

# Seminar 7: Fighting the Phantom Enemy



# Who/What is NATO fighting against?

Al Qaeda? The Taliban? The designated enemies of the Afghan government? All anti-government forces?

- ⇒ The definition of 'the enemy' has changed several times since 2001
- ⇒ This has provoked a feeling of insecurity among rural Pashtuns





# What is NATO fighting for?


Vengeance?

War on Terror?

For the Western way of life?

For Afghans? Women, minorities?

Eikenberry: “to create a state inhospitable to terrorist organizations with transnational aspirations and capabilities”



# Where?


- The Taliban insurgency spread into the tribal areas (Pashtun majority) of Pakistan, giving rise to a different group, TTP (Tehreek-e Taliban Pakistan) whose heart lies in Waziristan
- Anti-government groups in the rest of Afghanistan have partially joined the Taliban insurgency, among Tajiks, Hazaras, Uzbeks, Nuristanis, Pashais etc.



# International Security Assistance Force




## ISAF EXPANSION








# Afghanistan Oversight Access 2009







# Afghanistan Possible Oversight Access 2014



**UNCLASSIFIED**

**2014 Possible Oversight Access Coverage**  
*21% of total area of Afghanistan*

**Provinces**


This graphic depicts approximate oversight access areas for reconstruction projects and activities in Afghanistan. These oversight access areas represent access under the most favorable conditions possible and do not include limitations due to terrain, weather and security conditions.

# How is the counterinsurgency fought? 1/3

## Boots on the Ground: US and other NATO troops in Afghanistan

### TOTAL U.S. TROOPS

Numbers of troops are estimates as numbers change daily.



Sources: Congressional Research Service; Brookings Institute; media reports.



# How is the counterinsurgency fought? 2/3




**Drones** perform ‘Targeted Assassinations’ (as practiced by the IDF)

- Remote-control war, (steered from Nevada)
- The intelligence for drone attacks is provided by CIA handlers on the ground (collecting local intelligence) and the Afghan and Pakistani Intelligence services.
- These drone attacks elicit strong anti-American feelings among the Pashtun population, deflected towards their governments who allow and support these attacks




# How is the counterinsurgency fought? 3/3



**By proxy: Afghan and Pakistani security forces**



# US Aid to Pakistan




# Training the Afghan Security Forces






# Perceptions of foreign military personnel by Afghans




NATO deaths caused by Afghan security forces since 2003



Source: New America Foundation

## Hearts and Minds... or 'population-centered strategies'

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- Kilcullen's 'full spectrum approach': predicated on a comprehensive understanding of local factors: cultural, tribal, economic etc.
  - 'Where we have failed, it was due to a lack of understanding' [of these factors]
  - Using 'the road' as a tool to penetrate hostile territory and provide an array of government services and other (access to markets etc).
  - ⇒ the foreign military become a state-building, development actor
  - Capability of Provincial Reconstruction Teams: focus on spending money (Stryker Interim Report)
  - Misguided development projects (Shahran district government building, schools)
  - Conflict with other development actors: Afghan government, NGOs...
  - Providing security to the Afghan population becomes central concern




*But was a 'hearts and mind' campaign necessary in the first place?*






# Afghanistan Stability / COIN Dynamics



- Population/Popular Support
- Infrastructure, Economy, & Services
- Government
- Afghanistan Security Forces
- Insurgents
- Crime and Narcotics
- Coalition Forces & Actions
- Physical Environment



**WORKING DRAFT - V3**



# The failure of COIN

three crucial assumptions:

1. that the COIN goal of protecting the population was clear and attainable and would prove decisive
2. that higher levels of foreign assistance and support would substantially increase the Afghan government's capacity and legitimacy
3. that a COIN approach by the United States would be consistent with the political-military approach preferred by Afghan President Hamid Karzai.

Arrogance and Hubris. Can we solve the problems of our inner cities in the West?  
*"Marine captain, when are you going to invade Detroit?"*

# Effects of Military Intervention in AfPak



- Disproportionate amount of aid goes toward security forces, compared to for example education or justice: civil society comparatively weaker.
- Distribution of enormous amount of weapons
- Crystallization of armed resistance