

International Interventions and State- Building

GUEST LECTURE BY
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A note about your lecturer today

Work experience

NGOs, e.g. Doctors Without Borders in Tajikistan

UN Political Affairs Officer in Afghanistan

World Bank consultant on local governance in Afghanistan

EU consultant on Security Sector Reform in Yemen

Dutch donor program development in Iraq

Artistic development in Gulf countries (Saudi Arabia, UAE etc)

Political analyst in Northern Syria (Kurdish areas)

Security specialist for NGO sector in Somalia

Teaching experience

*Paris School of International Affairs
(international master program of
Sciences Po)*

- Lessons Not Learnt in Afghanistan

- Contemporary Art and Geopolitics in
the Arab World

New York University Abu Dhabi


- Research project with artists and
young academics about cultural
heritage in the Gulf countries

Why am I doing a PhD now?

- **Professional** decision: so that I can speak with more authority, and to get better paid consultancies
- **Personal** reason: so that I can sharpen my mind now that I'm 50 years old
- **Intellectual** challenge: why do international interventions fail, in particular in building viable states?

This map shows only UN interventions. Add Libya, Bosnia, and theatres of bilateral interventions such as Chechnya and Algeria

Where UN peacekeepers have been deployed



With this track record, can we trust that the next 'humanitarian' intervention will be a success???

Humanitarian aid provided by the US stranded at the Venezuelan border

What is the alternative? Is it better not to intervene, as in Rwanda in 1994 or at the beginning of the Yugoslav war?

Is non-intervention possible in this globally interconnected-world?



SECTION ONE

A short history of
international intervention

and its theoretical basis

The birth of the international community

Intervention was mostly seen as an instrument of **colonial or imperial policy**, and therefore it was condemned.

The principle of **state sovereignty** was used to fight intervention.

An exception was made in the case of colonial territories: intervention for the sake of **national self-determination** (against another colonial power) was considered legitimate.

To justify such a 'good' intervention, alliances were sought with other states; thus the concept of 'international' versus 'bilateral' intervention was created. The former is legitimate, the latter isn't. Such a concept of **international intervention** only arose after World War one, with the international order devised by US President Woodrow Wilson to fight communism.

The 'international community' was a response to the communist international (Comintern) which called for workers and oppressed people of the world to unite against the capitalist class. The birth of the international community, embodied in the League of Nations, was also the birth of the **international liberal world order** which still rules today.

Intervention in the Cold War

At the end of the Second World War there were two major developments in the international community:

1. The Creation of the **United Nations** to replace the League of Nations as the world body institutionalizing collective security arrangements, and designed not only to keep the peace among nations, but also – through the Charter of Human Rights – to defend the rights of the citizens of the world. It was to be more inclusive and more effective. From 1946 onwards, an intervention had to be supported by the UN to appear legitimate.
2. The separation of the Western world into two blocs, the **‘Free World’ versus the ‘Soviet Bloc’**. This rendered the UN largely ineffective, as both blocs had veto rights in the Security Council. Interventions in other countries were only seen as legitimate by the members of the intervening bloc, and were designed to secure allegiance to that bloc.

The ‘Non-Aligned Movement’ remained a powerful idea throughout the Cold War, but its individual members were usually not strong enough to stop interference by the two blocs.

Intervention was still seen as an abuse of power by strong states against weak ones

Interventions in the post-Cold War era

With the collapse of the Soviet bloc (1989-1991) a new world order seemed possible.

Until then international relations had been dominated by realpolitik, underpinned by 'realism' as theory. Within the Western world, however, the liberal ideals (underpinned by 'liberalism' as theory) had become dominant. From 1991 until now there has been an effort by Western states and the multilateral organizations they have created to extend this liberal order to the rest of the world. We'll return to this liberal order later on.

It was expected the UN could finally perform its original mission and ensure collective safety and global development. But while dreams were high in New York, the reality on the ground in Somalia and Yugoslavia required an immediate response.



The use of force to deliver humanitarian aid to the population was seen as legitimate. The failure of this policy led all NGOs to a 'no weapons' policy after Somalia



UN intervention in Somalia 1992-1995

A new type of international intervention was pioneered in Somalia: the **humanitarian intervention**

Initially there was no state-building component. An analysis of the UN security council resolutions of this period shows that the UN calls on the authorities to ensure safe **humanitarian access**; only with UNOSOM 2 (1993-1995) did the UN take on the goal of a political settlement.

To provide legal justification to intervene in Somalia, Charter VII of the UN Charter was invoked; the crisis in Somalia had to be cast as a **threat to the international community**.

To escape the problem of state sovereignty it was argued that Somalia was a **failed state**.

Failure of the UN intervention in Somalia

There was a **double failure**: 220,000 Somalis died as a result of the famine: the humanitarian assistance was too little, too late. And the mighty US military was routed by mooryaan, barefoot militias with AK47s.

1. That the mighty UN, supported by US military force, could fail in Somalia was inconceivable. That it happened dented the dreams of an international order led by the UN and moving toward peace and development with the support of the US and other Western powers.
2. It also turned the US military, and the US public, critical against cooperation with the UN. The US put the blame for the failure on the UN, as 'our soldiers have fought bravely'.
3. In Somalia the UN lost its neutrality, as it had taken sides in the clan conflict.

As a result, the UN did not intervene in Rwanda, Afghanistan and other far-away civil wars, and it hesitated to intervene in Yugoslavia.

Yugoslavia: from humanitarian intervention to integrated mission, 1992-1995



The civil wars in Somalia, Afghanistan and Sierra Leone could be safely ignored, but the civil war in ex-Yugoslavia, as it unfolded on Europe's doorstep, could not.

It was now understood that an intervention had to include, from the outset, humanitarian, military and political components: the **integrated mission**.

This concept has since then become the dominant form of intervention, and has led to several attempts to restructure the UN.

It has also shaped the interventions of the European Union and led the World Bank and other international organizations to become involved in interventions.

Human Security and the Responsibility to Protect

The genocide in Rwanda (1994) and the massacre in Srebrenica (1995) created a new impulse to overcome the defeat of the international intervention in Somalia. Western public opinion, influenced by the '**CNN effect**' of seeing dying children and other civilians victims of war or famine, put pressure on Western leaders to find better ways to save lives and build peace in the rest of the world; Western leaders mostly deferred this pressure to the UN and other international organizations.

In 1994 the UNDP, playing a leading role in those years, came up with the concept of **human security** as opposed to national security; this included not only safety but also development goals. It justified violating state sovereignty to protect citizens against abuses of the state, postulating an international 'Responsibility to Protect' which was used to intervene in Libya in 2011, among other places.

States that could not, for a variety of reasons, provide human security to their citizens were henceforth seen as 'failed' or 'failing' states. Providing humanitarian services without development would foster dependency.



⇒ Thus the state moved back to the center of development discourse.

A world of snakes

Security institutions, notably in the USA, France and Russia, remained skeptical of the notion of human security, and of participating in UN-led missions to achieve it. They preferred to focus on **traditional national security objectives**. Many civil wars festered on unchecked throughout the 90s if the great powers could not identify national security objectives to intervene.

“We have slain a large dragon, but we live now in a jungle filled with a bewildering variety of poisonous snakes. And in many ways, the dragon was easier to keep track of.” – said James Woolsey, Feb 1993, before becoming director of the CIA.

The director of USAID in 1994, facing the threat of US Congress to eliminate it, argued that aid was now a central component of soft power. Thus, humanitarian intervention became justified as a bilateral way to project power in the world, satisfying a realpolitik aim.

=> While liberals dreamt of a better world, Cold War institutions such as NATO and the national security apparatuses they had fostered also sought to **reposition** themselves in the post-Cold War era.



Intervention in the War on Terror era

This changed with **9/11**. The Global War on Terror gave a new justification for intervention based on national security interests. Failed states were now seen as launchpads for terrorist attacks on Western nations, especially if they had a Muslim population, justifying interventions in Afghanistan, Somalia and Yemen, and in so-called ‘terrorism sponsoring states’ such as Iraq, Libya, and maybe next Iran.

It also ‘normalized’ the ongoing Israeli repression and intervention in the Palestinian territories, against the 1993 Oslo accord. The same applies to Russian intervention in the Muslim states of the Caucasus, such as Chechnya.

The UN could be by-passed with the emotional appeal by George W. Bush: *“you’re either with us or with the terrorists”*.

There is in fact little evidence linking failed states to support of international terrorism. Most terrorists of 9/11 came from Saudi Arabia and were educated in the West.

The Intervention in Afghanistan (2001 to present)

The UN authorized the intervention in Afghanistan to remove the Taliban from power and bring to justice the perpetrators of 9/11.

Then the UN started working, within the framework of an integrated mission, to create a new government for Afghanistan, and to lay down the basic principles of the future state: the Bonn Agreement (Dec 2001).

This agreement seemed to work well and Afghans enthusiastically embraced the chance to create a modern, post-Taliban state without the warlords. However, this project ran counter the US policy.

The US needed warlords to fight against the remnants of Al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan, and imposed the inclusion of the despised warlords in Afghanistan's political system, thus sabotaging it.

The Taliban wanted to surrender in 2001-2002 and join the new government but Donald Rumsfeld, then Secretary of Defence, refused this, leading to the current conflict.



Other interventions after Iraq

The Intervention in Iraq (2003 to 2011)

The USA criticized the UN for not being hard enough on its enemies; in 2003 it decided to attack Iraq without UN support; instead it created a 'coalition of the willing'.

To justify the war in Iraq, the Bush administration and UK premier Tony Blair deliberately lied to the UN and their public about Saddam's links with terrorism.

Without the UN, the USA created its own administration in Iraq, the Coalition Provisional Authority, with support of the British. The CPA took over the state of Iraq.

The dismal failure of the CPA led to the bloody civil war in Iraq. The USA realized it had no capacity to build a state and handed over the job to Iraqi politicians.

The intervention in Libya (2011)

This was not undertaken as part of the Global War on Terror, but under the 'Responsibility to Protect' doctrine. The occasion was the fall of the Tunisian and Egyptian governments as a result of the Arab spring, and the hope to create a string of democratic countries along the Southern Mediterranean.

To avoid the pitfalls of state-building, the intervention had a limited scope: to remove Gaddafi from power as he was reportedly committing crimes against his citizens.

It was thought the Libyans could create their own state after the removal of Gaddafi, but this calculation proved wrong. Since the intervention, Libya has become a mess.



The humanitarian sector in the wake of the War on Terror

Since the Global War on Terror started, the UN and aid agencies have been compelled to participate in it, thus losing their neutrality.

The bombing of the UN headquarters in Baghdad was the first such attack on the UN, signaling it had become an enemy, not a neutral arbiter, for at least part of the Iraqi population.

Donors have made funding to NGOs dependent on compliance with CT financing rules and encourage them to participate in CVE and other programs to fight terrorism.

Summary of International Interventions

There are two poles of intervention: a bilateral intervention for national security objectives, and a multilateral intervention for humanitarian reasons. The second type has always enjoyed more legitimacy than the first. All interventions are situated on the scale between these two poles.

In their effects, the two types of intervention have not been very different. Both have been marked by failure to attain the stated objectives and have frequently led to increased conflict.

Despite the repeated failures, interventions are attempted again and again. Why?

- conspiracy theory: 'they' don't want peace but war. But who are 'they'?
- national interest: 'liberalism' and multilateralism are smoke-screens for the national interest of intervening countries. But how can this explain the role of the UN and smaller countries?
- stupidity and/or lack of imagination. But people working in this industry are smart and experienced. This is a reason to try harder.
- hegemony: the price of failure is acceptable for the maintenance and extension of a certain type of liberal world order. This is the institutional argument – path dependency.

SECTION TWO

The international intervention in Somalia

The effect of British colonialism in Somalia

1. Great Britain's direct efforts to transform Somali society in the area they controlled was minimal. The same may be said of Italy's efforts in Puntland. But the integration of these two regions into the regional livestock market increased the power of urban commercial elites (often Arab or Indian) thus transforming (monetizing) the pastoral economy and its relations, internal and with coastal communities.
2. The British 'native administration' created the Somali colonial subject, defining its native culture and social relations in fixed terms, while these relations and the culture(s) underpinning them used to be native. The British also constituted a ruling class above the 'natives', who now had to derive their legitimacy from their rapports with the colonial rulers.
3. The British maintained social peace by acting as the strongest clan, exacting fines and collective punishment when British subjects or interests were damaged by Somalis.
4. By their extensive travels in the region, ethnographic studies and effort to understand Somali language and culture, the British defined the international image of the Somali as a tough, ferociously egalitarian nomad who can best be left to his own devices. The riverine agricultural communities of the South and the more sophisticated inhabitants of coastal settlements never seemed quite as Somali as the Northern pastoralist. This image still predominates international thinking about Somalia, and preconfigures solutions for Somalia.

See Besteman - *Representing Violence and 'Othering' Somalia* and the debate it provoked with I.M. Lewis.




The effects of Italian colonialism on Somalia

1. Mogadishu and the Juba and Shebelle river valleys were developed with infrastructure and nascent state institutions to administer it. Was there any continuity with the Geledi Sultanate and previous states in Somalia (Ajuran)?
2. Italian fascist nationalism and the dream of the 'Africa Orientale Italiana' influenced Somali ideas of nationhood and the dream of reunion of Somali peoples under one government, 'Somaliweyn'.
3. Italian cultural influences last until today, while British left almost none. Italians stayed on after Italy left, while all the British left at the end of the colonial period.



The legacy of the trusteeship period

1. The state prepared for independence in 1960 did not have a strong basis in society. It relied on a tiny modernizing elite (mostly in the Somali Youth League) and had failed to define its relationship with traditional society.
2. There was no discussion about the state model to be applied with Somali society, and little such discussion abroad. A model was simply copied without much thought and adapted to the Italian lack of resources. Also within the SYL there was no discussion of state models, despite inspiring examples elsewhere in African anti-colonial struggles.
3. Rather than *what kind* of state, the question was immediately: *who* will capture the state and *how* will power be shared. In the beginning of the trusteeship period the Italians were inclined to work with tribal elders. Later the UN imposed that they should work with political parties, which allowed the SYL, the only party with national presence, to lead independent Somalia.
4. The SYL was motivated to increase its own constituency using external funding for the state and the economy, and to delegitimize clan identity.
5. As a system of governance, a modern state needs many more resources than traditional clan governance, which is basically free. Thus the Somali state was to remain dependent on external aid and thus external influence







Chart 4: Relation between Somali GDP and external assistance (source [World Bank](#))

UN agencies net flows to Somalia in current US\$ (source [World Bank](#)).



* The international community and the USA in particular were not a neutral actor but were clearly responsible for propping up the Barre state as it degenerated into a predatory organ killing and looting its own population. The principal means by which Barre and his cronies enriched themselves was the IMF-imposed privatization and the absence of accountability on the use of the resultant loans. Here again we see the principle at work: external support decreases incentive to build internal support.

* The humanitarian sector was already very present in the 1980s, and it was identified as part of the international alliance supporting the Barre regime. The predatory skimming or looting aid and ‘capturing’ vulnerable populations in camps to facilitate these practices, which became such a well-known feature of the humanitarian disaster in the 1990s and again in the late 2000s, were already an assumed part of aid delivery before the collapse of the Somali state.

* Although Somalia had a relatively strong state in terms of its international power projection, it had isolated itself completely by 1990, by a behaviour that was seen as aggressive, arrogant and uncooperative. It ruined its reputation by its insistence on ‘redeeming the lost Somali territories’ and invading a fellow African state. It was arrogant towards the rest of African nations, pretending it was Arab, but it never invested much in developing friendly ties with other Arab nations. The opportunistic switching from non-aligned to Soviet bloc to the West made it lose any semblance of integrity, and it was by all counts an embarrassing ally to have. In contemporary parlance, Somalia was a rogue state. Diplomats may have seen the collapse of the Somali state with a sigh of relief. It is puzzling that attempts to reconstruct the Somali state don’t seem to take this into account.

* Siad Barre is still admired today by some Somalis for his sheer longevity in power. He seems to have single-handedly changed the Somali regime from (corrupt) parliamentary democracy to socialist development to personal rule (‘sultanism’). This is blatant proof of the weakness of the Somali state institutions; at the same time, the Somali state remained strong enough until 1990 to keep all competitors at bay, for example rival generals or clan elders. This contradiction remains to be resolved.

Admittedly, Siad Barre was not alone behind the regime change in 1969; but he was, from the beginning, the *primus inter pares* in the new revolutionary government and by 1975 his hold on power was unshakable.

Lessons to be learnt from the UN intervention in Somalia 1992-1995

* The initial response was 'too little, too late'. By January 1992 the famine which claimed around 300,000 lives, and the conflict which had claimed tens of thousands of lives and sent hundreds of thousands seeking refuge outside the country, were far too advanced to stem. The principal reason for this late reaction was the UN principle of non-interference and respect of sovereignty. The intervention that resulted from UNSC resolutions 733 and 751 still sought to base itself on these principles; it was only in December 1992 that Chapter VII of the UN Charter was invoked for another type of response.

* The muscular approach advocated by the UN and the USA in a second phase backfired spectacularly when it was applied to eliminate 'spoilers', in this case Aideed. Although the UN carefully construed it as being retaliation against an attack on its peacekeepers, the long-standing enmity between Aideed and international forces made it seem, to Somalis in any case, that the UN was attacking the Habar-Gidir clan of the Hawiye. This allowed Aideed to mobilize a number of Somalis that the UN could not possibly defeat, even with 28,000 troops.

* The reason this clash came about was the disarmament effort by the UN against clan militias. In March 1993, in a classical case of 'mission creep', the UN secretary general, bolstered by favourable impressions of the new muscular approach, decided to go to the root of the Somali problem and to vastly expand the UN mission and help Somalis rebuild a functioning polity. This overstretch fatally affected UNOSOM II.

Bradbury (1994 p 16) estimates that 400,000 Somalis died in the first three years of the civil war from famine, epidemic outbreaks and from war violence.

This is the term used to indicate shifting and generally expanding goals of a mission that was originally much more succinct. For example, 'protecting humanitarian aid deliveries' becomes 'disarming all militias and including them in a political reconciliation process'.

Reflections on the period of minimal international involvement


* Although the consensus in 1995 was that after UNSOM's withdrawal the country would slip back into chaos and war, the reverse happened. Various forms of local governance emerged, involving clan elders, faction leaders, businessmen, Islamists, sharia courts, professionals and intellectuals. Fighting continued in some areas, but at a low level (for example, very little displacement). When the international community again became involved, mainly through neighbouring countries, local conflicts increased (although still modest compared to violence levels after 2006).

* Successful local governance and peace initiatives led observers to advocate for a 'building block' approach instead of a top-down effort to rebuild a national state. This could account for the greater autonomy of Somaliland and Puntland but also allow for Rahanweyn and other aspirations in a future structure. This is why the current federal model came to be seen as the most appropriate.

* The 4.5 formula was adopted in 2000 to give traditional leaders a larger share of power, hoping that thus the government would be more stable. Until then self-proclaimed political leaders, heading the largest factions, had been reluctantly seen as the repository of Somalia's sovereignty. The MPs selected by the clans in the 4.5 system were however often not clan elders or their representatives but political entrepreneurs, so the parliaments elected in 2000 and 2004 were not representative of Somali society.

Net flows of the EU/DAC and UN to Somalia (in current US\$)

source: The World Bank



* The assumption of international actors that Somalis invited to peace talks would represent their constituency proved erroneous. In successive rounds, different selection criteria were used to ensure better representativity. But what if the *principle* of political representation was not shared between Somalis and foreigners? If the participant to a negotiation has not been vested with a mandate, however symbolically, by the people he/she is supposed to represent, how can he/she speak in their name? What is the tradition of political representation among Somalis? Does it exist outside the clan context?

* In the second half of the 90s donors and humanitarian agencies led the intervention in Somalia. Despite plans to support development in areas that were recovering and spread the aid more intelligently, aid seems to have had little impact in these years. Remote management from Nairobi was part of the reason. Somalis in general show little respect for the aid sector.

Reflections on intervention in Somalia within the War on Terror matrix

* Somalia was identified as a global terrorist threat on the basis of a 'failed state' assumption, probably laced with a 'clash-of-civilisations' logic of Islam vs. West. The evidence was anecdotal at best. Somalia simply *had* to harbour terrorists with evil intentions toward the West. But although Western special forces and drones only could find occasional targets from 2001 to 2007, their presence may have contributed to the rise of Al Shabaab, exactly that what they had come to fight in the first place.

* Counter Terrorism Financing measures have harmed the Somali economy: by restrictions on the *hawala* remittances system, and by cutting off aid to areas controlled by Al Shabaab. Simultaneously, through the presence of World Bank advisers and international auditors, donor flows are being directed more carefully. In the latest phase of international intervention, finance has become a more precisely used tool.

* In 2005-2006 grass-roots mobilization of all Somalis in Mogadishu and the war-racked South-Central region brought to power a government of sorts that immediately improved security and governance in all areas under their control. This was also the opinion of international aid workers then present in the country. This government was violently evicted from power by a Western-backed Ethiopian invasion. The international community then sought to impose the government it had created in exile as the only legitimate one. This resulted in constant conflict and the gradual implantation of Al Shabaab in Somalia.

* There was already tension between the humanitarian agenda of aid agencies and the state-building agenda of the UN and donors. Now a third form of intervention has complicated the landscape: military intervention. Security forces are not *a priori* interested by either government capacity building or the humanitarian situation in the country, and their actions can harm both. How does this dynamic play out in the field? Are Somalis aware of these three competing objectives? Besides working at cross-purposes, do these forms of intervention also work together to produce a common outcome?


* To answer the question above, we may wonder what the purpose is of humanitarian assistance in Somalia today? As was apparent in 2007-08 and 2011-2012, the aid sector cannot respond adequately to a humanitarian crisis. This is partially due to contradictory objectives of interveners, but also because the entire international community is narrowly associated with one of the parties in conflict: the state. Failing to meaningfully improve human security, the aid sector enacts, in Somali eyes, the enforced modernization agenda imposed by the West. Gender-based violence and female genital mutilation, individual human rights and the rule of law – common themes of donor-driven 'development' programs – justify this view. The modern Somali state that interveners are seeking to build is also part of the modernization agenda. Can the humanitarian intervention still be distinguished from the political one?

“One hand of the 'international community' was strengthening the capacity of the TFG security forces while the other was trying to alleviate the humanitarian disaster those very forces helped to perpetrate”: Menkhaus 2010 p334.

SECTION THREE

Theory of State-Building

Liberal & humanitarian perspective



Realist and security perspective

We see how liberal conceptions of an international order based on human security and its component parts of peace, human rights and development converged with realist assumptions of national security on at least one point: the centrality of state-building.

But **what kind of state?**

Different conceptions of the state 1/2

ANGLO-AMERICAN

Minimal conception. The state is a set of institutions that exercise power.

Civil society is outside the state.

The state is result of a social contract whereby people agree to delegate their power to the state in exchange for the Rule of Law.

Weber: monopoly of violence over a territory

FRENCH & MEDITERRANEAN

Broad conception. The state is intertwined with society. It is like the skeleton of society, a set of institutions that cannot be divorced from the people it organizes.

Civil society is the foundation of the state – the *nation-state*. The nation remains sovereign, not the state.

In line with this, Bourdieu noted that the state has colonized our thinking, and it has become difficult to think about politics without the state.

Different conceptions of the state 2/2

WESTERN MODEL

State and government

State = fixed, unmovable concept

Government comes from ancient Greek κυβερνάω 'to steer, drive'

The Western model of the state comes from the Catholic church (12th C), which first invented the idea of office – where the function is separated from the person performing it.

This led to the concept of bureaucracy, a central pillar of the Western state (impersonal, merit-based system of administration).

ARAB/ISLAMIC MODEL

Dawladda iyo xukuumadda / الدولة والحكومة

Dawlah = movable, evolving concept

Hukumah = based on wisdom, knowledge

The state in the Arab/Islamic concept is personified in its ruler, who must ensure adl wa insaaf (justice and equity). There is no institutionalization. Bay'ah instead of social contract.

Shariah as basis for the state was only postulated by Ibn Taymiyya, the founder of Wahhabism, and only became commonly accepted in the late 20th century.

The Muslim Brotherhood envisaged a mix between a socialist state and an Islamic society

Marxist conception of the state

For Karl Marx, the state is a creation by the bourgeoisie in order to rule over the working class.

The state is an instrument of oppression. The law is also an instrument of oppression, as it protects the bourgeoisie and the capitalists more than the workers.

However, unlike anarchists, Marx did not suggest to abolish the state. First, the proletariat had to capture the state, and then use it as a tool to transform society.

In the long term, when equality had been achieved, the state would not be necessary anymore, and people would live in a self-regulated society.



The social welfare state

The social welfare state was a response in Western Europe to the danger of communist revolution after the second world war.

It was an acknowledgement that the liberal capitalist state had failed to protect its citizens from the Great Depression of the 1930s, while both the fascist states of Germany and Italy, and communist USSR, had enjoyed huge popularity because they increased the living standards of common citizens.

To avoid communist revolutions in Western Europe, social welfare states were built all throughout Europe, even though they were not good for capital accumulation.

With the disappearance of the communist alternative, the social welfare states started being dismantled in Europe with the argument that they are too expensive. This ongoing process allows capital accumulation by transfer of public to private wealth, resulting in rapidly increasing inequality.

The social welfare state remains a dream for many of the world's citizens.




The expected disappearance of the state and its revival

In the 1980s and 1990s, it was commonly thought that the state would gradually disappear. It would be replaced by global governance structures on the one hand, and by transnational relations on the other (people-to-people relations across borders).

The growth of multinational corporations not rooted in one country, the transfer of domestic sovereignty to supranational organisations such as the European Union and NATO on the other.

The state made a clear come-back after 9/11, as the provider of security for citizens. The security argument has become the main rationale for the continued existence of the state.

Despite the ideology of reducing state size, the state is consuming ever more funds. Much of this is debt servicing.



The state and the transnational class

The classic legitimacy of the state derives from the agreement of the people to be ruled by the state (minimal conception of Hobbes) and/or to shape the state for the **general good** of these people (the democratic, social welfare state).

However, power over the institutions of the state has been captured by a small group of people who have built strong links with rulers of other states and with the leaders of industries such as business, finance, entertainment and academia. This group, which socializes a lot together (in the same holiday places, schools, in Davos and other conferences) forms the **transnational class**.

The transnational class rules the world through internal consensus; they share the same ideas and outlook on life, and have an interest in perpetuating the current system. Most of the intervention industry includes people from this class.

The legitimacy of a state is now provided by this transnational class, not by the people. See for example Venezuela, but also the state being built for Somalia.

The dress code of the transnational class is suits and ties for men.

The state versus (self-)governance

Governance is how a society (or group of people) is organized and regulated; it does not necessarily need institutions.

Historically, most communities of people were self-governed until the early 20th century. Either they lived outside the confines of a state, or the state only nominally governed them. Large urban communities have needed institutions of government to organize them, but rural and nomadic communities do not.

Self-governance is free, but government by a state needs many resources.

Is it possible to build a system of governance, without a state, from the bottom up? Most experts don't believe it's possible, but the Kurds of Northern Syria are building a stateless democratic society.

Would this be possible in Somalia?



Federal states and confederacies

Federal states have generally been built from the bottom-up. First there were autonomous states, then they came together in a federation. The USA is the classic example. Others are India, Germany, Mexico and Brazil. Worldwide, only 25 countries are federal; usually they are big countries with large populations.

Federal systems as a top-down solution is a relatively novel idea, and was designed to facilitate power-sharing in post-conflict societies. In the Horn of Africa, Somalia, Ethiopia, South Sudan and Sudan have such a system. It doesn't work very well in any of these countries, usually over power-sharing agreements between the centre (the federal government) and member states.

A confederacy is an even more radical form of federal state, where the central government performs only minimal functions. Who has ever heard of the President of Switzerland?

Although Switzerland is clearly a successful model, why is it never posited as model?

'Getting to Denmark' or 'Getting to Switzerland?'

The concept of failed or fragile states

- not clearly defined. Different organizations use different definitions
- no proof of link between failed states and global threats such as terrorism, disease, WMDs
- politically insulting concept

The state may have failed if it's defined by American, but not by French or Muslims. The Somali society didn't fail, and self-governance traditions kept it going; only state institutions failed.


Many institutions created new branches to deal with failed states creating an industry.

The state model proposed for building a new state has no relation with local reality, is therefore politically difficult, and the web of international obligations is becoming ever more complex.

State-building has to take place on tight, donor-imposed deadlines.

The state is deemed to fail insofar it is incapable of delivering what the donor wants. **The failure is that of the donor's program, not of the state.**

Failed African states? The remarkable stability of African state borders



Crisis of the Western state model



SECTION FOUR

State-Building in Somalia

Why a federal state?

Somaliland seceded from Somalia in 1991 and it soon seemed to be a more viable state than the rest of Somalia. As it couldn't be recognized, the only solution was to design a federal structure which could incorporate it at a future date. I.M.Lewis suggested a building-block approach. After the creation of Puntland, and faced with continued fighting for central power in Mogadishu, the federal model became the international community's only viable plan.

The federal structure for Somalia, including the draft constitution, are UN projects.

The sharing of powers between the regional and central levels has not been clearly defined.

How can the entrenching (institutionalizing) of clan identity be avoided?

How can the current crisis between the federal and the member states be resolved?

Democracy and Elections

Somalia traditionally has an egalitarian, democratic society (among males).

Is parliament (expensive) an essential part of democracy?

Are elections (expensive) an essential part of democracy?

How can elections take place without a census?

On which basis should candidates be confirmed?

How can fraud be avoided?

Presidential elections = a winner takes all. Such elections are divisive.

Are quotas for women needed?

Search for a Somali-based democratic system to allow social control and sharing of power.

Presidential elections are not a necessity for a democratic system.

Imposed democracy is alienating, not empowering.

The institutions of state

- ▮ Offices of the President and the PM.
- ▮ 25 Ministries. The Ministry of Finance is the first to be supported, the Ministries of Justice, Labor and Social Affairs will be the last. Each ministry has many departments (MoI most).
- ▮ Parliament: 329 members plus staff.
- ▮ Judiciary: court system
- ▮ Education: schools and other places of learning
- ▮ Healthcare
- ▮ Government media and other agencies

Many of these state institutions are replicated at the level of federal member states

Other models of state in Somalia

1. Somaliland
2. Puntland
3. Other regional states
4. AS-governed areas

What can be learnt from each of these?