnically representative and professional Afghan National Police

The presence of adequate neutral security will be essential for holding free and fair Parliamentary elections safely and we welcome the recent progress in recruitment and training of the Afghan National Army. However, the disarmament process has not kept up with the changing nature of Afghanistan's militia structures and must be expanded to tackle the problem of unofficial militias who lie outside the mandate of the current DDR programme. If swift and effective action is not taken, there are grave implications for holding either free and fair elections and conducting them safely.

Studies based on Afghan opinions have repeatedly shown that human security - which amounts to the ability to lead a normal life with dignity and adequate livelihoods - is as important to the Afghan people as physical security. The 2004 National Human Development Report on Afghanistan sums up Afghans' feelings: "Security is not just the end of war, but the ability to go about one's business safely, to go to work or home, to travel outside knowing that one's family will not suffer harm. It is the assurance that development gains made today will not be taken away tomorrow." The establishment of security will also depend on justice, on respect for the equal and fundamental rights and freedoms of every citizen, female as well as male and on programmes that prioritise social equity. All of these need to become a reality rather than just being empty slogans.

Civil society organizations with our wide ranging networks can provide the momentum towards achieving these goals which are challenging but which constitute the foundation of real and sustainable security. Firstly, we can consult with communities and government on how to improve physical and human security. Secondly, we can help to address needs by providing services, testing solutions, and expanding the use of successful solutions. Thirdly, we can help to ensure that people's opinions flow from the periphery to government. We can **build bridges of communication between government and the people, ensuring that the voices of the people are heard in policy debates around key processes such as the development of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper** and the National Development Framework. In order to engage the Afghan people in our new democracy we all need to work together. The Afghan people, civil society organizations and the Afghan government should begin to trust each other, learn to understand our different strengths, capacities and responsibilities, all of which are needed to build a sustainable peace and avert new cycles of instability and conflict. We need to understand that we all work for common goals and by combining our strengths we can move forward more quickly. Distrust and competition will only undermine our ability to serve the goals of peace and development in a democratic political framework.

➤ **Rule of law**

The establishment of security also depends on the establishment of justice. When human rights organizations state that "without justice there can be no peace", they mean that unless people are guaranteed access to criminal justice other gains will not prove to be sustainable. The absence of justice has deeply eroded trust in public authorities and reversing this is crucial to establishing the legitimacy of the government in Afghan eyes. Despite this, progress in establishing the rule of law has been far too slow.

The culture of impunity is exemplified by the continuing incidents of systematic land grabs by the powerful. Legal title to the land in question is not worth the paper it is written on.

We call on the government and the international community for a more coherent approach to be taken across all areas of security sector reform and for the following steps to be taken:

1. The establishment of an independent body consisting of civil society representatives,

- lawyers, political parties, human rights representatives, to monitor the implementation of the Constitution and other laws relevant to the establishment of a stable, democratic state.
2. The speeding up the reform of the judicial system in a manner which ensures peoples' access to justice. Concepts of legal aid being broadened in other parts of the world to ensure access to justice particularly by the poor, must be utilized if relevant progress is to be made.
 3. Reforming and strengthening the development of a professional national police force by extending police training. Current police training programmes only consist of two to eight weeks duration. This is insufficient if a police force capable of commanding the respect and confidence of the Afghan people is to be created

➤ **Corruption**

We are increasingly concerned about rising levels of corruption and the potential for abuse of power at all levels of government. Large-scale corruption is being fuelled by the narcotics trade while bribery now seems to have become endemic within government bureaucracies for the first time. Too many Afghans are now saying things like, "Problems are solved but their solution is based on money. Those who are poor cannot get things resolved because they cannot afford to pay bribes." We recognise that many government employees cannot live on the very low salaries that they are paid and that limited job opportunities makes civil service reforms difficult to implement. To serve the Afghan people properly, we call on the government with the support of the international community to:

1. Speed up the pace of civil service reform
2. Set up an appropriate non select Commission to expedite civil service reforms in consultation with government employees and other stake holders.
3. Ensure that district, provincial and central administrative structures are ethnically representative and inclusive.
4. Ensure that individuals are hired for government position based on their competence rather than any linkages to individuals, groups or parties

• **Narcotics**

The narco-economy is the major threat to the future stability of Afghanistan. Opium production now represents 40% of the total economy (fig:UNODC) Therefore how the narco-economy is contained and ultimately eliminated requires great care, linked as it is to Afghan poverty and aspirations, land tenure issues, the creation of debts that can lead to child labor and the sale of daughters, not to mention the establishment of links to organized criminal syndicates in other countries. The government needs to be seen to be credible and honest, but in handling this issue it also needs to take into account the economic needs of its people, many of whom now benefit from some sort of opium-industry related income.

Urgent steps are required:

1. Any supporters of drug trafficking networks inside the government itself must be removed immediately.
2. The organization of anti narcotics committees by the farmers to curb drug trafficking and to identify the traffickers.
3. Given the increase in heroin refining laboratories within Afghanistan's borders a national dialogue should be initiated. We welcome the use of media by the government to communicate its counter-narcotics policies but we also need to use the media and civil society actors to facilitate a national dialogue on the threats drugs pose to our society. This dialogue should

include political actors, health officials, other government officials, farmers, the transportation industry, *mullahs*, children—in fact, the entire nation.

4. Efforts to transform the rural economy will take time and will also depend on wider macro-economic issues, improvements to the transport infrastructure and most of all on the establishment of the rule of law. The government and its international supporters must continue to promote alternatives to opium cultivation but should primarily target the traffickers through interdiction measures rather than poor farmers through crop eradication. Farmers insurance institutions should be established to help protect them from adverse economic effects of the government's counter-narcotics policies.

Civil society organizations can support these processes by:

- bringing people's voices to the government through frequent consultations
- educating people on the rights of responsibilities of government and citizens
- educating people on government initiative
- assisting government in implementing jointly programs that enhance the rule of law, human security and job alternatives
- help voice issues of importance to support transparent and accountable government

5.2: Invitation to Independent Women Candidates Fundraising Event at the FCCS

Join us in
a **landmark fundraising event**
to honor and support twenty
independent Afghan Women
Political Candidates
on
August 14th, 2005
6:30-9:00
at
the Foundation for Culture and
Civil Society.

This event is sponsored by;
Foundation for Culture and Civil

Society;

Refugee Women in
Development;
Afghan Women and Democracy;
and
Aid Afghanistan

\$20 requested donation

All proceeds will be distributed equally
among participating candidates to fund
their campaigns.

For more info:

Mahbouba Seraj/RefWID

079116941

refwidkابل@yahoo.com



The power of democracy is one vote for each citizen
Grassroots fundraising is the way many people, through small
donations, can have a political voice.

Well-qualified, independent candidates in Afghanistan have
difficulty competing with candidates heavily funded through
party affiliation. We appreciate your support as we begin this
grassroots funding initiative for candidates who have been
working with our organizations and whose integrity we have
seen

*All funds will be distributed equally and be monitored by
RefWID.*

5.3: Parliamentary Candidates Catalogues Project

Candidates Profile Catalogue Narrative Report

Reporting date: 05.09.2005



The procedure for the project was as below:

1. Recruiting and training program staffs one week

- Training Regional supervisors in Kabul
- Recruiting Provincial Master Surveyors(PMS)
- Training PMS
- Recruiting local surveyors and training them

2. Outreaches

We announced the process in different media, such as print and wave media. We also contacted the provincial WJ candidates who were in Kabul and surveyed them there.

3. Starting and completing the survey, duration: three weeks

The survey began in all provinces and took three weeks to be completed. Despite the lack of cooperation of JEMB and of some candidates who were gone to remote areas for their campaign, we manage to finish this process completely, except in Daikundi province, where even with the best efforts our surveyor failed to find enough candidates to complete the 80% of the total. The overall total percentage of the survey in 33 provinces reaches 91.6%.

4. Computerizing the data, duration: one week

- We recruited some people to computerize the data, during the survey and after the completion of it. This process took one week in all the provinces. All the data have been computerized and this process was successfully finished.

5. Printing the catalogues, ongoing.

Now we are at the process of printing the catalogues. The printing of the catalogue covers is already finished. The process of printing is going on in four provinces: Kabul, Nangarhar, Khost and Baghlan. In each of the above mentioned provinces we have contracted with one printing press agency, but asked them to share the work with others, if they wanted. This initiative was just to speed up the process as we have a very short time to print all these data. The process is due to be completed by the end of this week and we are starting the distribution of the catalogues as soon as they are ready.

PROBLEMS

During the whole process, we faced two problems, such as:

1. Lack of cooperation of JEMB in providing the contacts details of the candidates to our surveyors.
2. Non-cooperation of the candidates during this process, as some of our surveyors went to one single candidate more than five times. This problem was encountered in all the provinces.
3. Insecurity in some provinces, such as Urozgan, Zabul, Nimroz and Paktika where our surveyor's car has exploded because of a bomb. Luckily, our surveyor was not injured as he was out in a shop asking for a candidate's address.
4. The geographical location of the remote districts, and shortage of transportation, as well as bad road access in areas such as five districts of Badakhshan, some districts of Samangan, Bamian, Paktika and almost more than fifty percent of all the other provinces.
5. Insufficient time, we felt that the time duration for such an important project was really short, as the deputy of the project monitored more than three provinces in one day which is really hard and tough.

SUGGESTIONS:

In the future, for a better implementation of such projects, we have some suggestions which may be helpful:

Before the beginning of the process, a discussion must be done with the JEMB and/or other relevant election authorities, in order to attract their potential cooperation.

The process must not be carried out simultaneously with the candidate's campaign.

There should be a greater length of time to carry out such a project.

Province	# of Candidates	# of base surveyors	# of provincial Master surveyors	# of Regional Master surveyors	% of candidates surveyed
Capital Region					
Kabul	390	14	1	1	
Parwan	56	1	1		
Kapisa	49	1	1		
Panjsher	21		1		
Wardak	69	2	1		
Logar	60	2	1		
Southeast Region					
Paktia	86	2	1		
Paktika	62	1	1		
Khost	91	2	1	1	

Ghazni	131	5	1		
East Region					
Nangrahar	179	4	1	1	
Laghman	65	2	1		
Kunar	65	2	1		
Nooristan	24		1		
South Region					
Kandahar	105	2	1	1	
Zabul	22		1		
Uruzgun	19		1		
Helmand	84	2	1		
Nimroz	20		1		
West Region					
Herat	162	4	1	1	
Farah	47	1	1		
Ghor	58	1	1		
Badghis	35	3	1		
North Region					
Faryab	82	3	1		
Jawzjan	39	1	1		
Saripul	42	1	1		
Balkh	116	3	1	1	
Samangan	39	1	1		
Northeast Region					
Baghlan	110	3	1	1	
Kunduz	92	2	1		
Takhar	97	3	1		
Badakshan	89	4	1		
Central Highlands					
Bamyan	54	3	1		
Dai Kundi	53	2	1		
Total	2713	77	34	7	

5.4 List of Round Tables organized at the FCCS

The following Tables were organized by the round table section of the FCCS and were reflected through national Television and Mosharekat-e-Meli Radio.

No	LISTS OF ROUND-TABLE'S TITLES	Date
1	Civil society and democracy.	2/5/2004
2	What is civil society?	5/5/2004
3	Civil society and elections mechanism.	13/5/2004
4	Role of civil society in elections.	27/5/2004
5	Role of civil society in monitoring of multilateral development banks policies in Afghanistan.	10/6/2004
6	Activities of the commission for administrative reforms.	17/6/2004
7	Civil society and struggle against corruption.	3/6/2004
8	Civil society and freedom of press.	24/06/2004
9	Rights of children in civil society.	1/7/2004
10	Role of youth in civil society.	8/7/2004
11	Role of civil society in implementation of elections.	11/7/04
12	Role of civil society and political parties in monitoring the elections.	22/7/2004
13	Civil society and controlling of election.	3/8/2004
14	Monitoring of civil society.	10/7/2004
15	Monitoring of civil society from the responsibilities of president and DDR process.	17/8/2004
16	Role of civil society in government system.	2/9/2004
17	Role of civil society in development of election.	14/9/2004
18	Public's views on Election day	21/10/2004
19	Role of national police in ensuring of security during election.	28/10/2004
20	Ideas of people about vouch day.	11/11/2004
21	Role of civil society in implementation of democracy.	25/11/2004
22	Youth ideas about new government.	9/12/2004
23	Vital problems of women in civil society.	16/12/2004
24	Discussion of the Draft Law barring foreign contributions to political parties and social organizations	31/01/2005
25	Role of civil society in adaptation of country's law.	2/2/2005
26	Effectiveness of country's laws in development of civil society.	25/02/2005
27	Violence against women (8 of March international participation day of women)	05/03/2005
28	Role of civil society in parliament election.	10/03/2005

29	About the Afghanistan Development Forum	11/03/2005
30	Promotion of women in civil society	22/04/2005
31	Role of free expression in progression of civil society	25/04/2005
32	Role of civil society in transparency of parliamentary elections	15/05/2005
33	How independent candidates can campaign	10/5/2005
34	Role of open market's economy in the country	18/5/2005
35	Role of social organizations and democratic movement in parliament	25/5/2005
36	Press conference of Independent candidates	15/6/2005
37	Transparency Mechanism in Parliamentary Election	27/6/2005
38	Effectiveness of election campaigns by independent candidates	18/7/2005
39	Monitoring of parliamentary elections campaign and especially about the hanging of posters	25/7/2005
40	Afghanistan's relations with its neighbors	11/8/2005
41	Improvement of Election working process	23/8/2005
42	Electricity's problems in Kabul	10/9/2005
43	Press Conference related to BMP programs	15/9/2005
44	Participation of Civil Society's Observers in Parliamentary Election	20/9/2005
45	Electoral Law Violations in Counting votes	18/10/2005
46	Freedom of Speech Circumstance in the Country	25/10/2005
47	Parliamentary Election's Result from Civil Societies' View	20/9/2005
48	Current Situation of the Children	21/11/2005
49	Evaluation of the Ministers' Accountability by Civil Societies' View	28/11/2005
50	Regional Cooperation Conference and Preparation for London Conference	7/12/2005

5.5 Concept for the establishment of Law Clinics in Afghan Universities

By Mr. Mohammed Farshid, Director of the Clinical Legal Education Program of the FCCS

The following steps are considerable to be observed in the current project:

1. **Meetings**
2. **Consulting**
3. **Place of the training**
4. **Trainers**
5. **Trainees**
6. **Backstopping Advisers**
7. **Contracts with Government for the training permission**
8. **Granting License for the trainees after training**
9. **Material of training(Curriculum)**
10. **Budged**

1: MEETINGS

With following people required to be met about the project:

- ✓ Minister of Higher Education
- ✓ Minister of Justices
- ✓ Universities Presidents
- ✓ Law Faculties Deans
- ✓ Law Faculties , departments Chiefs
- ✓ Law 3rd and 4th class students
- ✓ Supreme Court of Afghanistan
- ✓ Other donors for supporting our project
- ✓ Trainers
- ✓ Trainees

Meetings

The meetings which has been done so far is so satisfactory; all who has met is interested to the Independent Lawyer project (Law Clinics in Afghan Universities). It should be mentioned that the meetings is following and in this project the aforementioned governmental officials included as Minister of Higher Education, Minister of Justice, in the pilot period of this project, which will be held in the Kabul Universities, so the President of the Kabul University should be met, law Faculty Dean, law departments Chiefs, Supreme Courts Chief, and also donors for financially supporting.

Date: 13 August 2005

By: Mohammed Farshid, OSI Program Assistant

Re: Law Clinics in_Afghan_Universities

THE FIRST MEETING WITH STUDENTS, FACULTY OF LAW, KABUL UNIVERSITY

On 13 August 2005, representative of OSI met with student 3rd and 4th class representatives at Kabul at 08:45 till 09:45am.

In fact this meeting was not an official meeting, but the OSI representative need was:

- ✓ To know reaction of the students for law clinics
- ✓ To listen the ideas of the students for the result of this project
- ✓ To show how much is the requirement for the law clinics in Afghanistan
- ✓ To introduce the project
- ✓ To introduce the OSI in general and field of activities

Result of meeting

The result was extra ordinary, all the student expressed their pleasure for holding such clinics and requested that:

1. If possible the amount of the students should be increase so as to include all the students in these courses
2. The student who are in the hostel requested that if they will join the training and in the winter the hostel in closed , what they will do and who will support them regarding their expenditures
3. If the training will be at the part time the trainees need to feed themselves so they request the cook tail of lunch.
4. Money for the transportation.

Generally it should mention that the students eagerly waiting for the opening of the clinics.

Date: 14 August, 2005

By: Mohammed Farshid

Re: Law Clinics in Afghan Universities

Summary of the meeting with Abdul Basir Faizi of Global Rights Organization

On August 14, 2005 Program assistant of OSI met with Abul Basir Faizi at his office in Global Rights base.

Present were:

1. Abdul Basir Faizi Legal Program Officer in Global Rights
2. Sair Ahmad Legal Program Assistant in Global Rights.
3. Mohd Farshid Program Assistant in OSI.

The issue of the meeting was the activities of the Global Rights Organization, and also the discussion about the "law Clinics in Afghan Universities".

Global Rights has signed a contract with the Faculty of law and political sciences of the Kabul University to train 90 student of 4th class during three months course as:

Name of the Project:	Legal Aids Clinics
Duration:	Three months
Number of the Students:	90 Students
Starting date:	August 22, 2005
Trainers:	8 Judges and Persecutors of the concern governmental Organs with USD 200 per a month, part time.
Days of training:	Monday, Tuesday and Wednesday from 02:00 up to 06:00 pm
Material of training:	Pragmatic training of the Judgment and Persecution
Transport and Refreshment:	(USD 4) per a day
Place of training:	Kabul University, Faculty of Law and base of Global Rights Organization.
Document:	The trainees will be entitled with a "Attendance Certificate"

It is mentionable that the "Legal Aids Clinic" which will train the Law 4th class students is about Judgments and Persecution but it also covers a short and general idea of independent lawyers that will be train by "Zarghuna Barakee" lawyer in Attorney General Office.

MEMO

Date: 1 September 2005

By: Mohammed Farshid OSI Program Assistant

Re: Law Clinics in Afghan Universities

Summary of the meeting with Marla Morry Program Officer of the NRC

On 1 September 2005 Program Assistant of OSI (Open Society Institute) Mohammed Farshid Hakimyar met with Marla Morry NRC (Norwegian Refugee Council) Program Officer at her office at Qhlai Fahtullah at 09:00 am.

At first there was discussion on the project specially the trainers and the curriculum of the teaching for the students, and also the number of the student in this project.

Marla Morry had the ideas:

1. The number of the student should not be more than 15 in each class
2. The trainer must be both the foreign and Afghan lawyers
3. The period of the training is okay to be for six months
4. NRC will have comments in the curriculum of the project , for betterment
5. NRC will be pave the ground for the internships of the top students
6. NRC will have Guest Speakers for the Clinics
7. NRC will be backstopping Adviser for the Clinics
8. If the project spreaded in the Heart, Mazar and Jalalabad NRC has offices in the mentioned province, so it is possible to do the project in all over Afghanistan.
9. NRC has about 40 Lawyers in all over Afghanistan, so NRC has good possibility of supporting of the project.

RESULT:

NRC can be good partner for this project in all parts and every where

Consultations

The consultation has been done with Afghan and foreign colleagues, all-out supporting is enjoyed regarding this project.

As some of the students of law faculty is met, they expressed their pleasure for the founding such Clinics.

The next step which is very necessary for this project is to meet Afghan and foreign trainers for training of the students.

Place of the training

It is not possible to found the clinic inside the faculty so it is requiring hiring a house for the training in a location which easy to access for it (near the Kabul University)

As it is declare that this is Law Clinic so it require practicing from other hand the student in the Afghan Universities are generally deprived of having information from out doors of their own city so I have a few request:

1. The ground ought to be paved for the students to participate in the court rooms of the outside of Afghanistan Courts like American, European, African or Asian for the better realization of the cases

from the International Level Education and possessing enough knowledge for being expert in their career as a private Lawyer in National and International standards.

2. There must be possibility for the students to go to Provincial Courts inside Afghanistan so as to be witness of the cases that are currently ongoing in Afghan courts, to have enough information about what is really going on and to find solution for them; as lot violence is going in the provinces then Kabul.
3. There must be a contract with some concern governmental Organizations for better access for the cases which are related to their field of activities.

Trainees

It is determined to take 26 students for the pilot program (It is better to take the students form the third class and fourth.

Student from 4th Class of Leadership Department

1. Angilaa d/o Mohammed Naseem
2. Samira d/o Sayed Khan Aqha
3. Sayeda d/o Sayed Muzafar Shah
4. Farzana d/o Naiz Mohammed

Students from 3rd Class of Leadership Department

1. Zarqha d/o Khudadad
2. Leena d/o Hafizullah
3. Latifa d/o Abdul Majeed
4. Ousta d/o Mohammed Zaman Khan
5. Sameen d/o Mohammed Muhsen

Students from 4th Class of Management and Diplomacy Department

1. Abdul Ghafur s/o Abdul Hodud
2. Sayed Ahsan s/o Sayed Khalilurahman
3. Dain Mohammad s/o Gul Mohammed
4. Sayed Azizurahman s/o Sayed Khalilurahman
5. Mohammed Amin s/o Mohammed Anwar
6. Adriss s/o Mohammed Zaman

Student from 4th Class of Judgment and Persecution Department

1. Mohammed Afzal s/o Mohammed Akbar
2. Mohammed Naser s/o Mohammed Saleem
3. Ahmad Yama s/o Mahrabuddin
4. Fakhria d/o Mohammed Hashem
5. Abdul Massoud s/o Abdul Hodud

Students from 3rd Class of Management and Judgment

1. Fazullah s/o Namatullah
2. Wahidullah s/o Nazar Mohammed
3. Sakhi Ahmad s/o Fakhruddin
4. Wahidullah s/o AbdulKarim
5. Shoaib s/o Fazel Baksh

Trainers

The train which we need in these Clinics must be that type of the lecturer that they must be expert in practicing of law, there is two options for the trainers

To an a foreign trainer who is expert in law clinics concept and is familiar in speaking Dari well, it is a little difficult this can be Iranian or some one else

There is a gap in Faculty of Law as some of the subject and Laws is not taught in the faculty so when we train these class of the students who did not studied the laws, is a gap, for the filling of this gap we must include some of the subject and laws in this Clinic so we need to think about the curriculum of this Clinic more so as to have a complete time table and the training should the best.

For including new law which is not exist in the curriculum of the law Faculty we need law Lecturer to teach those law that are not include in schedule of the Faculty may four less more

Curriculum of the Clinic

The curriculum for the Law Clinic is also very complicated as the Law Clinic which is going to be found in Afghanistan is require to include those string of the subject and laws are not taught in the Faculty of law in Afghan Universities so notwithstanding of the layering skills we must fill the gap that the present Faculties can not as it is mentioned.

Time of training in Clinic

It is also necessary to consider the time of training in the Law clinic, as all the students who will be trained in this Clinic are the current fourth Class student or they are graduated from Faculty so the student who are still student in Faculty they are following their studies in the morning and the student whom are graduated from the Faculty maybe they have some other amusement in the morning, so it can be conclude that the only perfect time for the holding of the training is afternoon, also it is necessary to observe the and estimate the that the students do not have lunch in the Faculty so it is another issue to include in the budget of this project that to be taught about the lunch of the students.

According to my point of view the time should be:

- ✓ Six months the period of the project for training without students backstopping activities
- ✓ Five days per a week, except of Saturdays and Fridays
- ✓ 120 minutes per each day
- ✓ The training should started at "01:30 until 03:30"

I request two years of backstopping advising for the students for empowerment of their experience.

Open Media Fund for Afghanistan Report of Activities, 2005

Background:

The objective of the Open Media Fund for Afghanistan is to support the independent Afghan print media and help them develop their capacity to subsist as independent information providers to the Afghan population, rooted in the local economy, and meet the contemporary requirements of information exchange and media in Afghanistan.

In order to achieve these goals the Foundation for Culture and Civil Society decided to manage the Open Media Fund for Afghanistan, OMFA. The Fund previously managed by Internews, distributed funds and grants to the publication mainly in the provinces to cover their printing costs. It should be mentioned that the FCCS does not interfere in the editorial line of these publications but it has gained a powerful communication tool.

The Expert Committee:

After its integration with FCCS, it is decided to setup an expert committee to manage the proposals received by the OMFA. The Expert committee was composed of 5 well known individuals in the field of Media and publication. Members of the Expert Committee were:

1. Jane McElhone & Halima Kazim: IMPACS
2. Gabriel Dvoskin Sayara
3. Horia Mossadeq Human Rights Research and Advocacy Consortium
4. Samandar Afghan Independent Journalists Association
5. Robert Kluyver FCCS Executive Director
6. Omar Sharifi FCCS/OMFA Director

The members of this Committee take decisions on which publications to fund, which to stop funding etc. besides, they help the OMFA establish cohesive relations and link with other nationwide media programs, training and advertising, etc.

The Expert Committee will also decide on other means of supporting media in Afghanistan. They will be asked to give their recommendations on the small grant program of the EC with the FCCS, Which means either by providing funds and financial support through this program to the OMFA publications, or fund new publications according to the OMFA guidelines.

Recently three members of the expert committee, Jane McElhone, Gabriel Dvoskin and Halima Kazim have left Afghanistan for various reasons (Halima Kazim was threatened by a warlord whom she denounced as participating in the drug trade). Therefore the board decided to select new members among the experts in the field of media and publication. The preference will be with Afghan members who are skilled and have a long experience in this field.

Activities:

Funding:

Since the FCCS took over OMFA we have received many proposals from different parts of Afghanistan, mainly from print media.

According to the OMFA Expert Committee, among the six proposals received in the summer and autumn 2004 from Baghlan, Ghazni, Herat, Jalalabad and Konduz, after discussion and evaluation, only one, Takhassos magazine, the official publication of Herat Council of Experts was conditionally approved. The OMFA Expert Committee agreed to provide Takhassos a grant of 12.000 USD for one year in four installments. Later, Jabar Sapand, the OMFA manager traveled to Herat to assess how the previous grants by OMFA to the Takhassos were spent. Since it was a conditionality of the new grant, Takhassos agreed to submit the detailed account of how previous grants were managed. On the other hand, the OMFA manager developed a business plan for Takhassos for better management of the grant.

The other proposals were put on hold on the ground of the expert committee's desire to have an assessment of the other publications in the mentioned provinces.

Furthermore the projects submitted by the FCCS regional office in Baghlan province for the journalist training was rejected on the basis that there are not enough journalists in Baghlan, but according to the suggestions of one of the Expert Committee members, the FCCS regional office in Baghlan identified two journalists and introduced them for the training workshop organized by IWPR in Konduz.

In the beginning of 2005, according to the decision of the Expert Committee, Mr. Sapand traveled to Herat, Baghlan, Ningarhar, Konduz and Ghazni, and later in 2005 he traveled to Khost, Baghlan, Bamyan, Kunar and Laghman for the evaluation of the media and publication activities. He prepared an assessment of existing publications and evaluated the overall situation of the media there. This provides needed information for the OMFA team and the expert committee about the situation of the media and helps them develop a clear strategy for funding and supporting the print media in the future.

In the spring and summer of 2005 OMFA received about 20 new proposals from all over Afghanistan. The OMFA Expert Committee agreed in giving the priority to the publications based in the provinces, especially to the new initiatives which are dedicated to development of self sufficiency.

After evaluation by the OMFA Director and Manager, the proposals discussed by the OMFA Expert Committee and four proposals were awarded a six month grant. The winner publications are:

1. Baztab Daily in Mazar e Sharif "the first daily in northern Afghanistan"
2. Neda e Ghazna in Ghanzi
3. Sada e Watan in Konduz
4. Meena monthly in Jalalabad

The fund is mainly to cover their print costs. Also a comprehensive business plan was provided for the grantees. This will help them to manage their grant more efficiently.

As the main goal for funding the publication is to determine the self sufficiency, the OMFA team, (Director and the Manager) evaluated the overall impacts of funding for the above mentioned publication. The evaluation includes their income status, management and business plan.

Upon the completion of the fund the results are:

1. Telaya biweekly which was funded previously by OMFA is **100%** Self sufficient.
2. Baztab Daily in Mazar e Sharif upon the completion of the grant will be **80%** self sufficient,
3. Meena in Jalalabad, although we don't have full data, is almost self-sufficient according to its editor in charge.

4. Neda e Ghaza in Ghazni province can cover **50%** of its cost by itself
5. Sada e Watan in Konduz province can cover almost **40 to 50%** of its costs
6. Takhasoss magazine in Herat will cover around **40%** of its costs

Based on our experience, funding new initiatives and publications in the provinces will have a better chance of survival upon the completion of the funds. Although magazines and other media publications belong to specific groups and their managers have a lot of problems in accepting new methods of journalism and management for self-sufficiency.

In addition to supporting publications by the OMFA funds, the OMFA Expert Committee took an active part in the media support program of the FCCS, funded by the European Commission. The purpose of the program was to encourage initiative among the media to explore the ways to raise awareness among the people about the importance of participation in the Afghan parliamentary elections. The OMFA Expert Committee evaluated all the proposals. Based on their experience with previous OMFA grantees and assessments, the following publications were awarded with the grants of about 3,500 USD each:

- **Cheragh Daily:** printed in 7,000 copies
- **Seerat Weekly:** the first women's weekly published in Afghanistan
- **Pukhlayena weekly:** Pashto weekly printed in 5,000 copies in Kabul and eastern provinces
- **National Participation Association:** the association produced 24 radio programs for the local radios around the country

The monitoring and evaluation of the projects has been done by the OMFA team.

In addition to funding of publications, OMFA initiated other activities such as organizing a press conference in which Professor Barnett Rubin explained his findings of poppy cultivation in Afghanistan and its effects on Afghan national economy and the anti-narcotic policies of Afghan and US governments. The meeting was attended by journalists from different papers and TVs of Kabul.

The OMFA attended the FCCS international Book Fair and set up a special bookstand for the exhibition of OMFA-funded publications. Estimated 9,000 people visited the exhibition and most of them bought the publications.

After the arrest and then conviction of the Afghan writer and journalist, Ali Mohaqiq Nasab by the Supreme Court, OMFA Expert Committee issued a press release condemning the action. The press release was published by the OMFA grantees and other publications in Kabul.

OMFA plans to actively support initiatives supporting freedom of speech and thought in Afghanistan.

Future Plans:

The future plans depend mainly on further funding. If OMFA receives enough funding, then we plan to continue our media support program by providing funds for at least 15 publications. On the other hand, based on the recent incident in which a journalist was arrested and convicted by the court, OMFA will take an active role in media advocacy work by providing space and materials for civil society and media activists.

During our assessments in provinces, we identified the need for better training and education for the local journalists and publications. Therefore we hope to organize training workshops by the Afghan and international experts on the fields of modern journalism, marketing, business plans and distribution in all over Afghanistan.

OMFA also plans to support nationwide thematic and professional publications, helping them in the distribution efforts through the national network of FCCS regional offices (6 regional offices in Mazar, Jalalabad, Pul-e Khumri, Khost, Herat and Kandahar, and 3 sub-offices in Kapisa, Maimana and Ghazni).

Finally OMFA would like to publish a monthly digest of articles from OMFA-funded publications, in Dari/Pashto for dissemination in Kabul, and in English for e-mail/web dissemination.

Meeting with Ashraf Ghani, Chancellor of Kabul University

Tuesday 11 October, 9.30 am at the Chancellor's Office

Dr. Ashraf Ghani warmly welcomed all the initiatives OSI and the FCCS have in mind to develop student life, and the capacity of students in different fields.

The points discussed were:

1. **CARTI scholarships.** Dr. Ghani was aware of the program, as he had been going over OSI HESP documents that very morning. (This requires another, separate meeting). He doubted we would find sufficiently qualified or motivated candidates for this program, but he encouraged Omar Sharifi to do his best to find the right students anyway, emphasizing that he would not introduce anyone, as this is not his habit. He also pointed out that the students are much more motivated and capable than the faculty, although the latter should not be “left behind” or sidelined, as they already feel very insecure.
2. **Scholarship Information Centers.** I have suggested to OSI to fund such centers, to be set up in all Afghan Universities eventually. We would start with a project pilot in Kabul. Dr. Ghani informed us that no such project existed currently, and told Omar to be in touch with Baqer Massud, his assistant, to find the right place to set up such an information center. Baqer is closely in touch with the students' associations that could facilitate such a project. In fact some students had already got together to make the most of scholarships offered by German Universities.
3. **Cultural and Social events in the University.** Following up on the subject of students' associations, I told the Chancellor of the FCCS' plans to extend its small grants program to Kabul University, to allow students groups with a minimum of formal organization to compete in a call for proposals that we will restrict to Kabul University, with the objective to develop social and cultural activities among students. For example, sports events, film screenings, poetry and literature readings, concerts, workshops, lectures, debates, etc. Dr. Ghani insisted that such activities should also be organized in the students' dormitories, where boredom is driving students to negative politics, and insisted that he would “lean over backwards” to support such activities. He also said that the auditoriums are ready to accommodate such events, and will soon be linked by CCTV to allow up to 10,000 students to follow an event. Again, Baqer Massud would be the ideal point of contact.
4. Lorenzo Deleagues then told Dr. Ghani about our plans to involve students in **anti-corruption research**, précising that the research will focus on donor policies to avoid corruption. Dr. Ghani once again warmly welcomed such an initiative, requesting Lorenzo to include students from the faculty of journalism (besides those from the faculties of social sciences, law and economy). He even suggested to focus on corruption in the University. He also said that he would personally protect students that would come into trouble with government authorities while doing such research.
5. Finally, I explained that OSI was looking into the possibility to set up **law clinics** in the Afghan Universities, starting with Kabul University, as part of a general strategy to reform the Afghan judicial system by bringing “new blood” into the system by filling the gap of the legal defense. Dr. Ghani replied that he wanted all the students to become involved in social work, confronting the poverty of the country, and hoped to include this kind of practical work and experience, and social service, in the curriculum of the different faculties, in this case, in the faculty of Law and Political Science. Mohammed Farshid, the OSI program assistant who will be in charge of organizing this project, was introduced and he indicated that the project would

eventually be extended to other Universities in the country. The first step would be to have an OSI consultant come to set up the project.

Follow Up

1. Omar stayed in the University to find some good candidates for the CARTI scholarships. In the coming days he will identify some good candidates and help them fill out their application forms, just before the deadline put at 15 October.
2. Omar will also be in charge of developing the concept of scholarship information centers. After a “feasibility study” he will write a concept paper that will help, we hope, to get OSI on board.
3. The FCCS will start registering all the students’ associations on the campus, and in the meanwhile develop the call for proposals, which should be announced at the end of October, before Eid, through a gathering of the students and the campus radio. They will be able to submit proposals until the 3rd week of November; and the FCCS will select 3 winning proposals among them, and announce it before the winter break. During the winter break some of the preparatory activities can take place, and after Nauroz (March 21, 2006) the activities can start, for a duration of three months.
4. Lorenzo and I will meet again with Dr. Ghani to get his own view on corruption issues, while developing a more concrete plan for students’ involvement in the research work, which could probably take place during the winter break.
5. On the law clinics, we will now try to get OSI actively involved, by sending a consultant to help Mohammed Farshid set up the project. We have already identified partner organizations (that can supervise the work of the students, and back-stop them when necessary).

Oral History Project of the Foundation for Culture and Civil Society

(unedited draft version by Omar Sharifi, research assistant)

The national Foundation for Culture and Civil Society was established in March 2003 as an independent social organization by a group of Afghan scholars. The Foundation has received initial support from the World Bank and is negotiating contracts with the European Commission and other potential partners. Its objectives are to become a focal point for all activities promoting modern Afghan culture and strengthening of civil society. Regarding this, The Foundation has inaugurated a Cultural Center in Kabul on 7 June 2003.

Moreover, the Foundation has planned research activities, as main part of that, a nationwide oral history project in Kabul and one of the rural setting areas to study the cultural diversity of the country. While awaiting the necessary fund and human resources, we started a pilot project in Kabul because it is at the heart of Afghanistan and has long been a rich in culture, in tradition, in trade and in politics. The city itself and most of the rural areas especially in recent decades have been home to turmoil, difficulties and war of the different factions existing in Afghanistan, because of these difficulties, the true roots of Kabul and main rural centers are slowly being lost, as the generations forgot their stories and lives of their ancestors. In Kabul city we therefore selected different kinds of areas, both old and new, inhabited by different ethnic and social groups

The main objectives are

- 1- To explore the old city of Kabul and take an oral history of the historical places and families that have been here for centuries,
- 2- To determine the specific characteristics of Kabul's neighborhood and rural setting areas, how they evolved in the last decades, especially population movements during the war.
- 3- The impacts of different political factions in social, political and economical aspects on the life of the people and their neighborhoods.
- 4- Human rights violations by local commanders and their affiliations.
- 5- Cultural heritage and its condition
- 6- To gather the people's views and ideas about the different regimes in the last decades.

Following are the names of areas which were studied:

- Old city of Kabul.
- Dasht-e-Barchi, new settlement area in the west of Kabul mainly inhabited by Hazaras.
- Chehelsutun, previously a village incorporated in to the city.

In the future we plan to cover other neighborhoods (such as Kharabad, the musicians' quarter in the old city, Deh Afghanan, the modern center, Karte Naw, mainly Pashtun populated area), and the results of the whole project may be published as a book.

I INTERVIEWS IN THE OLD CITY OF KABUL

The following text is a brief description of the historical sites and social situation of the old town of Kabul city. Kabul is located in the center of Afghanistan, in the southern margin of Hindu Kush Mountains. From a historical point of view, Kabul has been a historical and rich area since the time of Achaemenids of Persia about 2500 years ago. Kabul played an important role in the history of the region since the 18th century, when it became the capital of Afghanistan.

Places visited

The old town of Kabul- (Char Bagh, Asheqan wa Arefan, Kharabad, Chindawal, Bagh-e-Qazi, Bagh-e-Nawab, Shur bazaar, Barana road, Hinduguzar road and Darwaza-e-Lahori)

Shrines (Ziyarat) and monuments visited:

- Ziyarat-e- Mianji sahib in Bagh-e-Qazi,
- Ziyarat-e- Shah Tawous Pacha in Kharabad
- Ziyarat-e-Sar Lashkar in Bagh-e-Nawab
- Ziyarat-e-Mir Akram Khan in Khwaja Safa mountain
- Ziyarat-e-Asheqan wa Arefan in Asheqan wa Arefan area
- Shah-e-Du Shamshira mosque

The old town of Kabul is one of Afghanistan's ancient sites. The city is surrounded on all sides with mountains. The old town has been built on the southern bank of the Kabul river, it extended from Artin bridge eastward to the Bala Hissar (the fortress). The remains of the town walls that were built in the 5th century AD are still evident on the top of the Asmaii mountain. In the 1960s a master plan was made and some of the areas of the old town were rebuilt. But most parts of the old city were neglected. In the framework of my research project (to uncover the historical and social roots of Kabul, to explore the old city of Kabul and record the local oral history) I have interviewed some of the families who lived here for generations and who witnessed all the miseries and difficulties of civil war. Among them I've interviewed one of the elders of the old town who worked as the representative (wakil) of the neighbourhood's inhabitants for many years.

Translation of the interview:

Q-1: How long have you lived here? Could you please give me some information about the historical background of this area and about the people living in the old town?

Answer- I was born here 75 years ago, my fathers and ancestors have lived here for centuries, my father and grand father were the representatives of the neighborhood. I am Tajik, and the original people of Kabul are mostly Tajik, but there are also a few Pashtun and Hazara families living in old Kabul, but as I know the Pashtuns migrated here in the 17th century while the Hazaras moved to old Kabul in the beginning of the 20th century. There also used to be some Hindus and Sikhs living here, but all of them left the area during the civil war. Tajiks and Pashtuns are Sunni Muslim, but Hazaras are Shiites. Kabul (the old town) is the second capital of modern Afghanistan, Timor Shah Abdali (1773-1793 son of Ahmad Shah the great) moved the capital from Kandahar to Char-e-Bagh Kabul (where his mausoleum is located today) in 1774. In that time Kabul was the summer capital of Afghanistan, and Peshawar was the winter capital. From that time up to 1950s, the old city of Kabul extended from Artin bridge eastward to the Bala Hissar, but unfortunately most of the town has been destroyed in recent years.

Q-2: Could you please give me more detailed information regarding the historical places and in general about the structure of the old town of Kabul; and what changes has your area undergone in terms of appearance over the last few decades?

Answer: the old town of Kabul consists of the following places:

- 1- **Char Bagh** (once it was a beautiful garden with houses, now it is known as Timor Shahi because of the big mausoleum built for the King Timor Shah)

- 2- **Rika Khana, Khowab Gah, and Ali Mardan** garden (Ali Mardan garden was destroyed in 1960s by the Kabul municipality and the two other places were destroyed during the civil war).
- 3- **Kharabad**, next to the Bala Hissar (built in the late 18th century, it was the center for most of Afghanistan's famous musicians like Ustad Sarahang and Ustad Qasim, who were not only famous in Afghanistan, but in the Indian subcontinent too; unfortunately this historical area was completely destroyed and plundered during the civil war).
- 4- **Chindawal** is located in front of the Cinema Pamir, and it's the birth place of Sibghatullah Mojadeddi, the first president of the mujahidin government. (The area is mainly inhabited by Hazaras and Tajiks, Chindawal has been damaged greatly and burnt during the civil war, and some of its inhabitants were massacred in 1993)
- 5- **Bagh-e-Qazi** (once it was the most beautiful garden of Kabul. In the 1930s it was called Bagh-e-Zenana or women garden, but it was destroyed by the Kabul municipality during the 1960s, while the area has suffered more damage during the civil war)
- 6- **Bagh-e-Nawab** (this area is called after Nawab Zaman Khan s/o king Dost Mohammed Khan. The Cinema Behzad, the second cinema of Afghanistan, is located in this area, but both the area and the cinema were completely destroyed during the civil war).
- 7- **Hindu Guzar**: the inhabitants of this area were mainly Hindus and Sikhs; they migrated to Afghanistan in the 15th and 16th centuries. But the entire Hindu Guzar district was destroyed in 1993-94; all the temples and houses were plundered and burnt. Now you can find no Hindu or Sikh there, because some of them were killed during the war while others escaped to other areas of Kabul or to neighboring countries.
- 8- **Shur bazaar**: is one of the historical places of old town in front of the Maiwand square, but this area was burnt to the ground in 1993.

There are also some other places like **Mullah Ghulam street, Sangkash street, Sardar Jan Khan street, Guzar-e-Achakzai, and Charchatta, Barana street and Blacksmith street**, which once were part of the old town, but have now been partially destroyed either by Kabul municipality in the 1960s or during the civil war in the 1990s).

Q-3: what about the historical monuments and shrines?

Answer- there are many historical mosques and shrines in the old town such as:

1. **Khwaja safa** shrine and mosque, which is the most ancient historical place of old Kabul: as I know this was built about 500 years ago. The shrine is located in Asmaii mountain, and for centuries it was an entertainment place for thousands of Kabulis. Once the shrine was surrounded with a lot of trees and I reminded the days that there was a fountain with pure water. But now nothing is left from all those beautiful trees and the fountain. The shrine itself was damaged during the civil war and the Taliban regime.
2. **Pir Akram khan** shrine: it is a four hundred years old shrine, located in Bagh-e-qazi, but was heavily damaged during the civil war.
3. **Pahlawan monastery**: this is also a 400 years old monastery; it is located in Bagh-e-Qazi. The monastery was badly damaged during the civil war, but it was recently reconstructed by Mr. Raheen, the Minister of Information and Culture.
4. **Gulabi monastery**: it is also a very old monastery of Kabul, and located in Ali Mardan Street. Unfortunately nothing remains except broken walls.
5. **Asheqan and Arefan** shrine: one of the most ancient and famous historical shrines of Kabul. According to history it was built about 1000 years ago by Sultan Bahram Shah (1117- 1153). Two descendents of Hazrat-e-Abubakr are buried in this shrine. It has emerged relatively unscathed from the civil war.

6. **Shahe-e-Du Shamshira** mosque: it is one of the historical mosques of Kabul. The mosque is located on the northern bank of the Kabul river.
7. **Ghazian** (worriers) mosque: this historical mosque is located in the Bagh-e-Nawab area of the old town; it is the mosque where Afghans had started their revolution against the British invading army in 1842. The mosque was rebuilt in the 1980s, but this historical place was badly damaged during the civil war and plundered by Taliban criminals.
8. There are some other historical shrines and mosques in the old town like the shrine of **Mianji** in Bagh-e-Qazi, **Shah Tawus** in Kharabad, and **Sar Lashkar Dar** in front of the Behzad cinema which were either destroyed during the civil war or under the Taliban regime.

Q-4: what impacts have the different political factions had on your family and your life in this area? Have you ever fled from your residential area?

Answer- ohh... I do not know what to say, how our lives were destroyed, (tears in his eyes); the sight of the old town is a good proof of what happened here, to the people of Kabul.

In fact our miseries started when the communists took power. That was a time of horror and disaster. In that time they killed so many political and religious personalities of the old town; as I mentioned before the old town is the mother of Kabul, so it was a place where so many personalities, like poets, writers, politicians and intellectuals lived. But so many of these people were killed or disappeared, especially during the 23rd February 1979 uprising of Kabulis against the Russians and communists; a lot of Kabulis - the best of them - were killed or disappeared for ever. So the people started leaving Afghanistan. Most of them migrated to America or Europe while others departed to Pakistan and Iran. But still, a lot of Kabulis remained here until the fall of the communist regime. When the Mujahidin came to power, the real disaster began. Rival factions started fighting each other: Junbish forces were in the Bala Hissar, Hizb-e-Islami forces entrenched themselves in Asmaii Mountain, Hizb-e-Wahdat men were in Chindawal, they fought each other, fired thousands of rockets, in to the city, they burnt everything, they plundered our property, our houses, they destroyed shrines, monuments: in short, everything. In those dark days we were forced to leave our beloved homes, our property and everything we had, just to save our lives.

Every one fled. For one year there was not one person in the entire area except soldiers. I fled to Khairkhana (a place in the north of Kabul city), others to Pakistan or Iran. Now if you look around the old town, you may find just 80 to 100 families of Kabulis, others are mainly Hazaras and Panjshiris. In fact 65 to 70% of the old town was destroyed during this brutal war. After one year I returned to my home (tears in his eyes) and was shocked when I saw my home, my birth place and my beloved neighborhood. Nothing remained from those polite and civilized people, from all those beautiful gardens, shrines, mosques, old fashioned houses and from the old town, which once was the center of civilization in Afghanistan. I still remember the time when all people from different races and religions like Tajiks, Pushtuns, Hazaras, Hindus, Sikhs and even Jews lived here together: there was no hatred or discrimination. But now everything has changed. Love, brotherhood and respect are replaced with hatred and discrimination.

When the Taliban came to power, this was the beginning of another period of horror and terror. The Kabulis like all other Afghans suffered from severe restrictions and terror.

That time was our most difficult period of life, nothing was secure, and every one was in danger. Even I was, as a 75 years old man.

Let me tell you one of my stories.

In the time of President Najibullah I was the representative of this neighborhood. According to the people's desire, the government rebuilt the historical mosque of Ghazian (worriers). The Prime Minister F.H. Khaliqyar gave a golden model of the mosques of Mecca and Medina as a gift to the Ghazian mosque. During the civil war I kept the model, because I was the representative of people and it was

my responsibility. One day two Taliban came to my house and said that the local commander of the Taliban wanted to see me. When I went to them I saw a man with one eye and a black turban. He introduced himself as Mullah Nassim, head of the Taliban regional security forces.

He asked me: are you the representative of this neighborhood?

I said: yes

He said: what have you done with that golden model? Go and bring it to me

I said: It is national property and I can not give it to you without a receipt.

He said: you want a receipt from me?

Then he ordered his men to beat me. They tightened my hands with my turban and beat me for four long hours with lashes and sticks. I fell unconscious. In the middle of the night he came and asked me again, I said I will not give it to you without a receipt. He got angry and again ordered his men to beat me, after some time I again fell unconscious. I cannot remember what else happened, but in the morning he asked me again, and I refused once more. I was beaten so much that if they would continue to beat me I was certainly going to die, so he ordered his men to send me back to prison. After a couple of days he came to me and said, why are you so stubborn? You know that I can kill you. I replied: Mullah Sahib it is public property and it belongs to the mosque, the house of God. I am an old man, if I die it is not very important, but I don't want to be ashamed toward the people and God. At last after five days he gave me a receipt, and I gave that golden model to him. I do not know what happened, but that model disappeared.

As a result I am still sick and can not walk without a walking stick. The Taliban destroyed some of the holy shrines, I do not know why, maybe because of their religious thoughts or in the hope of finding treasures.

Q-5: do you want to leave this place?

Answer: this is a place where my fathers and ancestors lived and died. I want to live here; on the other hand we are very poor and neglected people and we do not have any possibility to go somewhere else. Neither government nor international organizations are paying attention to us. I want the government and international organizations to help us rebuild our war ravaged town. This is much better for us than leaving our birth place.

At the end I thanked him for his cooperation. With his eyes were full of tears, he said: my son we have experienced so many miseries and disasters, but I am very happy, that you've listened to our stories. I hope you explain our pains and miseries to every one.

II INTERVIEWS IN DASHT-E BARCHI, KABUL

The following text is description of my interviews with a group of people from Dasht-e- Barchi area in the west of Kabul. I went there four times to visit and talk with the people. Each time I talked with them about 2 to 3 hours. The persons whom I interviewed are:

- 1- Ali Hussein son of Ali Akbar- 55 years old, representative of people and government employee
- 2- Ustad Jaafar son of Mohd Hassan – 48 years old, government employee
- 3- Mohd Mossa son of Abdul Rahim – 65 years old, shopkeeper

Q-1: How long have you lived here? Could you please give me some information about the historical background of this area and about the people living in Dasht-e-Barchi?

Answer: actually our ancestors migrated from the Hazarajat to Kabul about one hundred years ago. It was the time when Amir Abdur Rahman Khan captured the Hazarajat and massacred a lot of Hazaras. Our grandfathers fled from the area for their lives. In fact we (our ancestors) are from Daizangi (present Yakawlang). But when the governmental forces defeated Hazara rebels and destroyed Yakawlang in the late 19th century, they left the Hazarajat and moved to Kabul. In the beginning they lived in Chindawal area (old town) which was the center of Shiite Moslems in the capital of Afghanistan. But when their population increased some of them moved to Dasht-e-Barchi in the west of Kabul, in the 1930s or 40s. Dasht-e-Barchi was a desert in the margins of western Kabul.

Ustad Jaafar:

You probably know that the Hazaras are among the poorest and most humiliated people of Afghanistan, so this was a perfect place, I mean far from the other people. Gradually a lot of Hazara families moved to Dasht-e-Barchi and neighboring areas. In addition, when the government gave the pastures and lands of Hazaras in the Hazarajat to Kuchi Pushtun tribes, thousands of Hazaras were forced to leave their homeland and move to Kabul. This gradually increased the population of Hazaras in Kabul, to the point that the majority of the population of western Kabul is now Hazara. (I guess about 75%).

To be more precise the majority of the population of West Kabul are Hazaras who are Shiites (12 Emamis), while some other ethnic groups like Tajiks and Pushtuns are also living in Dasht-e-barchi.

Q-2: could you pls tell me about other Hazara population and residential areas in Kabul.

Ali Hussein:

Answer: actually I don't know a lot about the exact number of Hazara population of Kabul, but I think there may be around 25% in Kabul city. Although you may find some Hazara families in different parts of Kabul, the main Hazara residential areas are:

1-*Dasht-e-barchi*

2-*Qilai Shahada* (70 to 80%)

3- *Afshar area*: (70%) where one of the most horrible massacres of civil war took place. Most of the Hazara population of the area was massacred in 1993, and the area itself heavily damaged, but it has undergone reconstruction in recent years.

4- *Chindawel*: (50%) this area was burnt during the civil war and all of the inhabitants forced to flee, but most of them returned in recent years.

Q-3: what changes has your area undergone in terms of appearance over the last few decades?

Answer: there are no significant changes regarding the geographical structure of Dasht-e-barchi over last few decades. Although the only major change, is that most parts of the area was destroyed during 1992-95. (Laugh) but fortunately it is rebuilt in recent years by the people not government. But regarding the changes, the former governments paid very little care to us, just few schools and one asphalted road, nothing else. No any other major change or improvement.

Q-4: how many of people who once lived here before the civil war, still remain in Dasht-e-barchi?

Mohd Mossa:

Answer: as you know, Dasht-e-barchi and almost the whole west of Kabul was surrounded by different factions of Mujahidin during the civil war. The entire area was heavily damaged and most of its

inhabitants were left their homes. Some of them migrated to Iran and Pakistan. Especially after the fall of the west of Kabul in 1995, and murder of Abdul Ali Mazari by Taliban, the majority of Hazaras left Kabul. But after one year especially when the Taliban captured Kabul they began to return to Kabul. Any way I think almost 60 to 70% of them have returned to their homes.

Q-5: Could you pls give me information about the social and political aspects of Hazaras life in recent decades, or to be more precise, about the impacts of different political factions on your family and location. And what drastic changes you've observed during last few decades regarding social and political aspects of life of Hazara people in your location.

Ustad Jaafar:

Answer: regarding your question, during the reign of king Zahir shah we had enjoyed security and peace. But we have suffered the most from poverty and discrimination. In his reign we were considered as untouchables, we were suffered in all aspects of life. For instance Hazaras like some other ethnic groups were not permitted to join some specific faculties, like faculty of law and politics. Hazaras were not allowed to the high ranking offices of army or governmental offices. I (Ustad Jaafar) was interested to study in the faculty of law and politics, but I was not accepted because I am a Hazara. And they did not want to see a Hazara politician.

How can we forget such humiliation and discrimination? Actually these discriminations and humiliations bore the seed of hatred and revenge in the hearts of Hazaras and I think these are the main causes of all atrocities and disasters of civil war. About the social aspect of life of Hazaras, especially Hazaras of Kabul which we are one of them, from that time even up to now, Islam played a major role in our lives. But as you know Hazaras are Shiite Muslims, while other Afghanistans are mainly Sunni Muslims, this has created a deep gap or difference between Hazaras and other Afghanistans. But Hazaras unlike other people of Afghanistan are not hardliner Muslims. I and most of Hazaras are permitting their daughters or sisters to educate. And there is no any restriction for women regarding education or working. But unfortunately bad economical situation and social problems are the main reason for our illiteracy. Any way after communist coup, things changed completely, because for the first time in the history, a Hazara became the Prime minister (Sultan Ali Kistmand one of the high ranking officials of people's Democratic Party of Afghanistan). The situation improved greatly. We've witnessed a significant increase among the Hazara intellectuals. The economical condition of our people especially in Kabul improved; a lot of Hazaras were permitted to work in higher ranking offices of the government, I also worked in the ministry of foreign affairs. Despite enmity against communists our situation was much better than before. The idea of the other people also changed toward Hazaras, they begin to consider and treat them as equals not as untouchables. A lot of marriages occurred between Hazaras and other ethnic groups especially with Tajiks. Even my brother's son married a Kabuli girl.

But every thing changed when Mujahidin took the power. In fact at the end of Dr. Najibullah's period there was a steady change and even decline in every aspects of life, gradually moderation was replaced with fundamentalism and respect to hatred and racism. Even the ideas of people had changed, it means that the ideas and thoughts of the people were Talibanized.

I think our miseries started when the Mujahidin entered Kabul, it was Thour of 1371(April 1992) when armed groups of Hizb-e-Wahdat, entered west of Kabul, and captured almost all Hazara residential areas of Kabul. They encouraged youth to join them for sake of Hazara Jat and Hazaras of Afghanistan. Some of the men especially young men joined them either because of poverty or nationalistic ideas. Then endless wars and disasters happened and in those bloody battles thousands of people died or injured. These wars created a deep hatred among different ethnic groups, because these gunmen committed horrible crimes against other peoples, almost all Tajiks and Pushtuns had left west of Kabul and migrated to other places. Simultaneously a very bloody war erupted between different Mujahidin factions like Itihad-e-Islami, Shorai-e-Nizar, and Hizb-e-Islami with Hizb-e-Wahdat. It was the most

disastrous and destructive war that ever happened in Kabul. Thousands of people from all ethnic groups killed or injured.

A lot of women raped, houses were destroyed and governmental and all public properties were plundered. Shorai-e-Nizar and its ally Itihad-e-Islami Sayaf (Abdul Rasul Sayaf one of the hardliner Mujahidin leaders) shelled Hazara residential areas every day, even in one day they fired more than 500 rockets to our areas. A lot of civilians were killed in those horrible days. Although Hizb-e-wadat's militias also fired a lot of rockets in to the city on innocent civilian but not as much as them. The most horrible crimes of Mujahidin militias were the massacre of Afshar, where hundreds of Hazara civilians were killed and a lot of women were raped.

Q-6: could you pls tell me more about the massacre of Afshar?

Answer: oh... yes. It was the end of 1371 or beginning of 1372 (1993) when the militias of Itihad-e-Islami and Jamiat-e-islami under commander Tofan and commander Anwar Dngar launched a major assault on Afshar district. After a fierce resistance by Hazaras, they had captured the area. When they entered to Afshar, although most of the people had escaped from Afshar, but those who remained were brutally massacred (especially men) they even killed children and white beards, many girls and women were raped by Sayaf's militias. All the properties of people were plundered, and then they burned and destroyed the houses. My brother in law a 50 years old man with his two sons and his daughter who lived in Afshar were killed by those barbarian militias. This was the worst massacre of civil war, hundreds of civilians were killed and hundreds were injured, for two years there were no one lived in Afshar. Because most of its inhabitants were either killed or escaped. Most of these crimes were committed by Sayaf's militias. In my own place or, Dasht-e-barchi a lot of people were killed by rockets and most of the houses were destroyed. But we should not forget that Hizb-e-Wadat's militias were also responsible for some horrible crimes and cruelties. They even killed Hazaras for their support to Akbari (another Hazara leader). They have also killed many civilians from other ethnic groups like Tajiks and Pushtuns. I remember a day when they captured a Pushtun young man may be 25 years old, they beat him to death, and after that they cut his head and thrown his body to Kabul river. And I also remember a day when they kidnapped a very pretty young girl from her house in Aladdin district, (tears in his eyes), they raped her for several times until she died, then they thrown her body in to a well, I witnessed all these horrible crimes, this is the main cause for my depression and psychological problems. Rape, murder, plunder were their daily tasks. How can we forgive and forget all these crimes. When the governmental forces captured west of Kabul in Hute of 1373 (March 1995) and Hizb-e-Wahdat's militias escaped, they killed more people, but not as much as previous times. This forced the remaining Hazaras to flee from their homes.

Q-7: how many people did leave their homes? What about you?

Ustad Jaafar and Ali Hussein:

Answer: in Dasht-e-barchi, more than 80% of the people escaped during 1992-95 war. we also forced to leave our home, because it was not secure. On the other hand most parts of the area had been destroyed, I moved to Taimani, where I lived for one year.

But at the end of this year (1995) people started to return to their homes, because they are very poor and have no choice but to return, and on the other hand Akbari's presence in the government were convinced them to return. And also some of them returned after the fall of Kabul to Taliban.

Q-8: how was the situation of Hazaras in your area under the Taliban?

Answer: fall of Kabul to Taliban was the beginning of another period of disasters and miseries for us. We've faced with the worst kind of humiliation and miseries in that dark period. As I mentioned already, we are Shiite Muslims and Taliban were hardliner Sunni Muslims, according to them all Shiites are infidels, you can imagine our suffering under Taliban. I think Hazaras has suffered the most

rather than other people of Afghanistan under Taliban. Humiliation, murder, aggression were the only way that the Taliban were used to treat us. Their behavior with us was much worse than Mujahidin. They had humiliated us, imprisoned us and tortured us because we are Shiites. Our main problem was Taliban's religious police, every day they were used to come to Hazara residential areas especially Dasht-e-barchi and Qilai Shahada, just to arrest some Hazaras and harass them. Every day they imprisoned two or three Hazara boys even elder people for beard or link to northern alliance or etc. once we went to Mullah Rabani one of Taliban top leaders to complain about Taliban's behavior with Hazaras. But he refused to meet us, his bodyguards told us to leave the compound, when I told them that we are all Muslims why you are treating us so harsh? They said that you are all infidels, and traitors, you are not Afghan, become Muslim or leave Afghanistan. Their humiliation and bad behavior increased day by day. But when they suffered a crushing defeat in Mazar-e-Sharif in 1997, they got wild. One day they rushed in to Dasht-e-barchi and captured a lot of people. They arrested me (Ali Hussein) too and sent me to Pul-e-Charkhi prison. We were 15 prisoners in a very small cell; it was so small that we had to sleep just side by side without any space between us. They gave just one piece of bread to each prisoner in 24 hours. Every night they took one or two prisoners for investigation and used to beat them to death. After one month three of us died because of hunger and beating. The others including me were just looked like skeletons. Among 15 prisoners there were four old men, others were all between 15 to 25 years. After 40 days the Taliban released me with other two old men. Because we were very sick and near to death. My relatives took me to hospital for sever malnutrition and depression. But about the others, as I know two prisoners who were just teenaged boys and my neighbors died in prison later. (Silence).

Ustad Jaafar:

When the northern alliance captured the city of Bamyan in early 1999, the Taliban arrested a lot of Hazara civilian in Kabul. I was among those doomed prisoners. They had arrested me in Dasht-e-barchi bazaar during shopping. They took me to Pul-e-Charkhi prison. They asked me for weapons, they accused me of having relation with northern alliance. After 28 days of continuous beating and torture, Mullah Malang the commander of prison told me that if I gave my daughter to him in marriage he will rescue me from jail. I refused, because death was much better than such humiliation. Then he came for the second time and threatened me if I refuse he will kill me, but I told him that even if you kill me I will not going to give my daughter to you. At last one of my relatives bribed the Taliban commander and paid him 50000Rs. Then I was released. In fact the situation got worse day by day during the Taliban, but as we are confident that God will not forgive those who committed crimes against God's creatures, Taliban were also perished.

Q-9: what are some of the most difficult time periods you have experienced?

Answer: although our entire life was full of miseries and tragedies, but the most difficult time period of all is from 1371 to 1381 (1992-2001). In these years we've lost a lot of friends and family members. I (Ali Hussein) have lost my two cousins, our houses were destroyed, our properties were looted, even we lost our hope for future, our society have changed, most of the ancient values were perished and disappeared under the shadow of war, and at last this war created so many sores and injuries in our society which need time to be cured.

Q-10: Do you want to leave or flee from your country?

Answer: to be honest, **No.** because we are almost old men, we love here despite all difficulties. This is our country, our pride. We lived here and we want to die here.

Q-11: what do you think about the present situation of Afghanistan and Hazaras?

Answer: although the situation is much better than before, but still it's a long way to a real peace, I think without very basic reforms it is very hard to achieve a lasting peace. We all believe that without the support of the international community, it is impossible to be hopeful for a bright future. At the end I thanked them all for their cooperation.

III INTERVIEWS IN CHEHELSUTUN, KABUL

The following text is a brief description of my interviews with a group of people of Chehelsutun district in the south of Kabul. I went there three times to visit and talk with the people. Each time I talked with them about 2 to 3 hours. The persons whom I interviewed are:

- 1- *Wakil Pacha Mir*: 53 years old, representative of the people and shopkeeper.
- 2- *Ustad Ishaq*: 48 years old, teacher in the technical institute of Kabul, and shopkeeper
- 3- *Baba Gul Mohammad*: 65 years old, one of the residences of Chehelsutun village.

Chehelsutun is considered as one of the historical districts of Kabul.

Its ancient name was Hindaky. Chehelsutun is located 8,5km in the south on Kabul city among 69 degree, 8 minute and 38 second of eastern longitude and 34 degree, 32 minute and 1 second of northern latitude. Thirty years ago, Chehelsutun was one of the most beautiful entertainment places of Kabul city. The entire area between Artin Bridge and Hindaky village (Chehelsutun) was covered with gardens and cultivated lands, but most of the gardens and fields have disappeared today.

In 1970 the population of Chehelsutun was given as 8473 men and 9884 women. Now the estimated population of Chehelsutun has tripled.

Places visited:

1- **Chehelsutun palace**: it was built by Emir Abdul Rahman Khan in 1886; the palace had forty columns (sutun) - Chehelsutun means forty columns, the area is named after the palace. During the reign of Amir Habibullah Khan, new rooms were built and added to the building. He had built another beautiful building beside the palace for his queen Shah Khanum (this building was completely destroyed during the civil war). The palace was damaged in 1929, but it was reconstructed by King Nadir Shah in the 1930s. In the early 20th century, Afghan kings and the royal family used to come to Chehelsutun in the summer. Later, during the reign of King Mohammad Zahir Shah it became an official guest house. Some famous statesmen like President Nasir of Egypt, President Eisenhower of the USA, and Chu En Lai, Prime Minister of China, stayed in Chehelsutun palace during their trip to Afghanistan. The palace and its garden was heavily damaged during the civil war, all its furniture and equipments was looted by commander Sarkateb's and commander Gran's militias (both are Hizb-e-Islami local commanders). The building itself was burnt and destroyed in 1372 (1993). Today only the walls of the once beautiful palace remain.

2- **Qalai-e-Noburja** (the nine tower fortress): the Noburja fortress was built about 150 years ago by Nawab Zaman Khan S/O Amir Dost Mohammad Khan. This fortress is considered as one of the most important historical buildings of the Chehelsutun area. This building had beautiful and thick walls with a marvelous garden. But today the fortress like other buildings of Chehelsutun, is damaged heavily. The bullet-ridden walls and burnt garden is a clear mark of the brutality of the civil war.

3-Minar-e-Chehelsutun (Chehelsutun minaret): the minaret was built on the top of Asmaii Mountain in the 19th century. It was heavily damaged during the civil war; the top of the minaret collapsed because of a rocket.

4- Koti Kafter Khana: a very beautiful house built in the 19th century during the Mohammadzai dynasty. The Red Army destroyed the walls of the building, and later the building itself was completely destroyed during the civil war.

5- Ziyarat-e-Shah Rasoul Wali: Shah Rasoul Wali shrine was built 400 years ago. The shrine was damaged during the civil war; but has recently been repaired by the residents of Chehelsutun.

6- Ziyarat-e-Mianji Sahib: according to the one of the residents of Chehelsutun village (Hindaky) it was built about 500 to 600 years ago. It is located in the old village of Chehelsutun. The shrine is considered as the most visited and respected shrine among the residents of Chehelsutun. Therefore the general condition of the building is satisfactory.

Description of the interviews:

Q-1: How long have you lived here? Could you please give me some information regarding the people living in Chehelsutun?

Answer: Wakil Pacha Mir: I was born in Hindaky “The ancient name of Chehelsutun” village 53 years ago; my father and ancestors were lived here for centuries. I am the representative of 3000 families of Chehelsutun. I am Tajik; the original people of Chehelsutun are Tajiks. They are the original people of Kabul too, they lived here for centuries, thirty years ago the majority of population of Chehelsutun was Tajiks (original residents of Chehelsutun). There were also some Pushtuns, mainly from Laghman lived in Chehelsutun in a place called Karte Arjal. Some of them are still living here today. According to my father, once communities of Hindus were lived here, may be that is why it is named Hindaky. On the other hand, ancient Kabulistan was once, part of Hindu Shahi empire, most of its citizens were Hindus. But many of them were converted to Islam during the Ghaznavids dynasty about one thousand years ago. Even up to king Abdul Rahman Khan’s reign there was a place called Qalai Hindu (Hindu fortress), when king Abdul Rahman Khan built Chehelsutun palace, he renamed the Qalai Hindu to Qalai Muslim. I do not know when the Hindus left Hindaky (Chehelsutun), but it might be 80 or 100 years ago. I do not remember Hindu community in Chehelsutun in my life.

Ustad Ishaq: my family migrated from Darul Aman 80 years ago; I was born in Chehelsutun 48 years ago. I am a teacher in Kabul technical institute.

Q-2: What changes have your area undergone in terms of appearance over the last few decades?

Answer: Wakil and Ustad- we have witnessed some changes in terms of appearance over last few decades. Forty years ago, most of the area from Chehelsutun palace to Artin Bridge were covered with gardens and cultivated lands. But gradually with the increase of the population, and shortage of water, most of the residents of Hindaky (Chehelsutun) migrated to western margins of Asmaii Mountain and built the present Chehelsutun. Most of the gardens and lands were disappeared because of the drought and shortage of water, (in early 1980s, the Mujahedin forces based in Chahar asiab had built a dam on the river and cut the water to the Chehelsutun, even today despite our endless efforts, and presidential decree, they do not open it).

Baba Gul Mohammad: I remember that once there was a railroad between Darul Aman and Chehelsutun. This railroad was built during Ghazi king Amanullah Khan in 1920s. It was the first

railroad ever built in our country. Unfortunately it was destroyed during king Nadir Shah. I think that you can still find its remnants in museum.

Q-3: Could you please give me information about the social and political and economical aspects of Chehelsutun's people in recent decades, or to be more precise, about the impacts of different political factions on your family and location. And what drastic changes you've observed during last few decades that have affected your people in your location

Answer: *Wakil and Ustad:*

Regarding your question, during His Majesty king Mohammad Zahir Shah's reign, we had enjoyed peace and security. Those years were the best years of our life. The government paid very little attention to us, but in comparison with the last three decades, it was a golden age for our people. From the economical point of view, our situation was much better than today. Traditionally, most of the residents of Chehelsutun are carpenters, farmers and masons. I think that they were among the best carpenters and masons of Afghanistan. Most of the palaces and buildings of Kabul were built by the people of Chehelsutun. Our people played major role in reconstruction plans of former governments. To be brief we enjoyed peace, security and economical prosperity.

The people of Chehelsutun are all Sunnite Muslims. Islam always played very important role in our lives. Most of our people were hardliner Muslims. When I was a child (40 years ago) there was no interest for education, because our parents thought that it will change our views toward Islam and mainly because of Mullahs propaganda against education. Most of our people were illiterate. (Even today the majority of our people are illiterate). I remember when I was a child; my father sent me to school, and every one in our family was very upset. They were afraid that I might become an infidel. Gradually things changed, the people realized the significance of education. But as I mentioned before, the former governments paid very little care to us, there was only one primary school for the people of the Hindaky (Chehelsutun), the Mihrabuddin primary school, this school was built by the people.

Did the people permit their daughters to go to school?

Wakil and Baba Gul Mohammad:

Not at all, although women's right were embodied in the Quran centuries before the united nation, but because of the traditions and culture which dominated our society, there were a lot of restrictions on women. But gradually they allowed them to go to school; especially in 1970s many families permitted their daughters to study and work. It was no longer considered zealousness. But there were no enough schools, this was the main problem.

Any way after communist coup, every thing was changed. Tensions escalated every where. Although in the beginning, the Mujahedin were weak and there were no a nation wide support for them, but when the Russians invaded Afghanistan, most of the people turned to support the Mujahedin, because every one was shocked, it was the first time after second Anglo- Afghan war that a foreign enemy invaded our beloved country. As you know, it is the worst insult for an Afghan to see foreign enemy invading their land. After the Red army invasion, our lives lost its normality. The communists began to imprison the people for their ideas. They've killed most of the white beards, intellectuals, teachers, doctors and lawyers. Especially after the uprising of the Kabulis in February of 1979, a lot of people were killed or disappeared for ever. There was a rapid change and decline in all aspects of live especially in education. When the Khalqis (the hardliner fraction of communist party) changed the curriculum of schools and universities, and their propaganda against Islam, diminished the interest of the people for education. On the other hand, hatred toward the communists and their Russian friends plus strong Mujahedin propaganda played a major role in diminishing the people's interests for education. Because of the lack of security, our economical situation deteriorated too, most of the young men fled to Pakistan and Iran, because they did not want to sacrifice themselves for Russians and communists. Most of the rich and wealthy families migrated to other countries. To be brief, the communist's era had

devastating effects on our lives, but not as much as Mujahedin period. At least in the communist era, we enjoyed some security. There were no plunder, destruction and atrocities like Mujahedin's period. When Mujahedin took over the control of Kabul in 1371 (1992), we were very happy, we thought this will be the end of all of our miseries. Unfortunately we soon realized that the power is shifted from bad to worse. Just one month after the fall of Kabul tensions escalated between Hizb-e-Islami (Chehelsutun and most of the southern parts of Kabul was controlled by Hizb-e-Islami) and Jamiat-e-Islami. It was the beginning of a very brutal, bloody and most destructive war in the history of Afghanistan.

How many houses of this area were destroyed during the civil war?

Wakil and Ustad: more that 70% of the Chehelsutun was destroyed in the civil war; most of the destruction took place during (1371-75)1992-96. Chehelsutun was the battleground of different Jihadi factions. Chehelsutun and surrounding areas were controlled by Hizb-e-Islami, Hizb-e-Wahdat entrenched itself in western Kabul, and Shorai Nezar militias were in television mountain. Shelling from Television Mountain by Shorai Nezar destroyed most parts of the area, while their Hizb-e-Islami brothers plundered all the property of the innocent civilians of Chehelsutun.

How many people of Chehelsutun had left their houses during the civil war? What about you?

Though a small number of the people had left Chehelsutun before the fall of Dr. Najibullah government, but it was in early 1990s when they began to leave their homes in large groups. The mass migration particularly increased when the Dostum forces attacked Chehelsutun in autumn 1371, and began to plunder and kill every one. More than 95% of the people of Chehelsutun were forced to leave and escape for their lives.

Ustad:

I left Chehelsutun with my family in Mizan 1371(September 1992) after the armed groups of Shorai-e-Nezar and Dostum attacked Hizb-e-Islami positions in Chehelsutun. When we escaped, all our property were left behind. It was completely plundered by barbarian Dostum militias. But we were lucky, because those who remained in their homes to protect their property were killed.

Wakil:

I lived here up to 1372 (1993). I witnessed most of the crimes of Mujahedin, as I mentioned I am the representative of the people of Chehelsutun, so I remained while most of the people fled.

I witnessed when the armed gangs of Hizb-e-Islami under Commander Hajji Sar Katib and Commander Gran Sagg Baz, looted the palace of Chehelsutun. Then the palace itself which once was shining like a diamond in Kabul city was burned and destroyed during the fighting between Hizb-e-Islami and Jamiat-e-Islami. I wished that they had the courage to destroy the palace when it was Russian army headquarter. But these cowards killed only innocent civilians. There was no regard for the lives of civilians. There were huge casualties among the civilian population. We buried 38 bodies in one day; in autumn of 1372. All of them were caught in cross fire and killed. We buried them in midnight inside the mosque compound, it was impossible to bury them during the day, because of the intense fighting, if you look to the grave yard near the mosque, there are a lot of graves of Chehelsutun people who were killed during the civil war by rockets or by Hizb-e-Islami militias.

In another incident, in Aqa Ali Shams (near Babur Shah garden) eight people killed when a rocket exploded next to them, this rocket was fired by Shorai-e-Nezar militias on Television Mountain. We buried them all in a mass grave.

In 18 Jadi 1372 (8 January 1994) when I decided to leave Chehelsutun, because of intense fighting between government and Shorai Hamahangi (Dostum, Gulbudin and Mazari alliance against the Jamiat-e-Islami), I saw the bodies of three men from our neighborhood who were killed by the Hizb-e-Islami militias under Commander Sar Katib Kandahari. They killed them for their money and throw their bodies to the street.

In 1372 (2 January 1994) one of our neighbors by the name of Anwar was killed by mortar fire from Khairabad hill (khairabad hill was controlled by Hizb-e-Islami) while he was talking with me from his balcony. We could not bury him for two days because of the intensity of fighting.

Ustad:

In 1371 (May 1992) Hizb-e-Islami militias under commander Karim Saqib had looted my shop at night, in the morning I went to the security post next to my shop, I told Commander Karim Saqib that his men had looted my Shop, but he beat me savagely until I was rescued by white beards.

To be brief these savage criminals committed so many horrible crimes. But most of the atrocities in Chehelsutun were committed by Hizb-e-Islami Commanders such as Hajji Sar Katib Kandahari, Commander Gran Sagg Baz, Commander Karim Saqib and Hajji Asadullah. Their crimes are so horrible that we can neither forget nor forgive it.

For two years, from Shorai Hamahangi coup, up to 1995 there were no one left in whole Chehelsutun, every one had fled for their lives. All the properties of the people were plundered by militias. The majority of the houses were destroyed. To be more precise, we have lost every thing, our homes, our property, our hopes and our lives.

How was your situation under the Taliban regime?

Wakil and Ustad:

When the Taliban or as we call them “the army of the darkness” captured Kabul in September 1996, most of the city was already in ruins. For the first time after three or four years we returned to our homes, but nothing was remained, every thing was in ruins. All the houses, gardens, shops etc, were in ruins. In the beginning we were optimistic toward the Taliban. Because we thought that they will bring peace, security and will put an end to the menace of warlordism in our country. But we soon realized that there are no much difference between Jihadis and Taliban. Except that the Jihadis are the small devils and the Taliban is the big Devil. During the Jihadis, we were suffered from war and poverty, but under the Taliban we faced with discrimination, mistreatment, contempt and intimidations. After the fall of Kabul to the Taliban, most of the people returned to their homes, but as I mentioned before, nothing remains from once beautiful Chehelsutun. Everything was in ruins. Now beside the poverty and war, the discrimination and intimidation were also added to our miseries. Years of brutal war, poverty, discrimination, contempt and intimidation, completely diminished our hope for future. Our property was already looted and our houses were in ruins, now with the Taliban regime our daughters were forbidden from education. as you know, most of the residents of Chehelsutun are Persian speaking Tajiks, while Taliban mainly came from Pushtuns tribal areas of the south, according to them, all non Pushtuns should leave Afghanistan because (according to them) they are not real Afghans. They were used to humiliate us in different way. We were tired of all the discrimination and humiliation. These discrimination, humiliation and restrictions forced the people to leave their homes and migrate to other countries, a vast majority of them made their way to Pakistan or Iran. Despite that, a lot of people resisted to stay in Kabul under the Taliban, because they had no choice, they had neither money nor property to sell and escape from the Taliban’s tyranny. We had no choice but to pray. We believe in God and his holy book Quran, it clearly mentioned in Quran that God will never ever forgive the tyrants and oppressors. Fortunately the cruel Taliban perished like other tyrants under the pressure of their crimes and cruelties.

What are some of the most difficult time periods you have experienced?

Answer: Ustad, Wakil and Baba Gul Mohammad

Although we had suffered the most in last ten years, but the worst and most difficult time period of our lives was from 1371-75 (1992-96). In these dark years we have lost a lot of our family members and friends. Our houses, properties, lives and our hopes were destroyed and vanished. Our society have

changed, most of the ancient values were disappeared for ever. These dark years (including Taliban period) created so many sores and injuries, in our society which only God can heal them up.

Do you want to leave Afghanistan?

Answer: No, to be honest, where can we go? Where can we find respect except in Afghanistan? May be we find peace and security in foreign countries, but I am sure we will never find true love and respect in foreign lands. May be our sons want to go abroad, but we are old people, we love here despite all the problems.

What do you think about the present situation of Afghanistan?

Answer: although the situation is much better than before, but still it's a long way to achieve a real peace. There are a lot of problems in our society; we do need the reforming of our justice and judicial systems and eradication of corruption. Other wise it is really hard to achieve an ever lasting peace. On the other hand our only hope is the presence of the international community, other wise with these warlords in power; it is really hard to be hopeful for future

Oral History Project

(paper written by Soraya Umewaka, Princeton University undergraduate)

The oral history project aims to capture the essence of Afghanistan's rich culture and captivating history through recording the people's experiences and thoughts. Bringing life to the past that can potentially be forgotten. Thoughtful methods should be adopted to carry out the interviews to ensure that the narrator shares his/her genuine thoughts, emotions and accurately describes past memories.

Interviewer

Interviewers should preferably be Afghan so that there would be an elimination of cultural and language barriers. Cultural sensitivity is necessary for the interviewees to feel at ease and openly share what can be considered personal information (see 1.1)

The interviewer should be Afghan also to prevent any misunderstanding that the interviewee will receive any form of financial/ international aid. Before the interviews are conducted, the interviewer should carefully explain the objectives of the oral history project to encourage participation and provide an incentive to share what can be very personal information (see 1.2).

Due to a long history of censorship on speech, expression and thought, it is essential that the interviewee does not feel that there are no risks involved in sharing information, especially when dealing with human rights violations (see 1.3)

Recommendation on how to exhibit cultural sensitivity (1.1)

To ease any form of tension, men should interview men and women should interview women and preferably be from the same ethnicity. In terms of age difference, a small difference in age can result in feeling more connected with the person, however, a large age gap would also work, as the interviewer can ask personal questions that can take form as seeking advice from someone who is older, wiser.

The interviewer should initially inquire the area's historic background (from where the interviewee is from), and ask very general/ broad questions; and gradually ask more personal questions, as the narrator will most likely feel uncomfortable if the interviewer asks personal questions from the start of the interview.

The interviewer should also exhibit at all times that you are greatly interested in learning about the narrator's historical background, experiences, personal identity,

position in society. The interviewer should approach the narrator by expressing that the area where he/ she comes from has great historical value, and that the stories that the narrator shares are unique and extremely valuable from a historical/ cultural and social aspect. This will make the narrator feel important and will in turn give the narrator confidence and pride to share his/ her stories. It has been generally found that people enjoy talking about himself/ herself.

Additionally, when the narrator shares hardships and difficult times, it is important to express empathy, sympathy (which is perhaps preferable to pity). According to Mr. Omar Sharifi, it is important to feel connected to the person and therefore expressing that he understands the atrocities the narrator experienced played a large role in encouraging the narrator to share his/ her disturbing memories.

It is also important for the interviewer to show that he/ she agrees with the narrator, also as a form of encouragement to reveal the narrator's inner thoughts.

To exhibit cultural sensitivity, perhaps the narrator can begin a question by for instance saying: "If you don't mind me asking..."however, it is important that

If the narrator expresses reluctance to share information, it may be recommended to give examples of possible answers.

If the narrator still expresses discomfort to share information, it would perhaps be best to say "I understand that you may feel uncomfortable, please do not answer if you do not feel like it."

Recommendation on what to share when explaining the oral history project's objectives (1.2)

The oral history project aims to preserve the rich cultural and historic heritage, and to have the information accessible to future generations so that the past does not become forgotten. It will also play a key role in giving the future generation of how their ancestors lived, their mentality, what hardships they went through, the root of their traditions, their rich culture and how it has evolved, forms of expression including language and various forms of art, legends, music, customs, rituals. The recordings of the oral history project will bestow future generations an opportunity to understand and capture their social, cultural, political and historic roots that will strengthen their national identity. The interviewers stories and thoughts will live in the Afghan people's memories. It can also help Afghans understand the strengths and weaknesses of social

infrastructure that can lead to improvement and a conscious effort to improve conditions for the underprivileged.

After the recordings of the oral history project is published and translated into different languages, the publication would extend its positive influence beyond the borders of the nation. It can educate the international community of the history and culture of Afghanistan so that external aid and international policies carried into Afghanistan can be adopted in ways that best suits the culture and civil society.

Recommendation on how to eliminate interviewer's fear and risk of sharing information (1.3)

The oral history project does not aim to prosecute or criticize those who committed atrocities, and violated human rights. Instead, the oral history project aims to inform, and make accessible the Afghan people's experiences and thoughts.

If you feel uncomfortable to share personal information, we will make sure that it will be anonymous.

It would be preferable to conduct the interviews as a narration, a form of story telling, rather than a question and short-answer session. This avoids questions that would lead the narrator into a particular response, rather than a more honest/ genuine one. It also avoids interrupting the narrator's train of thought. It is advised for the interviewer that if there are moments of silence, not to feel the urge to fill them in, as it is usually the case that the narrator has a lot to share, but may need time and encouragement to share what can be considered personal.

To avoid exerting unnecessary pressure on the narrator, the interviewer should not interrogate, but encourage the narrator to share their experiences in the form of storytelling. In order to achieve this, the interviewer should ask broad questions leaving room for the narrator to cover various topics. This will enable the narrator to highlight what he/she believes to be important. The interviewer may start by asking very broad questions such as learning the family background, how their lifestyle changed over time, etc. Once all of this basic information has been collected, the interviewer can go into more specific stories by just asking the narrator to tell what s/he knows, which will allow the narrator to speak uninterrupted.

NARRATIVE REPORT

Kabul Book Fair

Supported by NextPage Foundation/OSI and the FCCS

In summer 2005 the Foundation for Culture and Civil Society (FCCS) planned to organize an international book fair in Kabul. The project was sponsored by the NextPage Foundation/OSI.

The main goals of the project were:

- Building the capacity of non governmental Afghan printers and booksellers by providing exchange opportunities with professionals from neighboring countries
- Networking regional independent printers and publishers and distribution networks to provide more books in the fields of social sciences and culture to Afghan readership
- Encouraging real publishing activities by workshops between Afghan printers and booksellers and Iran publishing experts
- Stimulating Afghan readership in the fields of culture and social sciences, provide books which are difficult to find, and developing this market.

In the first step the project director visited Tehran and discussed the idea with the House of Books, an institution representing Iranian publishing houses. Based on the discussion it is agreed that the FCCS would implement this project with cooperation of the Iranian Cultural Center in Kabul. Besides, in order to ensure a proper balance (Afghanistan has two official languages, Dari/Farsi and Pashto) another representative of the FCCS traveled to Pakistan and discussed with Pakistan-based Pashto publishers, specially the Pakistan Pashto Academy and Danish Publishing house which is the main Afghan publisher in the field of Pashto books.

In the second phase, all Afghan publishers and booksellers based in Kabul were contacted and a planning committee was formed. Most of the famous Afghan publishing houses agreed to participate in the exhibition (Maiwand publication, Khawar publication, Resalat publication, Baihaqi...). In total around 20 Afghan publishers and major book-sellers attended the book fair.

Later an official agreement was signed with the Iranian Cultural Center, Pakistan Pashto Academy and Danish Publishing House. According to the agreement the Iranian Cultural Center agreed on facilitating the trip and transportation of the Iranian publishers and the books. They also promised to facilitate the trip of a group of Iranian experts in the fields of editing, lay- out and design, book binding and marketing of the books.

Meanwhile the FCCS contacted the Goethe Institute, AREU²³, Afghan Education Program of BBC and Academy of Sciences of Afghanistan. All of them are active in the field of publication (Goethe Institute in terms of magazines and children books and AREU on research books, BBC on educational books). They agreed to participate in the exhibition. As the Open Media Fund for Afghanistan is managed by the FCCS, a special stall was installed for its publications alongside those of the Goethe Institute, AREU and BBC.

As the book fair was planned to be within the FCCS compound, 25 stalls were installed and decorated for Afghan and Iranian publishers. On the other hand, FCCS rented many tables and bookshelves to provide extra display space.

As for the Pakistani publishers, they called two days before the inauguration and claimed that because of unexpected problems by the Pakistan provincial government they could not attend the book fair. In its policy towards Afghanistan, the Pakistani government considers exports of books as a sensitive matter requiring special authorizations, which the publishers did not obtain. So we give their stalls to Iranian and Afghan publishers.

For dissemination the FCCS published 2000 posters and printed 11 banners. About 100 posters and 100 brochures were sent to Iran through the Iranian Cultural Center for the Iranian publishers and 200 were distributed for Afghan publishers based in Kabul. The rest of the posters and banners were widely distributed around the city and major academic centers, universities, Academy of Sciences, schools, training courses, book shops and public areas. A large amount of TV and radio announcements were planned and executed

²³ Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, a foreign-led but Kabul-based research organization that publishes many research and briefing papers every year, since 2002.

successfully. All the major Afghan press (Tolo TV, Ariana TV, RTV, Radio Arman, Radio Kabul, Anis and Hewad Dailies, Cheragh Daily, Pukhlayena Weekly) broadcasted the book fair.

The book fair program was not only an exhibition/sale of books. The FCCS organized various activities linked with this field such as:

- a series of portraits of 21 famous Afghan writers, some pictures about the theme of reading were exposed in the courtyard and in the contemporary arts library
- a performance area in the FCCS courtyard where storytellers, singers, musicians, and poets presented their work
- a conference about the *New afghan literature scene* was organized
- A leather book-binder sat among the stalls and invited the public to make their own books covers.

We estimated that the provided books will be around 700 titles but because of strong interest and participation of Afghan book sellers, there were more than 1500 titles and 45.000 books. They covered all of the relevant issues in art, social sciences and culture. These include the socio cultural dimensions of educational and social empowerment and strengthening of publishing industry, contemporary art, history, cultural subjects, law, management, children's books, poetry, novels, media, scientific books and other information-rich publications.

The book fair was officially inaugurated on 24th of September. About 500 participants including the Minister of Information and Culture, the Director of the Iranian Cultural Center, Professors from Kabul University and other academic centers including Academy of Sciences and other cultural activists attended the ceremony.

Though the initial plan was to have the book fair for five days, due to public interest and the publishers' demands it was extended for two days, till 30 September.

From 800 to 1200 people visited the fair daily, and 15.000 books were sold. The visitors represented a wide range of society such as university students, intellectuals, representatives of cultural and research organizations, poets and writers.

During the book fair, the FCCS organized a seminar on Afghan modern literature. More than 120 people attended the seminar in which Afghan writers and poets presented their topics on the situation of Afghan modern literature in Persian, Pashto and Uzbek languages. The purpose of the seminar was to evaluate the modern Afghan literature and attract as many of Afghan academia and intellectuals to the book fair as possible.

On the third day of the exhibition a lively area with story tellers and poets was organized. 150 children from Aschiana, an organization for street children, attended the session. Two professional story tellers with 8 children presented their stories to the audience. Then all the children visited the exhibition, especially the children section which had 150 titles for children.

Both the seminar and the story-telling session were widely broadcasted by media. Several TV and radio interviews were given by the coordinator of the book fair. This media attention increased the number of visitors, whence the publishers' demands to extend the book fair (they were doing brisk business).

We also planned to organize a workshop between Afghan and Iranian publishers during the exhibition. But because of unexpected problems, the Iranian experts could not travel to Kabul. So we decided to hold the workshop early 2006.

We hope that the book fair will contribute to energizing the publishing sector in Afghanistan and provide exchange opportunities with professionals from neighboring countries, while at the same time indicating clearly that there is a market for these kinds of books in Afghanistan. We thus hope to defeat the impression that it is useless to develop this market in this poor and largely illiterate country,

List of the Afghan Publishers and books sellers

Kabul Book Fair

Afghan Publishers and book sellers:

1. Khawar Publishing house
2. Resalaat Publishing house
3. Baihaqi Publishing house
4. Fazel Publishing house
5. Urfan Publishing house
6. Tarawat Publishing house
7. Afghan Writers Association
8. Academy of Sciences
9. Noor Publishing house
10. Hairan bookstore
11. Faisal bookstore
12. Khairi bookstore
13. Amiri bookstore
14. Saljuqi bookstore
15. Naziri bookstore
16. Khorasan bookstore
17. Mosleh bookstore
18. Farid bookstore
19. AREU
20. BBC/ AEP
21. Goetha Institute
22. Samadzadeh bookstore

Iranian Publishing Houses

1. Alhuda Publishing house
2. Serosh Publishing house
3. Amir Kabir Publishing house
4. Agah Publishing house
5. books published by Iranian Cultural Center

Article written by Emmanuelle Ansaldi, Cultural Outreach Officer, and published in "Nokta" Art magazine, Pakistan

As Ramadan approaches, the Afghan independent Foundation for Culture and Civil Society (FCCS) has increased its activities, to make the most of the last days of the mild Kabul summer and distract the minds from the elections craze.

In the framework of the second theatre festival in Kabul (Aug-Sep 2005), the FCCS produced two Shakespeare plays "Love's Labour's Lost" and "Romeo and Juliet". Both plays were the result of an intensive summer of theatre workshops at the FCCS, for starting and confirmed Afghan actors and directors. The French Theatre du Soleil, led by Ariane Mnouchkine, brought 40 of its troupe to the Foundation's spacious compound for a 3-week long workshop, and later returned to supervise the production of Romeo and Juliet. Meanwhile, the Syrian-German director Corinne Jaber led some of Afghanistan's most famous actors and actresses - such as Marina Gulbahari, who starred in "Osama" - in a local remake of the comedy "Love's Labour's Lost".

The reappearance of the English bard in war-torn Kabul drew the attention of the international press to an issue that changes from the usual stories about terror, war and perilous political processes in Afghanistan: the renaissance of Afghan arts.

But Afghans also immensely enjoyed the theatre programs. Simple neighbourhood dwellers perched on the walls of Babur's Gardens, where a gala performance was held, could not heed the calls for prayer, spellbound as they were by the play.

As an example of the growing regional cooperation in arts, the "Theatre Aftab" theatre group performing "Romeo and Juliet" was invited with the support of the FCCS to the regional theatre festival in Dushanbe, Tajikistan, where they performed on Sept 19.

As a result of this success, the FCCS decided to program a theatre play every Thursday. This completes the weekly program of "Movie Mondays" (dedicated during the month of September to the beauty and the strength of the Iranian movies) and Saturday concerts.

This month there were concerts of Qawali, classical Afghan and folkloric music. As a special event, a workshop plus series of concerts will be organized by the FCCS from Sept 27 to Oct 02, led by the American-Dutch Jazz-Fusion band "American Voices" based in Thailand. This band will interact with Afghan pop and other musicians to perform songs of the "Afghan Elvis Presley" Ahmad Zaher plus a special fusion between jazz and Afghan traditional music.

On the Fine Arts front, two photo-exhibitions, meant as vivid reminders of our past and present, were inaugurated in the FCCS Cultural Center in downtown Kabul in September:

"New York - Kabul: one war, two cities" showed the effects of war and terror in both cities, through the perspective of two photographers: Joel Meyerowitz documented Ground Zero in New York, and the Afghan photographer Najibullah MUSAFAER the disastrous results of war in Kabul. The inauguration was held on Sept. 11.

"Hidden Afghanistan", inaugurated on Sept 20, is a documentary work by the famous Afghan photographer Zalmai, portraying the misfortunes of the users of opium and those who farm it in the northern province of Badakhshan.

But the biggest event in terms of audience in September has been the "Culture and Society Book Fair", with the participation of publishers and book-sellers from Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan (the Pashto publisher "Danish"). From Sept 24 to Oct. 01, 23 stalls set up in the FCCS' historical gardens have brought books focussing on the social sciences, literature and the arts to a book-starved population of Kabul students, professionals and other intellectuals.

In October, the FCCS will join the Afghan population in its reflexive mood, as they endure the fast of Ramadan. All music and other performing arts events have been cancelled, and only the Monday movie nights will continue. The FCCS staff will use this occasion to prepare for the fall season after Eid. in which one of the main events will be a workshop cum exhibition of miniaturists from the National College of Arts in Lahore, who will transfer their skills and innovative approach with Afghan miniaturists.

Article written for Public Information purposes by Robert Kluyver on the occasion of the inauguration of the Afghan Pavilion at the Venice Biennale, June 2005

Why Support Contemporary Arts in Afghanistan

General Concept

As part of the region which encompasses the Near & Middle East, Central Asia, the Caucasus and South Asia, Afghanistan is increasingly caught in a conflict which is often conceptualized as a cultural one. Afghan society is the victim of the increased polarization between contemporary Western and local (often religious) cultural values. It is therefore becoming more urgent than ever to equip this country with tools to develop cultural expressions that respond to the challenges of the modern age without alienating the society in which they develop.

Between the extremes of wholesale adoption of Western global culture, which is an option only open to the westernized elite, and a radical return to fundamental Islamic values, which is an option that has exhausted itself in the years of civil war, a 3rd way must be developed.

In fact the desire for an open society - a society with sufficient internal mobility which is open to the rest of the world - is already prevalent among large sections of the Afghan population. However these social changes have not been able to express themselves in the creation and/or consolidation of a socio-cultural middle ground.

In the West, meanwhile, there are increasing numbers of artists and cultural activists that understand they have a role to play in breaking this cultural conundrum, in defusing "cultural conflict". They come with a more humble attitude than mainstream global culture: they understand there are skills they can transfer to local artists and other cultural practitioners (in the wide sense: people and groups involved in issues ranging from media to management) but are also acutely aware of what they can learn from these different cultural practices, what can be brought back to the West to instill some new life and fresh ideas into what is an increasingly stale and immobile domain in the West: art as a force of social transformation.

The Situation in Afghanistan

Afghanistan finds itself in a particular position: the extremes are no options in this country any longer, after 23 years of civil conflict. The Western elites were scattered and have little sway over public opinion, while Islam as a political force has been thoroughly discredited by the experiences of mujahideen and Taliban rule.

Therefore, since the Taliban were ousted and a Western-style democratic regime change was initiated, the cultural expression of this new middle ground has been able to develop relatively unfettered by the West-Islam polarization. Due to the extreme low level of general contemporary culture development in the country (a starting point close to zero) Afghanistan has no lessons to teach to neighboring societies; but it can instill them with a bit of its current socio-cultural dynamics, while learning from the neighboring societies through exchange activities.

Due to the large numbers of foreigners working in Afghanistan on development issues, and the free reign they have to initiate new activities in a relatively empty context (the self-admitted low skill levels of most Afghans make them better disposed to learning from outsiders) Afghanistan has become an interesting laboratory for experimentation with new forms of East-West cultural exchange. For example, this year alone, half a dozen Western theatre troupes are engaged in exchange activities with the relatively few Afghan theatre professionals. Obviously, this is happening in a distinct post-colonial, non- "global cultural imperialist" manner. These experimentations are exciting and can serve as a model for other countries in the region,

when taking into account the considerable differences between the social, political and cultural contexts of, for example, Afghanistan, Iran, Turkey and Dubai.

Contemporary Art in Afghanistan

Afghan art reflects a new and emerging society. For centuries the main function of Afghan artists - with the notable exception of poets - was to produce court art, for the master who would usually command the reproduction of an existing work. But now the revolution which has happened in other parts of the world is also taking place in Afghanistan: the artist appropriates the tools of art and even invents new ones to express his individual self, his views and opinions.

Afghan art now freely borrows from other cultural traditions, from the West, India and the Arab world, amalgamating it in a mix which supposedly represents current Afghan society, between its past and its future, but also between East and West.

A notable fact is the participation of Afghan women in what used to be a purely male domain. Given that they are not expected to reproduce past art, they are often more innovative than the male artists.

Finally, as may be expected, it is especially the young artists (many of them in the Faculties of Fine Arts of Afghan Universities, others independent) who are ready to challenge the traditional, established art forms. These should be the focus of any further development efforts.

FCCS Background and Plans in Regional Cultural Exchange

The FCCS proposes to build on its successful past experiences with regional and East-West cultural cooperation, namely

- Exhibition of Afghan photographs by Ed Grazda, showing a more humane aspect of the wars and post-war situation in Afghanistan, in Delhi and Lahore, and soon in Dubai
- Inviting traditional music groups from Iran, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan to the FCCS' Nauroz music festival in Mazar-e Sharif
- Cooperation in the field of fine arts with Afghan artists living in the West, such as Lida Abdul (later present at the Biennale in Venice) Roya Ghiasy, gallery owner Saeed Ismail Noori, Zolaykha Sherzad, who all spent time with Afghan artists on projects supported by the FCCS. Other artists living abroad, from Austria, France, Kosovo etc. also worked with Afghan artists through FCCS intermediation.
- The Indian-American tabla player Suphala rehearsed with Afghan tabla players, leading to a concert in the FCCS. Similar musical exchange projects were organized with other Western musicians, such as George Glasl (zither), vocalists, a cello player etc.
- The world-reknown French theatre group "Théâtre du Soleil" spent 3 weeks in the FCCS compound doing a workshop for about 100 Afghan theatre artists; and a current project involves the French Theatre director Corinne Jaber, who is rehearsing a play by Shakespeare in the FCCS Cultural Center.
- We have supported Western movie and documentary makers by introducing them to Afghan actors and professionals (team members), and we have helped send Afghan musicians to performances abroad.
- Most importantly, the FCCS was instrumental in organizing the first-ever Afghan Pavilion in the Biennale of Venice. This was widely covered by the international press, thus contributing to making foreign audiences aware of the existence of an indigenous Afghan art "scene" which contradicts the simplistic vision of a region torn between regressive Islam and salvation by the West.

Plans for the second half of 2005 include:

- A follow-up to the Theatre du Soleil workshop: two of its foremost actors (one of them an Iranian woman) will help the Afghan theatre group "Aftab" which was created in the wake of the first workshop, set up the production of "Romeo and Juliet" in time for the Kabul Theatre Festival in late August 2005. (8 August - 5 September, USD 15,000 needed)
- Participation of 3 people (Timor Hakimyar, Leeza Ahmady and Robert Kluyver) in the Biennale of Istanbul (15 to 19 September, USD 3,000 "travel grant")

- Participation of 4 Afghan theatre professionals (Timor Hakimyar, Hussein Zadeh, Shahmard Bromand and Mariam Latifi) in the Dushanbe international theatre festival (organized by the Bactrian Cultural Center with financial support from OSI; no extra funding needed)
- A workshop by Pakistani master miniaturists from the National College of Arts in Lahore, for Afghan miniaturists, introducing new subject matters while retraining in ancient techniques, for two weeks; with an exhibition of works by the Pakistani miniaturists. (October or November 2004, travel, accommodation and fees = USD 4,000)
- Workshop and concert by the French (but actually Afghan-Iranian-Indian) ensemble “Badila” (November 2005; total budget USD 15,000)
- Workshop by the Russian Theatre group coming for the production of a movie to the Panjshir valley, which are invited to give a workshop for Afghan theatre artists at the end of September 2005 (yet to be confirmed; probable costs approximately USD 3,000)
- Workshop and concert by “American Jazz Bridges” an ensemble based in Bangkok which have been working for years on fusions between musical traditions in Central, South and South-East Asia and Jazz. No extra costs, paid for by the US Embassy in Kabul.

February 5, 2005

Rare Sound of a Woman's Drum Enlivens Hushed Kabul

By CARLOTTA GALL

ABUL, Afghanistan, Feb. 4 - Kabul's badly depleted music scene received a welcome injection of excitement last week with the arrival of Suphala, the New York-based tabla player and composer, who held a joint concert with some of the Afghan capital's most celebrated classical musicians.

One of the first foreign musicians to visit the war-battered city - and a rarity as a woman performer on the tabla, a pair of small hand drums traditionally played by men - Suphala packed a concert hall here. Reporters from Afghanistan's leading private television station, Tolo TV, followed her around town. Local companies and donors sponsored the concert last Thursday in a new hall at the private Foundation for Culture and Civil Society.

But it was the welcome Suphala received from Afghanistan's master musicians that set her visit apart. The musicians, who had survived years of war and repression only to be silenced completely under the Taliban, gathered to play for her, gave a lunch at the mostly destroyed musicians' quarter in the old city, and then, in an unusual break with tradition, joined her on stage.

Suphala, an Indian-American who was born and raised in Minneapolis, trained with India's leading tabla masters, the late Ustad Allarakha and his son, Ustad Zakir Hussain, in Mumbai, the former Bombay. This itself brought her ready acceptance among the proud Afghan musicians. Afghanistan's classical music traces back to India, the source of Kabul's first court musicians. The tabla is well known and loved here, since it is one of the main instruments in Afghan classical music.

"It's a rule, we always respect anyone who puts their hand on a tabla," said Khalid Amahang, one of five young tabla players who joined Suphala during the concert. But a woman as tabla player is unheard of in Afghanistan today. In fact, there are no known female instrumentalists left, after the deprivations of two decades of war, a fundamentalist Islamic government that banned women from television in the early 1990's, and then the Taliban, which banned women from public life altogether and prohibited the playing of music by both men and women. There are women who are professional Afghan singers, but they live abroad, and none have returned to perform in Afghanistan since the Taliban were ousted.

"I have not played with a woman before," Mr. Amahang said. "Our grandfathers do not even know of it." In fact, there were some female instrumentalists in the 1970's, but mostly players of the harmonium and the rebab, a classical lute.

Ahmad Shah Shahidahi, a tabla player from a leading musicians' family, said that it would be good if Afghan women could play. "It would create some brightness," he added.

Suphala certainly brought brightness, in her gold-embroidered Indian clothes and a full-length white rabbit fur coat, which she bought hastily after arriving in snowy Kabul in sandals. She brought her own mix of traditional and modern musical compositions. Her touch and rhythm are sure, and she held her own as she played with a group of five young Afghan players.

Two old Afghan masters of the tabla and the dilruba, a stringed instrument, played alone, and Suphala later joined another famous duo, Ustad Ghulam Hussein on the rebab, and Ustad Muhammad Asef

Mahmud on the tabla. Afterward, Suphala stooped to kiss the hem of Ustad Asef, as the tabla master is also known.

"She has a good future," said Ustad Asef, himself a celebrated player, who has returned after 14 years in exile in London to teach at Kabul University for a year. "It's good she's here, in terms of art, but also because she is an international, and because she's a woman," he said.

Carlotta Gall
The New York Times
Kabul, Afghanistan

THE NAUROZ NATIONAL FESTIVAL OF ARTS

GUL-E SORKH

MAZAR-I SHARIF

20 TO 22 MARCH 2005



Foundation for Culture and Civil Society



Introduction

This report is intended to inform and thank our donors, the Open Society Institute, the US Embassy, the Royal Norwegian Embassy, Swiss Development and Cooperation, the Provincial Reconstruction Team of the UK in Mazar, the Royal Netherlands Embassy, the Embassy of Italy, who provided the necessary funds for the implementation of the Festival.

This Festival was truly a unique occasion for all those who attended it. The audiences at our different locations reacted very enthusiastically to the offer of free entertainment, clapped, danced and generally had a very good time. It was amazing to see mostly young Afghans from all parts of the country enjoying themselves together. Not a single incident marred the celebrations, despite an amazing total of 80 events and performances in the 3 days of the festival.

The main difference with last year's festival was the regional cooperation: thanks to support by the Open Society Institute and the Netherlands Embassy, groups came from Azerbaijan, Iran, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan.

As the report of Mr. Hakimyar, the Director of the Foundation's Cultural Center and thus of the festivities, points out, we learnt some lessons:

- We had a much stronger participation of women, and discovered that we should cordon off areas for them when a concert is taking place, organize more events, specifically for them especially during morning hours, as many women from the Mazar region receive guests and are thus bound to stay at home during lunch and dinner periods.

Recommendations for next year are:

- Explore how the Festival can generate local revenue, for example by involving the merchant community to organize sales in relation with the Festival (like food and drink stalls near the concerts) and taxation of these sales by the local authorities; but especially involving more sponsors, including local ones.
- Organize more different type of events : exhibition, theatre, poems reading
- As a result, encourage local actors to help organize the Festival. More events can be organized on the sidelines by local partners.
- Make publicity for the event, including with international media.
- Continue to prepare with the municipal authorities, for better electricity provision and more police organization of traffic and crowd control around the concerts. The crowd control techniques of the police are dismal, and sometimes could be better dispensed with. However, maybe ISAF training and backstopping/supervision could be considered.
- Organize civil society events and stimulate strong participation in the Festival.
- Organize the International music festival in the year 2006 with the participation of 10 groups form foreign countries

Altogether, however, it was quite an amazing achievement and I would like to join Mr. Hakimyar in giving thanks to the Foundation's staff and the Organizing Committee in Mazar-i Sharif for having done such an excellent job

Following please find the report of Mr. Hakimyar

Short report of the Festival of Arts (Gul-e-Surkh) in Mazar-e-Sharif

Balkh Province in the Northern part of the country belongs to one of the historical regions of Afghanistan. Its area is about 12593 km² and it has an estimated population of one million. The population of Balkh is composed of different ethnic groups like Tajiks, Uzbeks, Hazaras, Pashtuns and Turkmens. Each year tens of thousands of people from all over Afghanistan travel to Mazar-e-Sharif (the Provincial Capital of Balkh Province) to attend the “Gul-e-Surkh” or Nauroz festival.

We identified a group of people to form a committee for the preparation of the Nauroz festival. Then we established a committee with five members who were selected among the famous artists and cultural personalities.

Later the provincial committee hired twelve people for organization of cultural events, while 11 of the Foundation's staff also cooperated actively in organizing the festival. This year more than one thousand colored posters were printed in Kabul and then distributed throughout the cities along the Kabul-Mazar highway and the city of Mazar-e-Sharif. The news of the festival was widely broadcasted through local radios and TVs.

The 2nd National Festival of Arts was inaugurated with a speech by Mr. Joyenda, Chairman of the Foundation, on the 20th of March 2005 at 2:30 pm in the Hall of the University of Balkh. This was followed by a speech given by Timor Hakimyar, the festival director.

The program timing was from 9.00 am to midnight. The total number of programs in all 5 mentioned locations reached 80.

In the festival 15 groups of national afghan musicians of different provinces of the country, and international artists from Azerbaijan, Iran, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan, and France (Marc Loopuyt, luthist specializing in classical Turkish and Arabic music) and The United States (Coleman Barks, the poet who made the Persian poet Mawlana Jalaluddin Rumi famous in the USA) participated in the festival. The festival included concerts and poetry readings with participation of Balkh province poets as well as Tajikistan counterparts; in these gatherings, Coleman Barks and Marc Loopuyt also participated, before the Afghan vice-president Ahmad Zia Massood and Ustad Atta, the governor of Balkh province.

Besides the above mentioned programs three afghani films (Rabia-e-Balkhi, Law et Wandering eyes) were shown to the audiences. In addition, Whitney Azoy gave an interesting lecture with slideshow on Buzkashi. In the festival, Mr. Ahmad Wali Masoud, the vice-president of Afghanistan, some cabinet members, the Governor of Balkh, and several other high ranking authorities and about 150 000 people participated.

One special program with several music groups and poetry readings was organized for the women of Mazar-e-Sharif in the Governor's auditorium.

The programs of the festival were:

- Music by musicians from different parts of Afghanistan on 5 different stages in the city of Mazar-e-Sharif.
- Concerts by Azerbaijani, Turkmen, Iranian, and Tajik artists in the Governor's auditorium and on public stages
- Poetry meeting with Tajik and Turkmen groups of women
- The showing of 3 Afghan movies

The festival was celebrated in 5 different places of the City such as:

- University of Balkh, a recently restored auditorium seating about 500 people
- Ghulam Sakhi Cinema, near the center of the city, with about 350 seats

- Bagh-e-Hozor: the Foundation's mobile stage was transported to this big park near the center
- Provincial Hall: a plush seating for about 250 people; on invitation only
- 2 outdoor locations, one in the Municipality and another in Bagh-e Huzoor, 1000 people each

It is worthwhile to mention that thousands of the citizens of Mazar-e-Sharif and other parts of Afghanistan and a lot of foreign guests including the Ambassador of France, the director of the Goethe Institute, the Cultural Attaché of the German Embassy and other foreign expatriates working in Mazar-e-Sharif and other parts of Afghanistan attended the concerts and films of the festival.

Results:

- Introduction of local musicians and artists to each other and the strengthening of their relations.
- Strengthening relations between the Foundation and artists.
- Strengthening relations and cultural exchange between international and local artists
- Improving the national awareness about the variety of musical forms in Afghanistan by achieving a good coverage on TV, local, national and international radios.
- Paving the ground for the participation of the women in social affairs
- Strengthening national unity by providing an occasion for all Afghans to celebrate together.
- Attracting the attention of the national and international community to the support of culture and civil society.
- Strong evidence of the ability of the Foundation in implementing big projects.
- one audio CD was given to each group (local and foreigners)
- Using 3 digital cameras, the entire festival program was recorded on (42) cassettes. Besides, audio recordings were made of each group, for archiving in the FCCS, while one CD was given to the group itself for further dissemination of their music.

Deficiencies and Problems:

- The Governor, Police Department, Electricity Department, Security Department and Department of the foreign affairs did not stand on their promises. Especially the security Department, who did not cooperate at all and we were forced to pay 1500 Afs for the police in order to protect our equipments and stage.

Despite all these problems the 2nd National Festival of Art in Mazar-e-Sharif is one of the most successful achievements of the Foundation for Culture and Civil Society. I want to thank every one of the office staff and the preparation committee for their cooperation.

Foundation for Culture and Civil Society

Press release

Celebration of Contemporary Afghan Arts Double Event on Saturday 11 June:

- Opening of the Afghan Pavilion in Venice
- Celebration of the FCCS' 2nd Anniversary

فرهنگ و جامعه مدنی



Foundation for Culture
and Civil Society

While, for the first time in the Biennale's history, Afghanistan has a pavilion where two Afghan-born artists will display their work (see separate press release) the Cultural Center of the Foundation for Culture and Civil Society (FCCS) will celebrate its 2nd anniversary.

The FCCS has organized a multi-media display of contemporary Afghan arts in Afghanistan, which it will display simultaneously in Venice and Kabul. It shows the work of 10 artists from different disciplines, men and women, mostly young, who have abandoned the culture of reproduction prevalent in Afghan arts to experiment with new media, subjects and techniques.

The 2nd anniversary of the FCCS in Kabul will be celebrated with a lavish program:

5.00 pm: introduction and speeches

5.40 pm: comedy performance by the RTA theatre group

6.00 pm: break, refreshments, and visit of the exhibition and the contemporary arts resource center - *including the multimedia show displayed in Venice*

6.45 pm: Ahmad Sham Qawali music group

8.00 pm: end of program

We're very proud to announce that the FCCS, in its two years of existence, has really been able to make a difference in the Afghan arts world. All of this has been made possible thanks to a very dynamic and professional staff and also thanks to the donor organizations who have actively participated in all projects. We'd like to thank all of them.

Hope to see you on Saturday,

FCCS

**Final Report about the Afghan Pavilion in the Venice Biennale
to the Canada Fund**

Project # AF/CF-32/2005
Duration: 01 June to 30 November 2005

Project Background

On the 6th of June, 2005, the Canada Fund, the Foundation for Culture and Civil Society, and Mr Saeed Ismael Noori, project director, signed an agreement whereby the Canada Fund provided USD 25,000 towards the project of setting up a Pavilion for Afghanistan at the Biennale of Venice.

The Venice Biennale is the most prestigious international art exhibition in the world. Occurring every two years since the late 19th Century, the 51st edition of the event held in 2005 was the first time that Afghanistan participated.

The Venice Biennale consists of the following venues for exhibition:

- 29 countries that always participate (the main Western and some non-Western countries such as Venezuela, Korea and Japan) have permanent pavilions in the area called the “Giardine”. Besides, the Italian Pavilion in the Giardine exhibits the work of artists from different countries: this year there were 42 artists there.
- Other countries that wish to have a major presence in the art exhibition rent spaces in different locations of Venice to establish their own pavilion. This year there were 26 countries with a pavilion outside the Giardine.
- While one curator organizes the theme for all the national pavilions (this year the theme was “The Experience of Art”) another curator²⁴ organizes an exhibition of artists from all around the world, according to another theme, in abandoned warehouses on a terrain called “The Arsenal”. This year the theme of the Arsenal was “Always a bit further”. The works of 49 artists were displayed in the Arsenale in 2005.
- Finally, there are unofficial art events and exhibitions organized around the Biennale, usually by local galleries and artist groups.

The Pavilions are generally funded by the government of the country wishing to be present in the Biennale. In this sense Afghanistan was an exception, as the government did not provide any funding to the project, but did provide its essential official support to Mr. Noori to set up a Pavilion in the name of Afghanistan. Some countries invest large amounts of money in their national Pavilion. The German Pavilion thus reportedly cost about 400,000 Euros.

The Biennale was inaugurated on 9 June, and lasted 5 months, until the 7th of November. The national Pavilions are required to stay open during the whole exhibition.

Mr. Noori is probably the most famous Afghan art curator in the world. He has been active in the field of contemporary art for more than 20 years. He has a gallery in Karlsruhe, Germany called “Kohinoor” but distinguishes himself by participating in many art fairs, such as Media Art in Koln, art fairs in Basel etc. Over the last decade he has progressively become involved in supporting Afghan artists, most of them working abroad, such as Lida Abdul, Roya Ghiasy, Manzur Kargar, Hakim Abdul, Hayati Hayatullah and Atifi Humayun. He brought together these artists in an innovative art project called MOMAK (Museum of Modern Art Kabul)

²⁴ This year both curators were Spanish women of the professional arts world: Rosa Martinez and Maria de Corral. The General Director of the Biennale was David Croff.

which is a virtual museum with a novel graphic interface, that one can visit at www.momak.org. He is now also increasingly involved in building the capacity of students in the Fine Art Faculty of Kabul University.

Mr. Noori started working on the project of establishing an Afghan Pavilion at the Biennale of Venice in 2001, as soon as the Taliban regime in Afghanistan fell. In 2004 he received the support of the FCCS in Kabul, which is the main Afghan organization working for arts development, to obtain a letter from the Minister of Information and Culture supporting his project to establish an Afghan Pavilion in Venice in 2005. As most national pavilions, he decided to exhibit the works of one Afghan artist, Lida Abdul. She is a video-artist born in Kabul but based in Los Angeles, who has already had several exhibitions in the USA and beyond, some with the support of Mr. Noori.



Image from Lida Abdul's "Bamiyan" Video



Image from Lida Abdul's "Repainting Kabul" video

The project they conceived was a multiple video projection, of works that the artist made in Afghanistan with guidance by the curator. She first came in May 2004 to participate in an exhibition by MOMAK in the FCCS Cultural Center in Kabul. She made several short films on the destruction and her personal vision of reconstruction in Kabul. In the process she worked with students from the Fine Arts Faculty in an exchange project organized by the FCCS and Mr. Noori, and funded mostly by the FCCS. The exhibition was inaugurated in June 2004 in the presence of, among others, the Canadian Ambassador Chris Alexander.

In the early spring of 2005 she came back with Mr. Noori to make a video in Bamiyan, with about 20 students from the Fine Arts Faculty in Kabul. The topic was the empty niches of the Buddhas and the reconstruction process. This project was funded by Mr. Noori and the artist herself, although support was given by the Banff Center for Arts for the editing of the art videos.

The work made in Bamiyan and two works made in 2004 in Kabul were shown in the Afghan Pavilion. But there was more: the Afghan Minister for Information and Culture had also given an official authorization letter to represent Afghanistan at the Biennale to Mrs. Olivetti, an Italian patron of the arts who became interested in Afghanistan, and who decided to exhibit kelims designed by Rahim Walizada, an Afghan who returned from New York to set up a new line of production in Afghan kelims called "Chakpalu". She rented a room adjacent to the rooms rented by Mr. Noori, to make it one Afghan pavilion, albeit with two curators. She paid for her own expenses, and for most of the inauguration expenses. Mrs. Olivetti actually hoped to sell some kelims (but not in the framework of the Biennale, where commercial activities are not allowed) as a fundraising effort for schools in Badakhshan (the province of origin of Rahim Walizada) but this does not seem to have materialized.

The Afghan Pavilion in Venice



The Fondazione Levi, hosting the Pavilions of Iran, Afghanistan, Ukraine and Turkey, on the Grand Canal

The Afghan Pavilion was located in one of the most prestigious buildings in Venice: the “Fondazione Levi” on the Grand Canal, near one of the two bridges that spans the Grand Canal, “the Bridge of Arts”, and thus close to where the streams of visitors walk. The Fondazione Levi supports arts and had rented its ground floor hall and an adjacent room for the Afghan Pavilion at a relatively decent price. On the water side there was a small pontoon, offering direct access to the Afghan Pavilion by boat for dignitaries and rich visitors. The 17th Century building was also home to the Pavilions of Iran, Turkey and Ukraine, thus attracting even more visitors. The Afghan Pavilion was however the most accessible to the public.

In the main space two projectors beamed two of the videos of Lida Abdul on giant screens opposite to each other. One of the videos was her recent work in Bamiyan, where art students were clashing stones together and in strange formal processions carrying reconstruction materials to the empty sites of destruction. The other one showed the artist patiently painting ruins in Kabul with white paint. In the adjacent room a 3rd video showed the process of uprooting a tree with inhabitants of Kabul. On the other side of the ground floor hall was the room with the display of Afghan kelims, curated by Mrs. Olivetti.

A team of people surrounded Mr. Noori to help him in the frantic days before the inauguration. Lida Abdul invested a lot of time, money and effort in the whole project. Ms. Simona Ciuccio, assistant to Mr. Noori, supported the administrative and organizational effort, while Sergio Quattrochi, who previously had been cultural attaché in the Italian Embassy of Kabul and Robert Kluyver, director of the FCCS, also assisted in the final effort to get everything ready on time. Finally, Mr. Noori’s brother Mirwais served as a troubleshooter and helped out financially.



in Rome) and Prince Mir Wais



of the Afghan Pavilion on 11 June 2005

From left to right: Mr. Noori, Mr. Nader Hatami A crowd of people during the inauguration of the Afghan Embassy

Many of the people invited to the inauguration came, including the Minister of Culture of Italy (Rocco Butiglione), the Prince Mir Wais, son of the king Zaher Shah and head of the National Committee for the Preservation of Afghan Cultural Heritage (and an all-round supporter of Afghan arts), the first secretary of the Afghan Embassy in Italy, Mrs. Ursula Blicke, head of the Ursula Blicke Foundation in Germany and some of the foreigners that had worked in Afghanistan. Other visitors included Mrs. Els van der Plas (Director of the Prince Claus Fund)

The artist, Lida Abdul, was present to talk about her work, as was the director of the FCCS, Robert Kluyver, who during the inauguration of the Pavilion gave a presentation with slideshow about the current trends in contemporary art in Afghanistan, showing the works of artists such as Najibullah Musaffer (photography and painting), Meena Faryad (young woman artist using mixed techniques), Khalid Hadi (re-mastered old photography), installations by the students of the Fine Arts Faculty, calligraphy by Ali Baba Aurang, drawings by Khalidzada, and fashion design by Zolaykha Sherzad.

Between 300 and 500 people attended the inauguration of the Pavilion, including many media. The presence in the Art Biennale of a country such as Afghanistan, more known for its terrorists and calamities than for its contemporary artists, naturally evoked a lot of interest among journalists. The event was reported on Deutsche Welle (broadcast internationally and also on Afghan TV), the BBC World Service (with an interview of the curator and the FCCS director), in Art Forum (German art magazine) and Art Asia Pacific, a prestigious American Art magazine, and by Russian, Turkish and French journalists.



Lida Abdul after receiving the prize from Taiwan



From l to r: Mr. Noori, Robert Kluuyver, Simona Ciuccio and Sergio Quattrochi preparing the slideshow of Afghan artists

On the 12th of June, a great encouragement was received by the whole team working on the Afghan pavilion when the Taiwanese Government's representative at the Biennale gave a 20,000 USD prize to the Afghan artists. The prize was shared in equal parts by the two artists, Lida Abdul and Rahim Walizada. This of course even increased the public and media interest in the Afghan Pavilion.

In the days following the inauguration, enormous crowds still came to the Afghan Pavilion, as to the other pavilions in Venice. At the end of June most of the team left, leaving guards in charge of the Afghan Pavilion until the end of the Biennale. On the 7th of November Mr. Noori was back in Venice to close the Pavilion. The videos were returned to the artist Lida Abdul and the rented video equipment was brought back to Germany.

All in all the first Afghan Pavilion in the Venice Biennale was a huge success, especially in terms of public relations for Afghanistan. The contributions by the Canada Fund, the commissioner-curator and the artist thus went a long way towards portraying Afghanistan as a country that can participate in the enrichment of global culture, rather than solely as a poor sister that is a "problem" for the international community.

Biographies of Afghan Artists

Photography

NAJIBULLAH MUSAFER

Born in 1963 in Kabul

Graduated from Kabul University Faculty of Fine Arts in Painting. Najibullah's career as a photographer began five years ago.

He uses his painting as a base for his photography.

Currently he works as a photographer for two Afghan magazines. He has had several exhibitions in Kabul, and joined a photography residency in India.

“Musaffer” (which means “traveler”) is one of the most prolific and imaginative Afghan artists today, mixing techniques such as painting and photography. He is continuously traveling through the country recording a changing society through his own artistic perspective.

Photography

KHALID HADI

Born in 1981 in Kandahar

Khalid grew up during the war between the Mujahidden and the Soviet Army. He learned to use the primitive box camera that produces a negative image on a photo paper. This print is then developed in the same camera producing a paper positive.

These portraits are of wounded fighters, orphans, and children maimed by land mines and bombs. They were taken when, only 12 years old, he was the photographer of an Islamic Charity organization to make ID cards for the war victims applying for help.

Later he went on to become one of the official photographers of the Taliban regime, often sent to the front line. He escaped in 2000 to the United States (New York). Now he supports a socio-cultural magazine in his home-town Kandahar

This small selection comes from a collection of approximately 5000 portraits; the prints were designed by Ed Grazda, an American photographer that has worked for many years in Afghanistan.

Installations

Students of Fine Arts University

This is the result of a workshop in Kabul University involving German and Afghan Art professors.

The students started by doing practical exercises in free painting as well as plastic art with material from Afghanistan. The aim of these preliminary exercises was to enable the students to create their own individual installations.

The works of the students were strongly influenced by the subject of war.

These works were the first artistic installations ever done in Afghanistan.

Cartoons

ABDUL KHALIQ ALIZADA

Born in 1975 in Ghazni

Received training in drawing and cartoons in Iran.

He's had an exhibition in Kabul and has worked on several public information campaigns, notably explaining the Bill of Human Rights

Currently he's the editor of Shakh Guy satirical monthly magazine.

Pastels and Graphisms

SHAKILA KABULI

Born in 1966 in Kabul, where she studied Fine Arts.

Teacher at the Fine Arts Faculty of Kabul and member of a collective of women artists producing contemporary art, which had several successful exhibitions in Afghanistan.

Collage

MINA FARYAD

Born in 1981 in Kabul

Daughter of Mr. Farooq Faryad, eminent Afghan painter and Dean of the Faculty of Fine Arts, where she's currently a student in the 3rd class in the Painting Department.

Her works were shown in several exhibitions in Kabul.

Paintings

ABDUL WASIE HAMDARD

Born in 1965 in Kandahar. After having served in the army during the Afghan civil war he joined the Faculty of Fine Arts in Kabul. Quickly successful, his paintings were shown in more than 20 exhibitions in Kabul, Pakistan, and Central Asia.

He received several rewards and prizes in appreciation of his work.

He is a follower of the expressionist movement.

Since the beginning of his career, he has painted more than 2000 works of art.

Calligraphy

ALI BABA AWRANG

Born in 1972 in Ghazni Province

Studied calligraphy in Shiraz with Ustad Hamid Dirin and Ustad Mushtaba Malezada.

He's now at the head of the writers association "Tarai" while contributing to the layout of the magazine of the Human Rights Commission.

Fashion

ZOLAYKHA SHERZAD

Born in Kabul, 1967. Studied architecture in Lausanne and worked in architects' bureaus in Osaka and New York, and taught architecture at Pratt (New York) before resettling in Afghanistan.

She created Zarif Designs to revive Afghanistan's cultural traditions while giving them new expressions. Zarif seeks out artisans who are masters of Afghan craft traditions and supports them in teaching a new generation.

She transforms "Chapans" which only men wear in Afghanistan, into chic women's jackets and skirts with intricate embroidery by Afghan women. The colors of the embroidery are carefully matched with the bright tones of the Chapans. The embroidery is all done by hand.

List of Movies for the Movie Club 2005 season

Inauguration

1. Sideways

Cycle of Alienation:

2. House of Fools
3. Lost in Translation
4. Things I never told you
5. Polyester

Spanish Movies:

6. Matador
7. Talk to Her
8. All About my Mother
9. Jamon-Jamon

America, Drugs and Violence

10. Amores Perros
11. Blow
12. Carlito's Way
13. Requiem for an American Dream

Photography

14. Blow
15. Dead Man
16. Solaris by Tarkovski
17. Irreversible

Eastern movies

18. Farewell to my Concubine
19. Warm water under a red bridge
20. Rashomon or other Kurosawa movie
21. Red Lantern

Programs of the Foundation for Culture and Civil Society June 2003 - August 2004

Saturday 7 June 2003 Inauguration

- Theatre: "Requital" directed by Qader Farrukh
- Exhibition of 42 contemporary Afghan artists, more than 200 works
- Demonstration of different Afghan musical traditions

Saturday 14 June Music: Ghazals

An evening of classical Afghan Music

Saturday 21 June Summer Solstice Programme

- Erada, an artistic movie recently produced and directed by Mr. Radmanish, was shown for the first time at Park Cinema
- 4 concerts of Afghan and French musicians ("Fete de la Musique") with the cooperation of the French Embassy

Saturday 28 June Poetry of Afghan Women

Women poets shed light on the condition of Afghan women today

Saturday 5 July Debate: The Loya Jirga

A round table on past and future Loya Jirgas with scholars, Loya Jirga delegates and those involved in the organization of the Emergency and the Constitutional Loya Jirgas. The debate was illustrated by a short documentary movie and a photo exhibition.

Thursday 10 July Debate: Land Rights in Afghanistan

Presentation of the findings of Liz Wiley, researcher working with the AREU

Saturday 12 July Music: Vanishing Afghan Musical Traditions

A concert by the last masters of musical instruments that are disappearing from the Afghan musical landscape was followed by a debate.

Saturday 19 July Debate: The Future of Afghan Cinema

This event was well attended by Afghan independent movie makers and Afghan Films staff. It resulted in a list of recommendations that could assist the development of Afghan cinema

Saturday 26 July Debate: The Presidential decree on the Constitutional Loya Jirga

A round table and debate on the recent presidential decree regarding the organization of the constitutional Loya Jirga. The debate was attended by scholars, representatives of civil society organizations and intellectuals. It led to a list of propositions of how to improve the Constitutional process that was agreed upon in a follow-up meeting, and then signed by about 100 prominent leaders of Afghan civil society. The recommendations were sent to the President, UNAMA and the Constitutional Commission

Saturday 2 August **Concert of Kharabad musicians**
A concert of Afghan classical music of the Kabuli school organized by John Baily, a musicologist.

Saturday 9 August **Cinema: Rozgaran**
Showing of the first movie produced in Afghanistan, "ROZGARAN" (1968)

Saturday 16 August **Exhibition: Musafir**
Inauguration of a photo exhibition by Najibullah Musafir.

Saturday 30 August **Concert: Nazari**
Concert of classical Afghan music by the artist Mohammad Naem Nazari, visiting from the USA.

Saturday 6 September **Hindus and Sikhs in Kabul**
Commemoration of the Hindu and Sikh culture of Kabul

- Debate with Hindu and Sikh Loya Jirga delegates and community leaders chaired by Dr. Andar from the Academy of Sciences
- A "living museum" exhibition of Hindu and Sikh culture in Kabul - past and present
- Religious music
- A demonstration of "chub-bazi", a dance/sport practiced by Hindus and Sikhs

Saturday 13 September No program, in commemoration of 9-11.

Saturday 20 September **Concert: Samey Rafi**
Classical music and ghazals by the artist "Samey Rafi" visiting from Germany

Sunday 21 September **Special Musical Program: Zither music**
Concert of Georg Glasl, a German Zitherist (in cooperation with the Goethe Institut)

Saturday 27 September **Concert: Qawali music**
A concert of "Qawali" (religiously inspired music) by Qassem Bakhsh

Monday 29 September **Inauguration of the French Cultural Center**
The French Cultural Center inaugurated its activities in Kabul in the Foundation for Culture and Civil Society with a photo-exhibition "L'Oeil Voyageur", by the official photographer of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Friday 3 October **Cello Concert**
Cello lunch concert by the Australian artist Charlotte Winslade

Saturday 4 October **Concert: Folk Music**
Concert of Logari musicians (folk music from Logar Province)

Saturday 11 October **Exhibition: Anzurgar**
Inauguration of an exhibition of oil paintings by Anzurgar

Saturday 18 October Pashto Poetry
Pashtun poetry festival with readings by Pashtun tribal and urban poets (accompanied by music)

Saturday 1 November Exhibition: Calligraphy
Inauguration of an exhibition of Afghan calligraphy by Ismail Siddiqi, Ali Baba Aurang, Fazlullah Arghandiwal, Naurozi, Mahboob Faeq and Rafiq-e Azaz.

Saturday 15 November Poetry: Masnawi singing
Masnawi singing (poetry of Mawlana Jalaluddin Rumi) by various artists

Saturday 22 November Satire
Afghan satire and joke-telling show (with the participation of 6 comedians)

Tuesday 26 November Debate: Land Rights in Afghanistan (part 2)
Joint conference with AREU about land crisis in Afghanistan. Mrs. Liz Alden Willy presented the findings of her research on the land crisis in Northern Afghanistan and the Hazarajat.

Saturday 06 December Concert: Ustad Biltoon and Salam Logari
Ustad Biltoon (Kabul) and Salam Logari (Logar) played from their extensive repertoire of classical and folkloric music; including a “Shir wa Shakar” musical duel sung in Pashto and Dari.

Saturday 13 December Movie: Baba
Showing of the first private movie production in Afghan history, “Baba” (1972). In this movie the Jirga conflict resolution mechanism takes a prominent place, and it was shown to mark the beginning of the Constitutional Loya Jirga

Saturday 20 December Poetry: National Contest and Shahnameh

- Distribution of the prizes for the three winners of the national poetry writing context organized by the Foundation.
- Shahnameh (the Book of Kings) reading and singing performed by the Iranian-French artist Guilda Shahwardi

Saturday 3 January 2004 Concert: Gul Zaman
Pashto concert in the Ministry of Information and Culture performed by the artist Gul Zaman

Saturday 10 January Theatre: Comedy Variety show
Comedy variety show by a group of artists working with Afghan TV.

Thursday 15 January Exhibition: Art-e Zan
The purpose of this exhibition of handicrafts made by Afghan women is to get maximum feedback from visitors, in order to improve designs and try out new products. This should lead to a production better adapted to both the domestic and the international market. Organized by Shireen Khan of Mercy Corps and the Afghan Women’s Business Center.

Saturday 17 January

Debate: Afghan opinions on human rights

The Afghan Human Rights Research Consortium (a group of 12 NGOs) presented the results of a survey on public opinion of human rights issues conducted in several Afghan provinces.

Wednesday 21 January

Debate: Should the General Elections be rescheduled?

Debate on the paper prepared by the AREU on the General Elections scheduled for June 2004.

Saturday 24 January

inauguration of Sadiq Theatre Company

Inauguration of Sadiq Theatre Company, famous private Theatre Company in Kabul.

Tuesday 10 February

Presentation of the book “Afghanistan: Nation-Building Unraveled”

Several of the authors of this book, from Tufts University, were in Kabul to present what may be the first scholarly analysis of the Afghan nation-building process. There was a lively debate with Afghan scholars.

Saturday 14 February

inauguration of Sabah Movie Company

Inauguration of the first women’s movie company in Afghanistan.

Thursday 4 March

Exhibition: Art-e-Zan (2)

Exhibition of handicrafts made by Afghan women. The exhibition is organized by Mercy Corps and Afghan Women’s Business Center.

Saturday 6 March

Inauguration of Asmaii private movie company

Friday- Sunday 19-21 March

Celebration of the National Festival of Arts, Nauroz

The Foundation has inaugurated the first national festival of arts during the Nauroz (New Year) festival. More than one hundred musicians from 14 provinces attended the ceremony. The Foundation organized 90 programs such as music concerts, theatre shows, painting and calligraphy exhibitions, poetry reading and screening movies during the festival days.

Saturday 3 - Thursday 15 April

Scriptwriting workshop

As the first part of the theatre elections campaign, the main playwrights from 6 cities in the country were invited to a workshop, in which they learnt and shared some techniques, and wrote a draft script for the mobile theatre campaign. Thursday 15 April there was a public showing of the first draft.

Saturday 17 April

Commemoration of Academician Abdurrahman Baluch

A day-long program of discussions, debates and presentations to commemorate the first anniversary of the death of the Academician A. Rahman Baluch, the famous Afghan Baluchi scholar.

Tuesday 4 May

Afghan Law students celebration

Programs of the Cultural Center (2005)

MUSIC & DANCE

- Tabla Playing concert by Sofala Indian American artist
- National Festival of Gule Sorkh in Mazar-e-Sharif with 76 different programs
- Classical Music concert by Saeed Jawad Zia, Ustad Asef, Ustad Amruddin, Ustad Hanif
- 2nd Anniversary of the Cultural Center with Ahmad Sham Qawali music band
- Hazara folkloric music group (Safdar Tawakali and others)
- Pashto ghazals (classical music by Khanawi Bowar)
- Dance performance of the Atan-e Melli by 7 different groups with Pashto folk music
- Classical music concert (ghazals and tecnowazi)
- Afghan Rock concert
- Concert by Kabuli folk musicians
- Concert by Abdul Hamid Kandahari
- Ghazal Music concert by Same Rafi
- Performing Concert by the students of the faculty of Fine Arts
- Classic Music Concert by Alim Shawqi
- Qawali Music Concert by Ahmad Sham
- Pashahi music Concert
- Classic Music Concert
- Pashto music Concert
- Concert by Professors from the Music School
- Concert by Mirza Watan (artist from Tajikistan) with local musicians
- Qawali Music Concert by Ahmad Sham

MONDAY MOVIE NIGHTS

- Sideways (USA)
- Gattaca (USA)
- Farewell to my Concubine (China)
- Amores Perros (Mexico)
- Dead Man (USA)
- Warm water under a red bridge (Japan)
- Matador (Spain)
- Polyester (USA)
- Secret Ballot (Iran)
- My Own Private Idaho (USA)
- Baran (Iran)
- Close Up (Iran)
- Salaam Cinema (Iran)

- Silence (Iran)
- Luna Papa (Tajikistan)
- Gabbeh (Iran)
- A Time for Drunken Horses (Iran)
- Cyclo (Vietnam)
- At the Height of summer (Vietnam)
- The Scent of Green Papaya (Vietnam)
- Nina (Brazil)
- Repentance (Georgia)
- Andrei Rublev part 1 (Russia)
- October (Russia)
- Solaris (Russia)
- Andrei Rublev part 2 (Russia)

EXHIBITIONS

- 2nd Anniversary of the Cultural Center, Exhibition of contemporary Afghan photography and graphic arts
- Cartoon exhibitions by Khaliq Alizada
- Exhibition of contemporary Afghan painting by Wasay Hamdard
- Art-e Zan women's handicrafts & designs fair
- Painting Exhibition by Mr. Saheb Nazar
- NEW YORK– KABUL exhibition "The effects of war on two cities"
- Photography exhibition by Zalmai Ahad for UNODC: "Hidden Afghanistan"

MOVIE CLUB FOR AFGHAN MOVIEMAKERS

- Lecture on the process of movie in the laboratory by Khwaja Ahmad Shah
- Analysis Hijrat Movie by Wahi Nazari
- Opening ceremony of Jurmana by Ghafar Zalam
- Opening ceremony of Asia Film
- Show of two experimental movies and debates on them
- Showing and debates on movie SHAK
- Lecture on Cinema by Professor John
- Opening ceremony of AFGHAN ZAMEEN film production Co. and its first film show "TALQEEN"

POETRY AND LITERATURE EVENTS:

- Poetry reading by Coleman Barks
- Short story and poetry readings by schoolgirls
- Satirical readings by a number of Afghan artists
- Modern Afghan Poetry readings (organized by Mr. Zaryab)
- Short story and poetry reading by schoolgirls
- Short story and poetry reading by schoolboys
- Poetry reading by the university students

THEATRE PERFORMANCES

- 2nd Anniversary of the Cultural Center, Comedy theatre by Television Artists,
- Comedy theatre by Television Artists
- Kandahar Theatre Performance in the framework of the 2nd Kabul Theatre Festival
- Mazar-e Sharif Theatre performance in the framework of the 2nd Kabul Theatre Festival
- Romeo and Juliet, Shakespeare performance by “Theatre Aftab” produced by the FCCS
- Loves’ Labors Lost, Shakespeare performance directed by Corinne Jaber, produced by the FCCS

Programme of the Cultural Center June & July 2005

- Wed, June 1, 2 pm **Short story and poetry readings** by schoolgirls
- Thu, June 2, 6 pm **Classical Music concert** by Saeed Jawad Zia, Ustad Asef, Ustad Amruddin, Ustad Hanif
- Mon, June 6, 7.30 pm Monday movie club: **Sideways**
- Thu, June 9, 5 pm **Inauguration of the Contemporary Art Resource Center**
- Sat, June 11, 5 pm **2nd Anniversary of the Cultural Center** with
- Ahmad Sham Qawali music band
 - Comedy theatre by Television Artists
 - Exhibition of contemporary Afghan photography and graphic arts
- Mon, June 13, 7.30 pm Monday movie club: **Gattaca**
- Wed, June 15, 3 pm **Satirical readings** by a number of Afghan artists
- Sat, June 18, 6 pm **Hazara folkloric music** group (Safdar Tawakali and others)
- Mon, June 20, 7.30 pm Monday movie club: **Farewell to my Concubine** (China)
- Sat, June 25, 6 pm **Pashto ghazals** (classical music by Khanawi Bowar)
- Mon, June 27, 7.30 pm Monday movie club: **Amores Perros** (Mexico)
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- Sat, July 2, 6 pm **Atan-e Melli** national dancing with Pashto folk music
- Mon, July 4, 7.30 pm Monday movie club: **Dead Man** (Jim Jarmusch)
- Wed, July 6, 2 pm **Short story and poetry readings** by schoolboys
- Sat, July 9, 6 pm **Classical music concert** (ghazals and tecnowazi)
- Mon, July 11, 7.30 pm Monday movie club: **Warm water under a red bridge** (Japan)
- Thu, July 14, 5 pm **Multimedia Exhibition on the destruction of the Buddhas**
- Sat, July 16, 6 pm **Afghan Rock** concert
- Mon, July 18, 7.30 pm Monday movie club: **Matador** (Almodovar, Spain)
- Wed, July 20, 4 pm **Modern Afghan Poetry** readings (organized by Mr. Zaryab)
- Sat, July 23, 6 pm **Concert** by Kabuli folk musicians
- Mon, July 25, 7.30 pm Monday movie club: **Polyester** (John Waters, USA)
- Thu, July 28, 5 pm Exhibition of **contemporary Afghan painting**
- Sat, July 30, 6 pm Concert by **Abdul Hamid Kandahari**

NB: this program is subject to change. For up to date information (and suggestions!) please consult our website (www.afghanfccs.org) or call Mr. Hakimyar, director of the Cultural Center, on 070 278 905

AND EVERY FRIDAY, FROM 10.00 TO 14.00 PM, A LAVISH BRUNCH IN THE GARDEN!

FCCS Culture Center Programs for the Month of August 2005

Date	Time	Event
Mon, Aug 1	7.30 pm	Movie Night My Own Private Idaho (Gus van Sant)
Wed, Aug 3	2.00 pm	Short story and poetry reading by schoolgirls
Sat, Aug 6	6.00 pm	Ghazal Music concert by Same Rafi
Mon, Aug 8	7.30 pm	Movie Night Secret Ballot (Babak Payami)
Wed, Aug 10	4.00 pm	Cinema Club lecture regarding digital audio use in movies
Sat, Aug 13	6.00 pm	Performing Concert by the students of the faculty of Fine Arts
Sun, Aug 14	6.30 pm	Fundraising event for Independent Women candidates (20\$ participation)
Mon, Aug 15	7.30 pm	Movie Night Baran (Majid Majidi)
Wed, Aug 17	2.00 pm	Cinema Club lecture at the faculty of Fine Arts
Thu, Aug 18 to Sat, Aug 20	9.00 am to 7.00 pm	Art-e Zan (Women Handicrafts: new designs) fair
Sat, Aug 20	6.00 pm	Classic Music Concert
Mon, Aug 22	7.30 pm	Movie Night Close Up (Abbas Kiarostami)
Wed, Aug 24	4.00 pm	Painting Exhibition by Mr. Saheb Nazar
Mon, Aug 29	7.30 pm	Movie Night Salaam Cinema (Moshen Makhalbaf)
<i>27 August to 01 September: Theatre Festival (various locations)</i>		
Sun, Aug 28	5.00 pm	Kandahar Theatre Performance
Tues, Aug 30	5.00 pm	Mazar-e Sharif Theatre performance
Wed, Aug 31	5.00 pm	Romeo and Juliet, Shakespeare performance by "Theatre Aftab"
Thu, Sep 01	5.00 pm	Loves' Labors Lost, Shakespeare performance directed by Corinne Jaber

Next programs include exhibitions: Zalmai/UNODC: Drug use and abuse in Afghanistan; Kabul, City of Dreams; Moving Walls; Bamiyan Buddhas: past, present and future; Contemporary Miniatures from Lahore; a Gala Theatre event in the Bagh-e Babur; and many concerts, etc.

Foundation News

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Saturday the 17th of September

Exhibition till the 15th of October

HIDDEN AFGHANISTAN

The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime present: The portraits of the life of refugees returning to Afghanistan.

Photographs by Zalmai

Exhibition till the 22nd of September – 10.00 am to 8.00 pm



On the occasion of the commemoration of the events on the 11th of September the FCCS and the American Embassy present


NEW YORK – KABUL "the war effects in two cities"

Photographs by J. Meyerowitz and N. MUSAFAER

Monday the 19th of September

Monday Movie Night – 7.30 pm

LUNA PAPA directed by Bakhtiar Khudojnazarov (2000)



In a small village, a 17-year-old girl who dreams of being an actress is seduced and impregnated one night by a mysterious stranger who claims to be a friend of Tom Cruise. The stranger disappears after their brief meeting.

When her father finds out what has happened, he is furious and they set out on a journey to the four corners of the country in search of the father of her child.

AUDIO

Russian with French subtitles

RUNNING TIME

107 min.

FCCS Cultural Center Program of November 2005

Date	Time	Event
Mon, Nov, 7	6.30 pm	Movie Night Cyclo (Tran Anh Hung)
Wed, Nov, 9	4.00 pm	Cinema club Yama Rahimi movies
Sat, Nov, 12	6.30 pm	Concert Classic Music
Mon, Nov, 14	6.30 pm	Movie Night At the Height of Summer (Tran Anh Hung)
Wed, Nov, 16	4.00 pm	Poetry reading
Sat, Nov, 19	6.30 pm	Concert Pasha hi music
Mon, Nov, 21	6.30 pm	Movie Night The Scent of Green Papaya (Tran Anh Hung)
Wed, Nov, 23	4.00 pm	Cinema Club Afghan film screening and analyzing
Sat, Nov, 26	6.30 pm	Concert Pashto music
Mon, Nov, 28	6.30 pm	Movie Night Nina (Heitor Dhalia)

Solo Performance by
Tehreema Mitha Dance Company

**Wednesday the 30th at 6.00 pm
at the FCCS**



Tehreema Mitha is the only Muslim Woman, who received her training in Pakistan, becoming a professional dancer/choreographer while in that country and now runs her own dance company in the U.S.A, producing her own music and continually premiering new work.

In the sub-continental tradition, a dancer is also choreographer and composer working with musicians to develop the melody appropriate to the mood of the piece, within the rhythm(s) or beat desired.

Tehreema Mitha prefers to use classical raag and taal even for contemporary numbers, exploring new dimensions, and sometimes successfully mixing these with other styles of music.

FCCS Cultural Center Program of December 2005

Date	Time	Event
Mon, Dec, 5	6.30 pm	Movie Night Repentance (Tenzig Abuladze)
Sat, Dec, 10	5.00 pm	Concert Trainers of the Professional Art School
Mon, Dec, 12	6.30 pm	Movie Night October (Serguei Eisenstein)
Wed, Dec, 14	4.00 pm	Cinema club Barmak Akram Productions
Sat, Dec, 17	5.00 pm	Concert Mirza Watan Mirof - Tajik artist
Mon, Dec, 19	6.30 pm	Movie Night Andrei Rublev (Andrei Tarkovski) 1st part
Wed, Dec, 21	3.00 pm	Exhibition
Mon, Dec, 19	6.30 pm	Movie Night Andrei Rublev (Andrei Tarkovski) 2nd part

CULTURAL ACTIVITIES IN 2006

March

19-21 March

1. *Event* : Nauroz Music Festival

April

Beginning of April

1. *Exhibition* : Kabul City of Dreams

End of April

2. *Exhibition* : The Destruction of the Bamiyan Buddhas

23rd to the 29th

3. *Concert* : Orchestra of Nations

May

1. *Exhibition* : The Destruction of the Bamiyan Buddhas

2nd half of May

2. *Video* : International Video Festival

June

1. *Workshop* : The miniatures
3. *Theater* : Theater play "letter from Tentland"

July

1. *Conference* : Cartoonists meeting
Canceled
2. *Exhibition* : Faculty of Fine Art students Contemporary exhibition
3. *Exhibition* : Amfi sculptures

August

1. *Theater* : Afghan National Theater Forum

September

1. *Exhibition* : Numeris Causa
2. *Concert* : Badila
3. *Event* : Book Fair

October

Beginning of October

1. *Exhibition and workshop* : Suada Kopic (FAMA)

End of October

2. *Event* : Cinema Festival with short film screening

November

3. *Cinema Festival*

December

1. *Exhibition* : Young artists from the Afghan provinces



FCCS' PUBLIC INFORMATION

Ideas for a new campaign

Within the framework of a new policy of external communication, the FCCS wishes to carry out an advertising display campaign.

Why ?

If after two years of existence, the assessment of the FCCS attendance figures is relatively good, it is necessary to realize a new tool of communication in order to:

- Improve the attendance of the Cultural Center in Kabul
- Be evidence of the dynamism that exists at the FCCS
- To be different and gain new visitors, but also keep the loyalty of existing visitors
- Make known the new services of the FCCS like the brunch and the rental of certain areas, and have people avail themselves of these services while paying, thus generating income.

This poster campaign will be thus carried out according to an axis of persuasion and an axis of seduction (to attract and arouse people's interest).

Where ?

The posters will be fixed in key locations where foreigners potentially interested in FCCS programs (i.e. not military bases!) congregate.

Target public

Expatriate community, young people with an active interest in getting to know Afghan culture.

Contents

Besides the texts below, the poster will have to include general information about the FCCS:

- postal address of the FCCS
- phone number
- a situational plan of where to locate the FCCS
- visual identity, the logo
- using pictures of the FCCS to illustrate each activity

Dimensions

A3 format (printable at the FCCS)

Text to use in the poster or on the website

Concerts and other Performances

For the past two years, the FCCS has organized more than 120 events in its Cultural Center. Most of these are concerts, but there have also been theatre productions, poetry and short-story readings, and special performances by Afghan or foreign artists. The focus is on the development of Afghan classical, local and contemporary art forms, and exchange between these art forms and other cultural influences from abroad.

Let yourself be transported by a pleasant atmosphere with traditional or classical music performed by Afghanistan's most famous musicians...

Every Saturday at 6.00 pm in the courtyard or the concert hall of the FCCS

Exhibitions and Fairs

Each month the FCCS organizes an art exhibition. Paintings, photographs, installations, calligraphy, media art... Priority is of course given to Afghan artists, but in rare cases the work of foreign artists on Afghanistan is also displayed. Usually the art is for sale, providing some income to the artists.

Occasionally, also the FCCS uses its exhibition space for handicrafts fairs, such as the successful « Art-e Zan » displays of current designs by Afghan craftswomen.

Come and see how the contemporary Afghan art scene is rapidly evolving, and enrich your personal collection of Afghan art!

Inaugurations usually take place on the **last Thursday of the month at 4.00 pm**

Movie nights

Every Monday, the FCCS screens movies (in language of production, with English subtitles) in the open air or in its concert hall.

The selection, from all parts of the world, targets movies that have an artistic or social content, and are rarely seen by the general public: for example cult movies from the 60s&70s, South-American, Iranian, Far-Eastern and Russian cinema...

Comfortably seated or lying on carpets, you will benefit from a moment of culture and relaxation. You can picnic with friends, and use our bar facilities.

Every Monday at 7.30 pm in the courtyard or the concert hall of the FCCS

Friday brunch

Every Friday morning, the FCCS puts its courtyard at your disposal for a relaxed and pleasurable moment.

For 9 \$ only, our menu includes a choice of bacon and eggs, French toasts, pancakes with maple syrup, sausages, cheese and mushroom omelets... as the main course, accompanied by toasts, butter and jam, beverages and unlimited side orders!

Enjoy a relaxed Friday in our garden with your friends or business associates

Every Friday morning from 10.30 am to 2.00 pm

Other Services

Since the FCCS is the main provider of cultural services in Afghanistan, we have expanded our facilities to include:

- **Cultural services:** Do you need some musicians, or an Afghan movie, or poets, for an event you plan to organize in your office or home? With or without a sound-system? Or even a stage? The FCCS, with the widest network of affiliated artists in the country, can easily arrange it for you, on short notice, according to your budget and desires.

- A **contemporary arts multimedia library** with books and magazines (English, Farsi and other languages), a videotheque, and internet connections, normally reserved for Afghan artists and researchers.

- A **cafeteria and leisure area**, with snacks and refreshments to international standards, chess, checkers and backgammon games, recent magazines, and of course the enjoyment of our wonderful garden.

- **Complete video-filming and editing facilities.** Whether you just need an expert cameraman to film an event, need a full camera-crew, or need assistance in editing your movie and putting it in DVD format, the FCCS can provide the services you need.

- **Rental** of our concert hall, stage and courtyard, or conference room, with full services (public address system, video recordings, food and drinks). These can be used either for a professional event (symposiums, meetings, press conferences, workshops) or a private event (cocktails, receptions, Christmas party).

- **Rental of office space:** the FCCS has built modern offices that can be rented out per room: furnished or non-furnished, with new sanitary facilities, a wireless internet connection, parking space, kitchen services and support staff (guards, cleaners and drivers). Ideal for visiting researchers, artists, consultants or organizations in need of temporary office space.

Report on Visit to Herat
By Robert Kluyver
11 to 13 May 2005

Theatre Inauguration

The inauguration went very well, with the participation of about 150 people, including senior members of the provincial government and from Kabul University, as well as civil society representatives such as Rafiq Shaher from the Professionals Shura. There was a notably strong presence of women and of students.



The piece was well received by all the audience, who thought it is a very good tool to explain the parliamentary elections to the people, including (and especially) in the districts. I interviewed several people afterwards asking them for their impressions and heard not one negative opinion.



The actors performed well, and without mistakes. Some improvements could be made on the voice of two actors, but generally they were well liked by the audience who clapped and laughed a lot.

There was a good presence of the media with several radios and TV Herat being there. The posters and stickers were distributed. The donors were thanked in the inaugural speech by Aziz Elias.

We noticed some changes in the script, especially of the 3rd part, which has been reduced to about 5 minutes or less. We asked Mr. Askarzada, the director, why - but got no clear answers.


The woman role is reduced, with only the “old woman” appearing, not “Fereshta”. Askarzada explained that this was due to local sensitivities, especially in the districts, and because anyhow he couldn’t find a good actress. But it must be noted that this is the **first time since many years that a woman plays on a stage in Herat**

We noticed that not much effort had been done on the scenography. The actors are obviously used to perform with minimal props and stage effects. It took them a long time to hang the backdrop for the last scene. We wondered whether the budget for costumes and accessories had been fully used.

The theatre group was going to start touring the following Saturday but we decided to postpone the tour while Mr. Askarzada is asked to work on the script (reintegrating some more parts) and on the decors. The tour is now scheduled to start on Monday 16 May.

Finding an Office Space for the FCCS

The Agha Khan Trust for Culture, who has embarked on a large scale restoration of historical buildings in the old city (see picture below right), offered us help in finding an office space. We saw several buildings in the Old City with the Project Director Arash Bostani. They even offered to sublet one of the buildings that they are restoring for about 200\$ but for the time being they have no such space. We will stay in touch because it would be very good for the FCCS to be located in a historic and renovated building with an inner courtyard. Also, when the AKTC has finished restoring the Hauz in Chahr Suq (the biggest dome in Afghanistan, see picture below left) we may use it for artistic events such as concerts.



For the time being an interesting option for the FCCS is to rent a room in the Theatre building. We need to discuss with the responsible for information and culture. It would be convenient as this recently restored building is in the middle of the city, is known to the public and has a hall that we can use for cultural and civil society events; it’s also a way of supporting Herat Theatre.

Recruiting an Office Manager and an Office Assistant

I interviewed 5 people for Regional Office Manager and 3 for the post of Office Assistant:

Position	Name	Remarks
Manager	Qassem Hashemi	Very strong candidate: a neutral intellectual who knows Herat civil society, artists and institutions very well. Motivated and makes a good impression. He's a little bit opinionated and maybe spends too much time talking.
Manager	Esmat Saeed (Fem)	Not very strong candidate; teacher with little other work experience except as trainer. No idea about civil society or artistic life in Herat, and seemingly conservative
Manager	Baseer Mardan	A good candidate but not strong enough. Very gentle, honest man with artistic inclinations, knows Herat, its people, artists and institutions well. But not much work experience or skills.
Manager	Aziza Khairandish 	Very strong candidate, in my opinion and that of other people in Herat the best one. Has extensive training, political and cultural experience; very cultured, energetic and determined. Knows everybody in Herat. Travels freely, also in districts and provinces. Husband works for ICRC. Is ready to leave a senior UNAMA electoral job to join FCCS for much less pay because she's interested to work for civil society and culture. Will run for Parliament and she asked if that would be compatible with FCCS job (I said yes)
Manager	Agha Mashuf	Also a strong candidate: strong intellectual, knows all about Herat, Afghan politics and artistic life in Herat. Trained journalists in Iran and civic educators for the Constitutional Loya Jirga. Has written books and articles. Refused a senior government job out of principle. No English, computers, and maybe a bit too powerful for FCCS job
Assistant	Ahmed Rafi Khairi	Introduced through a very trustworthy personal connection. Good English and computer sciences, various software. Taught IT students in Pakistan. No experience in accounting but basic understanding. Seems very honest, hardworking and eager to learn.
Assistant	Hossein Agha	No good candidate
Assistant	Ali Farhad Salehi	Overqualified IT expert who has managed IT installation programs for the UNDP. Very good English, high education, has traveled abroad and wants to move to Kabul where his family is. I offered him a job in the FCCS as IT manager and he agreed.

My preference would go to recruit Mrs. Aziza Khairandish as Office Manager, Mr. Ahmed Rafi Khairi as Office Assistant, and to recruit Ali Farhad Salehi as IT expert in the FCCS Kabul office.

END

THEATER
Monitoring Trip to Bamyan
August 23-28, 2005
Nellika Little


During my trip to Bamyan, I was able to see three theater shows. The following is a brief report of the shows....with many photos.

Show ONE


The first show I saw was held in front of the main Buddha on Wednesday, August 24th. Roughly 250 people were present, less than had attended the show held there during the last touring phase. An estimated 1/3 of these attendees were below voting age. No women were present. The theater troupe did a fantastic job as usual. The crowd was responsive and extremely pleased with the performance despite the strong dust storm that kicked up. The civic educator on the team ended the show with a quiz (4 participants) and finally a distribution of board games. The games were distributed according to the tombola ticket numbers pulled out of a box by a young boy. This lasted for about 5 minutes and then there was a flurry of people trying to get board games too. Children were particularly disappointed that they did not have a chance to receive a game.

A few media members were present at the show. Reuters was the only one I identified clearly. I was told that the show featured on BBC world news (TV). JEMBS, UNAMA and AKDN (to name a few vital or prominent organizations that should have been informed) had been unaware that the show was taking place. The civic educator on the troupe claimed that he had talked to someone in the JEMBS but it remains unclear who that was. I informed JEMBS and AKDN that the show was going to take place and put one of their staff in touch with the theater troupe. A national staff member of UNAMA was very keen to know why they had not been told and was interested in finding out more about the theater shows, who funded them and how long they would continue on. Lack of advertising was an issue that was evident in all of the shows. I discussed this with the troupe, explaining to them that the very least they need to do is to inform the JEMBS offices regularly; that *ideally*, they should inform *all* the prominent NGOs and organizations as they are often an effective means of advertising to the community.

We also discussed the board game distribution. The dissemination at the other two shows I saw was much better and was not based on the ticket numbers pulled out of hats.







Show TWO

This performance was held at a boy's school on August 25th. An estimated 400 students were present, ranging from very young to high school level. I would guess that roughly half were in high school, making them either voting age or almost voting age. Teachers and a few community members were also present. Again a fantastic performance. The students were thrilled with the show, despite the mid day sun beating down on them. The troupe improvised a good deal and were more dramatic in this presentation due to the highly responsive audience. The show was a bit too long, as was the quiz show. I advised the troupe that, depending on the nature of the audience, parts should be sped up or slowed down so as to ensure understanding of the play as well as to hold the attention of the audience. The board games were given to the "top" (best grades) students in the high school. I presume it was the principal who chose the students. All happened to be in 11th grade. There are both advantages and disadvantages to this method; on one hand this ensures that students who are capable of fully understanding the game can pass it on and explain to others, but on the other hand students who are likely to have already heard details regarding the elections are the ones receiving more information. No JEMBS or Press presence at this show.




Show THREE

The final show I witnessed was held at Band-i-Amir on a Friday. The audience for this show was overwhelmingly comprised of “picnickers” and visitors since the “town” of Band-i-Amir is not much of a town. The atmosphere for a theater show was perfect as everyone was in good spirits and enjoying the entertainment that the lakes provide. There were many women present, dressed up for the occasion and wandering around in large family groups. An estimated 300 people viewed the performance, half of whom were women, most watching from the shrine above. People did tend to come and go throughout the show. A core of roughly 100 people stayed throughout. The quiz was done entirely differently this time and in conjunction with the board game dissemination. A question was asked of the audience and who ever could answer correctly first received the board game. This was by far the smoothest method they used as it cut down on the time needed for the two activities (quiz and dissemination). The show was again a little too long. This is not the theater troupes fault but rather the attempt to squeeze too many messages into one play. The elections voting day assimilation or role play that has been added to the end of the show on JEMBS’ request is perhaps what turns the performance from a borderline appropriate length to too long. At this show it was particularly evident that the audience was unsure

of when the play had ended. When a set was changed they looked confused and wandered off thinking it was over, which made for a rather shaky ending. Associated Press was present at this event, I am unsure if whether or not other media organizations were present. They seemed very enthusiastic about the program.





Women watching the play

Additional notes/comments:

Upon her return on the 27th, I discussed with Alexandra, who is in charge of Civic Education for the JEMBS, the fact that the troupes had not informed them properly. She was concerned about this and felt that as it was such an important program it was vital for them to know what was taking place when. She said that she would inform the Waras office as they were headed there. The theater events offer JEMBS offices the opportunity to spread messages as well.

There was an all women’s show held at a girl’s school on the 23rd. The troupe civic educator estimated around 500 participants attended (claiming most were above voting age). I would guess that a smaller number attended (but probably not by too much) as there did seem to be a difference of estimates between us for the shows we both attended.

The attendance of women does seem to be dependent on location of the show. There are very few ways to guarantee a mixed crowd at all or even most shows. But as the Band-i-Amir show proved, family picnic areas are one type of venue that might allow for a more balanced audience. It would have been good to have seen the all female show while in Bamyán to get an idea of how many women (above voting age) attended and so forth.

Over all the troupe is doing really well and the communities are incredibly receptive to the shows. The troupe seems quite tired but are holding up well despite the continuous travel. The one major issue is outreach. This might be the case for all the troupes. The civic educator in each troupe needs to be reminded that they should go the extra length and inform as many people and organizations as possible prior to the show and that it is absolutely essential that JEMBS be informed as well.

The Asad theater troupe:



Elections Awareness Regional Theatre Campaign1- 2

Final Report

Summary

The Elections Awareness Regional Theatre Campaign 1- 2 was implemented by Sayara agency and the Foundation for Culture and Civil Society in more than 24 provinces of Afghanistan were covered by the seven theatre troupes. Overall, the drama was performed more than 450 times for a total audience of more than 300000 direct spectators, eager to hear information about the coming parliamentary elections. This does not include the indirect audience: the play was broadcasted by regional and local TV stations and local radio stations.

In the repartition of duties between Sayara and the Foundation for Culture and Civil Society, the FCCS was responsible for developing the script, organizing and supervising the rehearsals, monitoring the artistic integrity of the play, and especially filming the whole process, following each of the seven theatre groups in their regional travels, in order to make a documentary movie. Since the project went through a second phase, in fact two documentary movies were made.

1. Writing of the Play (End of March-April 23rd)

The first draft of the script was written by the Artistic Director of the program (Qader Farrukh). It was reviewed and significantly improved by Timor Hakimyar, Head of the FCCS culture unit, and Robert Kluyver, FCCS Executive Director. Mr. Hakimyar played the role of the producer, making sure the script responded to the programmatic necessities (length, number of actors and scenic props, and the feasibility of the play in different regions of Afghanistan) while Mr. Kluyver made sure the script incorporated in a balanced way the main electoral messages the JEMB and TAF wished to see in the play.

There is always a tension between the often technical messages that need to be incorporated on behalf of the donor agency and the artistic quality of such a play. It was the role of the FCCS to find a middle ground to this, which means finding an amusing and theatrical way to present some of the functions of the parliament, how to register for voting, how to become candidate etc.

The play was in three acts. The first act was in a rural setting. After a short presentation of farmers, the play starts with a drama: one of them steps on a mine, and due to the lack of hospital facilities, he dies before he can get the sufficient medical assistance. His mother cries her grief and deploras the bad condition they must live in.

The second act shows the villagers altogether, wondering about what the elections are about. In the discussions between them, and in the action, many of the main problems of Afghans come to light: the problems returning refugees face, the general insecurity, and especially the lack of information about the parliamentary elections. As an element of comedy, the town-crier confuses "Parliament" and "Pahlewan" (wrestler) and announces that the government is sending a wrestler to the community. As some villagers get ready to challenge the wrestler, a more scholarly youth explains that in fact elections are upcoming, and the difference between wrestling and elections is exploited as a dramatic (and comic) resource.

This was as backdrop for explaining what the parliament actually is, and what kind of candidates would be best prepared to help solving these common problems. This is brought to light when, after an attack by thieves, a female doctor arrives on the scene. She is best informed, and explains to the troupe what kind of candidate could best challenge the problems this community faces, insisting that these problems exist all over the country, and thus require a national response. In this act, most of the technical electoral messages are delivered: registering (including for returning refugees), the conditions to become a candidate for the provincial or the national councils, the electoral schedule, and the ballot-casting process, including the provisions and rights of both women and male voters and candidates.

Some of the villagers decide to become candidates (this leads to some comic scenes) and finally, the female doctor, in order to explain what the functions of parliament really will be, suggests to hold a mock parliamentary session.

In the third act, with a change of décor, the same actors are dressed differently and pretend, under the guidance of the female doctor and her husband, to be parliamentarians in action. The following issues are discussed: the problems of land ownership and land-grabbing by commanders; the problem of forced marriages; and the insecurity for children, who are kidnapped. (These are all very common problems in the country). At the end of the discussion of each problem, the parliament decides one way or another: either by voting, or by further investigation, or by referring the problem to the competent government agencies. Through these three problems, the main duties of the Wolesi Jirga are introduced: legislation, representing the population, approving the national budget, and checking the executive branch of government.

In the second round of the play, it was decided to change the play: the registration and candidate nomination process was taken out (as it was over) but more information was given about the voting process itself, and about the functions of the Parliament and the Provincial councils. Also, in some regions some of the controversial topics were removed (forced marriages, notably).

Altogether the play was perceived as very comical in some places, and dramatic in others. Thus we could grab the attention of the audiences.

The play was reviewed not only within the FCCS, but also by Sayara and The Asia Foundation, whose comments were mostly incorporated.

Once the play was decided on, the directors of the regional theatres were invited to a director's workshop. The previous year, on a similar project for the presidential elections, funded by TAF, we had invited the directors to a script-writing workshop. It thus made sense to follow up on this by a director's workshop. The reason for this is that we hoped to have a more unified way of performances among the different regional theatre groups, and we also wanted to improve the mise-en-scene, using décor elements, to make the theatre altogether more attractive to the audiences.

The workshop was held in the FCCS, and given by the program's artistic director, with considerable input by the FCCS Culture Unit Director. It lasted 12 days, and the regional directors stayed at the FCCS, thus providing a social occasion for them to become closer and improve their ties. It also allowed us to work until late at night. The presence of the theatre directors was also beneficial to Sayara, who worked out the roadmaps with them, for the implementation phase.

By April 23rd, the script was completed, translated in Dari and Pashto, and sent out to the various teams in the provinces.

Rehearsal Period

The rehearsals started simultaneously on April 23rd, for a duration of 2 weeks. During this period, the artistic director Qader Farrukh, along with a cameraman, travelled to Herat, Kandahar, Mazar, Khost, and Jalalabad, to help the theatre groups organize the mise-en-scène of the play. Most of this rehearsal process was filmed, and some of this material incorporated into the first documentary film. Meanwhile, in Kabul, the two theatre groups (Ustad Farrukh and Ustad Tajzai) also started the rehearsals, in the FCCS' Cultural Center.

It was however difficult to ensure a uniformity between the regional versions of the play, mainly because of the short time allocated to the rehearsals (two weeks). The artistic director had to visit and guide each group, which meant long travelling times, and that while the first group he visited (Jalalabad) hadn't even learnt their lines yet, the last one (Kandahar) had already rehearsed following their own style.

Before the second round of the theatre started, because of the differences brought to the text, and also because in some cases different actors were taken (the original actors in some cases were not available anymore), and finally, to improve the acting and mise-en-scene, there were again two weeks of rehearsal (from 10 to 24 July) for each theatre group.

Finally, during the first rehearsal period, pictures were taken of the actors of one theatre troupe (Ustad Tajzai) for the creation of Sayara's educative materials: a poster, stickers and a brochure with the main points of the play.

Monitoring the progress of the Theatre troupes

The first inauguration took place in Herat on May 12th. The Executive Director of the FCCS went to supervise the inauguration, while the Artistic Director and the cameraman (Noor) went to some of the other inaugurations.

Unfortunately, one day before the planned inauguration of the Jalalabad theatre campaign (13 May), Jalalabad city witnessed violent riots. The Theatre Group which was rehearsing in the premises of the Information and Culture Department lost part of its equipment as the building was looted and partially set on fire. The inauguration in Jalalabad had to be delayed, pending an improvement of the security situation.

The inauguration in Kabul took place in the Foundation for Culture and Civil Society on May 14th, featuring Tajzai Theatre

Balkh theatre's inauguration took place in Mazar-e Sharif on May 16th, while the last inauguration, in Kandahar, was on May 23rd.



Herat was the first team to complete its campaign by early June, after three weeks of performance in the only province of Herat. All the other teams performed until around June 15th. Jalalabad theatre, once it had bought new theatre equipment, and when the situation seemed to have calmed down, performed until the end of June. Mr Qader Farroukh, the FCCS reporter and the cameraman travelled extensively during these weeks in order to monitor the quality of the plays, suggest changes, and film the exciting travels of the theatre troupes through the provinces.

Only the two teams from Kabul and the team from Balkh theatre casted women actresses. There were two female roles in the play, which according to the plan were played by a single actress. However, the Balkh theatre group decided to split the budget for this actress to allow two actresses to play, as in the more liberal climate of Northern Afghanistan, it is not so difficult to cast actresses, even in remote areas. However in the other regions of Afghanistan no actress played. In fact it is impossible to even find a professional actress in Jalalabad, Khost, Kandahar or Herat. In Jalalabad, the female characters (the mother of a farmer and the lady doctor) were played by a male actor. Elsewhere, the grand-mother became a grand-father and Fereshta was replaced by a male character or her lines of text were divided among the other actors.

The script was written for a cast of 13 characters, but only seven actors were supposed to play them. This was meant as one of the innovations on the directing side, as in Afghanistan it is not common for

one actor to play several roles. However, some of the regional theatre groups had a hard time accepting this innovation. In some cases the minor characters' text was distributed among the other actors. In Mazar, as noted, one extra actor was recruited to play the second female part.

As to the performances, our monitor noticed that especially in the remote areas, the theatre attracted large crowds. As the images of the documentary show, people were captivated. The reaction of the public was often enthusiastic. People laughed a lot at the fun parts of the drama, but also very often, expressed their appreciation of a particular line or message by loudly clapping. Appreciation was also expressed after the show and in some occasions, the theatre troupes would be asked by enthusiastic spectators to come and perform in other localities.

Extension of EARTC2 project

On July 1st 2005 the FCCS signed an amendment to the original contract with the Asia Foundation, to revise the script, organize new rehearsals, and monitor the extension of the EARTC 2 project. The duration of the second round performances was from 25 July until September 15th 2005, with two weeks for rehearsals before the performances.

This allowed the coverage of the mobile theatre campaign to reach more than 75% of the provinces (26 in total). The coverage of provinces is as follows (information provided by Sayara):

- Kabul team 1 (Tajzai Theatre) : Kabul, Parwan, Kapisa, Panshjur and Bamyan;
- Kabul team 2 (Farrukh theatre) : Badakhshan, Takhar, Kunduz and Baghlan;
- Herat team : Herat;
- Balkh team : Faryab, Jawzjan, Sar-e Pul, Samangan and Balkh;
- Jalalabad team : Kunar, Laghman and Nangarhar;
- Khost team : Khost, Logar, Paktia and Paktika;
- Kandahar team : Kandahar, Helmand, Zabul and Nimroz.

Again, the monitoring team of the FCCS went out to ensure that the changes in the script had been effectively incorporated by the theatre groups, to monitor the reaction of the public and film the whole process, this time going to different provinces. Interviews were made with the audience and a wholly new documentary movie was made, this time with a different cameraman (as the cameraman who filmed the first round had another job).

The closing ceremony was held in the FCCS with the participation of all theatre groups, from Kabul and the provinces, and Afghan and foreign journalists. The FCCS organized the event and provided the accommodation for all groups coming from the provinces. We also showed to the audience the first documentary film, which at that time had already been edited by the FCCS.

The Filming and the Documentary Movie

Altogether about 50 hours of film were shot, all on digital professional cameras with mini DC cassettes. Our cameramen went to many provinces and recorded the performances in Badakhshan, Takhar, Kunduz, Balkh, Nangarhar, Herat, Kandahar, Khost, Kapisa, Parwan and Kabul. In all these provinces several of the theatre performances, in different locations, were shot.

This material was edited by our team at the FCCS into two documentary movies, both between 20 and 25 minutes. The footage was edited, a soundtrack was provided, subtitles and beginning and end titles were inserted, and reviewed several times by the FCCS Cultural Unit director and the Executive Director.

Concluding Remarks

As in 2004, the Elections Awareness Regional Theatre Campaign was a great success. Not only were electoral messages effectively delivered to the audience, sometimes in remote areas where no other civic education activities had taken place, but in addition, audiences all throughout the country for the first time could see theatre, thus contributing to the cultural development of Afghanistan. This is an important point for the FCCS. By mobilizing, training and guiding theatre directors and actors in novel direction and mise-en-scene techniques, the EARTC 2 also contributed to the artistic development of the theatre companies.

We'd like to thank Sayara for the wonderful organization of the theatre groups, the public education materials and the roadshows that accompanied the travelling theatre groups; and The Asia Foundation for supporting Afghan theatre in this way with USAID funds. We hope that other agencies will see the benefit of theatre for delivering messages in a novel, amusing but also impactful way to audiences throughout the country.

Participation of the FCCS in Kabul Theatre Summer
Short description of planned workshops / theatre production

Theatre du Soleil: Comprehensive Theatre Workshop

Dates: 16 June to 6 July
Director: Ariane Mnouchkine (Theatre du Soleil)
Participants: 40 French actors and technicians
and ca 50 Afghan theatre students and professionals
Location: Foundation for Culture and Civil Society, Kabul
Sponsors: Prince Claus Fund for all activities in Afghanistan
AFAA (France) for travel costs of the Theatre du Soleil
Theatre du Soleil: time (actors are not paid) & equipment

A 12 day workshop focusing on the use of masks in theatre, but including many of the novel acting and directing techniques developed by Mrs. Mnouchkine and her theatre company. The workshop, lasting 8 hours per day, is conducted in such a way to give all Afghan participants several chances to improve their acting techniques. Alongside this, the technicians of the Theatre du Soleil are teaching their Afghan counterparts how to efficiently solve problems of costumes, decors, lighting, sound and other stage props.

The FCCS has committed itself to producing a novel theatre piece using the new techniques learnt by Afghan actors and technicians, which will be ready by Sept 2005.

Corinne Jaber: Shakespeare in Kabul

Dates: 15 July to 5 September
Director: Corinne Jaber (German-French-Syrian-Canadian actress & director)
and Stephen Landrigan (playwright and production assistant)
Participants: 10 Afghan actors
Location: Foundation for Culture and Civil Society
Sponsors: British Council (Afghanistan)
Private donors in France and Kabul

Ms. Corinne Jaber, an international actress and theatre director based in France, has already come to Kabul twice to prepare the Afghan production of Shakespeare's "Love's labors lost", including castings and preparatory workshops. She will direct the Afghan actors (including 4 women) in a free adaptation of the play, using Peter Brook's technique of "Carpet Shows" which focus on storytelling in an environment with minimal barriers between the actors and the audience. The play will be performed in the Queen's Palace of Babur's Gardens, during the theatre festival and is supposed to tour afterwards.



Communique – For immediate release

Kabul, July 17, 2005

INVITATION

Press conference: Thursday, July 21, 10:00

at the Press Center of the Ministry of Information and Culture

Kabul Theatre Summer (16.06. – 02.10.2005)

2nd Afghan National Theatre Forum (27.08. – 01.09.2005)

Dramatic Arts Center in cooperation with Kabul University, Faculty of Fine Arts, Foundation for Culture and Civil Society and the Ministry of Information and Culture are organizing the **Kabul Theatre Summer 2005** and the **2nd Afghan National Theatre Forum** by the support of British Council, French Cultural Centre, Goethe-Institut (German Cultural Centre) and the U.S. Embassy. Both events are meant to stimulate and support the development of theatre in Afghanistan which after a gap of recent years, caused by the displacement of so many artists and intellectuals, strictly requires a reinvestigation.

During **Kabul Theatre Summer 2005** ten international theatre teams (from France, Germany, UK, USA and Estonia) will offer workshops and performances in various fields of theatre in order to train Afghan theatre makers and to strengthen intercultural exchange between Afghan and international artists.

Kabul Theatre Summer 2005: International Teams

Ariane Mnouchkine/ Theatre du Soleil (France): comprehensive theatre workshop **16.6.-6.7.2005**

Lars Jan / Mobile Performance Group (USA): physical character development **13.7.-23.7.2005**

Corinne Jaber (France): Shakespeare's *Loves Labors Lost* in Kabul **15.7.-5.9.2005**

Joerg Schuett & Karol Cybulla (Germany): technical workshop (light & sound) **18.7.-31.7.2005**

Merle Karuuso & team (Estonia): collaborative play development **27.7.-3.8.2005**

Bond Street Theatre (USA): August 2005

Dea Loher (Germany): playwriting **24.8.-7.9.2005**

Ralf Ralf (UK): *The summit* **19.9.-29.9.2005**

Hueges Fontaine (France): from oral tradition to dramatization **19.9.-2.10.2005**

Neusa Thomasi (France): artistic and technical workshop **19.9.-2.10.2005**

2nd Afghan National Theatre Forum (27.08. – 01.09.2005) is an extension of last year's gathering.

It consists of 30 performances from more than 15 teams (from Kabul, Herat, Jalalabad, Baghlan, Kunduz, Khost, Kandahar and Mazar-e-Sharif) in six venues (Kabul University, Faculty of Fine Arts,



Foundation for Culture and Civil Society, Kabul Theatre, Lycee Esteqlal, Auditorium of Radio Television Afghanistan, Auditorium of Educational University).

A jury will award the best performance, best director, best play, best actor/actress, best decor.

Opening Ceremony: Saturday, August 27, 9:00 Kabul University, Faculty of Fine Arts
Closing Ceremony: Thursday, September 1, 14:00 Lycee Esteqlal

Contact: Prof. Azim Hussain Zadah, Kabul University, Faculty of Fine Arts: 079-302212
Timor Shah Hakimyar, Foundation for Culture and Civil Society: 070-278905
Julia Afifi, Goethe-Institut: 079-303661
Mahmood Shah Salimi, Dramatic Arts Center: 070 – 184405
Gul Makai Shah Ghiasi, Kabul theatre: 070 - 274595

Welcome to the Kabul Theatre Summer 2005 and 2nd Afghan National Theatre Forum!(U 2)

During Kabul Theatre Summer 2005 several international theatre teams (from France, Germany, UK, USA, Estonia and Tajikistan) will offer workshops and performances in various fields of theatre in order to strengthen intercultural exchange between Afghan and international artists. The 2nd Afghan National Theatre Forum, an extension of last year's gathering, aims to continue the revival of theatre in Afghanistan.

We would like to extend our sincere thanks to British Council, Centre Culturel Français (French Cultural Centre), Goethe-Institut (German Cultural Centre), Kulturstiftung des Bundes (German Federal Foundation for the Arts), U.S. Embassy in Kabul and all of our many other supporters.

Enjoy the programme!

Kabul Theatre Summer 2005 and the **2nd Afghan National Theatre Forum** are meant to stimulate and support the development of this important art in Afghanistan. Such gatherings will undoubtedly begin to close the gap of recent years, caused by the displacement of so many artists and intellectuals. Afghanistan has a century-long tradition of involvement in the theatre arts that, now, after the recent difficult period, strictly requires a reinvestigation. Workshops and gatherings of this sort will surely pave the road to the restoration of this form in our country. I express my cordial thanks to the organizers and international supporters.

Dr. Sayed Makhdoom Raheen

Minister of Information and Culture
Islamic State of Afghanistan

(p.1)

(PHOTOS Workshops)

(p.2)

-----Kabul Theatre Summer 2005: International Teams & workshops

(p.3)

Ariane Mnouchkine /Theatre du Soleil
(France)

Lars Jan / Mobile Performance Group
(USA)

Corinne Jaber (France)

Joerg Schuett & Karol Cybulla
(Germany)

Hugues Fontaine (France)

Ralf Ralf (UK)

Neusa Thomasi (France)

Merle Karusoo & team (Estonia)

Bond Street Theatre (USA)

Dea Loher (Germany)

Ariane Mnouchkine / Theatre du Soleil (France)

16.06. – 06.07.2005 (p.4)

Workshop: comprehensive theatre workshop

Participants: 40 French actors and technicians & 120 Afghan theatre students and professionals

Location: Foundation for Culture and Civil Society, Kabul

Sponsors: Prince Claus Fund, AFAA (France), Theatre du Soleil

Contact : Robert Kluyver, Foundation for Culture and Civil Society
(manager@afghanfcs.org)

This intensive workshop focuses on the use of masks in theatre, on acting and directing techniques developed by Mrs. Mnouchkine and her theatre company (www.theatre-du-soleil.fr), and how to solve efficiently problems of costumes, decors, lighting, sound and stage props.

Lars Jan / Mobile Performance Group (USA)

13. – 23.07.2005 (p.5)

Workshop: physical character development

Location: Kabul University, Faculty of Fine Arts

Sponsors: Public Affairs Section of U.S. Embassy, Kabul

The workshop will stress physical and vocal training techniques, as well as collaborative playmaking strategies in order to help students create physically dynamic characters and non-text based theatre. Mobile Performance Group (www.mobileperformance.org) is an ensemble of international artists who craft portable, multi-disciplinary public art projects for non-traditional environments.

Corinne Jaber (France) Shakespeare in Kabul

15.07. – 05.09.2005

Location: Foundation for Culture and Civil Society, Kabul (p.6)

Sponsors: British Council, Goethe-Institut, private donors in France and Kabul

Contact: Robert Kluyver, Foundation for Culture and Civil Society
(manager@afghanfcs.org)

Corinne Jaber, international actress and theatre director, based in France, has already come to Kabul twice to prepare an Afghan production of Shakespeare's *Love's Labors Lost* incl. casting and preparatory workshops. She will direct Afghan actors (incl. 4 women) in a free adaptation of the play, using Peter Brooks's technique of "carpet shows".

Schuett & Karol Cybulla (Germany) **Joerg**
18.07. – 31.07.2005 (p.7)

Workshop: technical workshop (light and sound)

Location: Foundation for Culture and Civil Society, Kabul University/Faculty of Fine Art

Sponsors: Goethe-Institut, German Federal Foundation for Culture (Kulturstiftung des Bundes)

Contact: juliaafifi@web.de, theatre projects coordinator, Goethe-Institut Kabul

Joerg Schuett and Karol Cybulla, based in Luebeck and Hamburg, already equipped the Kabul University theatre at the Faculty of Fine Arts in 2004. This year they will equip the auditorium of the Foundation for Culture and Civil Society and train technical staff and theatre makers.

Merle Karuuso & team (Estonia)

27.07. – 03.08.2005 (p.8)

Workshop: collaborative play development

Location: Kabul University, Faculty of Fine Arts, Kabul theatre

Contact: juliaafifi@web.de, theatre projects coordinator, Goethe-Institut Kabul

Merle Karuuso, Estonian director, is a sociologist, pedagogue, and specialist in documentary projects. Her productions based on different contemporary topics (e.g. youth problems, drugs, exile, prison camps, deportation, Estonian soldiers stationed in Afghanistan during Russian invasion) utilize interviews, life-stories, letters, diaries and sociological studies. She will introduce her project "Who Am I" to theatremakers in Kabul.

Bond Street Theatre (USA)

spring 2005, august 2005

(p.9)

Location: Kabul University, Faculty of Fine Arts

Participants: members of Exile Theatre, students of Faculty of Fine Arts

Contact: **Joanna Sherman, Artistic Director,** info@bondst.org

Bond Street Theatre has trained extensively in the physical and gestural arts of many traditions to develop an innovative theatrical language that is understandable across lingual and cultural borders. The company uses performing arts as a tool for education and healing in areas of conflict, such as refugee camps and post-war environments. They have already visited Kabul in 2003 and begun a collaboration with Exile Theatre.

Dea Loher (Germany)

24.08. – 07.09.2005 (p.10)

Workshop: Playwriting

Participants: Afghan writers (PEN-Club) and theatremakers

Location: Kabul University, Faculty of Fine Arts, PEN-Club

Sponsors: Goethe-Institut, German Federal Foundation for Culture (Kulturstiftung des Bundes)

Contact: juliaafifi@web.de, theatre projects coordinator, Goethe-Institut Kabul

Dea Loher, based in Berlin and Brasil, is a pivotal German dramatic writer, and has been honoured with several prizes and awards. This workshop will offer the opportunity to Afghan writers and theatremakers to discuss techniques of dramatization.

Ralf Ralf (UK)

The summit

19.09. – 29.09.2005 (p.11)

Workshop & performances:

Location: Kabul University, Faculty of Fine Arts and other locations

Sponsors: British Council

Contact: Richard Weyers, British Council Afghanistan (Director)
Richard.weyers@fco.gov.uk

The summit, a wordless, but very vocal piece of physical theatre, is based around a summit conference between two politicians, speaking different invented languages. The piece has been performed in over 25 countries, winning numerous awards. The two brothers Jonathan and Barnaby Stone began working together as Ralf Ralf in the mid-80's and also made forays into making short works on film and video.

Hugues Fontaine (France) **19.09. – 02.10.2005 (p.12)**

Workshop: From oral tradition to dramatization
Location: Kabul National theatre
Sponsors: French Cultural Center, Kabul
Contact: Daniel Massat-Bourrat, director French Cultural Center, Kabul
dmassatbourrat@yahoo.com

Hugues Fontaine is based in Bretagne, where he usually invites artists to perform on his river boat, and has been involved in theatre for many years. His workshop will focus on the development of a play based on an adaptation of a traditional story.

Neusa Thomasi (France) **19.09. – 02.10.2005 (p.13)**

Workshop: artistic and technical workshop (light and sound)
Location: Lycée Esteqlal, French Cultural Center
Sponsors: French Cultural Center, Kabul
Contact: Daniel Massat-Bourrat, director French Cultural Center, Kabul
dmassatbourrat@yahoo.com

Neusa Thomasi, director and pedagogue, combines theatre, circus, and social mediation with street art. She realized several productions in France, Brasil, South Africa and Argentina. Her workshop will focus on making theatre under the precondition of limited resources.

2nd Afghan National Theatre Forum (27.08. – 01.09.2005) **PROGRAMME**

Opening ceremony: Saturday, August 27, 9:00 Kabul University, Faculty of Fine Arts
Closing ceremony: Thursday, September 1, 14:00 Lycee Esteqlal (p.14)

Participating teams: from Kabul, Herat, Jalalabad, Kandahar, Baghlan, Kunduz, Khost, Mazar-e-Sharif

Contact: **Mohammad Azim Hussain Zadah, Tel.: 079 – 302212**
Timor Shah Hakimyar, Tel.: 070 - 278905

2nd Afghan National Theatre Forum 2005 **(p.15)** **Team**

Selecting team: Prof. Mohammad Azim Hussain Zadah, Timor Shah Hakimyar, Gul Makai Shah Ghiasi
Organizing team: Prof. Mohammad Azim Hussain Zadah, Timor Shah Hakimyar, Julia Afifi, Mahmood Shah Salimi, Gul Makai Shah Ghiasi

Supporting team: Ahmad Farid Haidari, Robert Kluyver, Prof. Sayed Farooq Faryad, teachers and staff from Kabul University, Faculty of Fine Arts, Daniel Massat-Bourrat, Colin Guest, Dr. Norbert Spitz, Richard Weyers
Jury: Rahnamard Zaryab, Rashid Poya, Humayoon Firez, Roya Sadat, Asad Tajzai, Akbar Salam, Ahad Juand
Editorial staff: Moh. Azim Hussain Zadah, Julia Afifi, Mahmood Shah Salimi, Timor Shah Hakimyar, Kamil Alizad, Abdul Wadud, Ibrahim Hotak

Difficult Path

Theatre/group: Jalalabad (p.16)

Saturday, August 27, 10:00 Kabul University, Faculty of Fine Arts

Author: Fazalrahman Shams
Director: Abdulsaboor Samadi
Actors: Mohammad Shah Majroo, Zabih Qasimi, Abdul Qadir Fawad, Ibrahim Abid, Fazalrahman Shams, Mohammad Abbas Sediqi, Imamjan Majboor, Khalil Khater, Abdul Saboor Samadi, Gulpadshah Haidari
Duration: 45 min.
Topic: roadway banditry

Punishment

Theatre/group: students of Faculty of Fine Arts, Kabul University

Saturday, August 27 11:00 Kabul University, Faculty of Fine Arts (p.17)

Author: Mohammad Hamayoon Beria
Director: Mohammad Hamed Tabesh
Actors: Said Suliman Sanjar, Saidmir Sadat, Fazelahmad Farakhzad, Said Abdul Rauf Sadat, Mohammad Shoaib Stanakzai, Mohammad Karim Rahmani, Abdul Hamid Samat, Said Jawad Khairandish, Hussain Ali Farzam, Mirwais Amini, Mohammad Zubair Hadi, Alburs Arzoo, Mohammad Saleh Sepas
Duration: 20 min.
Topic: bribery in court

Beyond the Mirror

Theatre/group: Exile Theatre, Kabul (**coproduction with Bond Street Theatre, USA**)

Saturday, August 27 13:30 Kabul University, Faculty of Fine Arts (p.18)

Author/director: Mahmood Shah Salimi, Joanna Sherman
Actors: Anisa Wahab, Jamil Rawesh, Salim Asir, Zia Murad, Mahmood Shah Salimi, Joanna Sherman, Michael MacGuigan, Christina Gilsan
Duration: 50 min.
Topic: the political situation over the last twenty years

Bitter Play

Theatre/group: Kabul theatre

Saturday, August 27 15:00 Kabul Theatre (p.19)

Author: Mohammad Reza Fahimi
Director: Majid Ghiasi
Actors: Masshoud Nouri, Najibullah Rahimi, Said Samir Iqbal, Sharif, Sarwari Wahid Rashidi, Hasib Sultani
Duration: 45 min.
Topic: social problems of youth

Direction

Theatre/group: **Sutudah Tawhid Theatre (Tajikistan)** (p.20)
Saturday, August 27, 17:00 Lycee Esteqlal

Author/director: Nurudin Jarani

Actors: 10 members

Duration: 70 min.

Topic: meeting between poet Maulana Rumi and Sufi Shams Tabrez

Who is guilty?

Theatre/ group: Numai Nau, Kabul

Sunday, August 28 9:00 Kabul University, Faculty of Fine Arts (p.21)

Author/director: Wahid Gulistani, Sadiq Muzafari, Ghulam Reza Rajabi

Actors: Wahid Gulistani, Alijan Mail, Sadiq Muzafari, Ghulam Reza Rajabi, Ahmadshah Rasooli, Baratali, Abdul Hamid

Duration: 30 min.

Topic: A girl is killed due to forced marriage

Bazar

Theatre/group: Students of Faculty of Fine Arts, Kabul University

Sunday, August 28 9:30 Kabul University, Faculty of Fine Arts (p.22)

Author: based on a story by Spugmai Rauf

Director: Azim Rubati

Actors: Said Zubair Hashimi, Noor Rahman, Samiullah Nabipur, Mohammad Zarif Bakhtiari, Jawed Rostpur, Shafiq Yaqoobi, Mahmood Zazi, Azizudin Deldar, Ahmad Farid Farahmand, Mohammad Yaseen Rasooli, Mohammad Rezah Zahar

Duration: 40 min.

Topic: youth unemployment

Time is Witness

Theatre/group: Asmayee theatre, Kabul

Sunday, August 28 11:00 Kabul University, Faculty of Fine Arts (p.23)

Author/director: Aziz Elias

Assistant : Seddiq Darai

Actors : Ruhulla Tareb, Seddiq Darai, Mohammad Haroon Amani, Said Ahmad Hashimi, Ustad Abdullah, Painsa Joianda, Wais Hakimi, Mohammad Ashraf Akbari, Qurbanali Takar, Mustafajan, Ahmad Shoib Hashimi Kochak, Hamid Sahafi, Farid Mirzai, Abdul Mohammad, Nadir Afshar, Habib Takanayi and 2 kids

Duration : 40 min.

Topic:

Bloodshed

Theatre/group : Mazar-e-Sharif

Sunday, August 28 13:30 Kabul University, Faculty of Fine Arts (p.24)

Author: Mehdi Duagoi

Director: Abdul Rassul Farahmand

Actors: Mahmood Forgh, Nasima Jelal, Qudoos Farahmand, Jawed Ahmadzada, Anwar Nabil, Mohammad Ali Qurbani, Najiba Qurbani, Abbas Nirumand, Faridun Tanha

Duration: 60 min.

Topic:

Towards Unity

Theatre/group: Kandahar

Sunday, August 28 17:00 Foundation for Culture and Civil Society, Kabul (p.25)

Author/director: Nematullah Nalan

Actors: Zarmina Kochi, Asmatulla Ibrahimi, Abdulahmad Mohammadi, Rahmatullah Rahat, Sardar Mohammad Rafii, Mohammad Ali Rafii

Duration: 45 min.

Topic: an appeal for unification among all Afghans

Sun Rise

Theatre/group: Sun Theatre, Kabul

Sunday, August 28 18:00 Foundation for Culture and Civil Society, Kabul (p.26)

Author: Arif Bahunar

Director: Said Habibullah Sadat

Actors: Abdul Saboor Delawar, Mahmood Sharifi, Wahid Mahboobi, Omid Rawinda, Shafiq Kohi, Parasto Saqib, Mashal Kohi, Haroon Amani, Haroon Noori, Murtaza Ahmadi, Wahid Gulestani, Taher Afghank, Said Azif Defa, Farid Hujan

Duration: 30 min.

Topic: equal rights of men and women

Betrayal

Theatre/group: Girls of Mediothek Kunduz

Monday, August 29 9:00 Kabul University, Faculty of Fine Arts (p.27)

Author/director: Nasiba Holgar

Actors: Bibi Mahjan, Gulnajarjan, Esmailjan, Izatullahjan Yama, Ruqiajan, Afsanajan, Azizajan, Nilufarjan, Malihajan, Ajirajan

Duration: 20 min.

Topic: a palm-reader who betrays the people

Carelessness in Youth

Theatre/group: Girls of Mediothek Kunduz

Monday, August 29 9:30 Kabul University, Faculty of Fine Arts (p.28)

Author/director: Nasiba Holgar

Actors: Bibi Mahjan, Gulnajarjan, Esmailjan, Izatullahjan Yama, Ruqiajan, Afsanajan, Azizajan, Nilufarjan, Malihajan, Ajirajan

Duration: 25 min.

Topic: the influence of foreign films and culture

Master

Theatre/group: Baghlan/ Pul-e-Khumri

Monday, August 29 10.00 Kabul University, Faculty of Fine Arts (p.29)

Author/Director: Lutfullah Eshas

Actors: 9 members

Duration: 40 min.

Topic:

Devil's Advice

Theatre/group: theatre of Kandahar

Monday, August 29 13:30 Kabul University, Faculty of Fine Arts (p.30)

Author: Abdulbari Jahani

Director: Fazelahmad Anis

Actors: Walijan Ibrahim, Regari Afghan, Jawed Ahmad Abed, Ehsanullah Jers, Yarmohammad Yarmal, Shahmohammad Yarmal

Duration: 25 min.

Topic: the devil's advice to his children

Proposal for Engagement

Theatre/group: Theatre of Herat

Monday, August 29 14:00 Kabul University, Faculty of Fine Arts (p.31)

Author: Sarkhosh Herawi

Director: Ghaus Mohammad Askarzada

Actors: Niamatullah Hussaini, Ghulam Farooq Sarkhosh, Behsad Askarzada, Najubullah Akbari, N.N. (one woman under tshador)

Duration: 45 min.

Topic:

Joy of Life

Theatre/group: theatre of Radio Television Afghanistan (RTA) (p.32)

Monday, August 29 17:00 Auditorium of Radio Television Afghanistan (RTA)

Author: Mohammad Humayoon Feroz

Director: Shah Mohammad Nooran

Assistant: Mohammad Hashim Asifi

Actors: Mir Ahmad Qaderi, Parween Mushtal, Mohammad Adil Rahimi, Tahmina Nauroozi, Hamid Askarzada, Ruhulla Hamid, Daud Ludin

Duration: 45 min.

Topic: the wish for a new wife raises problems in a family

Mistake

(p.33)

Theatre/group: students of Faculty of Fine Arts, Kabul University

Tuesday, August 30 9:00 Faculty of Fine Arts, Kabul University

Author: Fazalahmad Farakhzada

Director: Said Suliman Sanjar

Actors: Said Suliman Sanjar, Fazalahmad Farakhzada, Moh. Shoaib Stanekzai

Duration: 20 min.

Topic :

Warlords Instead of Law

Theatre/group: students of Faculty of Fine Arts, Kabul University

(p.34)

Tuesday, August 30 9:30 Faculty of Fine Arts, Kabul University

Author/director: Mohammad Saleh Sepas

Actors: Fazalahmad Farakhzad, Abdul Karim Rahmani, Mirwais, Saidmir, Alburz Arzoo, Said Suliman Sanjar, Said Abdul Rauf, and 3 more actors

Duration: 25 min.

Topic: law cannot properly implemented due to warlords

King

Theatre/group: night class students of Faculty of Fine Arts, Kabul University (p.35)
Tuesday, August 30 10:00 Faculty of Fine Arts, Kabul University

Author/Director: Shapoor Saddaqaat
Actors: Shapoor Saddaqaat, Said Mansur Rahmani, Zabiullah Raufi, Noorullah Asi, Barialai Khamosh, Safiullah Amiri, Masood Zarifi, Maroof Shookhran, Fazalhaq Fazli, Hedayat Fazli, Jawad Parwani
Duration: 45 min.
Topic:

Why Me?

Theatre/group: students of Faculty of Fine Arts, Kabul University
Tuesday, August 30 11:00 Faculty of Fine Arts, Kabul University (p.36)

Author/director: Abdul Karim Rahmani
Actors: Abdul Rauf Sadat, Masood Zarifi, Shapoor Saqat, Karim Hakimi, Shekiba Rezai, Said Suliman Sanjar, Abdul Karim Rahmani
Duration: 25 min.
Topic:

Braggart

Theatre/group: Khost (p.37)
Tuesday, August 30 13:30 Faculty of Fine Arts, Kabul University

Author/director: Rahmatullah Khosti
Actors: 10 members
Duration: 45 min.
Topic: comedy about a braggart

Image

Theatre/group: Herat (p.38)
Tuesday, August 30 14:30 Faculty of Fine Arts, Kabul University

Author/director: Faraidoon Fakoori
Actors: Abdul Rashid Azimi, Ziagul Shahwazi, Ibrahim Mohamadi, Shima Rahmani, Said Jamal Saeed, Kubra Ishaqzai, Ibrahim Nabizada, Mariam Sarwari, Basir Ahmad Amiri (?)
Duration: 55 min.
Topic: depiction of difficulties during the past and nowadays

War and Peace

Theatre/group: Balkh, Mazar-e-Sharif
Tuesday, August 30 17:00 Foundation for Culture and Civil Society, Kabul (p.39)

Author/director: Wakil Nekbeen
Actors: (?)
Duration: 40 min.

Consequence

Theatre/group: Ashiana children Theatre, Kabul

Wednesday, august 31 9:00 Kabul University, Faculty of Fine Arts (p.40)

Author/director: Mohammad Osman Hairan
Actors: Emal Samir, Zabihullah Farotan, Sakina Farotan, Mujtabi Azami,
Rehana Hazerati
Duration: 20 min.
Topic: the war against drugs

I want to become an actor

Theatre/group: Red Cross Theatre, Kabul

Wednesday, august 31 10:00 Kabul University, Faculty of Fine Arts

Author: Nooragha Wafa Kabuli (p.41)
Directors: Mohammad Baz Wafa, Ziagul Alikozai
Actors: Mohammad Samin Karimi, Mohammad Baz Wafa, Ziagul Alikozai, Madina,
Nazifullah Hosawi
Duration: 25 min.
Topic: children's struggle against their parents for the right of education

Woman's Struggle

Theatre/group: Afghanica, Kabul

Wednesday, august 31 11:00 Kabul University, Faculty of Fine Arts (p.42)

Author/director: Mohammad Hasan Nazeri
Actors: Sabrina Saqib, Shamim, Ali Fazili, Haroon Hamdard
Duration: 50 min.
Topic: a young lady's struggle to choose a new husband

Bad Habits (p.43)

Theatre/group: Herat

Wednesday, August 31 13:30 Kabul University, Faculty of Fine Arts

Author/director: Ghaus Mohammad Askarzada
Actors: Behzad Askarzada, Asmatullah Hussainzadah, Najibullah Akbari, Mohammad
Rahim Sarkhosh, Ghulam Sakhi Ghulami, Abdul Karim Mohammad Yar, Faridun
Fakoori, Mohammad Yaqoob Amini
Duration: 40 min.
Topic: bad habits inside governmental departments

Moheb and Laila

Theatre/group: Kabul Theatre

Wednesday, August 31 17:00 Kabul Theatre (p.44)

Author: Zabihullah Tawakali
Director: Gul Makai Shah Ghiasi
Actors: Gul Makai Shah Ghiasi, Ghafar Zalam, Najibullah Rahimi, Samir Iqbal,
Haris Parwana, Rabani, Pinda Wais Hashima, Masood Noori, Aziz Elias,
Wahid Rashidi, Hasib Sultani, Arib Karimi, Shafiq, Sharif Sarwali
Duration: 45 min.
Topic: about two lovers and social cruelty

Uncle Dawlat is joking

Theatre/group: Jalalabad (p.45)

Thursday, September 1 10:00 Auditorium of Educational University, Kabul

Author/director: Abdul Saboor Samadi
Actors: Mohammad Shah Majroo, Zabi Qasimi, Abdul Qadir Fawad, Ibrahim Abed,
Fazel Rahman Shams, Mohammad Abbas Sediqi, Imamjan Majboor
Duration: 30 min.
Topic: Comedy

Direction

Theatre/group: Sutudah Tawhid Theatre (Tajikistan) (p.46)

Thursday, September 1, 11h, Auditorium of Educational University, Kabul

Author/director: Nurudin Jarani
Actors: 10 members
Duration: 70 min.
Topic: meeting between poet Maulana Rumi and Sufi Shams Tabrez

Love's Labors Lost

September 1-5 17:00 Foundation for Culture and Civil Society, Kabul (p.47)

Author: William Shakespeare
Director: Corinnne Jaber
Actors: Nabi Tanha, Faizal Azizi, Shah Mohammad, Kabir Rahimi, Marina Gulbahari,
Saba Sahar, Parween Mooschtael, Laila
Duration: 60 min.
Topic: In Shakespeare's *Loves' Labors Lost*, one of his funniest comedies, 4 young men agree to subject the affairs of the heart to the dictates of the will, only to have their unyielding principles collide with passionate yearnings when 4 beautiful ladies make an unexpected visit.

Love's Labour's Lost

a play by

William Shakespeare

Presented by

The Foundation for Culture and Civil Society

With Major Support From

The British Council

Additional Funding From

The Goethe Institute

August 31 to September 4 at the
Foundation for Culture and Civil Society

September 5 at the Bagh-e-Babur

All performances are free and begin at 5:00 PM

Love's Labour's Lost

by William Shakespeare

directed by

Corinne Jaber

adapted by

Corinne Jaber and Stephen Landrigan

based on the Farsi translation of

Alaeddin Pazargadi

Dari script prepared by

M. Qaseem Elmi and Qais Akbar Omer

Costumes by

Shalla Nawabi

Assistant to the Director and Rehearsal Interpreter

Qais Akbar Omer

Cast:

Haroon, King of Kabul	Shah Mohammed Noori
Sherzad	Nabi Tanha
Mansour	Faizal Azizi
Sohrab	Arif Bahonar
Shardokht-e-Herat	Sabah Sahar
Senober	Marina Gulbahari
Nargiss	Laila Fakhri
Maryam	Brishna Bahar
Sikander	Kabir Rahimi
Fatima	Parween Mooschtael
Suleiman	Mustafa Haidary

All scenes take place in the garden of Haroon, the King of Kabul.

Note: The names of the characters and places mentioned in the play have all been adapted to an Afghan setting.

Love's Labour's Lost

A Synopsis

Scene 1

Haroon, the young King of Kabul, has ambitions to become known as a great scholar. He asks three of his friends to join him in a vow to devote themselves to serious study for three years. They will fast, sleep little, and have no contact with women. Two of his friends, Mansour and Sherzad, agree at once. But the third, Sohrab, expresses concern that the vow cannot be kept, especially the part concerning women. Nonetheless, out of loyalty to the King, Sohrab agrees to sign the pact.

Only after all four have affixed their signatures to it do they remember that the daughter of the King of Herat is due to arrive later that day. What to do? The King is under royal obligation to host the Princess. But he decides that in order not to break his vow, he will house the Princess and her retainers in tents in his garden rather than in his palace.

Scene 2

The Princess of Herat arrives accompanied by three ladies, Senober, Nargis and Mariam. The Princess is on a serious mission. Her father lies dying in Herat. He has asked his daughter, his only child, to go to Kabul to settle a dispute he has had with King Haroon over a payment of gold and the feudal rights to Kandahar.

En route to Kabul, the Princess has heard about the vow taken by the King and his three friends. Nonetheless, she is astonished when, upon arrival, she finds that King Haroon expects her to sleep in a tent.

When she broaches her father's business with Haroon, he sharply disagrees with her account of the dispute and demands documents to support the King of Herat's claims. The documents, however, have been delayed in transit and will not arrive for at least another day. So the King suggests that they all make the best of it. The ladies shall retire to their tent; the men to the palace.

But for the King's three companions, especially Sohrab, the proximity of the beautiful ladies of Herat stirs deep passions. Sohrab immediately recognizes Senober as a woman he has met before, and who fascinates him.

Scene 3

Sohrab, despite his vow, asks a servant to carry a letter to Senober. The letter tells Senober how happy he is to see her again and how much he feels for her. The letter sent, he reflects with amazement that he, who had always scorned serious love, suddenly finds himself completely debilitated by it.

Scene 4

The letter for Senober gets intercepted by the Princess. She and the other ladies read it aloud, to their great amusement. Knowing that Sohrab has broken his vow, the Princess, still rankled to be sleeping in a tent, has the letter sent to King Haroon to let him know just how little regard his closest friend has for their vow.

Scene 5

Sohrab, though consumed with love, begins to feel remorse for breaking his vow by having written to Senober. As he bemoans his unhappy state of mind, he sees the King approach with a letter in his hand, looking distraught. Sohrab hides in a tree. The King enters and begins to read aloud a deeply-felt love letter he has written to the Princess. Sohrab, hearing the King pour out his feelings, is amazed and amused, but stays hidden.

Just then, the King notices that Sherzad is approaching. He quickly hides the letter, and then hides himself. He listens, stunned, as Sherzad reads a letter he has written to Mariam in which he claims that loving her will break no vow as he promised to love no woman, but she is a goddess. Sohrab, still in the tree, observes all this with great delight.

Hardly has Sherzad finished reading when Mansour approaches. Sherzad quickly hides. Mansour is carrying a love poem he has written for Nargis, which he reads aloud. When he finishes, he wonders aloud how his companions would regard his weakness and perfidy. He does not have to wait long for an answer.

Sherzad reveals himself and chides Mansour for breaking his vow. But before Sherzad can say much, the King steps forth and berates both of them at length. He concludes by asking them how they would feel if Sohrab knew of their deceitful actions. But the King's moral high ground is quickly lost when Sohrab jumps from his listening post in the tree and lacerates them all for their hypocrisy.

Just then, a messenger arrives from the Princess. He carries the letter sent earlier from Sohrab to Senober. The King, not knowing what it is, quickly passes it to Sohrab to read. As soon as Sohrab sees it, he panics and starts to tear it. The suspicions of the others are immediately aroused and they try to grab the torn bits from Sohrab, who attempts to eat them. They recognize Sohrab's handwriting. Sohrab throws himself on their mercy and confesses his guilt.

Sohrab begs them all to reconsider their vow. Without much need for persuasion, the others agree. Then they decide they will pay a call on their visiting ladies.

Scene 6

The Princess and her ladies are astonished when they start receiving gifts from the King and his friends. Diamonds come from the King for the Princess, a portrait of Senober from Sohrab, a pair of fancy gloves for Nargis from Mansour, and pearls for Mariam from Sherzad.

The Princess' servant arrives to reveal that he has overheard a secret plan by the King and his friends to visit the ladies in disguise. They will come dressed as Hindustanis. The women quickly veil themselves and exchange among them the tokens they have received as the men approach.

The King and his men attempt to entertain the women by singing Bollywood-style songs, and to romance the ladies who are wearing the tokens that they sent. But the men succeed only in making fools of themselves. As they begin to understand this, they slink away to consider next actions. The ladies reject them haughtily and burst into uncontrollable laughter after they leave.

Scene 7

When the men return without disguises a short time later, the women tell them with great hilarity of the strange visitation they have had. The men quickly understand that they are being played for fools, and admit their masquerade. They confess their love for the ladies who cannot be so easily assuaged after having been forced to camp out in a tent because of the vow.

The Princess demands that the King start setting things right by entertaining them properly. He King and his men then sing a heartfelt song about how the ladies have helped them understand the misguided nature of their vow.

A good feeling permeates the group at last. The women appear inclined to accept the King's apology and to carry on with the business of amicably resolving the dispute that brought them together in their first place. But all that is disrupted when a messenger, Sulieman, arrives from Herat with the grim news that the King of Herat has died.

The Princess and her ladies prepare to leave at once. In the shadow of tragedy, the feelings expressed by the men jokingly take on an unexpected urgency. The men speak openly of their hearts' desires. The women refuse to accept their pleadings, at least not immediately. Only yesterday, they remind the men, the King and his friends had made a vow.

But the women concede that after a year, they would be willing to rejoin the discussion, if the men still feel as strongly as they do now. They set tasks which the men are to perform in the intervening year to show the sincerity of their intentions. The men regretfully accept the women's terms. Nothing more remains to be said. The women depart in one direction, and the men in the other.

William Shakespeare
Author

William Shakespeare is considered by many to be the greatest writer the English language has ever had. His ability to capture and convey the most profound aspects of [human nature](#) has never been

surpassed. His understanding of the range and depth of human emotions makes his works as relevant today as they were when he wrote them more than 400 years ago.

Shakespeare was born in England in 1654. He grew up in a small farming village. As a young adult, he moved to the capital, London, where he became an actor. He began to write plays around 1588. Over the next 22 years, he wrote some 36 of them.

They include comedies such as *Love's Labours Lost* which was written in 1594, *A Midsummer Night's Dream*, and *The Tempest*. He was equally skilled at writing tragedies such as *Hamlet*, *Romeo and Juliet*, *Macbeth* and *King Lear*. He also wrote several plays about the history of England. His works are still performed regularly by theatre companies around the world and have been translated into nearly every language. Many have been filmed. Some have inspired major pieces of music, or been adapted to other theatrical forms.

Shakespeare also wrote some of the finest poetry in English. He was a master of a type of poem known as a sonnet.

He died at age 52 in 1616. He had given up his work in theatres about five years earlier and had gone home to the village where he had been born. He left a legacy of exceptional writing that continues to make audiences laugh and cry and recognize themselves in characters he brought to life so long ago.

Corinne Jaber

Director and Co-Adaptor

Corinne Jaber, who was presented with France's highest theatre honor, the Moliere Award, in 2001, has performed extensively in Paris and London, and has worked internationally with visionary theatre director Peter Brook who has so strongly influenced theatre in Europe over the past 50 years.

In April, she held two workshops for Afghan actors at the Foundation for Culture and Civil Society. From that, the idea of doing Shakespeare in Kabul developed. She has envisioned this production as an opportunity to give the actors a space in which to experiment, to encourage them to focus on detail, to draw from their own resources, outer and inner, to help them make their *Love's Labors Lost* a thoroughly Afghan work.

Dr. Alaeddin Pazargadi

Translator

The translation that is the basis for this production of Love's Labours Lost was made by Dr. Alaeddin Pazargadi.

Born in Shiraz in 1906, Dr. Pazargadi was educated in local schools. Upon graduation from high school, he left for England where he studied at Cambridge. In 1937, he received his Ph.D. in political science at Oxford University. He returned to Iran and started teaching English language and literature at Tehran University.

He had spent the next 50 years on the translation of the complete works of Shakespeare into Persian. He had also authored and translated more than 120 books including Imam Ali's Nahj-ul-Balagha, poems of the Iranian poets such as Farrokhi Yazdi, Parvin E'tessami, Baba Taher, Sa'di, Hafiz, and Khayyam. His own collected poems are due to be published soon in Tehran.

Dr. Pazargadi died on April 4, 2005, aged 98. As a sign of the great respect in which he was held, his funeral was held in front of Tehran University where he had taught for so many years.

Stephen Landrigan

Co-Adaptor

Stephen Landrigan is a playwright and journalist. His play, *The Pan Beaters*, a Caribbean retelling of the ancient Greek legend of Phaedra, won London Weekend Television's Plays on Stage Award. His stage adaptation of V.S. Naipaul's novel *Miguel Street* was chosen by *The Scotsman* newspaper as a "Pick of the Fringe" at the 2003 Edinburgh Festival. His folk pageant *Canboulay!* was a winner of the 1993 Best Village competition in Trinidad and Tobago. Mr. Landrigan has worked for many years as an international journalist including jobs with The Washington Post, BBC Radio and many other news organizations in England, the United States, Africa and the Caribbean.

Thank you

The Producers wish to thank:

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For Immediate Release

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FRENCH THEATER TROUPE IN KABUL FOR ARTISTS' WORKSHOP

The Theatre du Soleil, led by acclaimed French director Ariane Mnouchkine, is in Kabul for a three-week artists' workshop that will culminate in an original production with Afghan actors and technicians.

The workshop was conceived by the Kabul-based Foundation for Culture and Civil Society (FCCS), which is supported by the Open Society Institute, and the French American Cultural Exchange, in an effort to bolster Afghanistan's cultural revival.

"The response of the Afghans, especially the students, has been above our expectations," said Ariane Mnouchkine, who helped found the Theatre du Soleil in 1964. "Some of them are very talented, and I would like to find an opportunity to have them continue to train with us in Paris."

The project, funded by the Prince Claus Fund (Netherlands), involves 40 members of the Theatre du Soleil and some 60 Afghan theatre professionals and amateurs. The AFAA/French Ministry of Foreign Affairs is covering the Theatre du Soleil's travel costs.

Each day, while Mnouchkine leads a mix of Afghan and French actors in 8-hour daily workshops, the technicians from the troupe (seamstresses, electricians, stage decorators and painters) hold training sessions with their Afghan counterparts. One of the aims of the workshop is to produce an original production in Kabul, which will be overseen by the Foundation for Culture and Civil Society.

"What is most interesting for us is to see how they work together," said Ghulam Mustafa, a theater student at Kabul University's Faculty of Fine Arts. "Whether it's acting, preparing costumes, building an extension to the stage, or cleaning up, all of them are always working as a team."

The troupe brought with them an array of equipment—projectors, sound equipment, design materials, costumes—that will be left behind in Kabul for use by different theatre groups. "This is giving an incredible boost to Afghan theatre," said Timor Hakimyar, director of the FCCS Cultural Center.

The Theatre du Soleil is one of seven international theatre troupes conducting workshops in Kabul as part of the Kabul Theatre Summer, which will end in a small festival in August. The Foundation for Culture and Civil Society, which has produced and staged many plays in its Cultural Center, has also conducted extensive regional theatre campaigns using local groups to inform the Afghan public about elections and the political process.

After completing the workshop on July 5, the Theatre du Soleil will travel to New York City, where they will perform *Le Dernier Caravansérail* at Lincoln Center. *Le Dernier Caravansérail*, a 6-hour theatrical epic, follows the lives of Afghan, Kurdish, Iranian and other immigrants searching for refuge.

The Theatre du Soleil in Kabul

Final Report

Technical Details

- | | |
|----------------------|---|
| 1. Name of Project: | Kabul Cartoucherie |
| 2. Contractnummer: | UI.2005.01839 |
| 3. Awarded amount: | 38,000 Euros |
| 4. Contractor: | Foundation for Culture and Civil Society (FCCS) |
| 5. Project Director: | Robert Kluyver (Executive Director FCCS) |
| 6. Period of Project | 01 June to 15 October |

Summary of Report:

The Theatre du Soleil was in Kabul from 16 June to 6 July 2005. 39 actors and technical staff came from Paris, led by their Director Ariane Mnouchkine. They worked and stayed at the Foundation for Culture and Civil Society's Center. In this period there were 12 full days of workshop, 2 days of preparation and 1 of wrap-up, and 5 days of travel and rest. About 80 theatre actors and students on average attended the workshop, eight hours a day. The workshop was about acting, and the participants were continuously on stage, accompanied by French actors, performing short improvised sketches guided by Mnouchkine. Everything was translated by the Persian French actress Shaghayegh Beheshti. Besides, workshops were given by the French technicians in stage carpentry and sculpture, décor design, lighting, dyeing. Those that attended the



workshops regularly received a certificate at the end.

The Taliban reinterpreted, with costumes and masks

Thus the project went well, according to plan. But the results of this workshop were far more far-reaching than initially expected. At the end of the workshop Mrs. Mnouchkine urged the 20 best young actors (most of them students in the Theatre Department of Kabul University Fine Arts Faculty) to continue practicing together and keep alive what they had learnt during the workshop. They then promptly founded a group called "Theatre Aftab" (*Aftab* means 'sun' in Dari) and started rehearsing together at the FCCS after the departure of the Theatre du Soleil. We encouraged them to prepare a play for the Kabul Summer of Theatre Festival. They chose to perform Romeo and Juliet. Then the Open Society Institute (OSI or Soros Network) decided to fund the follow up. Maurice Durozier, a director of the Theatre du Soleil, together with Shaghayesh Beheshti, returned to Kabul to help the Theatre Aftab create

and perform an abridged version in Dari of Shakespeare's play. This was shown at the Kabul theatre festival with great success. Later, with help of the FCCS and OSI, the group went to perform the play in the Theatre Festival in Dushanbe, Tajikistan. Again the performance was very much appreciated and widely reported. Now the Theatre du Soleil has found funding to bring the 20 actors of the Theatre Aftab to their base in Paris, the *Cartoucherie* of the *Bois de Vincennes*, for a two-month intensive training and workshops, during February and March of 2006. When they return, the young group of actors will have a high skill level, especially to Afghan and regional standards.

Public Impact and Media Reports

- Although Mrs. Mnouchkine did her best to avoid journalists during the workshop, the event was very well reported with 2 pages in Liberation, on Radio France International and in other French media.
- At the end of July, Mrs. Mnouchkine and I gave a press conference in New York, organized by OSI. This again attracted a lot of attention, especially of theatre professionals.
- The performance of Romeo and Juliet by the Theatre Aftab in the Kabul Theatre Festival (end August) and later at the FCCS (September) was very much appreciated by audiences both Afghan and foreign and was certainly one of the best of the Festival (it was awarded a prize by the Jury). The success of the Theatre Aftab has certainly attracted many young people to theatre, as later workshops at the FCCS proved.
- The Theatre du Soleil filmed the whole workshop and the production and performance of Romeo and Juliet. They edited this into a 17' movie that was shown at the Theatre Festival in Berlin (Autumn 2005) to the great interest of the audience. A 52' documentary to be shown on ARTE is being prepared.
- The representation of Romeo and Juliet in Tajikistan in October 2005 was appreciated by Central Asian theatre groups and led to further cooperation in theatre between Tajikistan and Afghanistan (a three-week long workshop in Nov-Dec, at the FCCS). It was also reported on the BBC website in English and Persian, with pictures, which attracted the attention of, among others, the Afghan diaspora.
- The FCCS has filmed all the phases of the workshop, theatre production and performances (including the road trip to Tajikistan) and is in the final stages of producing a documentary movie which will be broadcast on Afghan TV channels.

Preparations

In November 2004 Robert Kluyver, the representative of the Open Society Institute in Afghanistan and Director of the FCCS, traveled to Paris to meet the Theatre du Soleil. The regional director of OSI, Anthony Richter, had heard about the latest mammoth production of the Theatre du Soleil, "The Last Caravanserail" (a 6-hour long portrait in about 40 sketches of refugees' travails as they err from their home countries to detainment camps in France and Australia) which includes portraits of Afghanistan and Afghans, and is partially performed in Persian. Since OSI also supports artistic and cultural exchange, he suggested we explore possible channels of cooperation.

In the first meeting with Ariane Mnouchkine and her actors, the grandiose and slightly crazy plan to bring the Theatre du Soleil to Kabul for a three-week long workshop - which was then to result in the creation of a piece about the destruction of the Bamiyan Buddhas - was born. As project director, I launched queries among several donor agencies, before finding the Prince Claus Fund (Netherlands), who expressed willingness to co-fund the project. This project also received financial support (airfares) from

the Association Francaise d'Action Artistique (AFAA) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The actors were not paid. It was decided 40 people would come (half of the full theatre troupe), a mixed group of actors and technicians who would both try to transfer their skills to their Afghan counterparts. All the local costs would be covered by the FCCS with support from the Prince Claus Fund and the general support OSI and Swiss Development and Cooperation (SDC) give to the Cultural Center.

The Theatre du Soleil also committed to collect theatre materials from French theatres and companies, and to send them to Kabul before the workshop. They thus collected six tons of second-hand theatre machinery, tools, lighting, clothes, stage props and other materials. This was all shipped to Kabul on French ISAF planes, courtesy of the French Ministry of Defense. The FCCS collected, stocked and inventoried the materials, and has since been handing it out to theatres and related organizations in Kabul and the provinces.



The Foundation headquarters in Kabul



FCCS support staff in the courtyard (with stage frame)

The FCCS in Kabul prepared its premises to accommodate this large group of people. 17 rooms were made ready in its vast compound in the center of Kabul for the staying of 40 people, as this would be more economic and secure than putting them up in a hotel. The accommodation was Afghan style but comfortable. The sanitary facilities and the kitchen were improved, and extra support staff was recruited and trained. A dressing/sewing room was set up with mirrors and racks for the costumes, and the stage facilities were improved. The FCCS also mobilized the theatre community in Kabul for this event, introducing the objectives of the workshop and familiarizing the actors with the work of the Theatre du Soleil (through videos).

First Phase: The Workshop

The nature of the workshop changed from producing a play to training actors, as Mrs. Mnouchkine came to understand that the level of Afghan actors is so low that it wouldn't be warranted to produce a full-fledged play. She decided to concentrate on masks, costumes and the related theatre styles: Nô theatre from Japan, Balinese theatre and the Commedia dell'Arte. This forces actors to truly impersonate characters. She also requested us to target the young generation, especially women, for the workshop (not the more experienced Afghan male actors).

35 members of the French theatre company came on 16 June (4 others came on 20 June). We briefed them on Afghanistan, Kabul and the workshop logistics. We had taken security measures that we found exaggerated ourselves but which would serve to allay the fears of the French actors, and especially those of the French Embassy, who felt responsible for the security of these prominent French artists in Afghanistan. In the coming three weeks none of the troupe would leave the Foundation's premises except under escort from our staff, or in the case of big groups, policemen.



Changing and adapting costumes



Some of the masks used during the workshop

On the day of the arrival and the next day (Friday, a free day in Afghanistan) we showed the group around Kabul and the surroundings in buses, to familiarize them with Afghan society. Meanwhile the group's technicians were improving the workshop facilities together with our logistics staff. On Saturday about 150 Afghan actors attended the introduction session of the workshop, led by Ariane Mnouchkine and Timor Hakimyar, the project manager in the FCCS. All the conditions for the workshop were explained. The actors were introduced carefully, one by one, to the characters of the masks they were going to use the following days. The workshop started the following day, on Sunday 19 June.



Participants in the workshop



A scene from a sketch about forced marriage

During 2 ½ weeks (12 full days), from 8 am to 5 pm, 80-100 people on average attended the workshops, divided into morning and afternoon sessions. The format was always the following: some ideas for a sketch were circulated, and a group including French and Afghan actors selected by Ariane Mnouchkine would choose costumes and masks, dress and come on stage to improvise this sketch. She, with the help of translations by the Persian-French actress Shaghayegh Beheshti, would intervene wherever she deemed it necessary to teach something about the acting. The French actors helped their Afghan colleagues in preparations and on stage, but considered it a workshop for themselves too.



The bride who was going to be forced into marriage declares her love to the doctor and threatens to shoot her husband-to-be and his family. In the foreground, Ariane Mnouchkine stands watching the play carefully



At the end of the improvisation the actors have taken their masks off and listen to Ariane going over the weak and strong points for the benefit of the actors and the audience. Shasha is translating on the left

The technical support team of the Theatre du Soleil, which consisted of about 8 people, meanwhile did their best to transfer their skills to Afghan youth and the FCCS staff. Since the FCCS has two relatively well-equipped stages and organizes many concerts and performances, this training for our staff was very welcome. Two seamstresses were hired to help prepare and adapt the costumes, and thoroughly trained in the process by their French counterpart. The carpenters impressed their Afghan assistants by their quick and high-quality work when making décor elements. Other workshops involved designing decors and dyeing of stage clothes and costumes. One sculptor that works with the troupe, Niko, made a wooden sculpture mixing Beninois and Nuristani styles after visiting the Kabul Museum. It still stands in the FCCS courtyard under the big mulberry tree.

The mornings would start with breakfast at 6.45 for the 39 French actors. During the lunch-break all the Afghan participants in the workshop were invited for lunch together with the French actors. Between 5.00 and 5.30 pm the workshop would finish. The Afghan participants would be requested to help clean up (which they were not used to). Strict rules of silence, non-smoking and punctuality were enforced by Ariane Mnouchkine, which in itself was a considerable training for the workshop participants.

At the end of the day, the French actors usually would relax, use the office internet facilities, play chess or read in the resource center, watch movies or discuss the progress of the workshop, before taking their dinner. Around 10 pm most of them would go to sleep, although some concerts and parties were organized by the hosts to keep the spirits high.



Relaxing in gardens outside Kabul



On Kargha lake, in the mountains near Kabul

On Fridays the FCCS organized outings; the first Friday, a picnic was organized in a park close to Kabul. The actors interacted with young Kabulis enjoying themselves in the park, and then saw a village close to the city. On the second Friday, all were taken out to another popular summer destination for Kabulis: fish restaurants on a big river about one hour North of Kabul. On the last Friday the whole troupe was taken to a high mountain valley near the Salang Tunnel for another picnic. The last day, the FCCS chartered a plane to take some of the main actors and the camera crew of the Theatre du Soleil to Bamiyan valley to visit the site of the ancient Buddhas. This had been planned according to the original proposal, but also served to give the French actors a last reality check before they left this rural country.

On the last day of the workshop Ariane Mnouchkine invited the 20 best participants of the workshop, only the new generation, to a final session. In this session she harangued them to make a life in theatre, to change society as regards to the bad reputation women get for becoming actresses, and to band together to do so. This motivational speech was highly effective as the young Afghans present - mostly students at the Theatre Department of the Fine Arts Faculty of Kabul University - pledged to stick together and to form a theatre group: "Theatre Aftab"

Second Phase: The Production of Romeo and Juliet

After the Theatre du Soleil left (between 6 and 10 July) the FCCS offered to host the Theatre Aftab three afternoons a week in order to continue the stage improvisations. We encouraged them to read plays available in Persian and to choose one of them to organize a performance for the Kabul Summer of Theatre Festival, which took place in the last days of August. This Festival was first organized in 2004 and is supported by the Goethe Institut, the Centre Culturel Francais, and co-organized by Kabul University Faculty of Fine Arts and the FCCS, with participation of the relevant institutions of the Ministry of Information and Culture.

As Director of the FCCS I was invited to New York at the end of July. The Theatre du Soleil was performing "The Last Caravanserail" in the Lincoln Theatre Festival. OSI, who had initiated the cooperation between Paris and Kabul, offered to give a press conference with Ariane Mnouchkine, Anthony Richter (the Regional Director for Central Asia of OSI) and me to discuss the results of the workshop in Afghanistan. Minutes before the press conference started, I heard from Kabul that the Theatre Aftab had chosen to perform Romeo and Juliet in the Kabul Theatre Festival. When this was announced during the press conference OSI and the Theatre du Soleil offered support to the production of this play. The Theatre du Soleil would send a senior director (Maurice Durozier) and Shaghayegh Beheshti (the Persian-French actress) to supervise this production, and OSI was to pay for this.

On 10 August Mr. Durozier returned to Kabul, where the Theatre Aftab had started its rehearsals, and on 15 August he was joined by Ms. Beheshti. In a record time, before 29 August, they produced a beautiful adaptation of Romeo and Juliet, cut to 1 hour from the original 2 hours, with a narrator to replace the missing scenes and some minor characters. A sound-track was professionally compiled with music by the Eastern-European composite group "Bratsch". One member of the Theatre Aftab was specifically assigned to the music. Most of the costumes were inspired by traditional Armenian dresses, but the action was firmly situated in Verona, Italy, to help actors in their effort of imagination and to deflect eventual Afghan criticism of this torrid love story. The mise-en-scene placed the emphasis on elegance of design and grace of movement.

Duccio Bellugi, a camera-man from the Theatre du Soleil filmed the workshop while Nathalie Joly, a singer and actress gave vocal training to members of the National Theatre of Afghanistan.



Juliet



The pseudo-death of Juliet



Parastou, the servant of the Capulets, played by a male.

The rehearsals of Romeo and Juliet were very intense, given the short time-frame. Of the actors, only two were women. One of them (Maryam) played Juliet magnificently, while the other played a man's role, maybe to compensate for the two men who played women's roles. The role of Romeo was given to Seear, the brother of Maryam, not only because he was one of the most talented actors, but again to deflect social condemnation of Maryam, a young mother, who was not to be seen flirting on stage with non-family men. This sibling relationship was announced before every performance by the narrator: Mahmood. He was also elected the Director of the Theatre Aftab by the other members of the group. He assisted Maurice Durozier and Ms. Beheshti in the production. Arif, one of the most talented actors, could not participate in Romeo and Juliet as he was engaged as actor in another play by Shakespeare, being rehearsed simultaneously at the FCCS: "Loves' Labours Lost" (directed by Corinne Jaber). Only one member of the group proved to be problematic. He was a little bit fundamentalist and refused to play the part of Father Lorenzo. Later, after the trip to Tajikistan, he was expelled from the company for his conservative views. He was replaced by a young woman, bringing the current total of women in the group to 3 (one other talented young woman has also expressed interest). This, by the way, was one of Ariane Mnouchkine's major concerns: bringing more young women into Afghan theatre.



The cast of Romeo and Juliet (not fully complete)

14. Wahidullah Giulistani : (Mrs Capulet, female)
15. Farid Ahmad Joya : (Parastou, female role)
16. Said Asef : Mr. Capulet
17. Ghulam Raza : Music and minor role

Currently the Theatre Aftab consists of

1. Said Mahmud Sharifi: director
2. Mariam Kohi: lead actress (Juliet)
3. Shikiba Razahi : actress (male part in Romeo and Juliet)
4. Shuhra Sabbaghi : new actress (did not play in Romeo and Juliet)
5. Amad Seeiar : lead actor (Romeo)
6. Omid Roinda : (Mercutio)
7. Said Haroon Noori : (Paris)
8. Ahmad Shafiq : (Peter)
9. Said Ahmad : (Balthazar)
10. Wahidullah Mahboodi : (Benvoglio)
11. Mohammad Taher Afghan Bik : (Thibalt)
12. Said Mortaza : (The Prince)
13. Abdul Saboor (Father Lorenzo)
18. Mohammad Arif Bahunar : lead actor (did not play in Romeo and Juliet)
19. Haroon Amani (replaced Habib, minor role)
20. Ghulamuddin Ewaz : part-time: technical stage assistant, FCCS

On 29 August the Theatre Aftab had its premiere of Romeo and Juliet in the courtyard of the FCCS. It was the very first time that the actors had public exposure on the stage. The performance went very well however and was loved by the audience, mostly Afghans but also some foreigners residing in Kabul, and journalists.

With the departure of Maurice Durozier and Shaghayegh Beheshti the second phase of the project ended.

Third Phase: Performance in Tajikistan

The FCCS still had some funds remaining from the Prince Claus Fund and OSI, and continued to assist the Theatre Aftab with rehearsal facilities, management support and small expenses. The actors decided to incorporate more scenes and dialogues from the original and thus continued their rehearsals. Another performance at the Foundation's Cultural Center was organized in September.

The FCCS then applied for travel costs to send the Theatre Aftab to the Theatre Festival of Dushanbe (20-25 September). They traveled to Tajikistan by road, crossing the broad Amu Darya at Sher Khan Bandar on the day of the Parliamentary elections. They performed once, while seeing the plays of Central Asian theatre companies and mingling with their Tajik counterparts (both populations speak Persian). Again, the performance was considered a highlight of the Festival, and well reported in the media, including the BBC. During this festival the contacts were laid for a Tajik theatre workshop in Kabul that would take place in November/December.

The trip to Tajikistan and the good reception their play got there further energized the group. Some other young talents, including two young women, were attracted to join the troupe. Before Eid, in early November, the 18 artists that performed in Romeo and Juliet got their first payment ever: 100\$ each, with the funds still remaining on the project.

Future Phase: Training in Paris

After the successful production of Romeo and Juliet, Ariane Mnouchkine became interested in trying to get the Theatre Aftab to the base of the Theatre du Soleil in Paris: *La Cartoucherie du Bois de Vincennes*. She is starting on a new theatre production in early 2006. This usually starts with a workshop open to almost everybody, where she filters the better actors for the kind of production she has in mind. The Afghan actors will partially participate in this workshop (where she may have puppet-masters from Korea, Iranian buffoons and Syrian dancers) but they will also receive their own actors' training, learn about directing and be exposed to different theatrical cultures. Meanwhile the stage technician from the FCCS will receive on the job skill-training from his French counterparts.

There is also a plan to have the Afghans perform their Persian version (with subtitles) of Romeo and Juliet in the suburbs of Paris, especially those with large and restless immigrant communities. The young immigrants living there could be stimulated to pursue vocations in art if they see young Afghans perform in their streets. It would also be a confrontation for the young Afghans with the reality of immigration in the West.

When they return from Paris more options for the future of the Theatre Aftab, as the motor of theatre development in Afghanistan, must be found. Several options are under discussion presently.

Current Situation and Future Plans for Theatre AFTAB and Theatre du Soleil

Kabul, 20 October 2005

On the composition of the group:

- Habib was requested to leave the AFTAB theatre group, as he was not playing any role and was hindering the cohesion of the group and their work with his fundamentalism. He left without protesting. Mahmood is now again the Aftab Theatre Director, leading the other 17 actors. He also takes care of financial and administrative matters for the group.
- Maryam cannot continue acting. This is due to personal reasons, but also because of lack of professional motivation. She is more interested in escaping the country and resettling in France. The FCCS will try to find an actress that is truly motivated to continuing in theatre, gets along well with the group, has sufficient beauty to play the role of Juliet, and is not afraid of social reactions. We probably will have to offer a financial incentive, and pay her a salary. This might create tensions with the other group members, but then again they might understand.

On future plans

- Currently the group is still practicing three times a week in the FCCS concert hall (on Saturdays, Mondays and Wednesdays) although during Ramadan this program is less regular. They are following Maurice's suggestions to work on voice, movement etc.
- Maurice plans to come in the month of December, for two weeks. The first week will be spent adding some lines and elements to the current Romeo and Juliet production, and the second week for a tour outside Kabul. The FCCS suggests Pul-e Khumri (2 representations), Mazar (2 representations) and Shiberghan (1 representation). In these places there are good auditoriums, the people are more liberal and arts-loving, and the weather is not too cold.
- After that, if the required funds are found, the Theatre Aftab will be invited to Paris by the Theatre du Soleil to participate in their workshops for the new production (February-March). When they return, we hope the group will start working on a new theatre production.

Financials

The contributions of the Prince Claus Fund (38,000 Euros) and OSI (15,600 USD plus travel costs) have been nearly fully spent. The small remaining funds will be used for the Aftab's rehearsal costs (heating etc).

Robert Kluyver

FCCS

Marketing Art

Most artists work to please themselves, however it helps if one can sell their work and make some money. Here are some guide lines to market art work.

- Framing
- Pricing
- Survey
- Labeling
- Artist's Statement
- Self Promotion and Portfolio
- Competitions and Positive Criticism
- Exhibitions and Galleries
- Show openings
- Internet

Framing

Framing can not only enhance, protect and add value to art work but a good frame will certainly make a difference for the better. Using simple wooden frames rather than, golden, coloured or silver frames for example. In some cases framing is not even required.

Pricing

Pricing your art work carefully will help increase sales at some point. For up coming artists it is better to have a reasonable price rather than over price as it is more important for the work to be recognized and the artists himself.

Survey

Surveying and understanding your target market is the first step in sales. It is vital to know what kind of work will sell and if it is different and unique then developing a market for it by introducing it in a new kind of way. Sometimes there is more than one market for art work as people from different countries have different likes and dislikes.

Labeling

All art work should be labeled and signed by the artist and dated. Signing on the right hand side of the painting at the lower bottom is better. Giving a painting a title will also help in understanding the thought process behind the creation.

Artist's Statement

Most art institutions that give grants, residencies, scholarships and fellowships require an artist's statement which includes a brief summary of the artist's work and inspirations.

Self Promotion and Portfolio

The best way to promote ones art is to interact as much with other artists, attend workshops and exhibitions of other artists. An updated portfolio of ones work will do wonders as people are always interested to look at the art work rather than just hear about it. Slides, pictures, digital photographs or even maintaining a file of an updated CV, participation in exhibitions, (group or solo) commissioned work etc.

Competitions and Criticism

Participation in art competitions, local or international is always a learning experience for artists. Whether the work wins a price or not comes much later, although the participation process itself is rewarding. Criticism of art work is healthy and helps the artist realize where he lacks and can improve. Positive input is encouraging and motivating.

Exhibitions

A professional artist must have one exhibition per year so his work stays in focus. Young artists however can have more shows especially group shows after selecting their best work before exhibiting. Keeping in touch with galleries, attending art forums and show openings, maintaining good relations with curators also helps tremendously.


Internet


Looking up the net for any information on art and art events around the world also opens the mind. Chatting with other artists from around the world is a good exercise to know how other artists cope with their problems. Most important of all is to look at different techniques, styles of painting and famous artists and get inspired and experiment with new ideas in ones own art.

Excerpt of the poetry book “An Assembly of Moths”.

This book contains poems written by Khalilullah Khalili, translated by his son Massood Khalili and Dr. Whitney Azoy. The book was published in India (1,000 copies) at the end of 2004 with the support of the Foundation for Culture and Civil Society, with funds provided by the Open Society Institute.

The illustrations are made by Sohaila Khalili, contemporary artist and wife of Massood Khalili





The moths assembled one night
at the hem of a garden.
They came from every direction
to burn at the candle's base.
Suddenly a red bee appeared,
seeking admission,
Buzzing its alien bee song
but claiming moth citizenship
"What's this noise," asked a moth
"that breaks death's silence?"
Expel him from our assembly of lovers."



Said another moth, "Let's first find out
Who he really is, not rely on guesses.
Let's examine him in the ways of Love
Then, if he fails,
we can throw him out. "
So the moths said,
"Whoever you are,
fly to the city,
And check on the candles all across town.
If you observe any of them in flame
Come back like the wind and let us know."



So that bee,
unfamiliar with Love's secrets,
Unschool'd in pain and fire and Love's song,
Observed a candle burning in every household,
Observed -
but only observed -
a whole town of small flames.
Satisfied,
the bee rushed back to the moth assembly
And reported his detached findings:
Candle flames everywhere.



But the moths,
in one voice, said, "You're no Lover.
No place for you in this assembly.
If, like a real moth,
you knew Love's lessons,
You'd fly into the first candle flame
and burn."
Not every crazy man is like Majnoun.
Not every fly has the bravery of a moth.



**Yama Torabi
Lorenzo Delesgues**

Afghanistan: a Post-War Reconstruction Survey

**Foundation for Culture and Civil Society,
Integrity Watch Afghanistan and Tiri**

**A project of
Integrity in Reconstruction Program**

March, 2006

ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AACA	Afghanistan Assistance Coordinating Authority
ACBAR	Agency Coordinating Body for Afghanistan Relief
ADB	Asian Development Bank
ADF	Afghan Development Forum
AIA	Afghan Interim Authority
ANDS	Afghanistan's National Development Strategy
ARDS	Afghanistan Reconstruction and Development Services
AREU	Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit
ARTF	Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund
ASP	Afghanistan Stabilization Program
ATA	Afghanistan Transitional Administration
CG	Consultative Group
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
CLJ	Constitutional <i>Loya Jirga</i> (Grand Council)
CSP	Country Strategy Paper
DAD	Donor Assistance Database
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
DFID	Department for International Development
EC	European Commission
ELJ	Emergency <i>Loya Jirga</i> (Grand Council)
EUSR	European Union's Special Representative
FY	Fiscal Year
GAO	US Government Accountability Office
GIAC	General Independent Anti-Corruption Office
HDI	Human Development Index
IARCSC	Independent Administrative Reform and Civil Service Commission
ICG	International Crisis Group
IDA	International Development Association
IDB	International Development Bank
IGO	Inter-governmental Organization
IOM	International Organization for Migration
IRC	International Rescue Committee
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
IWA	Integrity Watch Afghanistan
JFPR	Japan Fund for Poverty Reduction
JICA	Japan International Cooperation Agency
JSDF	Japanese Social Development Fund
KfW	Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (German Bank for Reconstruction)
LBG	Louis Berger Group, Inc.
LOTFA	Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MISFA	Microfinance Investment and Support Facility in Afghanistan
MoF	Ministry of Finance

MoLSA	Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs
MRRD	Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development
NDB	National Development Budget
NDF	National Development Framework
NDP	National Development Program
NEEP	National Emergency Employment Program
NIPP	National Irrigation and Power Program
NPP	National Priority Program
NSP	National Solidarity Program
ODI	Overseas Development Institute
RNISS	Tiri's Reconstruction National Integrity system Survey
SAF	Securing Afghanistan's Future
SG	Secretary General
TISA	Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan
UNICEF	UN Children Fund
UNOPS	UN Operational Services
URD	Urgence, Réhabilitation, Développement
WB	World Bank

Afghan Fiscal Year

March 21 – March 20

Solar Year	Calendar Year
FY 1380	(January 2002 to March 2002)
FY 1381	(March 2002 to March 2003)
FY 1382	(March 2003 to March 2004)
FY 1383	(March 2004 to March 2005)
FY 1384	(March 2005 to March 2006)

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Introduction

Afghanistan is a landlocked country bordering Pakistan, China, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Iran. Mountains dominate the central and eastern parts of Afghanistan, covering about three fourths of the country. Its population is estimated to be 24 millions, but no official census has taken place since the partial population census of 1978. Government and international estimates consider that this figure will double by 2015. The majority of the population is rural. Only 30% lives in urban areas. However, urbanization has occurred with a rapid pace over the last four years. Kabul alone is estimated by the World Bank to receive 250,000 new inhabitants annually for the 5 coming years. Administratively, Afghanistan is currently divided into 34 provinces (*Welayat*), each consisting of many districts (*Woleswali*). The major ethnic groups are Pashtuns, Tajiks, Hazaras, Uzbeks and Turkmens. The GDP was estimated, by the report *Securing Afghanistan's Future*, at 6.55 billion USD for 2004²⁵. This included the value of 2.5 billion USD of poppy cultivation. According to the World Bank, 70% of the population lived with less than 2 USD a day in 2004²⁶. Afghanistan is ranked 173rd country in the HDI according to the latest human development report of the UNDP²⁷. The under-five mortality rate in 2004 was 257 children out of 1000.

The conflict

The war that lasted 23 years occurred as a result of both internal and international dynamics. It was closely linked to state and society developments in Afghanistan. While the formal education set up by the state since 1920s produced a type of elite and inspirations for equal opportunities in having access to power, the political regime lacked necessary reforms since 1950s, becoming much more serious during the last decade under the rule of Zahir Shah. The emergence of two antagonistic political streams accentuated the struggle for power and alliance making. This led to a first coup in 1973 allowing Dawood, former King's cousin, to declare the regime as republican and get the involvement in power of communist elites. The second coup, in 1978, marked the arrival in power of two communist parties (*Parcham* and *Khalq*). As a result of political pressures after 1973, elites from the second political stream (Islamist groups, products of the University campus) started leaving the country for Pakistan and began violent political action.

International and regional geopolitical developments have also influenced the war²⁸. Since its creation²⁹, the Afghan state relied on external resources: looting in India at its origins when it acted as an empire, political taxes paid by the British Empire to the Afghan King until 1919 and aid to development from the United States and the Soviet Union starting in 1950s. In fact, the balance of aid inclined towards the Soviet Union after 1954 when the US signed a military cooperation with Pakistan, which Afghanistan considered with much concern. As a result, as Barnett Rubin puts it, Afghanistan had become a rentier-state in three decades, living mainly on foreign assistance. In 1978, the context of the Cold War helping, the stake in Afghanistan was high for the Soviet Union: unrealistic reforms and imported ideological agenda of the communist elites would cause social uprising that may have resulted in the overthrow of the pro-Soviet *Khalq* party. This obliged the

²⁵ On the basis of US dollars of 2002, *Security Afghanistan's Future* served as the basis of discussions in the Berlin conference in March 2004 and can be viewed at <http://www.af/recosting/berlinconference.html>

²⁶ *Op. cit.*, the value basis is the USD of 2001.

²⁷ UNDP Afghanistan, *Security with a human face: challenges and responsibilities*, 2004

²⁸ Barnett Rubin, *The Fragmentation of Afghanistan*, 2002

²⁹ The modern Afghan state and Institutions are considered to emerge during Abdul Rahaman reign (1880-1901).

Soviet Union to intervene militarily in 1978 to sustain the communist regime, but this time through *Parcham* party.

The post-1978 war transmuted over time and could be divided in three periods: the first period until 1992 could be qualified as a resistance war against the Soviet Union and its allied communist regime. The main Afghan actors of this war were the Mujahiddin groups and parties. The war took place in the context of the bipolar system, which allowed the resistance groups to get generous assistance by the US and its allies, mainly after 1984. The second period that emerged as a result of armed struggle between former allies in 1989 and continued until 1996 could be qualified as a civil war. This involved different Mujahiddin factions. It gained in intensity and touched Kabul city after the fall of Nadjibullah's government in 1992. Regional interferences and the burgeoning of a self-sustaining political economy of war were the main characteristics of this period. The third period, between 1996 and 2001, could be characterized as a war between the Taliban, entertained by foreign Islamist movements and a heteroclite alliance of former Mujahiddin groups, known as the Northern Alliance after US intervention in 2001. This military intervention resulted in a rapid regime change. Yet, a low intensity war has continued in the Southern and Eastern regions of the country with former Taliban commanders and attracted a couple of new comers into the scene of armed violence: Hekmatyar, Haqani etc.

The war has left the country with heavy human and intellectual scars. An estimated 1.5 million have lost their lives during the first period. Approximately, 4% of the population has been seriously wounded. No clear figures are available on disabled³⁰, but more than 1 million persons are estimated to be physically handicapped and are now suffering from a high rate of unemployment (up to 84%³¹). Approximately over 2 million Afghans suffer from mental health problems, particularly the generation aged between 12 and 35. The war caused huge internal and international population displacements. While 4 million Afghans came back in the country since 2002, according to UNHCR, a recent census by the Pakistan government showed that there are still 3 million refugees present in Pakistan. More than 1 million are still living in Iran. Owing to the influx of returning refugees, the population of Kabul alone has increased to around 250% in the last three years. Afghanistan's resources for education were limited even before the war. The war destroyed schools and teachers received little or no training. Thousands of qualified teachers were forced out from the country. As a result an entire generation has been left over, in particular women. After 2002, the "back to school" program brought back 70 000 teachers and 1.7 million children to school³².

There are high speculations about the economic losses of the war. A World Bank assessment considers that the last 23 years of war cost Afghanistan 240 billion USD³³ in terms of humanitarian aid and lost growth. In 1977, Afghanistan's GDP was estimated to be about 3.7 billion USD. It has dropped by about 20% during the 10 initial years of war followed by a stagnation period during the 1990s. It was estimated at 2.7 billion during the Taliban period. The majority of the public infrastructure (roads, hospital, schools, bridges, public offices, canals...) has been destroyed by the war either directly or indirectly. Many suffered from a lack of maintenance for two decades. Major destruction of private houses and properties occurred in the provinces before 1992 while Kabul city was mainly affected between 1992 and 1996. House destruction, forced occupation of land and

³⁰ TISA, *Comprehensive National Disability Policy*, 2003

³¹ IRC and MOLSA, *Labor Market Information Survey*, 2003.

³² The program was funded by USAID and implemented by Afghan government and UNICEF

³³ See <http://www.af/recosting/berlinconference.html>

forced selling of proprieties are the most common private capital destructions that occurred during the war. These illicit activities still take place in the post war period. The very low industrial development of the country before 1978 has been annihilated by the war. It concerned mainly cement plants, dry fruits industries, gas and petroleum extraction activities in the north, a textile factory in Jabulsaraj, olive oil production in Jalalabad etc.

Quite the same, there were some speculations on the level of the foreign debt of Afghanistan which did not allow the real debts to be publicly known. The Minister of Economy evaluated debts incurred by previous administration at 1.5 billion USD. Russia claimed until a few months ago that Afghanistan owed the former Soviet Union a billion USD. Official figures from the MoF established the total debts of Afghanistan at 182.9 million USD: 57.4 from USAID, 25 from US Department of Agriculture, 40 from former German Democratic Republic, 1.8 from OPEC fund, 49.5 from WB and 9.2 from ADB³⁴. Only pre-1381 loans from ADB and WB have been serviced on the basis of an annual interest of 442 thousand USD. Afghanistan benefited from debt cancellation by three creditors: China (£9.6 million), Denmark (5 million Danish kroner) and Germany (34.5 million euros). Furthermore, 47.3 million USD have been paid off by other governments directly to Afghanistan's creditors.

Environmental damages due to the war have not been comprehensively acknowledged yet. In 2003, 10 millions land mines still needed to be cleared. This process is capital both for the rehabilitation of lands and in order to offer pasturing to 1.8 million nomads. FAO and UNDP estimate, the area of forests declined, from an already low base of 3.4% in 1980s, to 2.6% (1.9 million ha.) of the total land area in 1991. The level of deforestation increased due to the war, mainly for two reasons: the increase in demand for wood because of refugees return and the war retaliation, particularly in the Shamali area. This has had a direct consequence on agriculture, poor watershed management, soil erosion and biodiversity conservation. The lack of state intervention and the wood traffic to Pakistan and Dubai sustained by warlords and Pakistani smugglers have resulted in wild cutting of trees. The desertification process was exacerbated by adverse effects of war and by 4 consecutive years of drought that lasted until 2002 in arid northern, western and southern regions. The capacity to produce fresh and dry fruits for exports, as it was the case before the war, is limited for many years as the majority of orchards were destroyed and many drying techniques vanished. The irrigation systems necessary for agriculture in most of the country suffered from direct destruction and a lack of maintenance. Canals that allowed the drainage of swampy lands have been destroyed leaving deserts of salty lands. Mineral exploitation to finance Mudjahidin political parties and factions, has been very intense in Badakhshan region, where lapis lazuli and rubies were intensely extracted. Other underground minerals or products suffered from access difficulties and were not exploitable in war period without an adapted infrastructure. The risk to have the patterns for this very worthy mine field and deposit sold or anarchically exploited by private actors or State spoiler is now high.

A humanitarian history³⁵

The humanitarian assistance in Afghanistan is closely associated with burgeoning transnational solidarities. Before the war, only a few agencies (Care, UN agencies, Asia Foundation) had an experience of the country. NGOs started working in refugee camps in Pakistan from 1979 onward and soon expanded their emergency activities inside the country. The growing aid community gave birth to different social representations among Afghans. The aid sector started soon to attract

³⁴ MoF, *Financial Report*, October 2004

³⁵ See the *The Case of Afghanistan* prepared for Group URD by François Grünewald

educated Afghans to work within the UN/NGO sector. At the end of the Taliban, due to economic atrophy the sector became prosperous and even became a tool for social mobility within Afghan society. In fact, the UN/NGO sector helped the formation of a distinct elite path, with specifically different values and objectives from political elites. It was only after the overthrow of the Taliban that members of this specific elite group got access to governmental positions³⁶.

The aid community replaced the state in its social responsibilities for the last decade of war, without any institutional mechanism making them accountable to populations. Besides, as Ashraf Ghani put it, “the delivery of services by dispersed and uncoordinated groups leads to higher structure costs and the creation of unsustainable and unaccountable financial practices”³⁷.

Operation Salam (1988): Operation Salam, which aimed to prepare refugees’ return, paved the way for the first large involvement of the UN and its agencies in Afghanistan’s rural areas. However, weakened by the lack of means, poor knowledge of conditions prevailing inside the country and a lack of operational partners in the field, Operation Salam had a rather limited impact. During this phase, a network of Afghan NGOs in Pakistan fostered the ‘sub-contracting’ culture. In fact, the “afghanization” of aid, promoted by the UN especially through UNOCA, started in 1989 and resulted in a proliferation of local NGOs. UNOCA even started registering Afghan NGOs in 1992 as a service to other UN agencies as they were as implementing partners³⁸. Most of these structures were set up by former staff of the UN or international NGOs. Until 1992, NGO undertook cross-border activities mainly in zones that were freed from pro-Soviet government control.

Civil war (1992-1996): During this period, large relief programs were mainly implemented by ICRC and WFP via sub-contracting by NGOs. Though some areas remained difficult to access due to logistics, continuing conflict (for example, in the Central Highlands) and banditry, the political situation was relatively stable in most rural areas. In these regions, NGOs, the ICRC, and UN agencies started to implement more development-oriented activities, as opposed to relief interventions. Most UN and donor agencies were settled in Islamabad, while most NGOs kept their bases in Peshawar, from where they carried out assistance programs in the camps and ‘cross-border’ operations, mostly in the eastern region. As the Cold War ended, diminishing interests of Western governments, especially the US, indirectly favored the rise of NGO. Besides, during this period, USAID gave much of its funding to NGOs rather than private companies.

The Taliban (1996–2001): Taliban policies gave rise to strong tensions within aid community, sometimes leading both to the temporary eviction of all NGOs based in Kabul and to individual expulsions of aid organizations. At times, serious security concerns for UN personnel prevented their actions. The sanctions applied by the UN and the budgetary restrictions of the European Commission (for example, ECHO) did not facilitate the provision of assistance to a population that continued to suffer simultaneously from the conflict and from one of the harshest droughts in the country. Donors officially refused provision of “development aid”, which resulted in the humanitarian labeling of every project. Paradoxically, this was the period when the aid was the most

³⁶ Hanif Atmar, Sima Samar, Massoum Stanekzai, Yusuf Nuristani, to name just a few

³⁷ Ashraf Ghani, Clare Lockart and Michael Carnahan, *Closing the sovereignty Gap: an approach to State-Building*, ODI, September 2005, p. 11

³⁸ Antonio Donini, *Policies of Mercy: UN Coordination in Afghanistan, Mozambique and Rwanda*, Institute for International Studies, Brown University, 1996, p. 42

principle-driven³⁹. As a result, humanitarian assistance was provided on the basis of aid neutrality, stricter impartiality towards conflicting parties, severe gender conditionality regarding the funding for education etc.

Postwar settlement

The post-conflict timeline combined, at least, three divergent dynamics: i) the need assessments carried out by UN and other international agencies in October 2001 even before the end of the Taliban regime gave an important role to non-state actors; ii) the Bonn Conference held in November 2001 that resulted in Bonn Agreement conferred to the Afghan citizens an important role, especially through the political process; iii) the war on terrorism waged by the US and its allies continued and was not articulated within the postwar settlement. The post-conflict situation had many serious built-in elements of conflict that allowed Astri Suhrke to qualify it as a conflictual peace-building⁴⁰. There was an obvious tension between economic strategies, that gave international agencies an important role to resume relief operations and plan for reconstruction, and political strategies, which positioned the Afghan state as the major player.

The Bonn Conference was not a peace agreement. It brought together the victorious Afghan parties of the war, which was quickly won with US support. There were four Afghan delegations present in the Conference. Merely two of them asserted themselves as major players: the Northern Alliance, which symbolically liberated the capital, and the former King's entourage, mainly American-Afghans from the Diaspora. The defeated party, the Taliban, was not represented. The Afghan population neither. However, Lakhdar Brahimi asked for a symbolic Afghan Civil Society Forum to take place in parallel with the Conference. The Conference gave way to the Bonn process and to the arrival in power of the most active group within the Northern Alliance: the Shura-e-Nezar, known as *Panjsheris*. The interim government that ensued reflected the above split of power: Security institutions were occupied by *Panjsheris* while financial institutions went to the Afghan-Americans. The international community acknowledged the unrepresentative character of the agreement by stating the necessity of a transition to a more 'broad-based, gender-sensitive, multi-ethnic and fully representative' government⁴¹.

The Bonn process was a roadmap for transition until a fully representative state would be in place. It consisted of a number of steps that allowed measuring the progress in stability of the political process. An Afghan Interim Authority (AIA) had to assume the power in December 2001 for six months in order to organize an emergency *Loya Jirga* (broad assembly) that allowed a more legitimate government. An Afghan Transitional Administration could emerge as a result and stay in power for 2 years. This second period would be achieved after the drafting of a constitution, ratified by a constitutional *Loya Jirga*, followed by presidential and parliamentary elections. The *Loya Jirga* emerged as the main legitimizing tool within the process.

Under the language of the Bonn Agreement a more ambitious perspective was reflected. Key international actors acted more in line with a minimalist – actors say pragmatic – perspective aimed at safeguarding short-term stability and limiting the influence of conservative Islamists. Many

³⁹ Antonio Donini, An Elusive Quest : Integration in the Response to the Afghan Crisis, *Ethics and International Affairs*, vol 18, n° 2, 2004

⁴⁰ Astri Suhrke *et al.*, *Conflictual Peace building*, International Peace Research Institute, Oslo, 2004

⁴¹ Text of the Bonn Agreement and the Security Council resolution of December 6, 2001

subjects directly related to the postwar situation were whether ignored or deliberately set aside. Human rights, for instance, were left aside⁴². The Accord did not cover issues like demobilization and reconstitution of a new army. Many other issues such as the role of Islam, the political regime, remained unresolved, ‘complicated by the lack of agreement on constitutive principles on the nature of the Afghan state and society’⁴³.

Yet, some background elements supported the peace process. The Afghans themselves were tired of war and there was a remarkable willingness among the population to go towards peace. Although, the last decade of war witnessed many ethnic massacres and cleaning of population on the basis of ethnicity, the society itself was not deeply divided into ethnic lines and communities as it was the case in Bosnia or Rwanda. Also, the end of Taliban’s regime did not result in total anarchy, traditional leaders and local commanders replaced them in most of the country. Last but not least, contrary to the way Iraqi war was decided, there was a united vision within the set of the regional and international actors for Afghanistan’s mid term future.

While the political framework was set at Bonn, donor summits orchestrated foreign commitments to Afghanistan. The Tokyo Conference held in January 2002 raised 4.5 billion USD, most of which were dedicated to relief and emergency operations. The summit was co-chaired by the US, Japan, European Union and Saudi Arabia. A second general donor conference took place in Berlin in March 2004. The Conference showed a high level of Afghan capacity as it was entirely prepared by the Afghan government. A shift to development aid by the donors was introduced through a multi-year development agenda that considered progressive reduction of poppy economy and its replacement in real GDP through the growth of legal economy. The drafted document asked for 27.6 billions over 7 years on commitment basis. The Conference pledged 8.2 billion USD for the first three years, i.e. more than 90% of the money expected by the Afghan Minister of Finance.

Rebel groups who have not been included in Bonn continued their armed violence. However, Karzai undertook in 2004 a more sensible policy of social and political inclusiveness, which aimed at increasing his basis of power in the South. This was quite sensitive during 2004 when Karzai co-opted in power sharing mechanisms some former Taliban. The Constitutional Loya Jirga of December 2003 already included former Taliban who formed up to 10% of the 500 participants. The establishment of a Reconciliation Commission suffered from mixed messages towards former rebel groups. However, after the parliamentary elections took place in September 2005, the president of the Commission offered amnesty to Hekmatyar and Mullah Omer if they ceased violence. Both rejected the offer. The election process itself allowed inclusion of many notorious Taliban leaders, while others failed to win sufficient votes to become deputies.

Corruption through the conflict

Corruption during the conflict is poorly documented. However, it is obvious that it has shifted through the different stages of the conflict. Within the state administration, petty and grand corruptions have both existed and resisted all regime changes. During his last years in power, Najibullah personally supported a TV program, set up by an engaged journalist, which aimed at pinpointing corrupted individuals and networks. The journalist suffered from many death threats and the program was interrupted many times. Before the withdrawal of the Red Army, many Soviet

⁴² Niland Nora, “Justice postponed: the marginalization of human rights in Afghanistan” in Antonio Donini *et al.* *Nation building unraveled? Peace, Aid and Justice*, Kumarian Press, Bloomfield Conn, 2004

⁴³ Astri Suhrke, *op. cit.* pp. 4

officers themselves were involved in corruption. Afghanistan became a gate way to smuggle proscribed occidental goods to the Soviet Union through a network of army officials and Afghan custom officers. Some of these networks staid in place after the Soviet Union collapsed and began to be used for more profitable drug trafficking. Grand corruption accelerated from 1992 to 1996 as a result of state fragmentation. In fact, after the fall of the communist regime, the central state started to be less coherent and was controlled by local and regional power holders or factions. Customs and border control constituted the most lucrative zones for local commanders. Many armed struggles in the cities, highly motivated by control over such resources, happened around airports, or public custom offices. This even took the form of a vendetta in Jalalabad during the last year of the Mujahiddin regime and resulted in a well-known massacre of members of Nangarhar Council on the road for Peshawar⁴⁴.

The rule of the Taliban was the only period when little perception of corruption practices by civil servants actually existed. There might be multiple reasons to this. First, the administration has been considerably reduced, as was the demand of citizens for state services. Second, the Taliban state was not really a state built on weberian bureaucratic rationality, but rather an administration of religious manners and behaviors. This resulted in hand-to-hand and under the table transactions among the Taliban leaders, which made it even hard to be evaluated in terms of corruption. Third, petty corruption by civil servants was sanctioned by way of example. Yet, despite expected severe punishment by the religious regime and the politics of zero tolerance, corruption did not completely disappear. On the contrary, this provided for a shift into a more legal practice in which private offices mediated the provision of government service between the state and the citizens against a commission. The private businesses used relatives and family connections without obviously leaving an evidence of kickbacks⁴⁵.

On the other hand, the progressive constitution of an assistance community and aid practices offered many advantages to reduce the level of corruption. Before the end of 2001, many NGOs and agencies who worked in Afghanistan had followed their activities continuously over the years. Most of them had set up strong monitoring and evaluation systems, forged management tools and procurement procedures, nurtured both downward and upward accountability values, standards and practices, formed a highly qualified staff, and build connections with beneficiary populations. All these were meant to improve transparency and accountability. ACBAR which had the responsibility for the coordination among NGOs had, for instance, an M&E unit that carried out external monitoring for NGOs. During the Taliban, when the regime put a lot of pressures on them, NGOs used their deep-rooted relations within the population and a moral principle of accountability towards them to reduce the impact of the regime. As a result, accountability developed much more towards the population while interactions with government were limited.

Yet, the aid community was not free of corruption. Non-integrity practices transcended actors all along the chain that started with the donors and ended by the beneficiaries. First, the foreign donors have used aid flows to manipulate NGOs or even use them for non-humanitarian goals despite their commitment to a set of humanitarian values. A French NGO became famous, in Afghanistan, for channeling money and weapons for the Northern Alliance. Leaders of the same NGO were criticized for private use of public funds. Many NGOs used funds mainly to expand their treasury or infrastructure. The expatriate staff of the NGOs had comfortable living conditions and often

⁴⁴ One of the authors living in Jalalabad at that time personally witnessed the events.

⁴⁵ IWA interviews October and November 2005

excessive and unjustified expenses in guest houses, in domestic staff and in representation. The impeccable image of the aid community was marred by a couple of scandals that shocked the members themselves. A well-known and powerful local NGO (AREA) had to make public the misuse of enormous amounts of money by its staff. Another important NGO (AVICENNE) had gone bankrupted many years ago, but its leaders made their way through other structures within the aid sector. Somehow, the reason for which erupting scandals appeared huge may be understood through the fact that principles – especially accountability towards beneficiary populations – mattered during this period within the aid community.

The individuals and groups themselves abused of their beneficiary status. For instance, the recyclers' phenomenon in repatriation programs – i.e. those who crossed back and forth the frontiers in order to receive the same amount of assistance many times – was estimated to constitute more than 10% of the overall assistance received by the refugees⁴⁶. Many beneficiaries sold the rations they received. Village leaders who were asked for information or were involved in distribution process often abused (misinformation or misappropriation of goods) of their position. Many bought from corrupt aid official documents that allowed them to benefit from the beneficiary status.

The reconstruction process

Introduction


Early stages of the intervention

The period between November 2001 and April 2002 will probably be remembered as one of confusion, during which access to donor funds and agency visibility were among the strongest driving forces in the deployment of aid. There was a rush of hundreds of agencies in the country, some of which had no previous experience of Afghanistan. Many were created as phantom structures that only relied on assistance money for their existence. The annual establishment rate of Afghan NGOs and social organizations were multiplied by 5 to 6 between the period before the intervention and the six months following it (see figure below)⁴⁷. Quite the same, according to the Afghan Ministry of Planning registry, there were more than 2000 NGO early 2004 while they were 250 registered in September 2001⁴⁸.

⁴⁶ David Turton and Peter Mardsen, *Taking Refugees for a Ride? The politics of refugee return to Afghanistan*, Kabul, AREU, 2002

⁴⁷ FCCS, unpublished survey of 900 Afghan Civil Society Organizations, October 2005

⁴⁸ Danida, *A Joint Evaluation, Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance to Afghanistan 2001-2005 from Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom*, October 2005



Source: FCCS, unpublished survey of 900 Afghan Civil Society Organizations, October 2005

The early stages of the intervention were marked by emergency assistance. Relief needs have been exaggerated as no other body had a say on the allocation of funds apart from aid agencies. Needs assessments of October 2001 by ADB and UN agencies, which have been carried out before the Bonn Agreement in which the Afghan Government had a relatively significant role, prevailed over allocation of funds and provided the international organizations a greater role. Most of international assistance to Afghanistan went through the Annual Afghanistan Appeal and “Donor Alert” for 584 million USD for the period of October 2001-March 2002, which was announced in late September 2001. Although the funds contributed through the Appeal went into a massive Trust Fund, virtually all contributions were “earmarked for specific projects, programs, and implementing agencies, which means that (1) the Appeal provides little scope for prioritization by coordinating bodies independent from the specific funding choices of donors; and (2) the composition of overall assistance tends to be skewed, and certain important sectors—such as education—get grossly under-funded”⁴⁹.

Local capacity

There weren’t so many high level Afghans with whom the donor community worked in the very early stages. Competition among donors might have produced a fragmented reliance on local

⁴⁹ World Bank, Afghanistan World Bank Approach Paper, November 2001

capacities. On the other hand, this was the period when foreign agencies implemented themselves most of the aid directly. There are different reasons for the emergence of figures of high level Afghans, depending on the individual paths of the top 6 Afghans and the needs of the moment. Some had a long experience with individual trajectories crosscutting aid community actors. Others were politically important or emerged as such at the end of 2001. Hanif Atmar who studied development and aid, for instance, worked for NGOs and was Deputy Director of IRC before becoming Minister of Rehabilitation and Rural Development. He had some academic publications, had become a respected figure within British aid agencies and was one of the most suited candidate for the job. His long and fresh experience in rural development in Afghanistan gave him higher advantages compared to the elites who stayed in Europe. Sima Samar had a quite similar path. She used to work with NGOs on health, education and gender. She founded and directed Shohada, an important local NGO. She had lost her husband, had a militant career and was originated from a minority group at a time when the international community was emphasizing on the ethnic balance of the government. Ashraf Ghani had a slightly different path. He worked for the World Bank and the UN and used to be a respected professor in American universities. He proved his commitment towards Afghanistan through his academic works, especially those papers written with Barnett Rubin and Olivier Roy, both recognized specialists of the country. Ghani had kept contacts with the Afghan elites in the West. He set up and led AACA during its first stages, which became the central body for the aid coordination. As the donor community started showing irritation about the incompetence of the former Finance Minister, he was appointed to replace him in June 2002. Ghani's efforts in establishing aid management mechanisms make him, no doubt, the architect of the financial structures in Afghanistan since 2002. Anwar-ul Haq Ahadi was a professor and worked in banking in the US before becoming Director of the Afghan Central Bank in 2002. He headed a political party and was married to Fatima Gailani, the daughter of an important political figure in the country. He replaced Ashraf Ghani in December 2004. Fahim is the famous warlord who received most of the funding by the US for Afghan Militia Forces. He emerged as the military commander of Massoud's forces after his assassination and remained Minister of Defense until December 2004. Dr. Abdullah, Minister of Foreign Affairs since the fall of the Taliban is a moderate figure who became a politically heavy actor after Massoud's death. He promoted peace solutions for Afghanistan abroad and within the circles of international organizations and western chancelleries.

The examples from the top 6 Afghans show, at the same time, how difficult it is to define local capacity. Ashraf Ghani's proximity is rather the global world. Yet he proved to be an excellent intermediate between the aid community and the Afghan population. Should the local capacity be defined geographically: local=inside Afghanistan? Should it be politically defined: local= Afghans? Should it be socially defined: local=those Afghans who are not part of the expatriate. Should it be defined in regard to freedom or condition of movement: local, not Diaspora, not those from Pakistan, Iran or other neighboring countries, but those who never moved? To avoid debate, we consider locals as those partners on whom the aid community should have relied because of their more effective and useful skills, but also due to the principal of a minimal sustainability.

At the end of 2001, contrary to what is often said, the war-torn Afghanistan was not totally empty of local capacities. NGOs and UN had forged local capacities for years. Migration helped many others to get differing levels of training, i.e. in Pakistan and Iran. Diaspora from European and North-American countries were used both as local and expatriate staff for the reconstruction. Brahimi, the UN SGSR, was mindful of Afghan capacities and sensitiveness when he recommended a "light foot print" approach for UN operations in Afghanistan. Yet, the UN did business as usual. This was because assessment surveys were done by UN and IFIs before the Bonn agreement was signed.

These gave international organizations and NGOs considerable role in executing the funding. The accent was put on relief and emergency dimensions of the intervention, as this is acknowledged in the mainstream analysis of interveners: donors' reports, but also analyses of NGOs and UN agencies were justification for emergency. At least, the first six months were no time of accountability, but "happy-go-lucky operationalism", to use Antonio Donini's terms.

Heavy reliance on international agencies capitalized on a special type of local resources. The main beneficiary in number of aid were those Afghans who experience migration in Pakistan, had basic English and Computer literacy. Members of minority groups who had access to universities in Iran, especially women, had difficulties to join aid agencies because they do not speak a basic English to deal with foreigners. At a more upper level of elites, this problem exists for those Afghans who came from Europe and did not speak the perfect English of their Afghan-American fellows.

One type of local workers suffered particularly from such a setting. For those who stayed inside the country, most of their skills and competencies were downgraded during the war. It was from this category of local capacities that Afghan administration has drawn the bulk of its resources. They are engineers, doctors, lawyers, teachers and low level civil servants who graduated from Afghan Universities. This resulted in resentment and a sense of segregation between Afghans, especially in the capital. If the Afghan administration was not sidelined by NGOs and UN agencies, such local capacities could have been capitalized through institutional capacity building and individual training.

Aid per capita

Actual aid for Afghanistan January 2002 to March 2003: \$67⁵⁰

Projected aid for Afghanistan 2004 to 2010: \$182

Total pledge: \$ 1,6079.8 million as of September 2005⁵¹ (see Annex I for details).

Major Players

Donors

Trends and Areas

Reporting procedures and definitions, program labeling (recovery, development or reconstruction), currency rates, and in some cases lack of data make it difficult to compare the different contributions made by donors. The major state donors included the US, the EU governments, Japan and Canada. Together, they amounted for up to 90% (7.8 billion USD)⁵² of the total disbursed assistance for Afghanistan by states. Funding by international financial institutions was mainly channeled through WB (1,463 million USD of pledges)⁵³ and ADB (1,328 million USD of pledges)⁵⁴. Most of their

⁵⁰ Barnett Rubin *et al.*, *Building a New Afghanistan: The Value of Success, the Cost of Failure*, Center on International Cooperation, March 2004

⁵¹ Source: UNDP, unpublished database


⁵² Rough estimates for the period 2002 to December 2005: 3.1 billion by EC and European governments, 3.5 billion by the US, 1 billion by Japan and 0.25 billion by Canada. These estimates are based on donor reports and include security expenses which are not systematically reported through DAD (expenses by DynCorp, for instance). Estimates made by the Afghan government showed total disbursement of 4.3 billion USD from January 2002 to March 2004 (MoF, Financial Report of October 2004) and 2.53 billion USD from March 2004 to October 2005 (DAD) for all donors. However, these do not consider most of security expenses paid by the US.

⁵³ Ministry of Finance, "Donor Profile", June 2005. Pledges included grants (647 millions USD) and loans (816 million USD), all made at Tokyo and Berlin Conferences for five years (2002-07).

funding (60%) is in the form of loans. As of March 2005, WB and ADB have disbursed 611 million USD in both grants and loans.

Donors' commitments towards the post-conflict reconstruction converged in broad political terms, although differences appeared during the implementation and planning phases of operations. Convergences of the major donors were made around: i) a unity of purpose to unconditionally engage in Afghan reconstruction, support the Bonn process and the fight against terrorism in support of the terrorist hit US; ii) a reconstruction process led by an Afghan ownership; iii) a shift from emergency and relief operations towards reconstruction and development; and iv) a broad oversight role of donors, with each major state taking the lead over a sector or an issue. This resulted in a division of tasks, with relatively insignificant overlaps. Security Sector Reform designed in Geneva Conference in 2002 identified five sectors led by five different nations: the US (army), Germany (police), Italy (justice), UK (counter-narcotics) and Japan (DDR).

Emergency relief was predominant in the two first years of assistance while reconstruction assistance progressively replaced it (see figure from Danida).




Source: Danida, *A Joint Assessment, Humanitarian and reconstruction assistance to Afghanistan 2001-2005*, p. 41


Main sectors

⁵⁴ Ministry of Finance, “Donor Profile”, April 2005. Pledges included grants (458 millions USD) and loans (870 million USD), all made at Tokyo and Berlin Conferences for seven years (2002-09).

National Development Framework which was drafted by the Afghan government has been officially taken into account by major donors⁵⁵. Consequently, a significant amount of funding was initially channeled through the Afghan government. However, as time passed, NDF became only a structure and did not allow for effective control over resources.



Sectoral components of the development budget (1383-1389), needs according to *Securing Afghanistan Future* document that was produced by the Afghan Government and was presented at Berlin in March 2004.



First recipients and disbursements partners


While the two first years witness a relatively significant amount of money channeled through the Afghan government (29%), the trend for Afghan FY 1383 showed a reverse pattern: more than 50%

⁵⁵ Afghanistan Strategic Plan for 2005-2010 of USAID and Country Strategy Paper for 2003-2006 of the EC have formally recognized the NDF as the core instrument through which their funding would be made.


of aid has been spent directly by foreign governments or foreign companies with the Afghan government receiving only 21% (see figure below). This finding should be looked at carefully, yet with caution as the findings FY 1384 seem quite different. However, these figures were based on a level of expenses corresponding to disbursements during the first six months. Generally, the low level of funds going to the Afghan government proves that it still has difficulty to obtain true ownership over funding, even though the London Conference renewed international commitment. The US and the UK particularly do not trust government's accountability and do not directly recognize it as a contractor even though their political backing of the Afghan process is more considerable than many other states.

Donor Disbursement by type of first recipient for FY 1383, rough estimate from DAD as of December 2005


Type of Implementing Agency	in \$ million	%
Private Companies	457	21%
Foreign Governments	673	31%
Afghan Government	457	21%
International Organizations	288	13%
NGO	263	12%
Undetermined	51	2%
Total	2 189	100%



Type of Implementing Agency	1383		1384	
	Million \$	%	Million \$	%
Private Companies	457	21%	22	7%
Foreign Governments	673	31%	2	1%
Afghan Government	457	21%	72	21%
International Organizations	288	13%	178	53%
NGO	263	12%	56	17%
Undetermined	51	2%	9	3%
Total	2 189	100%	339	100%



Total assistance 1380-82		
Implementing Agency	Million \$	%
Private Companies	705	16%
Afghan Government	1 226	29%
UN Agencies	1 957	46%
NGO	413	10%
Total	4 301	100%



Main funding mechanism

Funds went mainly through structures defined by the Afghan government (see NDF and NDB under government section) and trust funds such as ARTF and LOFTA administered respectively by WB and UNDP. Other trust funds such as Afghanistan Interim Authority Fund (AIAF) and the Army Trust Fund (ATF) were established but were closed after their terms ended⁵⁶. Donors funded projects and implementing agencies outside of these mechanisms. Besides, Japan established a few trust funds that were managed by ADB and WB.

ARTF was proposed following a request made by the Afghanistan Reconstruction Steering Group in Brussels in December 21-22. The proposal which was prepared jointly by WB, UNDP, ADB and IDB demanded the WB to be its Administrator and a member of the Management Committee that would include the other mentioned bodies⁵⁷. ARTF was established in May 2002 to serve as a coordinated financing mechanism for the Governments recurrent budget (Recurrent Cost Window) and priority reconstruction programs and projects (Investment Window). A third window, with an initial budget line of 5 million USD, allowed hiring of Afghan expatriates in order to increase the capacity of the Afghan government. As of December 21, 2005, ARTF mobilized 1.322 billion USD (1140 million USD of disbursement by donors to the fund since its establishment and 182 million USD of pledges for the period of current Afghan fiscal year) in grant contributions from 24 bilateral donors⁵⁸. European states and EC constituted 70% of the funding while Canada and the US funded respectively 10.5% and 18% of it. The UK was the single biggest contributor with 23.5% of ARTF.

Out of 1140 million USD received, ARTF Administrator committed 1019.75 million USD and disbursed 847.84 million USD, of which 684.8 million (80%) went to recurrent budget expenditure, 134.5 million (16%) for investment, 22 million to LOTFA and 7 million for the fees of the monitoring agent. The fees taken by the WB do not figure independently, but after the investment

⁵⁶ AIAF was closed in June 2002. MoF, Financial Report, October 2004, p. 13

⁵⁷ ARTF Proposal, March 21, 2001

⁵⁸ World Bank, *ARTF Quarterly Report*, December 2005

income from donor contribution has been reduced from it. So, IDA fees minus investment income amounted to 2.8 million USD as of December 21, 2005.

Aid approaches of the main State and Government Institutions

The United States: The US remained by far the major donor in Afghanistan reconstruction. There is a difference in budgetary terms between the US and other donors. The US considers a pledge the money that is appropriated while many other donors report the amounts that may be a statement of intentions but have not necessarily been mobilized. Obligation is meant by authorization of funding after a law was passed in Congress. This was the case for the Afghanistan Support Freedom Act of 2002 that allowed most of US non-security expenses in Afghanistan. The amounts obligated yearly by the US are much higher than the real expenses in the majority of the cases. There is a clear distinction between security expenses led by the State and Defense Departments, and non-security expenses led essentially by USAID.

For non-security assistance, the US represented 38% (2.8 billion USD) of the 7.3 billion USD of pledges made by all donors for FY 2002-04. Actual expenses represented 1.6 billion USD for the three years⁵⁹. According to Afghanistan Strategic Plan, commitments through USAID for the period 2005-10 are more than 6 billion USD. USAID accounted for 82% (587 million USD) of total US expenditure in FY 2004 and 56% of FY 2002-03. There were 11 (for 2002-03) and 9 (for 2004) US agencies providing assistance. The Bureau for Population, Refugees and Migration, under Department of State, arrived second with 23% in 2003-02 and 7% in 2004 (48 million USD). The main reason for an increased role of USAID over time is the shift from humanitarian and quick impact assistance towards reconstruction and development activities. 75% of the 900 million USD spent in FY 2002-03 concerned humanitarian assistance. Three quarter of the money spent in 2004 went for the reconstruction.

Security considerations, lack of human and financial resources, unfortunate sequencing of funding and political pressures have impeded achievements of US agencies and their accountability. Besides, the awarding of contracts by USAID was done through bidding procedures that have not been fully open and competitive⁶⁰. This rather confirms what USAID official said in Kabul: ‘there is no such a selfish thing than the use of the assistance for international cooperation’⁶¹. USAID works in Afghanistan through one main contractor, preferably for one sector or program. Contracts are no less than 10 million USD and reach many hundred millions for infrastructure projects. Most of the funds go to private US companies. Security considerations have limited the oversight capacities of the USAID. Most of the staff are confined in the US Embassy compound and have to undergo tough security clearances in order to be able to go outside. At the same time, such considerations have allowed salary increases of up to 100%⁶² while the risks of exposure to insecurity in the over-protected compounds are even lower compared to the risks to which ordinary Afghans and the staff

⁵⁹ US Government Accountability Office (GAO), Reports to Congressional Committee, *Afghanistan Reconstruction: Deteriorating Security and Limited Resources Have Impeded Progress; Improvement in US Strategy Needed*, June 2004, and *Afghanistan Reconstruction: Despite Some progress, Deteriorating Security and Other Obstacles Continue to Threaten Achievements of US Goals*, July 2005.

⁶⁰ USAID Regional Office of the Inspector General, Report Number 5-306-04-005-P, Manila, August 2004

⁶¹ IWA interview, Kabul, December 2005

⁶² IWA interview, December 2005

of other agencies are exposed. The work of USAID has been undermined by lack of human resources⁶³. The Kabul mission currently has 100 employees, including drivers, cleaning and security staff, for a level of 1.6 billion USD expected expenses. USAID did not require its contractors to submit quarterly reports, as it did in normal circumstances, because the mission lacked oversight and monitoring capacity⁶⁴.

In September 2003, the US government announced the “Accelerating Success” initiative, providing 1.76 billion USD for reconstruction in 2004. The idea was to accelerate US effort before the Afghan presidential elections that was scheduled for June 2004⁶⁵ and finally took place in October. Besides, USAID concentrated 70% of its reconstruction efforts in Kabul and Kandahar provinces on the vote of whose populations Karzai was mainly counting. However, funds arrived late, with for the majority 3 to 6 months to meet the targets. In FY 2004, 41% of USAID expenditure went to infrastructure and 17% to economic governance. Both sectors revealed many problems. While half of obligations (297 millions) supported the rebuilding of infrastructure, the actual expenditure represented 236 millions for roads and 6 million (out of 49 obligated) for schools and clinics. The infrastructure was contracted by Louis Berger Group. Accelerating Success Initiative increased the number of clinics from 50 to 253, while implementing partners reported by September 2004 that only 15 were constructed⁶⁶. Quite the same, the initial number of schools were increased from 100 to 105 for LBG and 774 for five additional organizations by October 31, 2004, while implementers reportedly refurbished 77 buildings and constructed 23 new ones by the end of FY 2004⁶⁷. There were many misuses of funds including important school construction costs of up to 650,000 USD for one unit, while the same was built by NGOs with 20,000 USD⁶⁸.

The US plays an important role in security expenses in Afghanistan. It has provided 3.3 billion USD during FY 2002 through 2005 towards the goal of eventually establishing a 70,000 man force. The Department of Defense is the main implementer for the establishment of the army. Contribution towards the reconstruction of the national police reached 804 millions USD during FY 2002 through 2005⁶⁹. The oversight is ensured by State Department who contracted DynCorp Aerospace Technology to train and equip the police, advise the Ministry of Interior, and provide infrastructure assistance, including constructing police training centers. Overall, security expenses enjoy less transparency as it involves US and Afghan defenses. Figures are presented in broad terms and hardly allow for more investigation. Yet, corruption among the police is a notorious fact that most Afghans have experienced. State and DynCorp officials are aware of the ‘pervasive corruption’ within the police. The main problem remains in delays in the reform of police while the training program is very short: an 8-week course for new recruits and a 2-week program for veteran police. Pressures on DynCorp to accelerate the training resulted in using 800 Afghans who only completed a 3-week instructor development course⁷⁰. Those who are trained returns to district stations under the authority of former militia leaders. Contributions of other donors to Afghan army and police are quite insignificant: 193 million USD for the army as of March 2005 and 246 million USD as of

⁶³ GAO, July 2005, *Despite Some Progress ... op. cit.*

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 10

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 34

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 37

⁶⁸ Washington Post, “Afghanistan: A Rebuilding Plan Full of Cracks”, November 20, 2005.

⁶⁹ GAO, Report to the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, *Afghanistan Security: Efforts to Establish Army and Police Have Made Progress, but Future Plans Need to Be Better Defined*, June 2005


⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 20

January 2005. For the Afghan army, over 52 million USD was in cash and an estimated 141 million donated in weapons, ammunition and equipment. For the police, 120 million USD was provided in cash and directed through LOTFA and 126 million USD in equipment and training. Comparatively, Germany who is supposed to lead the police provided 68 million USD as January 2005.

Timelines and sequencing of funding have had significant impact on US funded projects for the reconstruction of Afghanistan. This was especially the case for USAID funded project for the FY 2004 (see figure below). Under the Initiative Accelerating Success, all operational targets had to be met before the end of June 2004. Delays in funding shortened the time required for most of the projects. There were two main portions of funds that were delayed. The Congress appropriated 672 million USD for emergency in November 2003 and 283 million USD in January 2004 for reconstruction. USAID received 642 millions in two installments late January and early February 2004 from the first appropriation and started receiving installments for the second in March 2004⁷¹. This left all the programs with less than five months.

Timeline and sequencing of USAID funds

⁷¹ GAO report, *Despite Some Progress ...*



Source: GAO analysis.

^a Pub. L. 107-38, Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Recovery from and Response to Terrorist Attacks on the United States.

^b Pub. L. 107-115, Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act.

Source: GAO report 05-742, July 2005

European States: The EU states have contributed one third of the total aid promised at Tokyo and Berlin Conferences⁷² and two third of the current 10,000 ISAF peacekeepers. The EC alone pledged 1 billion euros over five years: 657 million euros in 2002-04 and 376 millions planned for 2005-06⁷³. EC and member states collectively pledged 3.1 billion at Berlin⁷⁴. An EU communiqué put the amount of money spent on Afghanistan at 12.5 billion euros. This includes security expenses made by ISAF. However, with exception made to the first months of the post-Taliban period, there has been little coordination between different European actors: individual states, EC, ECHO, EUSR etc. The development is mainly dealt with by the EC Office, which has been strengthened as a result of

⁷² ICG, *Rebuilding the Afghan state: the European Union's role*, 30 November 2005

⁷³ « Afghanistan: How EU Support is Making a Real Difference », Memo/05/156, Brussels, May 2005

⁷⁴ Ibid.

the devolution reform that began in 2000. Relief operations were mainly funded by ECHO with a total spending of 218.5 million euros. The political face of the EU is represented by EUSR and member state ambassadors. Security is ensured through direct contribution of individual member states. Unlike the US embassy, in which the USAID, State Department and Coalition forces all hold offices and consult each other on a weekly basis⁷⁵, the European actors are not coordinated.

The European donors have historically been great contributors to NGOs⁷⁶. However, the EU channeled 40% of its funds in 2002 through NGOs and only 20% in 2004⁷⁷. This reflects the shift from emergency (2002-03) to reconstruction (2004-05) efforts that most of the donors underwent. After December 2001, the European donors shifted their policies by concentrating their efforts on the legitimacy of the Afghan state. EU states contribute to more than 70% of the funds made to ARTF, mainly for civil service salaries. The 2003 EC Country Strategy Paper emphasized working within NDF. However, the staff from the Kabul Office has been critical about it. The only important contract made to a private company concerns the Kabul-Jalalabad road, which costs 89.5 million euros and is implemented by a Chinese construction enterprise.

An assessment of aid provided by five donor governments affirms the fact that there was not any European model for assistance to Afghanistan. The five donors had in common the fact that most of their aid was provided to the UN (40%), NGOs (27%) and to the ARTF (24%)⁷⁸. Ireland, Sweden and Denmark gave a considerable amount of aid to national NGOs, while the Netherlands and the UK supported the Afghan government (through ARTF) and multilateral agencies.

	Denmark		Ireland		Netherlands		Sweden		UK	
1	UNHCR	15.2%	ARTF	19.7%	ARTF	42.5%	SCA	17.9%	ARTF	28.6%
2	DACAAR	9.9%	Goal	9.2%	UNHCR	13.5%	UNHCR	16.2%	UNDP	17.1%
3	ARTF	9.8%	UNICEF	9.1%	OCHA	10.7%	UNICEF	15.6%	ASP	7.6%
4	DDG	7.1%	Concern	8.2%	UNICEF	7.8%	UNOPS	9.2%	GoA	7.2%
5	MRRD	7.0%	Trócaire	7.3%	WFP	7.5%	ICRC	7.1%	UNHCR	6.1%
6	WFP	6.7%	WFP	7.0%	UNDP	4.9%	ARTF	6.6%	WFP	5.1%
7	MoE	5.7%	UNHCR	6.2%	ICRC	4.6%	WFP	5.5%	UNICEF	4.6%
8	UNICEF	5.0%	Christian Aid	4.2%	IOM	1.2%	GoA	5.1%	ICRC	2.3%
9	ICRC	4.9%	IFRC	3.5%	BTHW	1.2%	OCHA	2.5%	WHO	2.1%
10	DAC	4.8%	HALO Trust	3.0%	SV	1.1%	AIAF	2.0%	IOM	2.0%
11	UNDP	3.5%	LOTFA	2.4%	HNI	0.9%	Forum Syd	1.9%	UNMAS	1.2%
12	DAARTT	2.8%	AIAF	2.4%	RC-NL	0.9%	IOM	1.4%	FAO	1.2%
		82.5%		82.2%		96.8%		91.1%		85.1%

⁷⁵ Coordinated development, diplomacy and defence efforts was first outlined in “The National Security Strategy of the United States of America”, but were further enforced in Afghanistan after the US military commandment shifted its headquarters from Bagram to Kabul.

⁷⁶ EC funded NGOs for 500 million euros over 10 years before 2001 according to ICG. *Op. cit.*

⁷⁷ ICG report. *Op. cit.*

⁷⁸ Danida, *A Joint Evaluation, Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance to Afghanistan 2001-2005 from Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom*, October 2005

Germany is an important donor to Afghanistan. The pledges made in Tokyo in 2002, totaling 320 million euros for the period 2002-2005, were completely disbursed by the end of 2004. At the Berlin conference on Afghanistan in April 2004, Germany pledged a further 80 million euros a year for the period 2004-2008. This brings the total German contribution to the reconstruction of Afghanistan - including humanitarian aid - to 650 million euros⁷⁹. The German share through EC amounts to 63 million euros. Last but not least, the German government wrote off Afghanistan's debt to the tune of 34.4 million euros.

Japan has pledged during Tokyo and Berlin Conferences more than 1 billion USD and disbursed 986 millions as of August 2005⁸⁰. There is less transparency regarding on how, when and how much have went to specific programs. This is because there is less information available through reports and evaluation. Funds come through JICA, which is also an implementer for DDR and technical assistance projects. The main projects funded by Japan are in infrastructure (202 million USD) including a portion of the Kabul-Kandahar, the DDR (107 million USD), refugees, education and health (156, 60, 58 millions USD respectively). Besides, Japan supported the establishment of the constitutional process, the Afghan elections and cultural projects in Bamyan. Japan has established two special funds with ADB (JFPR) and WB (JSDF) and allocated 110 million USD through them to support the Afghan reconstruction. Japan's aid has shifted from humanitarian to recovery and reconstruction assistance under "Ogata Initiative" that focuses on 'regional comprehensive development' including Kandahar, Jalalabad and Mazar-e-Sharif as three main regions. Most of the funds go the UN agencies.

Canada is also an important state contributor to the reconstruction process. Before 2001, Canada's assistance was largely humanitarian aid and reached 10 million USD a year. Since 2002, Afghanistan has been the main beneficiary country of CIDA with assistance focused on development and reconstruction. Canada pledged in Tokyo and Berlin together 616.5 million USD (2002-09). As of June 2005, it has disbursed 252.3 million USD⁸¹. Canada is an important contributor to the trust funds. As of October 22, 2005, it had disbursed 103 million USD to the ARTF. Canada has supported the ADF structures and priorities. Funding goes mainly to human capital and enabling environment for development pillars. Canada hardly supports infrastructure projects. The biggest part of its contributions goes either to the Afghan government or to UN agencies. Only a small portion went to NGOs, mainly in the health sector. In most cases, Canada funds programs that enjoy the support of other donors.

World Bank is considered as 'the second largest donor to Afghanistan in terms of total pledges to the country (1463 million USD)' by the MoF⁸². However, as of September 2005, the WB website puts its commitments at 456.8 millions USD in grants and an additional 436.4 million USD in no-interest loans for 19 development and emergency reconstruction projects. Loans are no-interest with 10-year

⁷⁹ <http://www.bmz.de/en/countries/partnercountries/afghanistan/cooperation.html>

⁸⁰ MoF, Donor Profile: Japan, August 2005

⁸¹ MoF, Donor Profile: Canada, June 2005

⁸² MoF, Donor Profile: World Bank, June 2005

grace period and 25-40 year repayment period. None of these go into the multilateral funds the WB administers: ARTF (1.3 billions of pledges) and the JSDF (38 million USD). The administration fees (1.5% of disbursement and deducted monthly) are interest on deposits plus a 4.4 million USD as of October 22, 2005.

The WB works in close collaboration with the MoF and has provided advice to help the government manage donor funds ‘effectively and in transparent way’. It has set up mechanisms that ensure WB involvement in different steps of government procurement and expenditure procedures. This is the case, for instance, with ARDS which has received more than 30 million USD from the WB. Up to 90% of the funds go to ministries and other state institutions. Internal evaluation of WB showed lack of effective competition in procurement, ‘unsatisfactory project management and monitoring that put 11% of IDA investments in Afghanistan at risk’, and limited results in capacity building within government⁸³. Afghanistan rejoined WB in 2002. 26 millions of arrears on pre-1979 loans were paid off by Japan, Italy, Norway, Sweden and the UK in 2003. The same year, Afghanistan started paying off the remaining pre-1979 loans through ARFT (about 3 million USD per year)⁸⁴.

ADB pledged at Tokyo 500 millions USD of loans and grants for 2.5 years and some 800 million USD for the period 2005-08, ‘loans and equity investment of up to 100 million USD in partnership with local and foreign investors and guarantees of about 100 million USD to catalyze private investments’⁸⁵. Loans from Asian Development Fund are no-interest with 10-year grace period and 1% annual fee. ADB’s assistance focused on transport, energy, natural resources and governance and financial sector. Building national capacity has been also a focus area. For the assistance trend since 2002, the level of ADB loans has risen while the level of grants has lowered. Funds are mainly contracted by the Afghan government. ADB itself is an implementer, as is the case for technical assistance and capacity-building of Afghan ministries. In 2002, the UK paid off 18 million US of pre-1992 arrears. In 2003, Afghanistan began repaying the remaining through ARTF. As of April 2005, ADB pledged 457.5 millions USD in grants and 870 million USD in loans over 1380-1387⁸⁶. The disbursement ratio is one of the lowest, with 214 million USD for the period 1380-84.

Comparative analysis

There are both similarities and differences of donor policies on aid spending. All of the major donors focused on emergency relief during 2001-2003 and shifted the bulk of their aid towards reconstruction efforts during 2004-05. All agreed in principle towards the Afghan ownership over the process, followed the NDF structures and guideline in broad terms and supported the process of state-building and political stabilization. Yet, all relied on non-state actors for the implementation and rapid expenditure of the assistance.

The US assistance was provided mainly to private contractors while the European governments and institutions provided assistance mainly through UN agencies, NGOs and some private contractors. Indeed, European NGOs such as SCA, DACAAR, GOAL, ACTED benefited from European assistance quite the same as American companies did from US aid. While the US remained the most important single, coherent and internally coordinated donor to Afghanistan, its political imperatives

⁸³ Ibid.

⁸⁴ Bank Information Center, May 2004, www.bicusa.org

⁸⁵ ADB, Annual Report 2004, p. 78

⁸⁶ MoF, Donor Profile: ADB

were considerably felt through the process. The US assistance, especially the USAID assistance, is apparently more transparent than their European and Japanese counterpart. Yet, corruption and lack of integrity have been much more sensitive within US assistance than in any other countries' assistance. Somehow, political imperatives and timelines have had an important impact on the projects in the field, as implementing agencies had to meet their targets often in less than half of the time initially foreseen. As an example, Jalalabad-Kabul road project funded by EC escaped many political pressures from the Afghan government and followed a path which was initially planned⁸⁷.

Coordination, at first, took place at inter-agency level within state institutions of a same donor as it was the case for the US, while the European Union governments and institutions proved the contrary. Second, donors coordinated their efforts through high level groups and meetings, especially the first phases of the process when the Afghan capacity was weak. Third, the CGs offered for some coordination on specific issues at national level. Other types of coordination were also present at differing degrees: PRTs and NGOs, among NGOs, Civil-Military, inter-agency at the UN under the two pillars of UNAMA etc.

Government and state institutions

Government and state institutions have interacted with main players through the development of complex governance structure, broad visions and shared strategies. Karzai announced the color in Tokyo conference: build a minimal state compatible with market economy and western friendly. Overall, the state institutions have themselves evolved over the past four years, including today 27 ministries, 5 independent commissions, 4 independent agencies (such as National Security Council and Anti Corruption Body), offices of the Attorney General and Chief Justice, and 6 other government bodies (such as National Directorate of Security and Central Bank). Yet, no minimal and effective state was built. The government that came out of the Bonn Conference reflected a power sharing body, which Karzai himself repeatedly described as a coalition government, and did not favor reforms. Pressures from international community focused rather on the ethnic balancing of the state institutions while power holders of the time could assert themselves as representative of the so-called ethnic groups. The shift to ATA after ELJ gave more power to Karzai and provided for a more enabling environment towards reforms away from power-sharing setting. Finally, after presidential elections and in accordance with the Afghan constitution, the new government consisted of highly educated ministers. Yet, it has shown less coherence over programs, strategy and vision so far. Rather, many ministers have acted as free riders and have followed their own political agendas as Karzai and the International Community were focused on the political process and tried to bring into that as much factions as possible. In fact, coherence within state institutions was sacrificed by the consideration that building a state was equivalent most often to stabilizing an Afghan political process..

Ashraf Ghani has been the principal architect of the dialogue between the Afghan government and the donors. He joined the government in April 2002 as the head of AACA, which was entitled to coordinate the actions of the aid community, and became Minister of Finance in June 2002. He drafted in April 2002 the National Development Budget (NDB) that became the main mechanism, with National Development Framework (NDF), through which the majority of donors coordinated funding and programming. The NDF was drawn up as a road map for the development and reconstruction process in Afghanistan. It identified 16 sectors, called National Development

⁸⁷ Interview with EC Official, December 2005

Programs (NDPs), each overseen by a corresponding Consultative Group (CG). The 16 CGs operate each as a forum within which projects are designed, discussed and implemented. All 16 NDPs are dispatched into three broad pillars: human capital and social protection (28% of the total budget), physical infrastructure (54%⁸⁸), and enabling environment for development (18%). There are also six cross-cutting issues (gender, environment etc.) within NDF. The original NDF identified six National Priority Programs (NPPs) to which Karzai added six more in April 2004. NPPs are meant to be major policy priorities for the government and have progressively replaced NDPs in their functions. The NDF has remained the core instrument within the reconstruction process until now and will be replaced after the donor Conference in London and the implementation of i-ANDS⁸⁹. Overall, functions of oversight and implementation are separate within CGs, Advisory Groups and NPPs.

Some of the NPPs have become important programs and have drawn significant amounts of aid. For instance, the National Solidarity Program (NSP) which is planned to reach every village in the country by 2007 aims at strengthening local-level participation in development process. By May 2005, the NSP had involved 8,100 village communities in over 150 districts⁹⁰. NSP is executed by MRRD and is implemented by UN-Habitat and well-known and long-established NGOs. As of October 2005, the NSP has spent 205 million USD, with a total program budget of 781 million USD for the period 2004-07⁹¹. Funds come from IDA, ARTF, JSDF and Danish Government. NSP has been recognized as one the most successful community driven development program in the world to date⁹². Other important NPPs are NEEP, ASP and NIPP. Apart from NSP and ASP, most of the NPPs have been absorbed by their relevant ministries and has operated, since mid 2004, independently of the NDPs to which they correspond.

For fund raising purposes, the Afghan government has interacted with donors through summits and conferences. These included two types: general (Tokyo, Berlin and planned London) and thematic (Berlin II in December 2002 and Tokyo in February 2003 for security reform, Doha on Police reconstruction, Kabul in February 2004 on Counter-narcotics) conferences. The Afghan Development Forum (ADF) is another institution providing dialogue among Afghan government, donors, UN agencies, NGOs and private sector. While the two previous ADFs (March 2003 and April 2004) have worked as pledging conferences, the goal for the third one, which was held in April 2005, was “to move focus from the recitation of past accomplishments by government and contributions by donors toward serious policy dialogue”. The main achievement of the last ADF was an agreement to develop an ANDS by the end of 2006. The government also engaged discussion with international actors on political reconstruction, regional good neighborhood, and regional cooperation and integration. The regional dimension has been considered as an important pillar of the reconstruction and gathered neighboring countries and major international actors (US, WB and ADB). The latest forum held in Kabul in December 2005 insisted on energy and electricity needs of Afghanistan.

The Berlin Conference has been a milestone in many ways. The Afghan government tried to engage with the international community in a development-oriented dialogue that was meant to transform

⁸⁸ Figures reflect the breakdown by pillar of the Development Budget for Afghan FY 1383-89 (2004-10). MoF, *Securing Afghanistan's Future*, March 2004.

⁸⁹ AREU, *A to Z Guide to Afghanistan Assistance*, fourth edition, August 2005

⁹⁰ *Op. Cit.* p. 49

⁹¹ MRRD, *NSP Monthly Program Report*, October 2005. See www.nspafghanistan.org

⁹² AREU, *Fine-tuning the NSP*, November 2005

the Afghan economy from poppy production to legal economy. Ashraf Ghani in his interview of April 1, 2004 with BBC tried to found the legitimacy of the government on its development efforts, notably its pro-poor actions. Afghan ownership asserted itself in a particular manner, as for the first time in 13 years the Afghan state launched a consolidated appeal alone. In the SAF document, a clear distinction was made between a development budget and the current expenditures.

Nevertheless, beyond formal structures, mechanisms, policies and strategies in regard to aid management, governmental actions are largely defined by power relations. The recent absorption of NPPs by relevant ministries that appears, in deed, very natural and can be even counted as a further step towards governmental ownership reveals, however, the competition for funding resources among different ministers. Power and prerogatives of the ministers are determined, at least, as much by their relations to aid community as by their predefined functions within the cabinet. Even the immediate post-Bonn interim authority included one third of ministers coming from NGOs and IGOs. Past experiences and trajectories have relevantly contributed in building relations and affinities with donor: Ghani with the WB, Atmar with the UK and NGOs, Arsala with the US etc. Access to external funding is an empowering factor for ministers. Programs such as MISFA, NSP and ASP have, no doubt, increased the power of ministers and transformed the relevant ministries into powerful bodies while other ministries resemble comparatively as phantom structures. Since February 2005, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has undertaken advocacy to control another yet unexplored domain (the regional cooperation) and asked in April the WB for funding an advocacy and research department with the ministry. However, beyond the obvious lack of coherence within the cabinet, there are perverse effects associated to the fragmented functioning of the government, which clean off the structures from their substances and goals. We recently learned that a powerful minister discussed their mutual criticism with one of his deputies about an Alternative Livelihood Program run by American company and funded by USAID, but concluded to silence them in order to ensure that funding for NSP from the same donor will continue. Dependency towards external resources has, no doubt, limited the coherence of the government..

Karzai stated in Tokyo that accountability towards Afghan citizens and the international community, transparency and effectiveness of the state institutions would be the fundamental principles guiding the action of its government⁹³. Yet, there was less done to ensure accountability towards the Afghans. Karzai launched a public accountability week only in November 2005. Transparency and accountability towards donors were much better guaranteed, but got blurred by complacency due to security consideration, the peace agenda and internal political pressures on donor governments. In fact, accountability towards donors is more relevant within the aid context, as many programs such as Counter Narcotics are in reality donor priority rather than Afghan needs. They are often supply-driven and governed by an out-in dynamic. Accountability is ensured within the Afghan state through a myriad of internal departments inside the institutions or independent bodies. The General Auditing Office (*Tafteesh wa Contorol*) exists as an independent body since 60 years ago, but has very poor capacity. However, transparency is generally better ensured. All the expenses fell into programs, with structures involving multiple actors and decision-making procedures. All are reported to MoF and published by the latter mainly through Internet

Corruption has not been a priority. The Constitution (article 75, § 3) puts the ‘elimination of administrative corruption’ as one of government’s duties. Article 154 declares that the ‘property of the President, Vice Presidents, and ministers and members of the Supreme Court before and after

⁹³ Statement of Hamid Karzai, ‘A vision for Afghanistan’, Tokyo Conference, 21-22 January 2002

their term of office would be registered and monitored’. There was less evidence of anti-corruption efforts and advocacy at the time of writing of the constitution. We found only a text from Rose-Ackerman that strongly advocated the inclusion of a clause stating ‘public official, both elected and appointed, have an obligation to maintain high standards of public integrity’⁹⁴. The inclusion of such a clause would have given more power to combat corruption and would have restricted the power of corrupt official to make less powerful laws. The Anti-Bribery and Corruption Law that was signed in November 2004 established the General Independent Anti-Corruption Office (GIAC) that is charged to devise and implement the government’s policy to combat bribery and corruption. GIAC has broadly defined powers, but is subject to pressures from the NSC that filters the cases to be investigated. Besides, despite its mandates, it has only limited itself in investigative tasks regarding civil servants involved in corruption. There is less understanding within GIAC that one day it may expand its activities to the entire aid system.

Multiple pressures by donors on the Afghan government have been put. Yet, they are poorly documented. There were cases of USAID advocating the actions of US private companies before the Afghan state institutions. This was the case, for instance, when the MoF was not totally satisfied by the work done by Bearing Point and had asked a review of their performance. The assessment found many gaps, but the MoF finally gave up under the pressure of USAID⁹⁵. In the same ministry, the World Bank has apparently changed the scoring rules for evaluating private companies who were candidate for a multi-million project⁹⁶. According to an EC official, major donors lobbied for defending NGOs when the former Planning Minister was putting a lot of pressures on them. Similarly, the clause mentioning financial auditing of NGO by MoF which was proposed in the law of NGOs was finally removed by international advisors because apparently the ministry “does not have to audit donor funded projects”.⁹⁷

Foreign Contractors

Channels of aid to reconstruction that include international companies are, no doubt, the least transparent. The top five companies who have received the bulk of funding are US companies, funded by the US government. Yet little information exist at this stage in order to exactly determine what is the exact amount disbursed and spent. This is further complicated by the mixed objectives and task orders of the US companies who made no differentiation between reconstruction activities and civil logistics for the military intervention.

DynCorp, for instance, that might be the biggest beneficiary company in Afghanistan is no where in DAD. According to GAO, DynCorp is the main contractor for the 804 million USD training program of the Afghan police. DynCorp was actually awarded in September 2005 a three-year contract for a total amount of 290 million USD by the State Department⁹⁸. No figure was found for the FY 2003 to 2005. Other than training the police, DynCorp has undertaken different other missions, including the security of the Afghan President and the US Ambassador, for which no official figure was available. The latter did not go into any bidding process, but was an extension of an original contract worth of 50 million USD signed on March 3, 2000. The Center for Public

⁹⁴ Susan Rose-Ackerman, Professor at Yale University, *Corruption*, unpublished document.

⁹⁵ GAO report, *Despite Some Progress ...*

⁹⁶ Najibuallah Mojadidi, *Corruption and Fraud in the Government of Afghanistan with Emphasis on the Ministry of Finance*, February 2006

⁹⁷ Idem, p. 11

⁹⁸ Septembre 7, 2005, <http://www.dyn-intl.com/subpage.aspx?id=78>

Integrity estimated as 43.5 million USD the value of amendments related to works in Afghanistan as of March 2004⁹⁹. In early 2005, DynCorp was awarded a contract for counter-narcotics eradication with an annual value of 174 million USD, which covers ‘a performance period that could extend from an initial base period (six months) to 10 years with incentives for strong performance’¹⁰⁰.

Louis Berger Group is the biggest construction company in Afghanistan. According to DAD, LBG has so far received commitments for up to 700 million USD mainly for building the infrastructure. However, GAO reported that LBG has been provided a total contract ceiling 665 million USD for three years up to the end of 2005¹⁰¹. The Accelerating Success Initiative increased LBG’s initial contract of 146 million USD, awarded in September 2002, under the Rehabilitation of Economic Facilities and Services (REFS) program¹⁰². As a result, LBG dropped the capacity building aspects of the project in order to meet the visibility requirements of Accelerating Success. Contrary to security and paramilitary services that could have not been easily subcontracted, the infrastructure program has gone into many implementers within the chain of contracts allowing, at each stage, significant margins or overheads. There is evidence that, in many components of the program implemented by LBG, there has been up to 3 and 4 other sub-contractors in addition to LBG itself. Project costs are estimated considerably high. For instance, according to the Washington Post, a school building that normally costs 20,000 USD was reportedly invoiced 600,000 USD¹⁰³. The 2.5 km road that goes from the Kabul airport to the US embassy is estimated to cost 7.5 million USD, i.e. 4 to 5 times more than normal costs¹⁰⁴.

The other two important companies are Chemonics International, Inc. and BearingPoint, Inc. According to DAD, each benefited from commitments up to 100 million USD. However, under Accelerating Success, Bearing Point was awarded a three-year (ending December 05) contract of 98 million USD for economic governance. The initial 3-year contract was 39 million USD. Bearing Point is especially famous for buying highly expensive consultants who worked in MoF. An evaluation requested in mid-2004 by the Afghan government found among, other things, that Bearing Point lacked effective means to determine ministerial needs. USAID disagreed with the evaluation and the Afghan MoF agreed in November 2004 to allow the contract to continue until its completion date¹⁰⁵. The Center for Public Integrity estimated the value of USAID contracts with Chemonics at 167.7 million¹⁰⁶.

Based on donor reports through DAD, LBG, Bearing Point and KfW accounted for 56% of the money (705 million USD) that went to private companies during FY 1380-82. This represented 16.4% of the total assistance disbursed¹⁰⁷. In FY 1383, private companies constituted 21% of the overall assistance disbursed, with 98% of them going to American companies. LBG, Bearing Point and Chemonics alone accounted for 73% of the funding going to private companies¹⁰⁸. Yet, the

⁹⁹ <http://www.publicintegrity.org>

¹⁰⁰ May 19, 2005, <http://www.dyn-intl.com/subpage.aspx?id=67>

¹⁰¹ GAO-05-742, *Despite Some Progress ...*, July 2005

¹⁰² USAID Office of Inspector General, *Audit of the Kabul to Knadaha Highway Reconstruction Activities Financed by USAID REFS program*, September 21, 2004

¹⁰³ Washington Post, “Afghanistan: A Rebuilding Plan Full of Cracks”, November 20, 2005.

¹⁰⁴ IWA interview, December 2005

¹⁰⁵ GAO, *Despite Some Progress ...*,

¹⁰⁶ As of March 31, 2004, <http://www.publicintegrity.org/wow/bio.aspx?act=pro&ddlC=8>

¹⁰⁷ MoF, *Finacial Report*, October 2005, p. 32

¹⁰⁸ These are rough estimates from DAD. The top 4 for FY 1383 represented 412 million USD out of a total assistance of 457 million USD disbursed to private companies.

Center for Public Integrity reports as of May 2004 showed some 2.63 billion USD committed by the US government to US companies¹⁰⁹, i.e. 49 % of the total commitments towards the Afghan reconstruction by all donors until the end of February 2004¹¹⁰.

However, estimations based on official reports by the Afghan government are biased as they, themselves, rely on the reporting willingness of donors. For instance, DAI that received important funds from USAID for alternative livelihood activities to poppy cultivation is not mentioned in DAD. Besides, security-related expenses either are not reported to Afghan government or have been deliberately put aside by DAD. According to the Center for Public Integrity, as of May 2004, the Department of Defense contracted 24 US companies for works in Afghanistan. The most important of these are Contract International Inc., Halliburton and Washington Group International, with indefinite delivery and quantity contracts with a maximum value of 500 million USD, 599 million USD and 500 million USD respectively. However, it is not clear how much money went to the Afghan reconstruction and how much civil logistics of the army (construction of military bases in Bagram and Kandahar, embassy in Kabul).

There are multiple mechanisms through which private companies obtain contracts. As for the US companies, most of them are familiar of the work of USAID. LBG, for instance, has been working for USAID since 1990s. They often have the specific requirements of the contracts which limit the scope of competition. US contracts have had a minimal and a maximal amount, allowing the private companies to extend their initial engagement when a new bill is introduced to the Congress. Once companies started working, especially when Afghan ministries relied on them for technical capacity, they would be in position of quasi-monopoly within a given sector. They will write calls for proposal that are most suited to them and be a candidate on bidding. The MoF has particularly suffered from such mechanisms¹¹¹. The resulting conflict of interest has had serious consequences on capacity-building and local ownership of the reforms. In 2004, Bearing Point alone provided more than 250 advisors to the MoF. Another mechanism through which private companies obtained contracts was through the facilitation role of UNOPS. This was the case mainly for secondary roads connecting provinces. USAID has imposed LBG on UNOPS¹¹². LBG then passed the contract to Turkish private companies. Yet, UNOPS that takes up to 10% of the contracts provides no monitoring and evaluation.

Local NGOs and Local private companies

At the begging of the reconstruction process, there was no difference between local NGO and local companies. Both were supposed to be registered in the ministry of economy. The creation of a local organization in the context of 2001-2002 aid flow has been in some cases very pragmatic. Only recently, the government focused on the reduction of his lack of control over local organizations by implementing a series of regulations and a law on NGO¹¹³. An emphasis has

¹⁰⁹ Figures are based on the reports of the Public Integrity Website, which has apparently been updated only until May 2005. These figures do not comprise contracts for geographical areas that include both Iraq and Afghanistan.

¹¹⁰ Barnett Rubin *et al.*, *Building a New Afghanistan: The Value of Success, the Cost of Failure*, March 2004, Center on International Cooperation, p. 10

¹¹¹ Najibullah Mojadidi, *Corruption and Fraud in the Government of Afghanistan*, February 2006

¹¹² Interview with an official of UNOPS, December 2005. Secondary roads through UNOPS included Jalalabad- Asmar, Kaboul-Panshir, Pul-e-Halam- Ring-Road, Lashkargah-Ring-Road, Farah-Ring-Road, Kandahar-Tarinkat, Ghazni-Sherana, Tolokan-Faizabad

¹¹³ *NGO law*, May 2005

been made on the rationalization of the registration process, the ministry of economy and the ministry of justice became only recently the only institution permitted to register local organizations and companies. Certain organizations had a previous working experience in the Afghan context, mostly in Pakistan. They have been able, in this post-conflict reconstruction circumstance, to expand their sector of activity and increase their funding by moving into Afghanistan. As example of such organizations: Afghanistan Development Association (ADA), Sanoy Development Foundation, CAPU, AREA¹¹⁴. These organizations had a growing number of projects to manage. In the case of AREA, the number of projects went suddenly from a pick of 104 in 2003 to 30 in 2005¹¹⁵, certain of these organizations were in reality not able to handle this exponential development potential and became known to the donor community for their corruption practices¹¹⁶. By organizing themselves into informal networks, these organizations have been able to canalized project proposal and exchange projects. This phenomenon is clearly appearing within ADA which received projects from the World Bank or from the Education Ministry and redistributes them to one of the following organizations: COHAR, AWEC. ADA has a Board of Administrators in its structure that helps it to become recognized among the donors. Such a redistribution system has a direct impact on the execution quality of the project. Each intermediary reduces the amount of money effectively used for the realization of the project.

Integrity and corruption in the reconstruction process

Reported incidences of corruption

Corruption in the media

Freedom of media offered for publicizing many corruption cases. Yet, most of them were undocumented whispers with little credibility and were presented as a banal subject. The Afghan investigative journalism was not developed at the beginning of the reconstruction process and is still rudimentary. While he became minister of plan in 2004, Ramazan Bashardost whose ministry was in charge of regulating the activities of the NGOs undertook a systematic campaign against NGOs, accusing them of misappropriating the money allocated to the Afghan people. He continued his campaign until recently, after his resignation in December 2004 in protest of his claims not being taken into account by Karzai. Bashardost became very popular and won a seat as a deputy in the parliament. His most recent popular campaign was against Minister Anif Atmar who led the MRRD for the last four years. He was accused of embezzlement, as the MRRD has managed one third of the non-security assistance to Afghanistan under his office. Bashardost stated that he sent evidence to the Supreme Court. The latter announced that the evidence was not strong. The case of Atmar has been taken to the judiciary and is under preliminary investigation for the time being.

Rumors and realities of grand corruption, often well informed, have occupied the public debate in restricted circles. Some rumors were even taken to the larger public space, mainly through the private Tolo TV. Many included high level official such as ministers and governors in office, as was the case for an order of school chairs by the Ministry of Education (worth 25 million USD), illegal sell of state's lands in the north (100 million USD) etc. Rumors about the former Minister of Finance accused him of diverting funds to many NGOs he owned. This seemed to be rather a campaign against him than a reality. The most publicized and shocking case concerned the

¹¹⁴ IWA interviews January 2006

¹¹⁵ Ibid.

¹¹⁶ This is the case in particular for AREA, IWA interview with ACBAR, October 2005

organized corruption involving many government officials, including the two deputies of the Ministry of Religious Trust and Haj (Pilgrimage). Each candidate to Mecca had to pay a sum of money in order to be enlisted for actual departure. The disclosure of the case caused an immediate dismissal of all the corrupt officials by Karzai. The trial cost the two deputy ministers 3 years of imprisonment each and 256,000 USD of fines¹¹⁷. Six other officials were sentenced to one and two years of imprisonment.

In March 2005, several thousand people protested against corruption in Kandahar and some raised slogans in favor of the former Taliban government, which reputation of integrity is often reminded.

Allegations of corruption and protest of local people, especially in the provinces, have become a common place in the Afghan TVs since December 2005, probably after Karzai's declarations opened the door for discussion.

Links with war

The post-conflict reconstruction continued with many corruption processes, practices and attitudes that became legitimate during the war and stayed unquestioned after. The Afghan state lacked authority over entire provinces and large parts of the country. As a result, local and regional commanders strengthened their power basis intercepting state resources at their disposal in the area under their control. This even led to fighting between different groups, in particular in the Northern regions (Muhammad Attar, Dostom, Ismael Khan). Illegal and undeclared custom incomes and taxes were the most significant part of the income of many warlords before the rise in the opium traffic during the last two years. For instance, Ismael Khan's control over the Herati costumes supposedly cost the Afghan State 2 million per day to. Afghans have been familiar to this situation, as it was quite the same during 1992-96 when the majority of the country was fragmented and exploited by commanders for private interests. The international community, in pursuit of its peace agenda and security considerations since the overthrow of the Taliban, has refused to tackle the problem. Moreover, because they were more organized and rapidly effective, the Pentagon paid – three times more than a normal afghan soldier – until mid-2004 the Afghan Militia Forces for trucking Al-Qaeda and Taliban. Often, only a part of the money was given to the militiamen. The same happened with DDR process, in which local commanders kept authority over military groups, often over estimated, and took for himself a part of the financial package for demobilized soldier.

Even in Kabul, the historic area of *Sheerpoor*, known now as *Zorabad* (Built by force), was distributed among the post Taliban government officials who have built their private houses. Many other state lands and proprieties were illegally seized for private purposes by former party strongmen who made their way to the government. Kabul municipality, headed by politician and strongmen issued from the Northern Alliance, was the high place for corruption.

Precious stones and other natural resources, in zones under the control of armed groups, continued to be illegally sold in foreign countries. Timber contracts were made with foreign exploiters without any legal authorization in the east. This has considerably been reduced during the Taliban years. Trade of antiquities and archeological pieces followed the same paths built during the war and was estimated by the Ministry of Culture in 2004 to reach 1 billion USD per year.

¹¹⁷ Reuters, April 12, 2005

Former leaders of factions and regional commanders during 1992-96 and after 2002 are currently the richest individuals in the country. Anecdotal evidence confirm that one head of a former party and now a deputy in the Parliament is famous in Afghanistan for having 1.5 billion USD in his personal accounts in foreign countries. The same organized his power networks within many official circles, notably the judiciary, without holding any official power himself until his recent election.

Overall, the post-conflict state reflected many predatory characteristics of the previous one. Harassment and corruption have become notorious in security institutions and the police. Most of the time, people try to avoid the police in order to be exempt of the extra costs of bribe and unjust arbitration after the policemen have taken kickbacks from one side. In a recent interview with NRC, we were told that most of the disputes have not been referred to the judiciary because of existing high level corruption. This has been an important incentive for resolving problems through informal mechanisms such as the *shura* and *jirga*. Moreover, the parliamentary elections allowed many well-known present law breakers to become future law makers in the newly elected national assembly: 40 commanders still associated with armed groups, 24 belonging to criminal gangs, 17 drug trafficker, and 19 facing serious allegations of war crimes. Yet, according to a former ECC official, corruption in the elections was not a significant dimension of the process, as 'buying potentially loyal voters was a too risky investment' in secret bulletin system¹¹⁸.

Opportunities for Corruption

The reconstruction context has offered several incentives for the abuse of public funds for private gains. While the state has been dysfunctional, there has been little hope that a case of corruption would be dealt with correctly. The emphasis of the donors was much more on success stories visible for the media. Security considerations of the state-builders also offered for indulgent views on corruption of the contributing states and less accountability of the implementing agencies. Consequently, the post-conflict era, essentially concerned with the stability of the political process, became a haven for corruption practices. Besides, political agendas made it that often the implementers have had a very short period of time to spend the money and show results. Overall, assistance players implemented there actions in a chaotic environment, with weak incentives for integrity. Lack of security, which actually resulted in killing and injuring of many aid workers, raised the bidding for perceptions of high risk of insecurity within institutions. As a result, security norms and standards were institutionalized and led to an auto-definition of higher salaries within the system (donor, UN, NGOs) while this was largely considered as an abuse of entrusted power by the local population.

UN agencies have been so far the biggest recipient of assistance (45.5% of aid received in Afghanistan during 2002-04¹¹⁹). Although we found little evidence of grand corruption, the UN agencies seem to be a common place for petty and medium corruption. Small scale corruption by both national and expatriate staff includes nepotism, getting hired through personal contacts with the least open and competitive recruitment environment, use of office resources such as cars, telephones ... for private usage, but also renting out properties. We found during our preliminary case studies that heads of many small NGOs have to pass through an intermediate level built up by local staff of the UN agencies in order to get funds or information against a percentage of the project funding or a sum of money. In any case, many agencies are trapped by organized networks of local staff that

¹¹⁸ IWA interview, December 2005

¹¹⁹ MoF, Financial Report, 21 January 2002 to 20 September 2004, p. 37

limit the sphere of operations of the expatriates in choosing local partners, identifying areas of intervention or programs.. This tendency is exacerbated by the large turn-over of UN staff, which has only little time to understand the local power distribution in the aid system.

NGOs have directly received only 9.6% of the assistance during 2002-04, but constituted an important recipient of aid at the end, as both UN agencies and the Afghan government contracted them for different projects. Small scale abuses are current within international NGO, with quite a few well-known for institutional and grand corruption. The latter concerns mainly those NGOs that served most often the immediate interest of donors to the detriment of its stated beneficiary. For instance, a couple of American NGOs arrived in Afghanistan early 2002 and started their activities without any assessment of needs. Ordinary Afghans believe that ‘they came here because they could get funding from their state’. A few European NGOs, which settled in Afghanistan for a long time, accepted projects to please the state donor. The anti-NGO campaign relied on such negative perceptions around which general frustrations about the slow pace of the reconstruction process were crystallized.

There are hundreds of local NGOs set up after 2002, merely phantom structures, existing only on the basis of the fund availability. Most of such NGOs are family-NGOs employing many members of the same family. A significant number of them are set up to offer high salaries to their leading staff. A few NGOs became reputed for organized corruption within the staff members. However, these cases have been quite limited, as donors cannot support structures with publicly known scandals in such a short period of time. In a couple of cases, NGO staff members were also donor employees and were actually part of the decision-making for the funding – even on the salaries – of the NGO. In some cases, local NGOs were created by former donor staff immediately after funding was ensured and could allow higher salaries for one who created the NGO.

International and long-established Afghan NGOs, which handle a couple of million dollars, present comparatively less corruption within the structures. Yet, relationships with providers, clients, intermediates and beneficiaries have implied different degrees of corruption. Internal procurement procedures alone do not prevent from corruption because the outside environment hardly makes a difference between private and public spheres. Most often, contracts are verbal commitments. Individuals who have been able to assert themselves as the legitimate intermediate between the beneficiaries and the NGOs have often abused of their power and position, including in many cases with the complacency of the NGO staff. The NSP, whose aim is to strengthen the local communities, has institutionalized this practice by setting up community councils at the village level in which power holders of the past became today’s legitimate representatives of the people.

Bilateral versus multilateral: Many examples of aid through bilateral channels confirm the hypothesis that multilateral mechanisms are better endowed to reduced corruption and strengthen integrity. One of the five founding principles of the ARTF is to provide integrity and accountability in the allocation and use of assistance funds. Such a mechanism is based on the previous experiences of the WB with state donors in other countries and has a clear mandate with specific clauses regarding corruptions or abuses that naturally come from the donor position¹²⁰. For example, contributions that are ‘earmarked for specific component, activity or program funded by ARTF’ will not be accepted. However, donors can ‘designate their non-binding preferences that their contribution be matched against a specified component’. For instance, a donor cannot say that its contribution should go to

¹²⁰ ARTF, Proposal by WB, UNDP, ADB and IDB, March 20, 2002

the restructuring of the MoF, but can say that it has a preference for the NSP without being guaranteed that its money will eventually contribute to the NSP. On the contrary, bilateral aid has offered for donor-led flows of aid shocking abuses. For example, France sent 60 tones of wheat seed to Afghanistan in 2004, which was distributed through a French NGO who accepted the contract while other NGOs highlighted the inappropriate quality of wheat seed for the Afghan context. In fact, the seeds have never been subject to experimentation in Afghan soil and presented risks of being inadapted¹²¹. IOM was funded by EC in order to recruit European Afghan expatriates while the Expatriate Window of the ARTF does not allow for such discrimination. However, it was during the implementation phase that Afghan-Americans were favored¹²². This led to another EC funded project for European Afghan expatriate. Quite the same, AREU announced job vacancies for internationals in May 2005 that specifically asked for American and European nationals in response to donor requirements. UNOPS was used as a “société écran” by USAID to channel aid to private companies for road reconstruction programs.

Anti-corruption efforts

Apparently functioning efforts: Aid coordination and a core Afghan capacity were both dealt with within the emerging Afghan financial institutions during the first months of the Interim Authority in order to introduce a bit of transparency and accountability. In fact, many Afghan technocrats who headed these institutions were former employees of international organizations and knew quite well the importance of effective transparency mechanisms in increasing and sustaining the level of aid. The MoF became the focal point for these strategies.

The DAD became a remarkable legitimizing instrument for the government, even if its project-based approach does not allow for effective and comprehensive tracking of financial flows. Often, for a same project, there are many implementers and donors. DAD only details the first-level implementers while there are a lot of projects that have been sub-contracted to second and third-level implementers. In addition, DAD represents only a proportion of the aid channeled, as reporting results of DAD rely on the voluntary efforts of the donors. Besides, donors have funded under a same contract military logistics and reconstruction efforts, which further complicates tracking. Yet, it has incredibly increased the level of information about where the money is channeled, who implements the projects and last but not least, what are the donor’s areas of interests.

Less systematic, yet effective, are the individual “donor profile” of the MoF. However, the terms used (pledges, commitments, disbursements etc.) have largely remained undefined and have been instrumentalized by donors. Efforts in order to harmonize the reporting documents have yet to be done. The general impression is that these documents rather show the complacency of the MoF towards some donors.

In October 2004, the MoF published a *Financial Report* covering all aid flows until September of the same year. This showed a high level of commitment to transparency and accountability. However, the Ministry has not been able to reproduce such a report in 2005. The report on the National Budget to which the government is committed is quite limited in terms of information and

¹²¹ IWA interview with French NGO members, December 2005

¹²² Interview with EC official in Kabul, April 2005. The EC was not happy with scheming of the Afghan-Americans who dominated the IARCSC. EC funding was also meant to get an observer role, but encountered serious obstacles and protests by IARCSC Secretariat General.

analysis. For example, it does not give the accumulative loans of the government or the money spent by NGOs or private companies.

Many other mechanisms witness some seemingly working efforts. AACA was established in April 2002 to increase the management capacity of the state administration. One of the tasks included the procurement of the government, which became much more transparent as a result. After AACA's mandate arrived to an end, the Afghanistan Reconstruction and Development Services (ARDS) took over procurement and capacity building of the government. The latter is fragmented and dispatched among many institutions. The procurement services provided by ARDS follow no less than ten steps. The process includes the interested ministries who made the request and at least three non-objection agreements of the WB. Yet, the ARDS becoming too close to MoF and the three Ministers who are present in most of the oversight bodies allows little guarantees for strong mechanisms and procedures preventing the risks of grand corruption. Besides, the WB is not apparently well-armed to put pressures on the Afghan government, at least at this stage while donor search for political success in Afghanistan is a constraint to aid effectiveness and public finance management.

Mitigated efforts: One of the most enormous tasks of the transition period concerned the reform of administration. While the international financial institutions promoted the idea of a radical reform, Karzai chose to make it progressively. The charge was put then on IARCSC, while recruiting and downsizing initiatives by individual institutions were frozen. Furthermore, the IARCSC became responsible for deciding on the Priority Reform and Restructuring (PRR) within the state administration. This was based on selective reforming of the administration, with some staff of a same institution getting access to the up-graded salary scale while the majority could not. PRR was supported by ARTF. IARCSC's activities have involved a lot of pressures from outside, including cabinet ministers. A recent report of the WB praised resistance efforts of the IARCSC in spite of tempting pressures. Yet, many cases of nepotism and recruitment on the basis of political affiliation marred the image of the independent body. This was especially the case with hundreds of advisers who claimed for international salaries and joined different ministries on the basis of connections and waited for their case to get through the board of IARCSC. Besides, efforts of the independent body were undermined by competing parallel expatriate programs and competition among donors (EU and US, to some extent ADB and WB).

Specific efforts of the government on the fight against corruption, which resulted in the establishment of the GIAC, were highly mitigated by competing views and objectives, which were initially supposed to give coherence and credibility to the independent body. National security considerations, largely undefined and kept vague by the NSC, have implicitly structured the initiative power for investigation of the GIAC. Consequently, there was significant confusion about whose agenda GIAC was following. This happened as the President himself lacked to strongly support the institution in order to ensure its independence. Karzai refused the replacement of Mr. Ludin after he became SG for the Parliament, even though the conflicting interests were highlighted by Ludin himself¹²³. In addition, the dysfunctional judiciary system could not offer sufficient guarantees for GIAC to test its role and challenge its findings. The Attorney General to whom GIAC is supposed to refer cases of corruption has hold different views on the questions and has not always acted independently in order to bring the case to the court. Overall, GIAC restricted itself to an investigative role, although its defined mandates are much broader. The incapacity to bring the

¹²³ IWA interview, November 2005

investigated cases to an end, due to institutional lack of autonomy, creates an additional risk for the GIAC to lose legitimacy among other state institutions and credibility among the population.

Failed efforts: The Afghan government has been aware of the misuse of public resources, notably the misappropriation of income taxes by local officials since the beginning of the reconstruction process. While corruption was not a subject of concern to Karzai, expanding the authority of government over provinces and ensuring fiscal income had competing objectives with local actors who undermined state authority and revenue. Karzai used a method which made sense to Afghans and within the local political arena: displacement of governors from their initial provinces in the aim of uprooting their power structures and networks. This is an old method used by previous central governments in order to reduce the risks and amounts of money misappropriated, especially in border provinces. However, the practice proved unsuccessful as many notorious corrupt officials continued to hold their positions in different provinces and protect the mechanisms that allowed their private gains through networks of influence and service rendering. There is not much empirical evidence about the nature and the structures that maintain grand corruption in provinces. It seems that networks of clients, which produced corruption, are much more mobile nowadays and make fail efforts of displacement by the central government. Often, for influential power holders a phone call to a friend or former colleagues allow unfreezing affairs. Besides, there was no other sanction in preventing bribe-taking officials while bribe giving has become institutionalized and a norm for custom officials and traders who handle considerable quantities of imports and exports.

Effort yet to be tested: In the dawn of the first parliamentary setting, the Afghan government announced some strong measures including the rule of law and anti-corruption efforts. A statement of the Ministry of Counter Narcotics announced on 17 December 2005 the approval of the new counter-narcotics law, which recommends ‘significant penalties for corruption and bribery associated with drug trafficking offences’. Corruption has been deliberately associated with drug barons against whom the government has been doing campaign since early 2004 and notably through the SAF document presented in Berlin. The new i-ANDS, which considered corruption as a cross-cutting issue, also recognized it as an important component of the counter-narcotics, therefore streamlining government policies on issues specific to drug. UNDP and FCCS/TIRI have pushed for a broader consideration of the corruption phenomenon, including petty and grand corrupt practices¹²⁴. The EU-EOM report also recognized the prevalent corruption in Afghanistan as a risk factor¹²⁵. The report considered links with drug trafficking, but pointed out that corruption is not an exclusively drug-related phenomenon. Last but not least, in his inaugural speech to the Parliament on 19 December 2005, Karzai mentioned the fight against corruption as an issue ‘at the spotlight of the government’s future working policy’ requiring strong efforts¹²⁶. Karzai recognized that the ‘government was not very successful in its combat against corruption’. However, corruption is essentially related to the ‘years of turmoil in the country’. Overall, the government has viewed corruption as an undermining factor of the state accountability while the lack of the accountability of the government in its relationship with creating/favoring corruption has not been questioned yet.

Conclusion

¹²⁴ Consultative Meeting of i-ANDS, December 7, 2005

¹²⁵ EU-EOM, *Democracy-Building in Afghanistan: an Integrated Dimension for the Way Forward*, December 2005

¹²⁶ Hamid Karzai, « Speech at the Opening Session of the Parliament of Afghanistan », Kabul, 19 December 2005

The aim of this survey was to provide a mapping of the reconstruction process in Afghanistan and to point out opportunities for corruption as well as practices that allowed improving integrity within the process. The survey covered many aspects of the reconstruction process and relied mainly on reports, a couple of interviews and media accounts of the process. Yet, many challenges arose during our work, which should be taken into consideration when we move forward with case studies, RNISS and focus groups.

Clearly, there is a lack of comprehensive quantitative data regarding the amount of aid that arrived in Afghanistan since the plan of Afghan reconstruction was announced late 2001. This is because of a high number of actors at the top and the bottom of the chain of aid, their different degrees of willingness to report, their differing definitions and procedures, exchange rates, etc. This is further complicated by insufficient coordination among major donors. The unity of purpose of major players towards the Afghan reconstruction might have helped to ensure a certain degree of coordination through the leadership role of the Afghan government. This allowed in return an increased transparency. Yet, while major players stated that they were in a same boat, many followed their ephemeral willingness of the moment when it came to determine through which direction, what pace and how the boat should arrive to that end. Therefore, integrity was marred by competing interests of the donors and especially by the political use of success made by donor governments.

Another difficulty in tracking aid to reconstruction comes from blurred status and functions of actors in terms of donor and implementer. As it was the case for JICA, a few donors implement their own projects or state themselves as the main implementer while the program is sub-contracted to other bodies. Many other implementers such as NGOs and foundations arrived with their own funds. For instance, the 23 biggest NGO members of ACBAR, spent 71.5 million USD¹²⁷ from their external private funds, which figures in none of aid accounts. Therefore, the number of funding contributors is much higher and the figures in this survey will remain approximate estimations.

Streams of funds become more tiny and fragmented when one approaches the bottom of the process. There have been some 2400 local NGOs and some 300 international NGOs registered in the Ministry of Plan. Many hundreds of private sub-contractors of sub-contractors have profited from the process. For example, Kabul-Kandahar road contracted initially by LBG had 5 main contractors and dozens of sub-contractors¹²⁸. While there is no comprehensive empirical evidence in regard to corruption at this level of interaction, anecdotal evidence has confirmed the existence of bribery and corruption. Lack of regulation and accountancy further favors corruption. Obviously, this level of interaction is the least transparent and accountable within the whole process and should be taken into consideration in the coming research.

Another difficulty concerns the security sector spending, which is politically sensitive. As Ashraf Ghani put it, an argument can be made that 'if monopoly of the legitimate violence is one of the State's prerogatives, states must then be clear and transparent on the expenses that are made in this sector'¹²⁹. However, privatization of security, as it is the case for DynCorp, erodes not only the monopoly of the state over violence, but also makes it legitimately difficult to publicize such spending.

¹²⁷ ACBAR Statement for the Afghanistan Development Forum 2005

¹²⁸ John Bray, *International Companies and Post-Conflict Reconstruction*, The World Bank, February 2005

¹²⁹ Ashraf Ghani et al. *Closing the Sovereignty Gap: An Approach to State Building*, ODI, September 2005

Last but not least, the survey challenged how rigorous an understanding of the corruption phenomenon we can have. Tiri's 'abuse of entrusted power for private gain' is a broad definition, which allowed embracing wide ranges of corrupt practices. Yet, it is elastic. The term 'entrusted' refers to existing social representations of what is acceptable and what is an abuse. It is, thus, limited within a socio-historical development in a particular time and space. It often occurred that important expatriate salaries were considered to be a case of corruption for Afghans while expatriates themselves maintained that they were perfectly honest and transparent about them. How can we ensure that a same definition can make sense across the chain of aid?

The survey singled out three important case studies: NSP, security sector and construction infrastructure. All three allowed handling important sum of money, but only NSP is a specific program. All three involve important players, with multiple levels of interaction. Further work is required to define a methodology for in-dept understanding of the themes and identifying actors involved.

The Status of the FCCS and its Programs Management Report, March 2006

By FCCS Executive Director

Robert Kluijver

The FCCS, created in 2003, went through a third year of rapid expansion in 2005. The main expansion was in the following fields:

- Opening of 4 regional offices in Herat, Mazar, Kandahar and Jalalabad. The existing regional offices of the FCCS in Baghlan and Khost were upgraded, with more personnel, equipment and bigger premises. Staff was recruited for a 7th regional office in Maimana but the office has not become operational yet. Plans are also underway to open an 8th office in Ghazni.
- Set-up and initiation of the EC small grants program named “Beydari Melli” (National Awakening) which made the FCCS a grants-making foundation
- Survey of more than 1,000 local Civil Society Organizations in 50% of Afghan provinces, and analysis of the data.
- The FCCS became the main organization projecting Afghan art internationally when it helped set up the Afghan Pavilion at the Venice Biennale, and by increasing collaboration between Afghan and foreign artists, including a big theatre workshop with the Theatre du Soleil in Kabul, another theatre workshop with Tajik theatre professionals, the participation of groups from 4 neighboring countries in the Nauroz Music Festival in Mazar-e Sharif, and some smaller contemporary art exchange projects.
- The FCCS implemented major programs with USAID funding for the parliamentary elections: a traveling theatre campaign to foster critical electoral awareness and the production of 180,000 catalogues with information about the 2,700 provincial candidates to the National Assembly
- New Program areas: Integrity Watch Afghanistan started operating in Dec 2005, while the Clinical Legal Education program was initiated in the last months of 2005
- A MoU was signed with OSI, formalizing the budding relationship between both organizations. Both partners hope to reach the point where the FCCS can make grants on behalf of OSI, using the Grants Management Unit set up for the EC grant with OSI technical support (GMS), and the new governance structures of the FCCS. Relations between FCCS Units and OSI network programs (OSJI, Arts & Culture Network, CEU programs) were also strengthened.
- The FCCS staff increased from 31 to 74, of which 20 work in the regions and 54 in headquarters. The FCCS also increased its office space, by renovating a compound across the road with a concert hall, a parking and office space for rent, and by occupying the office space abandoned by UN Habitat in the main FCCS compound. New kitchens and toilets were installed, and some work was done to improve the drainage on the road outside the FCCS.

1) FCCS Governance

Governance Structure of the FCCS:

1. Senior Advisory Board
2. Board of Directors, headed by the FCCS Chairman

3. Executive Committee, headed by the Executive Director
4. Expert Committees, to give advice and make decisions on FCCS programs

The Governance of the FCCS was until recently the exclusive domain of the Executive Committee of the FCCS, with the main guidance given by the Executive Director and a significant role played by the Chairman and the Unit Heads. The other FCCS Board members were usually not involved by the Chairman. The Board was large (12 members) and the functions of the Board were not clearly defined, and besides many Board members seemed to be too busy with their own jobs to become more involved in FCCS affairs.

Although the FCCS functioned very well in this manner, this model of governance had several weaknesses:

1. It didn't respect the Statutes of the FCCS, where the Board plays a more important, if ill-defined role
2. It reposed heavily on the personality and the personal capacity of the Executive Director, while it was clear that he would not stay in Afghanistan all his life to fulfill this function; in other words, a better system had to be devised for the future of the FCCS.
3. OSI, the FCCS' most influential donor, wanted to see the FCCS Board play a more important role as a prerequisite to signing a MoU with the FCCS and allowing the FCCS to take decisions about the disbursement of OSI grants in Afghanistan. These decisions would have to be taken by the FCCS Board, according to OSI's model.

For this reason, during the spring and summer of 2005 the FCCS Board was reformed: 5 of the 12 members resigned voluntarily – for them a “Senior Advisory Board” was created. The only real function of the Senior Advisory Board is to intervene in the FCCS Board when there are intractable problems that cannot be solved by the Board itself. The 7 remaining members were:

1. Mir Ahmad Joyenda (Chairman), Parliamentarian with few votes & Deputy Director of AREU. Secular Ismaili, half Hazara half Tajik from Baghlan. Political background Parchami (communist) with Sayed Mansoor Naderi (traditional leader of Afghan Ismailis), various gvt functions in communist era and later under the mujihadeen. Age approx. 50
2. Dr. Hussein Ramoz, Executive Director of the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission. Hazara from Jaghori. Vocal civil society activist, participation in many national and international conferences. Board member of the Afghan Civil Society Forum and of the Free and Fair Elections Foundation for Afghanistan. Worked with the National Democratic Institute as Program Officer. Age approx 30
3. Farid Hamidi, Director of the Electoral Complaints Commission & Human Rights Commissioner. Pashto from Kabul. Law graduate, several other important government positions since 2002 (Emergency Loya Jirga Commission). Age approx. 30
4. Safia Siddiqi (fem), Parliamentarian with many votes. Pashto from Jalalabad. Previous important functions at Ministry of Women's Affairs and Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development, and during Emergency Loya Jirga. Poetess. Age approx 40
5. Nafisa Kabuli (fem), Judge on the new Special Counternarcotics Court, and Judge at Women and Children's Court, Kabul Province. Tajik from Kabul. Age approx. 40
6. Dr. Alam Ishaqzai, Member of Academy of Sciences, Department of Social Sciences. Pashto from Jalalabad. Left the FCCS Board since he was appointed Treasurer of Nangarhar Province. He has not been replaced.
7. Omara Khan Massudi, Director of National Museum of Afghanistan. Pashto from Logar. Age approx. 50

It is noteworthy that since the summer of 2005, all but the last Board members have risen to the functions they currently have. The FCCS Board members are upwardly mobile.

Most FCCS Board members were very busy during the period preceding the National Assembly Elections. However in October and November 2005 they revised the FCCS Statutes. The Executive Director suggested a more realistic electoral schedule whereby the Board members are elected every two years (with by-elections every year) in a General Assembly. The General Assembly consists of the members of the Senior Advisory Board (currently 4), of the Board of Directors (7), of the Executive Committee (7), of the Founding Members not belonging to one of the other groups (4) and the Regional Office Managers (8). Currently 30 people would participate in the General Assembly, plus observers, preferably from donor organizations. Each General Assembly member can propose candidates' names (including him/herself). Elections are by secret ballot. Each Board Member can only serve twice in succession. The Board members choose among themselves the Chairperson in the first meeting they have after the Electoral General Assembly.

The FCCS Chairperson resisted these changes – especially the limitation of two successive terms, i.e. 4 years – but eventually other Board members agreed. However the Chairperson greatly augmented his powers vis-à-vis the Executive Director, leading to new disagreement. Eventually the Board members made their final draft. According to the FCCS' original statutes these have to be approved by a 2/3 majority in the General Assembly. This has not happened yet, and the new statutes yet need to be signed into effect and then be registered with the Ministry of Justice, replacing the previous statutes. For the time being the first statutes still rule the FCCS. In these, Board members need to be elected every year by a General Assembly. On March 11 2006 the FCCS celebrated its third year of existence, and there have been so far no elections.

The main issue now facing the Board is rapidly holding elections, in which the revised statutes will be approved (and registered) and a new Board elected. This will renew the legitimacy of the Board, which it currently lacks. One crucial issue that was not included in the revised Statutes was whether a professional politician, such as the current Chairman, can head the Board. The general consensus among other Board members is that this is inappropriate. The manner in which the current Chairman used the FCCS as an electoral platform, politically and resource-wise, underscores this apprehension.

As to the other tools of governance, the FCCS Executive Committee expanded in 2005 with the creation of the Grants Management Unit, and the inclusion of its Director, as well as the Director of the Admin/Finance Unit, into the Executive Committee.

The first Expert Committee was set up in early 2005 to oversee the Open Media Fund for Afghanistan (OMFA) strategy and grant-making activities. Given its success, it was decided to set up similar Expert Committees for other FCCS programs, notably Integrity Watch Afghanistan, the Citizen's Rights Awareness and the Civil Society Advocacy Programs. Their function is to provide general guidance to the program, establish wider relations with connected institutions and related organizations, and take decisions on eventual grants given as part of the program.

2) Financial and Administrative Status of the FCCS

Since its inception the FCCS was run as a small organization, with minimal but sufficient administrative and financial structures,. It is very hard to find qualified accountants, managers, human resources specialists and other finance/admin staff, and the FCCS was not in a position to compete with international agencies and NGOs. The light admin/finance structures were compensated for by direct management oversight in all areas.

As the FCCS grew, however, it became not only necessary but also possible (financially) to attract such qualified staff. In September 2005 a qualified Admin/Finance Director was recruited to reorganize the correspondent department of the FCCS, establish new rules and procedures, and financial mechanisms of sufficient standards to allow better financial management, make eventual misallocation of funds and other malpractices more easily detectable, and to successfully pass external audits.

As part of this effort, the Human Resources section of the FCCS was also improved, with valid contracts for all staff, automatic calculation of leave balance, etc. Transport, Logistics and Procurement were also regulated by new procedures.

The FCCS in 2005 started making grants under the EC funded “Beydari Melli Program” (BMP, which stands for “National Awakening”). OSI had supported the FCCS in obtaining this 2.3 million European Commission grant (through UN Habitat as EC Contracting Partner) by providing 5% core funding to the FCCS and equipping the FCCS with a Grants Management System (GMS) in which FCCS received training several times. After the last training, in November 2005, the FCCS overhauled its entire Finance System on to the GMS, which was operational early 2006. This provides an extra degree of transparency, as the GMS is controlled from Bulgaria by expert Finance staff working for OSI.

Issues facing the FCCS Finance now are: providing a mechanism of control over the Admin/Finance manager. This control has existed in the person of the Executive Director, but once he leaves and is not replaced immediately by another person who has the capacity and authority to control the activities of the Finance Department, abuse may occur. The FCCS Board had appointed a Financial Controller whose signature was required under every voucher, but as the Executive Director found out recently, he is easily corruptible. The Executive Director has suggested to the Board to dismiss him. The Executive Director suggested the same about the Finance Director, who was also found to mismanage FCCS core funds and book personal expenses that are unjustifiable. The Chairman of the Board however has indicated he does not want to take action, which is understandable as he himself has derived some advantage from the misallocation of funds. The other FCCS Board members, informed directly by the Executive Director, have shown concern but it remains to be seen whether they will, and can effectively challenge the authority of the Chairman. The Chairman of the Board has announced that after the departure of the Executive Director he will take direct responsibility over the Finance Department, but of course that will only compound the problem.

The Executive Director has ordered an external audit but it appears that this will not necessarily solve the problem, as the auditors will focus on the financial systems, which now are up to standard, and will not be aware of misallocation of funds as long as this is done correctly, i.e. with the signatures of the FCCS Finance Manager, the Financial Controller and an authorization given by the Chairman.

The solutions the Executive Director now suggests, but which may not be implemented before his departure, are

1. Dismissing the Admin/Finance Director and the Financial Controller, and having the Board (not only the Chairman) appoint new people to these positions

2. Create separate bank accounts for each program, and allow the Program Directors oversight over their own bank accounts and expense ledgers, as they have an interest in avoiding the misallocation of their program funds
3. Appoint a new Executive Director, preferably foreign, with sufficient management experience to provide effective oversight and if possible improve the system of financial checks and balances even more.

3) FCCS Prospects and Opportunities for 2006

The issues mentioned under the two previous headings need to be addressed urgently, as for the rest FCCS has established itself as a major presence in the Afghan cultural and social scene, and the opportunities for the organization are constantly growing.

Small Grants Program

The Beydari Melli Program, whereby the FCCS makes small grants for cultural and social development through its 8 regional offices, is running smoothly. About 150 grants have been made already, to as many different civil society organizations, in about 2/3 of Afghan provinces. This grant-making system can be used by other donors, among which OSI. The European Commission has decided in Brussels, as part of its next 6-year plan (2007-2012) that they will not support civil society and cultural development any longer, so if other donors are not found the whole grant-making system will have to be dismantled again, including FCCS regional offices.

Cultural Center

The Cultural Center is very active, and has planned a big Nauroz Music Festival in Mazar-e Sharif for the third consecutive year, to be held between 20 and 22 March 2006. After this, from April/May to the beginning of Ramazan (13 October) there will be weekly events in the Cultural Center: every Saturday evening a concert, foreign artistic movies on Monday nights, and occasionally special programs on other weekdays.

The Cultural Unit will participate in the 3rd National Afghan Theatre Festival, in which it is becoming a more important partner (alongside the Goethe Institut and the Centre Culturel Francais de Kaboul) every year. This year our regional offices will help select groups from the provinces, and according to plan, provide small grants to these theatre groups to prepare their participation in the Theatre Festival, to be held the first week of September, with the participation of 12 groups, in Kabul.

The Theatre Aftab, which was formed as a result of the Theatre du Soleil workshop in Kabul (June/July 2005), and who was propelled to instant success with the staging of “Romeo and Juliet” (directed by Maurice Rossabi) in Kabul and Dushanbe, are currently in a two-month workshop in Paris, at the base of the Theatre du Soleil. When they return to their home base at the FCCS they will certainly produce another play. Hopefully they will be a motor for young theatre development in Afghanistan.

Mr. Hakimyar, the Director of the Cultural Center, is also preparing a “Cultural Week between Tajikistan and Afghanistan”. This has already been announced on the Afghan media, although the date has not yet been set. It will include theatre, art exhibits, movie showings and discussions.

Mr. Hakimyar, who is also an established film director, plans to make a joint production between Tajikistan and Afghanistan, a feature film on the “mules” running drugs between the two countries. The FCCS also has plans to organize a national film festival, given the increasing production (usually by amateurs) of movies in Afghanistan.

The Cultural Center has also planned a number of exhibitions: “Kabul City of Dreams” with visionary projects by artists, town-planners and architects; “The Buddhas in the Afghan imagination”, a partly scientific, partly folkloristic, and partly historical exhibition; “Talents of the Fine Arts Faculty” as a result of a media art workshop to be held with the students of Kabul University; and hopefully a “Moving Walls” internationally traveling exhibition of photographs. Some other ideas for exhibitions have been floated but are not yet planned for.

The FCCS also hopes to organize a small contemporary art fair with the participation of Afghan artists from abroad, and young Afghan artists residing in Afghanistan.

As the FCCS has gained international fame with its participation in the Venice Biennale of 2005 and its hosting of the “Theatre du Soleil”, more and more artists, groups and cultural organizations are requesting FCCS participation or cooperation on art projects. The list is almost too long to give here, but includes Dreamworks (for support in casting), curators of other Art Biennales (Singapore, Hong Kong, Venice 2007), the Asia Society, groups from France, Iran, musicians from the USA, theatre companies, an art activist from Bosnia, etc. It will require a solid organization and international outreach capacity to respond to all these opportunities.

Civil Society Advocacy

As part of its strategic plan to develop civil society in Afghanistan, the FCCS decided to set up a permanent advocacy (and lobbying) presence within parliament, for all civil society organizations in Afghanistan. A committee was set up that includes the bigger civil society umbrella organizations (Afghan Civil Society Forum, Afghan Women Network, Aid Coordination Body for Afghan Relief, Free and Fair Elections Foundation) which will liaise between their member organizations and parliament. One FCCS staff member will act as the liaison between parliament and civil society, distribute briefing papers, etc.

This structure may be also set up in each province with the provincial councils, with a USAID grant. The FCCS is currently negotiating this grant. This would allow to keep the civil society unit of the FCCS funded until 2007

The civil society unit further plans to focus its grant-making and advocacy activities on transitional justice, freedom of press, rule of law and watchdog activities monitoring the Afghan government.

Open Media Fund for Afghanistan

The Open Media Fund for Afghanistan over the past years has helped several regional publications achieve complete, or near self-sufficiency. The program is running steadily, managed well by Mr. Sapand, with oversight by the OMFA Director Dr. Omar Sharifi and good guidance by the Expert Committee. Media surveys have already been made in several of the most important provinces; grants for publications are usually decided on by the Expert Committee on the basis of the interest and the prospects for self-sufficiency of local print media after such a survey.

This year the OMFA will continue making grants to the publications that have shown good potential to establish themselves without continued funding. Installments are made every three months on the basis of progress the publications make on their business plan. These publications include Meena magazine in Jalalabad, Baztab daily in Mazar-e Sharif, and Neda-e Ghazni biweekly. New grantees will be selected in Herat, Kandahar, Maimana and Khost, and probably in some other cities of Afghanistan. The OMFA is also looking into providing the printing costs for “Le Monde Diplomatique” which comes fully translated in Farsi, with a ready layout, on CDs every month, free of copyright. It only needs to be printed and distributed.

Furthermore, the OMFA will focus on training local print media, in on-the-job sessions, in lay-out and generating more income, and try to organize trainings in Kabul or in other cities in journalism skills, using the network of trainers that it has access to through the Afghan Independent Journalists Association, Pazhwok News Agency, and OSI’s Network Media Program.

Finally, the OMFA has decided to take a strong stance on protecting the freedom of expression and individual Afghan journalists facing censorship and repression. The Expert Committee members are very vocal on this point and have relations with the Committee to Protect Journalists, Article XIX, the International Federation of Journalists and Reporters Sans Frontieres.

Integrity Watch Afghanistan

Integrity Watch Afghanistan is a recently established section of the FCCS, set up by Lorenzo Delesgues and Yama Torabi, two researchers that have studied in France. Their prospects seem very good, as Lorenzo has been very active in securing political support and funds for their projects. During 2006 they will be working on a comparative study for Tiri, on Integrity in National Reconstruction (whose conclusions and recommendations will be presented to donors after a collective analysis in Oslo in June 2006); on a study on political integrity funded by OSI, focusing on the Afghan Parliament; they have also secured funding from the Overseas Development Institute (UK) and are quite likely to secure a UNDP grant for related anti-corruption projects.

Integrity Watch Afghanistan is increasing its independence vis-à-vis the FCCS, as they are worried about the future integrity of the FCCS if it will be directed by the current Chairman, who is personally hostile towards their project, and whose integrity they strongly doubt.

Clinical Legal Education and Citizen’s Rights

The Executive Director’s early plans (from 2003 onwards) to establish a Unit in the FCCS working on Rule of Law issues have finally come to fruition. Mohammed Farshid, who is in charge of setting up this Unit, is young and relatively inexperienced but he makes up for it with an incredible amount of enthusiasm and a sense of management. He has received considerable support from the Open Society Justice Initiative, including a training in Clinical Legal Education in Cambodia and ongoing on-line support. He has also mustered a lot of support among the Afghan community of lawyers, some international organizations working on related Rule of Law projects (ILF, USAID, IDLO, Global Rights, UNIFEM), and Law Professors working in Afghan Universities, including OSI grantee Qadir Amiryar and the Dean of the Faculty of Law and Political Science in Kabul.

His plan is to set up legal clinics with Kabul University and Herat University in the first semester of 2006. His plans are becoming more and more feasible but he hasn’t yet secured any funding. He

may need support to raise funds and he will certainly need more advice, preferably in the person of an expatriate familiar with setting up legal clinics.

Besides Legal Clinics, his Unit also plans to work on raising citizen's awareness about their rights. Much Human Rights and Women's Rights Awareness has been accomplished in Afghanistan, but such prosaic yet essential issues such as contract, consumers' and property rights are rarely addressed. A contract with the National Participation Association (radio program producers) and Equal Access (broadcasters) is in the making for producing almost 2 hours of broadcasting weekly, and small grants will be awarded through the Beydari Melli Program to local organizations who can work on such rights awareness while at the same time offering para-legal advice (in the form of mini amateur legal clinics working on the basis of local initiative).

4) Current and Future Financial Viability

General Overview:

Activity	End Date	Budget	Donors	Shortage
FCCS Core incl EC Small Grants Program	31-Dec-06	\$ 787,041.00	EC, OSI	\$ 118,709.00
Cultural Center & Projects	31-Dec-06	\$ 219,400.00	Income, SDC, various	\$ 120,100.00
Civil Society Advocacy	31-Dec-06	\$ 120,000.00	USAID, OSI?	\$ 120,000.00
Open Media Fund	31-Dec-06	\$ 225,000.00	OSI, EC Small Grants	\$ -
Integrity Watch	31-Dec-06	\$ 100,000.00	Tiri, OSI, UNDP, ODI	\$ 50,000.00
Clinical Legal Education	31-Dec-06	\$ 150,000.00	OSJI, USAID, others	\$ 150,000.00
Total		\$ 1,601,441.00		\$ 558,809.00

For 2006, although the FCCS is still missing more than 30% of the desired funding, the picture is quite positive:

1. The Core Budget (including EC Small Grants Project) is almost fully funded if OSI agrees to provide 100,000 USD Core funding plus about 30,000 USD for grant administration costs (based on total OSI grants administered by FCCS = 600,000 USD x 5% admin costs). The remaining funding of 118,709 will mostly be secured through project overheads (if 10% is obtained on the budgets of projects still to be secured, this will amount to 44,000 USD) and income (minimal USD 16,200 foreseen). It must be noted that absolutely all salaries (of 98 people) and their operating expenses are foreseen in the FCCS Core budget, while in many cases, these costs actually are covered by project budgets. Therefore we can consider that until the end of 2006 there will be no shortage of core funding.
2. The Cultural Center budget is comprised of 12 separate projects, and if no more funding would be secured (i.e. shortage of 120,000 USD) it could still continue functioning, albeit with few major activities. However the Director of the Cultural Center, assisted by a French outreach officer skilled in writing project proposals and following up with donors, is quite capable of securing small funds on a regular basis for the CC's projects, as over the past years we have built up good relations with several donors, mostly embassies and bilateral assistance programs. Swiss Development and Cooperation, for example, has routinely funded Cultural Center programs, as have the Embassies of the United States, Netherlands, Norway, Canada and others, and DED, GTZ, and the British Council. OSI's Arts and Culture Network and the East-East program have also supported the FCCS Cultural activities when they involve other countries in the CEP region.
3. The Civil Society Advocacy Program has of yet not secured funding for 2006. A promising negotiation with USAID Local Governance Assistance Program is underway, and we hope

OSI will also be interested in partially funding the effort of setting up an advocacy mechanism. The Civil Society Unit Head, Dr. Niazi, has become well known among Afghans and with donors for his capacity of rapidly setting up nationwide programs involving local civil society. Besides, there is quite a strong interest among donors in supporting civil society, and FCCS has acquired a good reputation. However Dr. Niazi suffers from the lack of capacity to write English and has no one to support him in this. He also lacks the support of the FCCS Chairman.

4. The Open Media Fund is fully funded during 2006 thanks to a grant from the Open Society Institute and can count on the Beydari Melli Program to provide an extra 125,000 USD in grants.
5. Integrity Watch Afghanistan, as noted above, is quite skilled in raising funds and it has found itself a niche. There is thus no reason to worry for its financial prospects for 2006 and beyond, as long as it is led by the same team.
6. The Clinical Legal Education program has of yet not secured funding. However it has relatively good prospects through its association with OSJI and other partners. There is a lot of interest in Clinical Legal Education among donors working on Rule of Law issues, and it seems that the FCCS has convinced many of them it is the ideal implementing partner. The Program Director still has a lot to learn but is actively engaged in raising funds and establishing new partnerships.

For 2007, however, there is no certainty at all. The EC-funded Beydari Melli Program is quite certainly not going to be renewed, which will deprive the FCCS of its major source of core funding. There are no indications of any other donor wanting to invest in the FCCS. Therefore a protracted and skilled effort at fundraising must be undertaken during 2006.

USAID may become a major donor for the FCCS, especially on the civil society side. As indicated above, some of the programs are viable generally, and may continue to raise their own funds. This is especially the case of Integrity Watch Afghanistan. For the other programs, all the fundraising efforts have always been made by the Executive Director, and it remains to be seen whether the Program Directors themselves, or a future Executive Director, can continue this effort.

Since 2004 the Executive Director has led a conscious effort to make the Cultural Center self-sustaining. This goal has been partially achieved: the Cultural Center receives income from rental of space for office, trainings, fully furnished accommodation, and its concert hall. Facilities can also be rented for events, exhibitions, catering, and the FCCS can provide stage services outdoors (stage, sound, lighting, transportation, but also artists). The professionalism of our service delivery, and relatively good rates, have made the FCCS a popular contracting partner for all kinds of events: workshops, training sessions, conferences, dinners, parties, private concerts etc.

At the end of 2006 it will become clear whether the Cultural Center (rent, staff, operational costs) are fully self-sufficient or not.

In short, the financial viability for the FCCS post 2006 looks like this:

1. Small Grants Program, Grants Management Unit, Core funding: a major effort must be made to attract major funding, and to keep the Grants Management Unit and the regional offices operational. Otherwise a major downsizing exercise must be initiated

2. Cultural Center: may become fully self-sufficient in 2006 for normal operations (concerts, movies, exhibitions) and raise small funds from a variety of sources for special projects
3. Civil Society Advocacy, Clinical Legal Education: must initiate fundraising activities and strengthen partnerships
4. Open Media Fund: must continue current activities and raise funds from more sources than only OSI; partnerships with other international media organizations to be initiated
5. IWA: has sufficient fundraising capacity for the future, including expansion

5) Status of the European Commission-funded United Nations Habitat-FCCS project

The EC funded Beydari Melli Program was initiated upon the signature of an agreement between UN Habitat and the FCCS, on 28 January 2005. According to the contract it was to last two years, i.e. until the end of January 2007.

The FCCS agreed to disburse at least 270 grants to an equal amount of organizations around the country, and provide training to 260 civil society organizations. The FCCS was to open 6 regional offices outside Kabul and to perform a baseline survey of civil society in Afghanistan.

The total amount of grants to be given equaled 1,352,498 USD.

The role of UN Habitat was to supervise the project financially for the EC (they make the grant disbursements to the grantees) and to build the capacity of the FCCS, in order to make it a grant making institution.

The Open Society Institute agreed to provide 5% co-funding, which were used by the FCCS as core funds, and provide a Grants Management Software package plus training to the relevant staff at the FCCS and UN Habitat.

The FCCS organized a first pilot round of calls for proposals in June 2005, to test the systems it had set up. A full-fledged second round of calls for proposals was launched in all the regional offices of the FCCS in November 2005. A third round is currently being initiated.

The current status of disbursement per region is:

Region	Proposals Submitted	Grants Awarded	Total disbursement
Kabul	316	84	270,786 \$
Mazar	44	16	50,900 \$
Herat	94	27	74,500 \$
Kandahar	34	10	27,800 \$
Khost	36	6	19,000 \$
Jalalabad	42	12	41,900 \$
Baghlan	54	18	47,500 \$
Maimana	Will participate in the 3 rd round of Calls for Proposals		
Total	620	173	532,386 \$

The status of disbursement per sector is:

Sector	Proposals Submitted	Grants Awarded	Total disbursement
Culture		110	258,670 \$
Media & Research		36	141,589 \$
Civil Society		27	132,127 \$
Total		173	532,386 \$

We plan to do two more rounds of calls for proposals; one has been initiated already, and the last call for proposals, for projects of not more than 3 months duration. The general disbursement rate stands as such:

Round	Number of CFPs	Total disbursement
First (pilot), June 2005	6	62,786 USD
Second, November 2005	15	469,600 USD
Third, March/April 2006	16	700,000 USD
Fourth, July 2006	13	120,114 USD
Total	50	1,352,500 USD

The FCCS and UN Habitat plan to monitor 100% of projects. Reports are submitted by the FCCS and by UN Habitat's own field monitors to UN Habitat, who submits reports to the EC.

There are currently no more issues on this program. Relations between the FCCS and UN Habitat were sometimes strained in the past, but they have all been solved by a closer working relationship and by amendments to the agreement between the two organizations, and the budget, according to FCCS' wishes. The only problem remaining is the slowness of UN Habitat's response to FCCS requests for advances, and in making the disbursements to the grantees.

In the absence of the Executive Director, and until a new international Executive Director for the FCCS is recruited, UN Habitat's program officer in charge, Fritz Affolter, will replace Mr. Kluijver in the crucial Project Selection Committees and in some programmatic aspects, such as the making and editing of calls for proposals and the monitoring of overall progress on the program.

6) Memo on the current status of FCCS cooperation with OSI Network Programs

a) Network Media Program

After an initially strong interest of the NMP in Afghanistan, which led to a survey and later a workshop for printed media in Afghanistan in 2004, the relations with the NMP have become quieter. The NMP still follows the OMFA program and regularly communicates with the FCCS, especially on freedom of expression issues. The NMP has offered the FCCS to introduce one professional lawyer to be trained as media lawyer in 2006. The OMFA Expert Committee members have been notified and are looking for the most suitable candidate.

b) Open Society Justice Initiative

This Network Program has been very quick in providing support to the FCCS' plans to engage in Clinical Legal Education. The Program Director to be, Mohammed Farshid, was first invited to a CLE workshop in Cambodia, and has since then received rapid online support from OSJI's staff, notably Zaza Namoradze and Mariana Berbec. They have invited several relevant Law Professors, as well as Farshid himself, to visit the legal clinic in Bilgi University in Istanbul, scheduled for April. Farshid has also been invited through the OSJI to attend a meeting on Human Rights and Governance Grants Program in Budapest, in May. But most importantly, they have just committed to send an expert to help Farshid set up the CLE program. An intern from Virginia Law School may also come to work on CLE in Afghanistan this summer; this person was introduced through OSJI.

c) Arts and Culture Network

In 2005 the area of operation of the Arts and Culture Network was extended to include Afghanistan. Mr. Hakimyar, the Director of the FCCS Culture Unit, has since then been in contact with Andrea Csanadi and other staff from the Arts and Culture Network, as well as with OSI national foundation staff working with this network program. The first concrete cooperation came with the A&CN contribution to the Nauroz International Music Festival in Mazar, which the FCCS organizes every year. Other likely areas of cooperation with the network will be in theatre (Afghan festival to which groups from Iran and Tajikistan are invited) and in film (a similar event).

d) Moving Walls

There has been talk since 2004 about the sending of a Moving Walls exhibition through the CEP and MENA region, including Afghanistan. Our Cultural Center is of course ready for this event, but we have had no news for many months; it seems this project idea is facing some problems.

e) Revenue Watch

OSI's Revenue Watch program has been an inspiration for the setting up of Integrity Watch Afghanistan, but so far it seems there has been no talk of direct cooperation between the two programs. IWA has mentioned however it would like to benefit from Revenue Watch expertise.

f) Information Program

The Information Program, in cooperation with the Next Page Foundation, sponsored the FCCS Book Fair, which was truly a big success. This year the FCCS plans to repeat the Festival, in cooperation with the Goethe Institut (who will link their yearly literary forum to our book fair) and the Afghan PEN Association. The FCCS will use the occasion to launch several new publications in Dari and Pashto, some of them produced as a result of the small grants program.

Given the commercial success of last year's book fair, the FCCS plans to reduce or eliminate some of the incentives for the publishers and booksellers that present their publications. Free lunches and free stalls will not be given. In this manner the FCCS hopes to reduce the total financial contribution requested from external sources. However it is hoped that the Information Program and the Next Page Foundation will contribute to the book fair, in financial and technical aspects.

g) OSI partners in neighboring countries

The FCCS tried several times to establish a working relationship with the OSI representative in Iran, but the lack of response at critical times that his support was needed to organize an Iranian presence at a FCCS event (before last year's Nauroz music festival, and before last year's book fair) have discouraged further such attempts. There seems to be no interest on his side to increase the relations with the FCCS or other Afghan entities.

In Pakistan, the other neighboring country with which Afghanistan has close relations, there are so far no OSI-supported activities that the FCCS can connect with, to our knowledge.

The most important cooperation with OSI partners in neighboring countries takes place with Tajikistan. The OSI Foundation in Tajikistan has provided essential help in sending Tajik artists to Afghanistan on bequest of the FCCS, and helped FCCS staff in learning how to use GMS. Currently the Tajik OSI Foundation is involved with the FCCS in setting up a "Cultural Week between Afghanistan and Tajikistan". They will certainly also be involved in other projects, hopefully supported by the Arts and Culture Network, such as the regional theatre festival and the Iranian language film festival of Kabul. Hopefully this cooperative relationship between OSI Tajikistan and the FCCS will expand into non-cultural areas.

7: Status of the OSI Grantees in Afghanistan

#	Grantee	Start Date	Interim	Duration	Final Report	Remarks
1	AWJA 1	July, 2004	Yes	12 months	Yes	Closed
2	AWJA 2	April 2006		3 months		Grant not received
3	NPA 1	January 2004	yes	12 months	Yes	Closed
4	NPA 2	January 2006		12 months		Grant not received
5	CRA 1	April, 2004	Yes	12 months	Yes	Closed
6	CRA 2	March 2005	Yes	12 months	Yes	Closed (completed early)
7	ACBAR 1, 2 & 3	March, 2003	Yes	until Dec 05	Yes	Closed
8	Talayadaran	December 04	Yes	12 months	No	Requested extension
9	AIAS	11 March 04	Yes	5 months	No	But Project completed
10	AOHREP 1	April 2004	Yes	3 months	Yes	Closed
11	AOHREP 2	January 2006		6 months		Grant not received
12	AWN	December 04	Yes	12 months	Yes	Closed
13	Equal Access	April 2005		12 months		Contract signed March 2006, with new dates
14	Crimes of War					Not reporting to FCCS
15	ILF 1	Apr 2004	Yes	12 months	Yes	
16	ILF 2	Apr 2005		12 months		Not due yet

#	Grantee	Start Date	Interim	Duration	Final Report	Remarks
17	IHRLI Bassiouni			Sep 2005		Yes (OSI NY)
18	AJP 1					Not reporting to FCCS
19	AJP 2					Not reporting to FCCS
20	Sayara	2004	Yes		No	Project not completed
21	WCLRF Participation	January, 2004	Yes	6 months	Yes	Closed
22	WCLRF Polygamy	September 05	Yes	6 months	No	Not due yet
23	ACSF					Not reporting to FCCS
24	AIHRC	September 04		4 months	Yes	Closed
25	Awaz				Yes	Closed
26	CFDO	March 2004	Yes	6 months	Yes	Closed
27	Shuhada 1		Yes		Yes	Closed
28	Shuhada 2	Jan 2005	No	12 months	No	Reports late
29	Norw. Ref. Council	August 2005		6 months	No	Should be sent by FCCS
30	Aftab/FCCS	August 2005		1 month	Yes	Closed
31	FCCS Core funds 1	Mar 2004	Yes	9 months	Yes	Closed
32	FCCS core funds 2	Jan 2005	Yes	12 months	Yes	Closed
33	FCCS proj adm	Jan 2005		12 months	Yes	Grant not received yet